In Rhode Island, the concept of an “elective share” is governed by Rhode Island General Laws § 34-26-1 et seq. This statute provides a surviving spouse with a right to claim a portion of the deceased spouse’s estate, regardless of what the will might dictate. The elective share amount is calculated based on the length of the marriage. For marriages lasting less than five years, the elective share is 3% of the augmented estate. For marriages lasting five years or more but less than ten years, it increases to 6%. For marriages of ten years or more but less than fifteen years, the elective share is 9%. Finally, for marriages of fifteen years or more, the surviving spouse is entitled to 12% of the augmented estate. The augmented estate, for purposes of the elective share, includes the decedent’s probate estate, plus certain non-probate transfers made by the decedent during the marriage that were intended to defeat the spouse’s elective share rights, such as certain inter vivos transfers and joint tenancies with right of survivorship where the decedent was the sole contributor. In this scenario, the marriage lasted for exactly ten years. Therefore, the surviving spouse is entitled to 9% of the augmented estate. The augmented estate is calculated as the probate estate ($250,000) plus the value of the jointly held property with right of survivorship that was solely funded by the decedent ($100,000). Thus, the augmented estate is $250,000 + $100,000 = $350,000. The elective share is 9% of $350,000, which is \(0.09 \times \$350,000 = \$31,500\).

In Rhode Island, a will contest can be initiated by any “interested party.” This term is broadly construed to include individuals who have a direct financial stake in the estate, either under the contested will or under a prior valid will, or who would inherit if the decedent died intestate. The relevant statute, Rhode Island General Laws § 33-11-1, governs the probate of wills and the procedures for challenging them. A beneficiary named in a prior will, even if disinherited in the current will, is generally considered an interested party because their potential inheritance is directly affected by the validity of the new will. Similarly, heirs at law who would inherit under intestacy laws if the will is invalidated are also interested parties. The rationale is that these individuals have a legally recognizable interest in the proper distribution of the decedent’s estate. The probate court in Rhode Island has jurisdiction over will contests. The grounds for contesting a will typically include lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, or improper execution of the will. The burden of proof initially rests with the proponent of the will to show it was properly executed, but the contestant bears the burden of proving grounds for invalidity.

The scenario involves a deceased testator who named a specific individual as executor in their will. However, this named executor is subsequently found to be a convicted felon, having served time for embezzlement in Rhode Island. Rhode Island law, specifically Rhode Island General Laws § 33-17-1, outlines the qualifications for an executor. This statute generally requires an executor to be of sound mind and of legal age, but it also prohibits individuals convicted of certain crimes, particularly those involving dishonesty or breach of trust, from serving as executor. Embezzlement falls squarely within this prohibited category as it demonstrates a lack of the trustworthiness and integrity essential for managing an estate. Therefore, the named executor’s criminal conviction disqualifies them from serving. In such a situation, the probate court will typically appoint an administrator with the will annexed, often prioritizing a beneficiary or a suitable individual nominated by the beneficiaries, to manage the estate according to the terms of the will. The court’s primary concern is the proper and honest administration of the estate, and a convicted felon is presumed to be unable to fulfill this duty.

The Rhode Island Uniform Trust Code, specifically Rhode Island General Laws § 34-16-406, addresses the modification of a trust. A trustee may be permitted to modify a trust without court approval if the trust instrument itself grants this authority or if all beneficiaries consent to the modification. However, when a trust is irrevocable, and the settlor is deceased, the primary mechanism for modification without court intervention involves the consent of all beneficiaries, provided the modification does not contradict a material purpose of the trust. In this scenario, the trust instrument is silent on the trustee’s power to modify. The settlor, Mr. Abernathy, is deceased. Therefore, modification can only occur with the consent of all beneficiaries, assuming the proposed change to distribute income annually rather than biennially does not violate a material purpose of the trust. The beneficiaries are his three children, who are all adults and legally competent. Their unanimous agreement to the change, coupled with the trustee’s belief that it aligns with the settlor’s general intent for the children’s financial well-being, would allow for the modification without seeking court approval under Rhode Island law.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “holographic will” is not recognized as a valid testamentary instrument. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-1 requires that a will be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested to by at least two witnesses who subscribe their names to the will in the presence of the testator. A will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting but not witnessed does not meet these statutory requirements for due execution. Therefore, such a document would be considered invalid as a will in Rhode Island, and the decedent’s estate would likely be administered according to the laws of intestacy. Intestacy statutes dictate the distribution of an estate when there is no valid will, typically distributing assets to the closest surviving relatives in a prescribed order. The probate court would look to these statutes to determine how the assets of the estate of Mr. Abernathy should be distributed in the absence of a validly executed will.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child or descendant of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will, and who is not provided for in the will, nor is there any indication in the will that the omission was intentional. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-10 addresses the rights of such pretermitted heirs. This statute essentially provides a mechanism to ensure that a child born or adopted after a will is made receives a share of the estate, as if the testator had died intestate, unless specific exceptions apply. The primary exception is when the testator’s intent to disinherit the after-born child is clearly demonstrated. This intent can be shown through express provisions in the will itself, or through other evidence outside the will that unequivocally indicates the testator knew of the child and intended to exclude them from inheriting. Without such clear evidence of intent, the pretermitted heir is entitled to receive the same share of the estate that they would have received if the testator had died without a will. This protection is rooted in the public policy of preventing accidental disinheritance of one’s children. The calculation for the share is based on the intestate succession laws of Rhode Island, which would dictate how the estate would be divided among surviving heirs if no valid will existed. For example, if a testator dies leaving a spouse and one child, and that child is a pretermitted heir, the child would typically receive one-third of the estate, and the spouse would receive two-thirds, as per Rhode Island’s intestate succession rules for that scenario. The statute aims to prevent a testator from unintentionally overlooking a child due to circumstances arising after the will’s creation.

In Rhode Island, the concept of an “after-acquired title” clause in a will addresses the situation where a testator devises property that they do not own at the time of executing the will, but subsequently acquire before their death. Such a clause operates as a covenant, binding the testator to convey the after-acquired property to the intended beneficiary. This principle is rooted in the equitable doctrine that equity regards as done what ought to be done. When a testator includes such a clause and later acquires property fitting the description of the devise, the law presumes their intent was to pass that newly acquired property to the beneficiary as if it were owned at the time of devising. This avoids intestacy for that specific asset and fulfills the testator’s presumed intention. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-11-13 provides statutory recognition and effect to after-acquired title clauses in deeds, and this principle is generally applied by extension to testamentary dispositions in the absence of contrary statutory provisions specifically addressing wills, reflecting a common law approach that aligns with the equitable intent of the testator. Therefore, if Eleanor’s will contained a valid after-acquired title clause concerning her ancestral farm in Bristol County, and she subsequently repurchased the parcel of land adjacent to it that had previously been sold off, that adjacent parcel would pass to the beneficiary designated for the farm.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust created by a Rhode Island resident. The question focuses on the application of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), as adopted in Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-7-1 et seq.), to the trustee’s investment decisions. Specifically, it tests the understanding of the duty to diversify and the prudent investor standard. Under UPIA, a trustee has a duty to manage investments as a prudent investor would, which includes diversifying the portfolio unless there is a clear reason not to. Diversification is a key component of managing risk. The trust instrument grants the trustee broad discretion, but this discretion does not override the statutory duties imposed by UPIA. The trustee’s decision to invest a significant portion of the trust assets in a single, illiquid real estate development project, without apparent consideration for diversification or risk mitigation, likely breaches the duty of prudence. Rhode Island law, through its adoption of UPIA, emphasizes a total portfolio approach to investment management, meaning the trustee must consider the entire portfolio’s risk and return characteristics, not just individual investments in isolation. The fact that the real estate investment was a “passion project” of the decedent is irrelevant to the trustee’s fiduciary duty to manage the trust assets prudently for the beneficiaries. A prudent investor would assess the risk-return profile of such a concentrated investment against the backdrop of the entire trust portfolio and the trust’s objectives. The absence of diversification, coupled with the concentration in a single, speculative asset, suggests a failure to meet the standard of care required of a trustee in Rhode Island. Therefore, the trustee’s actions are likely to be considered a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically the duty to invest prudently and diversify.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pour-over” will is a testamentary instrument that directs that property owned by the testator at the time of their death, which is not otherwise effectively disposed of by their will, shall be distributed to a trust established by the testator or another person. This trust must be identified in the pour-over will and must be executed before or concurrently with the execution of the will. The pour-over will essentially acts as a safety net, catching any assets that were not properly transferred into the trust during the testator’s lifetime. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-27-1 specifically addresses the validity of such trusts and the pour-over provisions. The key is that the trust must be in existence and identifiable in the will. The assets passing under the pour-over provision are administered according to the terms of the trust, not the will itself, thereby avoiding the often more public and potentially more expensive probate process for those specific assets. This mechanism is often used in conjunction with revocable living trusts to ensure that all of a person’s assets are managed and distributed according to their wishes, with the pour-over will serving to consolidate any inadvertently omitted assets into the trust structure.

The Rhode Island Uniform Trust Code, specifically RIGL § 34-42-401, addresses the modification or termination of a trust. A trust may be modified or terminated by consent of all beneficiaries if the modification or termination is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. In this scenario, the trust instrument clearly states that the primary purpose is to provide for the care and education of the grantor’s grandchildren, with remaining assets to be distributed to a named charity. The grantor’s intention to benefit the grandchildren and then the charity constitutes a material purpose. The proposed modification, which would allow for immediate distribution of the entire corpus to the grandchildren, effectively bypasses the charitable beneficiary and the grantor’s phased distribution intent. While all beneficiaries might consent, this consent cannot override a material purpose of the trust. Therefore, the modification is not permissible under the statute because it contravenes the grantor’s material purpose of benefiting the charity after the grandchildren’s needs are met. The statute allows for modification or termination by consent only if it is not inconsistent with a material purpose. The distribution to the charity is a clearly stated material purpose.

In Rhode Island, the Uniform Probate Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration of estates. When a decedent dies intestate, meaning without a valid will, the distribution of their estate is determined by statutory rules of intestacy. These rules prioritize close relatives. If a decedent is survived by a spouse and no descendants, the entire estate passes to the spouse. If the decedent is survived by a spouse and descendants, and all descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse, the spouse receives the first \$50,000 of the intestate estate, plus one-half of the remaining balance. The descendants receive the remaining balance. If the decedent is survived by a spouse and descendants, but not all descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse (meaning there are children from a prior relationship), the spouse receives the first \$50,000 of the intestate estate plus one-half of the remaining balance, and the descendants of the decedent receive the other half. In this scenario, Elara is survived by her spouse, Marcus, and two children, both of whom are also children of Marcus. Therefore, Marcus, as the surviving spouse, is entitled to the first \$50,000 of Elara’s intestate estate and one-half of the remaining balance. The remaining half of the balance will be divided equally among their two children. The total value of the estate is \$250,000. Marcus receives \$50,000 + \(\frac{\$250,000 – \$50,000}{2}\) = \$50,000 + \(\frac{\$200,000}{2}\) = \$50,000 + \$100,000 = \$150,000. The remaining \$100,000 is divided equally between the two children, with each receiving \$50,000.

In Rhode Island, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, when a trustee resigns or is removed, the process for appointing a successor trustee is crucial. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-21-313 outlines the methods for appointing a successor trustee. The primary method is to follow the trust instrument’s provisions for successor trustee appointment. If the trust is silent on this matter, or if the named method fails, the statute provides a hierarchy of appointment. This hierarchy prioritizes appointment by persons holding a power to appoint a trustee, followed by the qualified beneficiaries. If neither of these methods is effective, the statute permits a trustee of a trust that forms part of a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other employee benefit plan to be appointed by the person designated in the trust instrument or by the employer. For other trusts, if no successor can be appointed by the preceding methods, the statute allows for judicial appointment by the Superior Court. The question concerns a situation where the trust instrument is silent on successor trustees and the named beneficiaries are all minors, rendering them unable to effectively exercise the power to appoint. Therefore, the most appropriate method for appointing a successor trustee would be through a judicial proceeding in the Rhode Island Superior Court, as the beneficiaries, due to their minority, cannot exercise this power.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pour-over will” is crucial for integrating a will with a pre-existing trust. A pour-over will directs that the assets of the testator’s estate, after payment of debts, expenses, and specific bequests, should be transferred to a trust that was established either before or concurrently with the execution of the will. This mechanism ensures that the assets are administered according to the terms of the trust, which can offer advantages in terms of privacy and potentially probate avoidance for those assets. Rhode Island General Laws Section 33-6-32 specifically addresses the validity and effect of pour-over provisions, allowing for the transfer of estate assets to a trust, even if the trust is amendable or revocable, and even if the testator is the sole trustee or beneficiary. The key is that the trust must be identified in the will and its terms must be ascertainable at the time of the testator’s death. The explanation of this scenario focuses on the legal framework in Rhode Island that validates this estate planning technique.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pour-over will” is a common estate planning tool. A pour-over will is designed to work in conjunction with a living trust. Assets titled in the name of the testator at death, but not yet transferred to the trust, are directed by the pour-over will to be transferred into the trust. This allows for the administration of those assets according to the terms of the trust, rather than through a separate probate process for each asset. The validity of a pour-over will in Rhode Island is generally governed by the Uniform Probate Code, as adopted and modified by Rhode Island statutes. Specifically, Rhode Island General Laws § 34-27-1 addresses the pour-over of assets into a trust. This statute clarifies that a will may direct the disposition of property to a trust established by the testator, or by another person, or by the testator and another person, if the trust is identified in the will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before or concurrently with the execution of the will. The statute further specifies that the property so disposed of shall be administered or held in accordance with the terms of the instrument establishing the trust. This means that the will essentially “pours over” the remaining estate assets into the existing trust structure for management and distribution. The key is that the trust must be in existence and properly established prior to or at the time the will is executed.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust created under a Rhode Island will. The testator, Ms. Eleanor Vance, established a trust for her nephew, Mr. Silas Croft, with the corpus to be distributed to his children upon his death. Ms. Vance’s will specifies that the trustee has discretion to distribute income and principal for Mr. Croft’s “health, education, maintenance, and support.” Upon Mr. Croft’s passing, the remaining trust assets are to be divided equally among his three children. The question concerns the proper interpretation of the trustee’s powers and the nature of the beneficiaries’ interests. Specifically, it asks about the legal classification of the children’s interest in the trust corpus. Rhode Island law, consistent with general trust principles, recognizes that where a trustee has discretion over the distribution of principal to a beneficiary during their lifetime, and the corpus is to be distributed to a class of beneficiaries upon the death of the life beneficiary, the remainder beneficiaries have a contingent interest. This interest is contingent because the exact amount, or even the entitlement to receive any principal, is subject to the trustee’s exercise of discretion during the life beneficiary’s tenure. The children’s interest is not a vested remainder because it is subject to a condition precedent: the death of Mr. Croft and the trustee’s distribution decisions. It is also not a present possessory interest, as they are not entitled to possession until Mr. Croft’s death. Therefore, their interest is best characterized as a contingent remainder. The trustee’s discretionary power to invade the principal for Mr. Croft’s benefit directly impacts the size of the remainder, making the children’s ultimate entitlement uncertain until the termination of the trust. This uncertainty is the hallmark of a contingent remainder.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will, and who is not provided for in the will. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-10 governs the rights of such heirs. This statute presumes that the testator intended to provide for after-born or after-adopted children. If a testator has a child born or adopted after the will’s execution and fails to make any provision for that child in the will, and the child is not mentioned or provided for in a manner that clearly indicates an intention to disinherit, the child will be entitled to a share of the testator’s estate. This share is typically equivalent to what the child would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance of children who were not in existence or were not a consideration at the time the will was drafted. The key is whether the will demonstrates an intent to exclude the after-born or after-adopted child. A general clause leaving the residue of the estate to existing children or a class of beneficiaries that does not explicitly include after-born children may not be sufficient to disinherit. The testator must either provide for the child or expressly state an intention to disinherit them. The determination of whether a provision or statement constitutes sufficient evidence of intent to disinherit is a matter of testamentary interpretation.

The core issue in this scenario is the validity of the holographic codicil under Rhode Island law, specifically concerning the requirements for testamentary intent and proper execution. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-10 addresses the validity of wills, including holographic wills, though it is less explicit than some states. However, the general principles of testamentary intent and capacity apply. For a holographic will to be valid, it must be entirely in the handwriting of the testator and signed by them, demonstrating a clear intent to dispose of property upon death. The document in question, while handwritten by Eleanor, was found among her personal effects in a safe deposit box, which is a common place for storing important documents. The critical element missing is clear testamentary intent. The phrase “for safekeeping, in case anything happens to me” is ambiguous. It could indicate a desire for the document to serve as a will, or it could simply be a precautionary measure for the safekeeping of a list of items. Without a clear statement of intent to distribute her property upon her death, such as “this is my last will and testament” or specific bequests with designated beneficiaries, the document is unlikely to be admitted to probate as a will in Rhode Island. The law requires that the instrument, on its face, demonstrates the testator’s intent to make a disposition of property that will take effect upon her death. The codicil’s wording leans towards a statement of intent for safekeeping rather than a definitive testamentary act. Therefore, the codicil would likely be deemed invalid due to insufficient testamentary intent.

In Rhode Island, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), codified at Rhode Island General Laws § 6-16-1 et seq., governs when a transfer of property can be challenged as fraudulent. A transfer is considered fraudulent if it is made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor. Alternatively, a transfer can be deemed fraudulent without regard to actual intent if the debtor received “less than reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer, and the debtor was engaged or about to engage in a business or transaction for which the debtor’s remaining assets were unreasonably small, or the debtor intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due. In the scenario presented, Mr. Abernathy transferred his beachfront property in Newport to his nephew, Bartholomew, for a consideration of $100. At the time of the transfer, Mr. Abernathy was facing significant and mounting medical bills, and he was aware that his primary asset, the Newport property, was the only significant asset available to satisfy these debts. The $100 consideration is demonstrably less than the reasonably equivalent value of a Newport beachfront property. Furthermore, Mr. Abernathy was clearly engaging in a transaction (continued medical treatment and associated costs) for which his remaining assets (which would be none after the transfer) were unreasonably small, and he reasonably should have believed he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay. Therefore, the transfer to Bartholomew is voidable by Mr. Abernathy’s creditors under the UVTA because it meets the criteria for a constructively fraudulent transfer, specifically failing to receive reasonably equivalent value while being rendered insolvent or near-insolvent.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” addresses situations where a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of their will. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-10 outlines the rights of such heirs. Specifically, if a testator has a child born or adopted after the execution of their will, and that child is not mentioned or provided for in the will, the child is entitled to the same share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional. This means the child receives an intestate share of the estate, which is determined by the Rhode Island intestacy statutes. The explanation of this principle does not involve a calculation, as it is a legal principle determining distribution. The core idea is to prevent accidental disinheritance of after-born or adopted children. The statute provides a default protection for these individuals, ensuring they receive a portion of the estate unless the will clearly indicates a deliberate exclusion. This protection is a safeguard against oversight or changes in family circumstances that might not be reflected in an older will.

The core issue in this scenario is the interpretation of a residuary clause in a will that purports to dispose of property acquired after the will’s execution but before the testator’s death. In Rhode Island, as in many other states, a general residuary clause in a will is generally construed to pass to the residuary beneficiaries any property the testator owns at the time of their death, including property acquired after the will’s execution, unless the will specifically indicates a contrary intention. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-10 addresses the effect of a will on after-acquired property. This statute states that a will shall be construed to pass all property which the testator owned at the time of death, including property acquired after the execution of the will. In this case, the residuary clause in Elias’s will states he devises “all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever kind and wherever situated, which I may own at the time of my death.” This language clearly demonstrates an intent to include after-acquired property. The condominium in Newport, purchased by Elias in 2022, falls within the scope of this clause. Therefore, the condominium passes to the residuary beneficiaries, Clara and David, in equal shares. The specific bequests to his niece and nephew are satisfied by other assets in his estate. The question does not involve any calculations.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust created under a will probated in Rhode Island. The question pertains to the distribution of income generated by the trust during the administration period, prior to the final distribution to the beneficiaries. Rhode Island law, consistent with general trust principles, generally mandates that income earned by a trust from the date of the testator’s death, or from the date the trust is established if it’s an inter vivos trust, should be allocated to the income beneficiaries. This income is typically generated from assets that are productive, such as stocks paying dividends or bonds paying interest. The Uniform Principal and Income Act, as adopted and potentially modified in Rhode Island (Rhode Island General Laws § 34-27-1 et seq.), governs the allocation of receipts and expenses between principal and income. Under these principles, income collected by the trustee after the decedent’s death but before the trust is fully funded or terminated is generally considered income of the trust, distributable to the income beneficiary. Expenses related to the administration of the trust, such as trustee fees or property taxes on income-producing assets, are typically charged against income. Therefore, the interest earned on the savings account, which is an income-producing asset, accrues to the trust’s income and is distributable to the income beneficiary, Elara, after accounting for any administrative expenses charged to income.

In Rhode Island, the doctrine of equitable conversion dictates that when a contract for the sale of real property is executed, the equitable interest in the property shifts from the seller to the buyer. The seller retains legal title as security for the purchase price, while the buyer acquires equitable title, meaning they have the right to compel the transfer of legal title upon fulfillment of the contract terms. This conversion has significant implications for inheritance. If the buyer dies before the closing, their interest in the property is treated as real property for purposes of inheritance, passing to their heirs. Conversely, if the seller dies before closing, their interest in the proceeds of the sale is treated as personal property, passing to their personal representative or beneficiaries entitled to personalty. This principle is crucial in determining how property is distributed when a party to a real estate contract dies prior to the completion of the transaction. In this scenario, Mr. Abernathy, the buyer, died after signing the purchase agreement but before the closing. Under Rhode Island’s equitable conversion doctrine, his equitable interest in the property was considered real property at the time of his death. Therefore, his interest in the land passes to his heirs, not to his estate to be distributed as personal property. The executor of his estate would have the right to complete the purchase on behalf of the heirs, securing legal title for them.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “residuary estate” is crucial for distributing assets that remain after specific bequests, debts, taxes, and administrative expenses have been paid. When a will directs that “all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate” be divided equally among named beneficiaries, and one of those beneficiaries predeceases the testator without leaving lineal descendants who are eligible to take under the will, Rhode Island law generally applies the anti-lapse statute. The anti-lapse statute, found in Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-6, prevents a gift to a predeceased beneficiary from failing if that beneficiary is a relative of the testator and leaves lineal descendants who survive the testator. In such a case, the share that the predeceased beneficiary would have received passes to their lineal descendants per stirpes. If the predeceased beneficiary is not a relative or has no surviving lineal descendants, the gift lapses. A lapsed residuary gift, under common law principles and as generally interpreted in Rhode Island absent a specific contrary provision in the will, does not fall into the residue of the residue but is instead distributed as intestate property. However, the specific language of the will is paramount. If the will contains a “pour-over” provision directing the residue to a trust, or if there’s a residuary clause that explicitly addresses lapsed gifts, those provisions would control. In this scenario, since the will directs the residue to named individuals and one predeceases without lineal descendants, and no alternative disposition is specified for a lapsed share, the lapsed share of the residuary estate would pass according to the laws of intestacy. This means it would be distributed among the testator’s heirs-at-law.

In Rhode Island, the concept of a “qualified disposition” under the Uniform Trust Code (RIGL § 18-7-101 et seq.) is central to understanding how a settlor can protect trust assets from creditors. A qualified disposition is a transfer of property to a trustee, where the transferor is a beneficiary of the trust, and the trustee has the power to distribute income or principal to or for the benefit of the transferor, or the trustee is required to distribute income or principal to or for the benefit of the transferor. Crucially, for a disposition to be qualified, it must meet specific criteria, including that the transfer was made without actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Rhode Island law, like many states that have adopted versions of the Uniform Trust Code, generally upholds domestic asset protection trusts (DAPTs) against claims by the settlor’s creditors, provided the trust meets the statutory requirements for a qualified disposition. This includes ensuring the trust is irrevocable and that the transferor does not retain excessive control or benefit that would render the transfer a fraudulent conveyance under common law or statutory provisions, such as those found in Rhode Island General Laws Chapter 6-16 concerning fraudulent conveyances. The key is that the transfer must be a genuine transfer of property to a separate legal entity (the trust) managed by a trustee who is not solely the transferor, and the transferor’s beneficial interest must be structured in a way that is permissible under the law, without constituting a fraudulent transfer at the time of the transfer.

The scenario involves the concept of ademption by extinction in Rhode Island. Ademption by extinction occurs when a specifically devised asset is no longer owned by the testator at the time of their death. In Rhode Island, like many other states, the common law rule of ademption by extinction generally applies, meaning if the specific gift is gone, the gift fails. However, Rhode Island law, specifically under Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-1, provides an exception for certain circumstances involving condemnation awards. If the testator is entitled to a condemnation award for property that was specifically devised, and the award is paid to the testator or their conservator or agent, the beneficiary receives the award. If the award is unpaid at the testator’s death, the beneficiary receives the unpaid award. In this case, the specific devise was the parcel of land located at 123 Ocean Avenue, Narragansett, Rhode Island. This property was sold by the testator to a third party before their death. Therefore, the specific devise of the land itself has adeemed by extinction because the testator no longer owned it. The subsequent sale and the resulting cash are not considered a substitute for the original real property under the typical application of ademption by extinction, nor do they fall under the specific exceptions for condemnation awards or insurance proceeds for damage to the property that were paid to the testator or their conservator, as stated in R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-4-1. The cash proceeds from the sale of the land are now part of the testator’s general estate and will pass according to the residuary clause of the will or the laws of intestacy if there is no residuary clause or if it is ineffective.

The scenario involves a life estate with a remainder interest. The life tenant, Ms. Eleanor Vance, possesses the right to use and enjoy the property during her lifetime. The remainder interest is held by her nephew, Mr. Thomas Vance, who will receive the property upon Ms. Vance’s death. Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-1 defines a life estate as an estate in land or other property, which is limited to the life of the tenant, or to the life of another person. The crucial aspect here is the nature of the remainder interest and the rights of the life tenant concerning the disposition of the property. A life tenant generally cannot commit waste, which is defined as the unreasonable destruction or alteration of property by a life tenant, to the prejudice of the remainder-man. This includes selling the property outright without the consent of the remainder-man or a court order, as such an action would frustrate the remainder interest. Therefore, Ms. Vance cannot unilaterally sell the property and keep the proceeds because this would extinguish Mr. Vance’s vested remainder interest, which is a violation of her duties as a life tenant. The disposition of the property must respect the future interest.

The core issue here is the effect of a divorce on a pre-existing will under Rhode Island law. Rhode Island General Laws § 33-5-33 addresses the revocation of provisions in a will upon divorce. This statute states that if a person is divorced from their spouse after making a will, all provisions in the will that affect the divorced spouse are revoked. This includes any provisions that grant the divorced spouse an interest in the estate, appoint them as executor, or confer any power upon them. The statute further clarifies that the remainder of the will remains in effect as if the divorced spouse had predeceased the testator. In this scenario, Beatrice divorced Arthur after executing her will, which named Arthur as the sole beneficiary and executor. Therefore, according to Rhode Island law, the provisions naming Arthur as beneficiary and executor are automatically revoked. Beatrice’s estate will then be distributed as if Arthur had predeceased her, meaning the property will pass according to the residuary clause of her will, or if there is no residuary clause, it will pass via intestacy laws to her heirs at law. Since the question asks what happens to the provisions specifically naming Arthur, they are revoked.

The scenario involves the interpretation of a residuary clause in a Rhode Island will that attempts to disinherit a specific heir, a grandchild named Elara, while also creating a residual beneficiary. Rhode Island law, like many other jurisdictions, has specific rules regarding disinheritance, particularly concerning lineal descendants. The key statute to consider here is Rhode Island General Laws § 33-6-8, which addresses the effect of a will upon a child or grandchild for whom no provision is made. This statute generally presumes that the omission was unintentional and that the omitted descendant would have inherited had there been no will. However, the statute allows for intentional disinheritance if the will clearly expresses such an intent or if it is shown that the testator provided for the omitted descendant outside of the will. In this case, the testator explicitly states that Elara is to receive nothing and that the residue of the estate should pass to her brother, Silas. The language used is unambiguous and directly addresses the disinheritance of Elara and the disposition of the entire residuary estate to Silas. Therefore, the will effectively disinherits Elara from the residuary estate. The question of whether Elara could still claim a pretermitted heir share under § 33-6-8 hinges on the clarity of the disinheritance. Since the will specifically names Elara and states she is to receive nothing, and then designates the entire residue to Silas, it demonstrates a clear intent to disinherit her from the residuary estate. The statute’s protection for omitted heirs is generally overcome by clear and unequivocal language of disinheritance within the will. The residue of the estate, after all specific bequests and debts are paid, is what remains to be distributed according to the residuary clause. As Silas is named as the sole beneficiary of the residue, Elara receives nothing from this portion of the estate.

In Rhode Island, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified by state law, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, the concept of a “trust protector” is not explicitly defined or widely recognized in Rhode Island’s statutory framework for trusts, unlike in some other jurisdictions that have adopted specific provisions for such roles. A trust protector is typically an individual or entity appointed to oversee a trust, often with powers to modify or terminate the trust, appoint or remove trustees, or amend trust provisions to address unforeseen circumstances or tax law changes. However, in Rhode Island, the powers and duties of a trustee are primarily outlined in the trust instrument itself and governed by general trust law principles. If a trust instrument attempts to grant powers to a “trust protector” that are not clearly delineated or are inconsistent with the trustee’s duties or the trust’s purpose, courts may scrutinize these provisions. Absent specific statutory authorization or clear delegation of fiduciary duties that align with established trustee responsibilities, such a role might be viewed with skepticism or interpreted as an attempt to circumvent established trust law. Therefore, the absence of specific Rhode Island statutory recognition for a trust protector means that any such role would need to be carefully construed within the existing legal framework, often relying on the trust instrument’s language to define its powers and limitations, and potentially facing challenges if those powers are too broad or undefined, or if they conflict with the trustee’s core fiduciary duties.

In Rhode Island, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified by state law, governs the interpretation and administration of trusts. Specifically, regarding the termination of irrevocable trusts, Rhode Island General Laws § 34-4-19 provides for the termination of a trust if all beneficiaries consent and the court finds that continuation of the trust is not necessary to substantially fulfill a material purpose. The statute also allows for termination if the value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of administration. This scenario involves a trust established by Eleanor for the benefit of her nephew, Liam, with a remainder interest to Liam’s children. The trust’s stated material purpose is to provide for Liam’s financial security and to protect the principal from his creditors. Liam is currently 45 years old and has two adult children, Maya and Noah, who are the contingent beneficiaries. All parties, Eleanor (as settlor, though her consent is generally not required for termination of an irrevocable trust unless reserved), Liam, Maya, and Noah, are in agreement to terminate the trust. The trust corpus is valued at \$750,000. The key consideration is whether the material purpose of protecting the principal from creditors and providing financial security has been substantially fulfilled or is no longer relevant, allowing for termination under the Uniform Trust Code’s principles as applied in Rhode Island. Given Liam’s age and established financial stability, a court would likely consider whether the protective purpose is still material. If the court determines that the material purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer achievable, and all beneficiaries consent, termination is permissible. The value of the trust is sufficient to warrant administration, so that basis for termination is not applicable here. The question hinges on the court’s interpretation of “substantially fulfill a material purpose.” In Rhode Island, courts look at the settlor’s intent. If the intent was to protect the beneficiary from their own improvidence, and the beneficiary has demonstrated prudence over a long period, this purpose may be deemed fulfilled. The consent of all beneficiaries, including the contingent remainder beneficiaries, is a critical factor.