In North Dakota, the tort of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff, that the statement was published to a third party, and that the statement caused damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. For statements concerning matters of public concern or public figures, the plaintiff must also prove actual malice, which means the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. North Dakota law, specifically referencing the principles laid out in cases interpreting the First Amendment’s protection of speech, emphasizes the distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion. Opinions, even if unflattering or critical, are generally protected and do not constitute defamation. The context in which a statement is made is crucial in determining whether it would be understood as asserting a fact or expressing an opinion. For instance, hyperbole or figurative language used in a heated political debate might be interpreted as opinion, whereas a direct assertion of wrongdoing in a factual report would likely be considered a statement of fact. The legal standard for determining whether a statement is one of fact or opinion involves an objective analysis of the language used, the surrounding circumstances, and the overall context of the communication. The burden of proof for establishing that a statement is defamatory rests with the plaintiff.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff, published it to a third party, and that the publication caused damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. For statements made about public figures or matters of public concern, the plaintiff must also demonstrate actual malice, meaning the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, as established in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. For private figures, the standard for liability regarding false statements of fact is generally negligence, meaning the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in determining the truth of the statement. However, if a private figure plaintiff seeks punitive damages, they must prove actual malice. The North Dakota Century Code, specifically Chapter 32-12, addresses libel and slander. The concept of “of and concerning” the plaintiff is crucial; the statement must be reasonably understood by recipients to refer to the plaintiff. The publication element requires communication to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Damages can be general (presumed in some cases of defamation per se) or special (actual pecuniary loss). Truth is an absolute defense. Fair comment and criticism, as well as privileged communications (absolute and qualified), are also important defenses. The analysis focuses on whether the statement was a statement of fact or opinion, its defamatory nature, publication, and the applicable fault standard and damages.

In North Dakota, the tort of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages. North Dakota law, like much of U.S. defamation law, distinguishes between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Defamation per se refers to statements that are so inherently damaging that damages are presumed. These typically include statements imputing criminal conduct, a loathsome disease, unchastity, or conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, or profession. If a statement is not defamatory per se, the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages, which are specific, quantifiable financial losses. The critical element for this scenario is whether the statement about the veterinarian’s alleged negligence in treating a prize-winning show dog constitutes defamation per se. While veterinary malpractice could certainly harm a professional’s reputation, it does not automatically fall into the categories traditionally recognized as defamation per se under North Dakota common law or statute. The statement, though damaging, would likely require proof of special damages to establish a claim for defamation, unless it also directly imputed an inability to perform the duties of the profession in a manner that is inherently damaging and universally understood as such without further explanation. Given the nature of the alleged statement, it is more likely to be classified as defamation per quod, necessitating proof of specific economic losses resulting from the statement. Therefore, without evidence of such special damages, the claim would fail.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff, that the statement was published to a third party, that the statement was defamatory, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. For statements made about public figures or matters of public concern, the plaintiff must also prove actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This standard is derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. However, North Dakota law, like many states, distinguishes between private figures and public figures. For private figures, the standard of fault is typically negligence, meaning the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the statement. The explanation of damages can vary. General damages are presumed for defamation per se, which includes statements imputing a crime, a loathsome disease, or affecting one’s business, trade, or profession. Special damages, which are economic losses, must be proven for other types of defamation. In this scenario, the statement was made by a private citizen about another private citizen concerning a matter of private concern. Therefore, the plaintiff, Ms. Albright, would need to prove negligence on the part of Mr. Peterson regarding the truthfulness of his statement. Actual malice is not the applicable standard here. The statement about Ms. Albright’s alleged embezzlement, if false and published, would be considered defamatory per se as it imputes a crime, allowing for presumed general damages without specific proof of financial loss, though special damages could also be sought if proven.

In North Dakota, the tort of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages, unless the statement is actionable per se. North Dakota Century Code § 14-02-02 outlines statements that are considered defamatory per se, which do not require proof of special damages. These include statements imputing a crime, a loathsome disease, or that the person is unfit to practice their profession or conduct business. In the given scenario, a statement that a licensed real estate broker in North Dakota “is secretly manipulating property values to defraud clients” directly imputes criminal conduct and unfitness in their profession. Such a statement, if false and published to a third party with at least negligence, would be considered defamatory per se. Therefore, the plaintiff would not need to prove specific financial losses to establish a claim for defamation. The focus is on the nature of the statement itself and its tendency to harm the reputation of the individual in their professional capacity, as codified in North Dakota law.

North Dakota law, like many jurisdictions, recognizes the tort of defamation, which involves a false statement of fact that harms another’s reputation. The elements generally include a defamatory statement, its publication to a third party, fault on the part of the defendant, and damages. For private individuals, the standard of fault is typically negligence. However, when the defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern, or when the plaintiff is a public figure, the standard of fault increases to actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This higher standard is a constitutional requirement derived from cases like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In North Dakota, a plaintiff must prove that the statement was false and that it was communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. The statement must also be defamatory per se or per quod. Defamation per se refers to statements so inherently damaging that damages are presumed, such as accusations of criminal conduct, loathsome disease, or unchastity. Defamation per quod requires pleading and proving special damages, which are specific monetary losses resulting from the statement. The context in which a statement is made is crucial in determining its defamatory nature and the applicable standard of proof. North Dakota Century Code Section 32-12-02 provides a qualified privilege for certain communications, but this privilege can be overcome by a showing of malice. The statute of limitations for defamation in North Dakota is two years from the date of publication. The analysis here centers on whether the statement about Mr. Abernathy, a private citizen, regarding his business practices, constitutes defamation per se or per quod, and what level of fault must be proven. Since the statement directly implies dishonesty and potentially fraudulent activity in his business dealings, it could be considered defamatory per se. However, the statement was made in a private conversation among business associates, not a broad public dissemination. The question hinges on whether the statement, even in a private context, meets the threshold for defamation and what fault standard applies to a private individual concerning a matter that might touch upon public interest but isn’t exclusively a public concern. The crucial element is the falsity of the statement and the defendant’s fault. Without proof of falsity and the requisite fault, a defamation claim will fail. The provided scenario does not establish the falsity of the statement nor the level of fault. Therefore, the most accurate assessment is that the claim is insufficient without further evidence.

In North Dakota, a private figure who is the subject of a defamatory statement concerning a matter of public concern must prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages. Actual malice, as defined in cases like *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, means the defendant published the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Reckless disregard requires more than just negligence; it involves a subjective awareness of probable falsity. For private figures on matters of private concern, negligence is the standard for actual damages. However, when a private figure is involved in a matter of public concern, the heightened standard of actual malice applies to protect robust public debate, even if it occasionally leads to false statements. The question posits a situation where a private individual, a local artisan whose work is featured in a statewide art exhibition (making it a matter of public concern), is falsely accused of plagiarism by a competing gallery owner in a widely circulated online publication. The artisan, as a private figure, must demonstrate that the gallery owner knew the accusation was false or acted with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. Merely showing the statement was false and caused harm is insufficient for presumed or punitive damages under North Dakota law when the subject matter is of public concern. Therefore, the artisan must prove actual malice.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must typically prove that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement of fact about the plaintiff, published it to a third party, and that the publication caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. The standard for proving falsity can be influenced by the plaintiff’s status. For private figures, the plaintiff generally bears the burden of proving the falsity of the statement. However, for public officials or public figures, the plaintiff must demonstrate “actual malice” under the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. North Dakota law, like federal constitutional law, requires this higher standard for public figures. Therefore, if a statement about a prominent North Dakota rancher, who is considered a public figure due to his extensive involvement in agricultural policy and public advocacy, is made without actual malice, even if it is false and damaging, it would not constitute defamation under North Dakota law. The key element distinguishing this from defamation of a private individual is the plaintiff’s status and the corresponding burden of proving actual malice. The explanation does not involve calculations as defamation law primarily deals with legal principles and factual determinations, not mathematical formulas.

In North Dakota, for a private individual to prove defamation, they must establish four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages. North Dakota law, as interpreted by its courts, does not require proof of malice for private figures in ordinary defamation cases, unlike public figures who must prove actual malice. The publication must be understood by a reasonable person to be defamatory. The concept of “publication” means communicating the statement to a third person, whether in writing or spoken word. Damages can be presumed in cases of defamation per se, which includes statements that impute a crime, a loathsome disease, or affect one’s business, trade, or profession. In cases not falling under defamation per se, special damages, meaning actual monetary loss, must be proven. The statute of limitations for defamation in North Dakota is two years from the date of publication.

The core of this question lies in understanding the concept of “actual malice” as defined in defamation law, particularly as applied to public figures in the United States, including North Dakota. The landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established that a public figure must prove that a defamatory statement was made with “actual malice,” meaning the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. In this scenario, the anonymous online commenter, “Prairie Critic,” posted a statement about agricultural consultant Elara Vance, a well-known figure in North Dakota’s farming community. Elara is suing for defamation. To succeed, Elara must demonstrate that Prairie Critic made a false and defamatory statement of fact about her. However, the critical element for a public figure is proving actual malice. If Elara can show that Prairie Critic fabricated the information about her business practices, or published the statement despite having serious doubts about its truth, she could meet the actual malice standard. Simply showing the statement was false and damaging is insufficient for a public figure. The standard requires a subjective awareness of falsity or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. The commenter’s subsequent deletion of the post and refusal to identify themselves, while indicative of potential guilt, do not automatically prove actual malice. The focus remains on the commenter’s state of mind at the time of publication.

North Dakota law, like many other states, recognizes the tort of defamation, which involves the communication of a false statement about another person that harms their reputation. To establish defamation, a plaintiff must generally prove four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages. In North Dakota, the definition of defamation is found in N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-01, which distinguishes between libel (written defamation) and slander (spoken defamation). A statement is defamatory if it “exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or if it injures him in his business or profession.” N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-02. The critical element here is the “publication” to a third party. This means the defamatory statement must be communicated to someone other than the person being defamed. The publication can be intentional or negligent. For private figures, the standard of fault is typically negligence, meaning the publisher failed to exercise reasonable care in verifying the truth of the statement. For public figures or matters of public concern, the standard of fault rises to actual malice, requiring proof that the publisher knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. The explanation of the concept of publication in North Dakota defamation law is that it requires communication of the defamatory statement to at least one person other than the defamed party. This communication can be through any medium, including spoken words, written words, or even gestures, as long as it is understood by the recipient. The intent to publish is not always necessary; negligence in allowing publication can also suffice.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff that was published to a third party, and that caused the plaintiff harm. For statements concerning matters of public concern, or when the plaintiff is a public figure or official, the plaintiff must also prove actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. North Dakota law, specifically referencing principles similar to those in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, requires this higher burden to protect robust public discourse. In cases involving private individuals and matters of private concern, negligence may be sufficient to establish liability, but the actual malice standard is a critical component for public concern matters. The scenario describes a statement about a candidate for public office concerning their alleged financial improprieties. Such a statement clearly relates to a matter of public concern and involves a candidate for public office, who is considered a public figure for the purposes of defamation law. Therefore, the plaintiff would need to demonstrate actual malice. The question tests the understanding of when the higher standard of actual malice is required in North Dakota defamation law, which is a fundamental aspect of the tort, particularly when public figures or matters of public concern are involved.

The core issue in this scenario is the application of North Dakota’s statutory definition of defamation, specifically focusing on the elements required for a claim and the distinction between libel and slander. North Dakota Century Code (NDCC) § 12.1-15-01 defines defamation as a false statement about another that harms their reputation and is communicated to a third person. The statute further distinguishes between libel, which is a false and defamatory statement in a permanent form (like writing or print), and slander, which is a defamatory statement made by word of mouth. For a defamation claim to succeed in North Dakota, the plaintiff must generally prove: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either damages or the statement must be actionable per se. In this case, the statement by Ms. Gable about Mr. Peterson’s alleged theft is in a written format (email), making it libelous if it meets the other elements. The statement is clearly about Mr. Peterson and is alleged to be false and damaging to his reputation as a respected community member. The email was sent to multiple recipients, satisfying the publication element. The critical element to consider for a successful claim, particularly in a scenario where the plaintiff is not a public figure and the statement is not on a matter of public concern, is whether the statement constitutes defamation per se. North Dakota law, like many jurisdictions, recognizes certain categories of statements that are considered so inherently damaging that damages are presumed. These typically include statements imputing a crime, a loathsome disease, a business or professional misconduct, or unchastity. The allegation of theft is an imputation of a crime, which falls squarely within the category of defamation per se. Therefore, Mr. Peterson would not need to prove specific monetary damages to establish a claim for libel, as the statement itself is actionable per se. The statement’s falsity is central, and if proven false, the harm to reputation is presumed.

In North Dakota, a public figure alleging defamation must prove actual malice, which means the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This standard, established in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, applies to individuals who have achieved pervasive fame or notoriety or have voluntarily injected themselves or been drawn into a particular public controversy. For a private figure, the standard is generally negligence, meaning the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in verifying the truth of the statement. However, if a private figure seeks presumed or punitive damages, they must prove actual malice. The case of *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.* is foundational in differentiating between public and private figures and their respective burdens of proof. North Dakota law, as interpreted through case law, follows these federal standards. Therefore, for a private individual to recover punitive damages in a defamation action in North Dakota, they must demonstrate that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice. The calculation here is conceptual: Private Figure + Punitive Damages = Actual Malice.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff, that the statement was published to a third party, that the statement was defamatory (tending to harm the plaintiff’s reputation), and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. However, for statements concerning matters of public concern, or when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the plaintiff must also prove actual malice. Actual malice, as defined by the Supreme Court in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* and applied in North Dakota, means that the defendant made the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Reckless disregard involves a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or serious doubt as to the truth of the statement. The burden of proving actual malice rests with the plaintiff. If the statement is opinion, it is generally not actionable as defamation unless it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. North Dakota law, like federal law, recognizes that pure opinion is protected speech. The key distinction is whether the statement asserts a provable fact or is merely an expression of subjective belief or judgment.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff in a defamation case, particularly when the statement involves a matter of public concern and the plaintiff is a public figure or limited-purpose public figure, must prove actual malice. Actual malice does not mean ill will or spite. Instead, it refers to knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This standard, established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, is a high bar for plaintiffs to meet. To demonstrate reckless disregard, a plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. This could involve showing that the defendant fabricated evidence, relied on inherently unbelievable sources, or failed to conduct a reasonable investigation when there were obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the information. The North Dakota Supreme Court has consistently applied this federal constitutional standard in defamation cases involving public concern. Therefore, for a plaintiff to prevail against a defendant who published a statement about a local zoning dispute, which is a matter of public concern, and the plaintiff is a prominent local business owner actively involved in the debate, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the publisher knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Without such proof, the claim will likely fail.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact that was published to a third party and that caused the plaintiff reputational harm. The standard of proof for defamation of a private figure is negligence, meaning the plaintiff must show the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in determining the truth of the statement. For public figures or matters of public concern, the standard is actual malice, requiring proof that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. North Dakota law, like many states, recognizes certain privileges that can shield a defendant from liability, such as absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings or qualified privilege for statements made in good faith on a matter of common interest. The statute of limitations for defamation in North Dakota is two years from the date of publication. In this scenario, the statement about the veterinarian’s competence, if false and published, would likely be considered defamatory. The key is whether the veterinarian can prove the statement was false and that the speaker acted with at least negligence. Since the speaker is a former client and the statement concerns professional competence, it is unlikely to be considered a matter of public concern requiring an actual malice standard. The veterinarian, as a professional, is not automatically a public figure. Therefore, the plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the statement was false and that the speaker was negligent in making it. The lack of proof of falsity or negligence would defeat the claim.

In North Dakota, a private individual suing for defamation must prove actual malice if the defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern. Actual malice, as defined by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and applied in North Dakota, means the defendant published the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Reckless disregard requires more than just negligence; it means the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. For a private figure on a matter of public concern, the standard is a heightened one beyond mere negligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate this higher level of fault. Therefore, if the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant knew the statement about the agricultural cooperative’s financial stability was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, the claim will likely fail under North Dakota law, even if the statement caused reputational harm. The focus is on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of publication.

In North Dakota, the tort of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages. North Dakota Century Code § 14-02-02 outlines the definition of libel, which is defamation in a fixed or tangible form. The statute specifies that a false or defamatory statement is libelous if it exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or shame, or if it injures a person in their occupation. The concept of “publication” in defamation law means communicating the defamatory statement to a third person, meaning someone other than the defamed individual. The fault requirement varies depending on whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private individual. For private figures, negligence is the standard, meaning the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the truth of the statement. For public figures, actual malice must be proven, meaning the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Damages can be presumed in cases of defamation per se, which includes statements that impute a crime, a loathsome disease, or conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, or profession. In cases of defamation per quod, special damages must be pleaded and proven, which are specific economic losses. The qualified privilege, as recognized in North Dakota law, can defeat a defamation claim if the statement was made in good faith on a subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or duty, to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. However, this privilege is lost if the statement is made with actual malice.

In North Dakota, a public figure suing for defamation must prove actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This standard is derived from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. For a private figure, the standard is generally negligence, meaning the publisher failed to exercise reasonable care in verifying the truth of the statement. However, if the defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern, a private figure must also prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages, as established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and applied in North Dakota law. Without proof of actual malice, a private figure plaintiff in North Dakota can only recover actual damages, which are quantifiable financial losses directly resulting from the defamation. The plaintiff here, a former mayor, is a public figure. Therefore, to recover any damages beyond actual proven losses, they must demonstrate that the newspaper acted with actual malice when publishing the article. Since the question states the newspaper believed the article was true, and there is no indication of reckless disregard for the truth (e.g., relying on a single, uncorroborated source without further investigation when easily verifiable facts contradict it), the plaintiff cannot meet the actual malice standard for presumed or punitive damages. Thus, they are limited to recovering only their proven actual damages.

In North Dakota, a private individual suing for defamation must prove actual malice if the statement involves a matter of public concern. Actual malice, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted by North Dakota courts, means the defendant published the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Reckless disregard requires more than mere negligence; it involves a subjective awareness of probable falsity. For a private figure, proving defamation generally requires demonstrating that the defendant published a false statement of fact about the plaintiff that harmed the plaintiff’s reputation, and that the defendant was at least negligent in making the statement. However, when the subject matter is of public concern, the standard shifts to actual malice for all plaintiffs, including private figures. This higher standard is designed to protect robust public debate and prevent chilling speech on matters of public interest. Therefore, if a statement about a local zoning dispute, which is undeniably a matter of public concern in North Dakota, is made by a journalist and harms a private citizen’s reputation, that private citizen must demonstrate actual malice to prevail in a defamation claim, not just negligence.

In North Dakota, for a private individual to prove defamation per se, they must demonstrate that the statement made was false, defamatory, and published to a third party. If the statement falls into one of the categories of defamation per se, damages are presumed, and the plaintiff does not need to prove actual harm. North Dakota law, as codified in N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-02, outlines these categories. These include statements that impute a crime, a loathsome disease, or that prejudice the plaintiff in their profession, trade, or business. In the given scenario, the statement made by Mr. Abernathy directly alleges that Ms. Bell committed embezzlement, which is a criminal offense. Therefore, the statement constitutes defamation per se under North Dakota law because it imputes a crime to Ms. Bell. This classification means Ms. Bell is not required to present evidence of specific financial loss or reputational damage to establish her claim, as such damages are legally presumed. The core elements of defamation – falsity, defamatory meaning, publication, and harm (presumed in this per se case) – are all present or presumed. The truth of the statement is a defense, but without evidence of its truth, the statement’s defamatory nature as an imputation of a crime is sufficient for per se classification.

In North Dakota, the tort of defamation requires a plaintiff to prove four elements: a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and damages, unless the statement is actionable per se. North Dakota Century Code § 14-02-02 defines libel as a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or shame, or which has the tendency to destroy his or her reputation. Slander, as defined in § 14-02-03, is a false and unprivileged publication, other than by writing or other fixed representation to the eye, which: 1. Imputes to him or her the commission of a crime, or tending to expose him or her to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or shame; 2. Imputes to him or her an infectious disease or a loathsome, bệnh tật, or unchaste condition; 3. Tends directly to injure him or her in respect to his or her office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him or her general disqualification in those particulars, or by imputing something with respect to his or her office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency so to injure him or her; or 4. By particular circumstances, imputes to him or her some other offense, or to subject him or her to a loss or the contempt or ridicule of the community. For statements not considered defamatory per se, a plaintiff must demonstrate actual damages, which can include economic losses (special damages) or harm to reputation. For statements considered defamatory per se, damages are presumed. The scenario involves a statement about a business owner’s financial practices that, if false, could harm their reputation and business. The statement is published to a third party. The crucial element to assess is whether the statement falls into a category of defamation per se, which would allow for presumed damages, or if actual damages must be proven. Statements that impute a lack of integrity or competence in one’s business or profession are generally considered defamatory per se in North Dakota. Therefore, the statement about “skimming profits” directly attacks the business owner’s professional integrity and financial probity, making it actionable per se, and thus, proof of specific monetary loss is not required for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for damages. The question tests the understanding of defamation per se in the context of business reputation under North Dakota law.

North Dakota law, like many jurisdictions, recognizes a qualified privilege for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. This privilege, often referred to as the “litigation privilege” or “judicial proceedings privilege,” generally protects participants in litigation from defamation claims based on statements made during the course of that litigation, provided the statements are relevant to the proceedings. The privilege is rooted in the need to encourage open and candid participation in the judicial process without fear of reprisal. In North Dakota, this privilege is codified and interpreted through case law. For a statement to be protected, it must be made in a judicial proceeding, by a litigant or other participant, and be pertinent and material to the subject matter of the litigation. The privilege is not absolute; it can be lost if the statement is made with malice or is entirely unrelated to the judicial proceeding. However, the burden is typically on the party claiming defamation to demonstrate that the privilege does not apply. In the given scenario, the statements made by the attorney to the judge and opposing counsel during the deposition are precisely the types of communications the privilege is designed to protect. The deposition is a formal part of the judicial process, and the statements, even if critical or damaging, were made in that context and related to the ongoing case. Therefore, the attorney’s statements are shielded by the qualified privilege afforded to judicial proceedings in North Dakota.

North Dakota law, like many jurisdictions, distinguishes between defamation per se and defamation per quod. Defamation per se refers to statements that are so inherently damaging that harm is presumed, and special damages (actual monetary loss) do not need to be proven. Examples include accusations of serious crime, loathsome disease, unchastity, or conduct incompatible with the plaintiff’s business, trade, or profession. In North Dakota, the elements of defamation generally require a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and either damages or the statement being actionable per se. When a statement is not defamatory per se, the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages. Special damages are specific, quantifiable economic losses that result directly from the defamatory statement. General damages, which compensate for reputational harm, humiliation, and mental anguish, can be awarded in cases of defamation per se or when special damages are proven for defamation per quod. Therefore, for a statement that does not fall into the categories of defamation per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate a direct link between the false statement and a specific financial loss to establish a claim. The absence of proof of special damages in such a scenario would lead to the dismissal of the claim.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff that was published to a third party and caused the plaintiff harm. For private figures, the standard of fault is negligence. For public figures or matters of public concern, the plaintiff must prove actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. North Dakota law, specifically referencing the principles of defamation, requires that the statement be presented as fact, not opinion, and that it be demonstrably false. The element of publication means the statement was communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Damages can be special, meaning provable financial losses, or general, referring to reputational harm, which may not require specific proof of financial loss if the defamation is considered per se. The statute of limitations for defamation in North Dakota is two years from the date of publication.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff that was published to a third party and that caused the plaintiff harm. For statements concerning matters of public concern, or when the plaintiff is a public figure or official, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. North Dakota law, like federal law, recognizes two types of defamation: libel (written) and slander (spoken). Damages are generally presumed for libel and for certain categories of slander (slander per se), such as statements imputing a crime, a loathsome disease, or unchastity. For other types of slander, special damages must be proven, which are specific monetary losses. The statute of limitations for defamation in North Dakota is two years from the date of publication.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the application of North Dakota’s defamation law, specifically concerning the distinction between libel and slander, and the elements required to prove each. North Dakota Century Code (NDCC) § 12.1-15-01 defines defamation generally, and NDCC § 12.1-15-02 distinguishes between libel (written defamation) and slander (spoken defamation). For a plaintiff to succeed in a defamation claim in North Dakota, they must generally prove four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) damages, unless the statement constitutes defamation per se. In this case, the statement made by Mr. Abernathy about Ms. Chen’s alleged embezzlement is in spoken form, making it slander. The statement is also arguably defamatory, as it imputes criminal conduct, which would likely harm Ms. Chen’s reputation. The critical element for determining liability here is the “unprivileged publication” and the level of fault. North Dakota follows the common law rule that certain statements are privileged. However, in the context of a private individual like Ms. Chen, the standard of fault for defamation generally requires proof of at least negligence. If the statement was made with actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), it would also satisfy the fault requirement, but negligence is the baseline for private figures. The publication to Mr. Abernathy’s colleague constitutes publication to a third party. The question then becomes whether the statement was false and whether Ms. Chen suffered damages as a result. Without evidence that the statement was true, it is presumed false for the purposes of a defamation claim, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove truth. Given that Ms. Chen was not involved in embezzlement, the statement is false. The statement also touches upon her professional integrity, which is a matter of special damage in the context of slander, meaning she does not need to prove specific monetary loss if the statement imputes criminal behavior or affects her business or profession. Therefore, Ms. Chen would likely have a viable claim for slander against Mr. Abernathy because he made a false, defamatory statement about her to a third party, and the statement falls into categories where damages are presumed for slander.

In North Dakota, a plaintiff alleging defamation must generally prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact about the plaintiff that was published to a third party and caused damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. For statements concerning matters of public concern, or made about public officials or figures, the plaintiff must also prove actual malice, meaning the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. This standard is derived from federal constitutional law, specifically New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In cases not involving public concern or figures, the standard is negligence, meaning the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in determining the truth of the statement. North Dakota law, as codified in N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27-01, defines criminal defamation, but civil defamation claims are primarily governed by common law principles and case precedent, with specific statutory provisions like N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-01 et seq. addressing certain aspects such as privilege. The crucial element for a successful defamation claim, especially in a public concern context, is the presence of actual malice, which requires a showing of subjective awareness of probable falsity or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. Without this, a claim concerning a public figure or matter of public concern will likely fail.

In North Dakota, a private individual suing for defamation must generally prove actual malice if the defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern, even if the plaintiff is not a public figure. This heightened standard, derived from federal constitutional law as applied in cases like Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant made the defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. North Dakota law, as codified in N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-05, defines defamation as a false statement that injures reputation. However, the application of the actual malice standard is crucial for private figures on matters of public concern to balance free speech protections with the need to remedy reputational harm. Without proving actual malice in such circumstances, a plaintiff cannot recover presumed or punitive damages, and may only recover actual damages shown to have been caused by the defamatory statement. The scenario describes a statement about a local agricultural cooperative’s financial practices, which would typically be considered a matter of public concern in a state like North Dakota where agriculture is a significant industry. Therefore, the plaintiff, being a private individual, must meet the actual malice standard.