The scenario involves a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina, with one party claiming rights based on a customary land tenure system prevalent in a Latin American country of origin, and the other party asserting ownership under North Carolina’s statutory land law. North Carolina, like other U.S. states, primarily operates under a Torrens or deed registration system for land title, which emphasizes recorded instruments and public notice. Customary land tenure systems, often found in Latin America, may recognize rights through long-term possession, community consensus, or oral tradition, which are not typically recognized as legally sufficient for establishing title in the U.S. legal framework without specific legislative or judicial recognition. When a conflict arises between a claim based on customary law and a claim based on North Carolina’s established property law, the latter generally prevails in U.S. courts. This is due to the principle of comity and the requirement that foreign legal norms must be compatible with domestic law to be enforceable. North Carolina General Statutes Chapter 47A, for instance, outlines procedures for registering deeds and establishing title, which are rooted in common law principles and statutory requirements for notice and recording. Therefore, a claim based solely on customary possession, without a corresponding recorded deed or other statutory recognition under North Carolina law, would likely be unsuccessful against a properly documented title. The key legal principle here is the supremacy of domestic statutory law in matters of property ownership within the state’s jurisdiction. The court would examine whether the customary claim has been converted into a recognized legal right under North Carolina law, such as through adverse possession under specific statutory conditions, or if there’s any treaty or international agreement that grants such recognition, which is highly unlikely for customary land rights in this context. The absence of a recorded deed or other statutory basis for the claim under North Carolina law is the critical factor.

The question concerns the extraterritorial application of North Carolina law, specifically in the context of a business operating in Latin America with a North Carolina nexus. When a North Carolina resident or entity engages in business activities abroad that have a direct and substantial effect within North Carolina, or when such activities violate North Carolina statutes designed to protect its residents or economic interests, North Carolina courts may assert jurisdiction. This principle is rooted in the concept of long-arm statutes and due process considerations, ensuring that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. In this scenario, the alleged predatory pricing by a North Carolina-based company’s subsidiary in Colombia, impacting North Carolina consumers and businesses through inflated prices or reduced market access, would likely fall under the purview of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCGS Chapter 75). The extraterritorial reach of such statutes is often interpreted to cover conduct outside the state that causes foreseeable harm within the state. Therefore, the North Carolina Attorney General would have grounds to investigate and potentially bring action against the parent company for actions taken by its foreign subsidiary if those actions demonstrably harm North Carolina’s economic interests or consumers, aligning with the state’s interest in regulating unfair competition and protecting its marketplace. The specific legal basis would involve demonstrating a sufficient connection between the Colombian operations and the harm experienced in North Carolina, such as through supply chain disruptions, pricing impacts, or anticompetitive effects felt by North Carolina consumers or businesses.

The scenario involves a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina where one party claims title through adverse possession based on a historical grant from the Spanish colonial era. Spanish law, particularly as it influenced early land grants in territories that later became part of the United States, often had different requirements for establishing title compared to English common law or later U.S. statutory law. Adverse possession in common law systems typically requires open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession for a statutorily defined period. However, the concept of “just title” or “color of title” can be crucial in some civil law traditions or in transitional legal periods. In this case, the claimant’s reliance on a Spanish grant suggests an argument for a “color of title” claim, where possession is under a document that appears to convey title but is ultimately defective. North Carolina law has specific statutes governing adverse possession, including NCGS § 1-38, which addresses possession under color of title, and NCGS § 1-40, which pertains to possession without color of title. The critical factor here is whether the historical Spanish grant, even if not perfectly conforming to subsequent U.S. or North Carolina requirements, can be considered sufficient “color of title” to satisfy the statutory period for adverse possession under North Carolina law. The question probes the understanding of how historical legal frameworks interact with contemporary property law in North Carolina, particularly concerning the recognition of prior non-English land grants and their impact on adverse possession claims. The claimant’s argument hinges on the continuous nature of possession and the validity of the Spanish grant as a basis for claiming title, even if the grant itself is now considered imperfect. The effectiveness of this claim would depend on North Carolina courts’ interpretation of how historical Spanish property law principles are integrated into the state’s adverse possession statutes, especially when dealing with claims rooted in pre-American sovereignty. The claimant must demonstrate that their possession, initiated under the Spanish grant, met the statutory requirements for adverse possession in North Carolina throughout the prescribed period, treating the Spanish grant as a valid, albeit potentially flawed, basis for their claim.

The scenario involves a North Carolina business, “Andes Imports,” which has entered into a contract with a Colombian supplier, “Café Sol Ltda.” The contract specifies that disputes will be resolved through arbitration in Bogotá, Colombia, and that Colombian law will govern the contract. Andes Imports believes Café Sol Ltda. has breached the contract by supplying sub-standard coffee beans, failing to meet agreed-upon quality standards, and causing financial losses to Andes Imports. North Carolina’s Uniform Arbitration Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.1 et seq.) generally enforces arbitration agreements. However, when international elements are involved, particularly where a foreign jurisdiction’s law and arbitration forum are designated, the enforceability and scope of the arbitration clause are subject to international agreements and principles, such as the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to which both the United States and Colombia are signatories. The question asks about the most appropriate initial legal action for Andes Imports to pursue to address the dispute, considering the contract’s arbitration clause and governing law. Given the explicit agreement to arbitrate in Bogotá under Colombian law, Andes Imports’ primary recourse is to initiate arbitration proceedings in Colombia. Attempting to file a lawsuit in a North Carolina state court would likely be met with a motion to compel arbitration, as courts typically uphold valid arbitration clauses, especially in international commercial contracts, to promote predictability and enforceability of agreements. While seeking a preliminary injunction in North Carolina might seem like an option to preserve assets or prevent further harm, the contract’s specific arbitration clause directs dispute resolution to a foreign forum. Therefore, initiating arbitration in Bogotá is the most direct and contractually compliant first step to seek resolution and any potential remedies.

The scenario involves a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina, where a claimant asserts rights based on a historical land grant from a former Latin American jurisdiction that predates North Carolina’s statehood and its incorporation into the United States legal framework. The core legal issue is the recognition and enforceability of such historical grants within the current North Carolina property law system, particularly when these rights conflict with established statutory and common law principles governing land title. When considering the enforceability of pre-statehood land grants, especially those originating from foreign sovereign powers, North Carolina courts would analyze several critical factors. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution generally establishes federal law as supreme, but historical treaties and international agreements can create vested rights that may be recognized. However, property law within the United States, including North Carolina, is primarily governed by state law, which has evolved significantly since the colonial era. The claimant’s assertion would need to demonstrate that the original grant was valid under the laws of the granting jurisdiction at the time it was issued and that these rights were not extinguished by subsequent political changes, such as the acquisition of territory by the United States or the establishment of North Carolina’s own land laws. This would involve examining the terms of the grant, the nature of the sovereign that issued it, and any subsequent legislative or judicial actions that might have affected its validity. Crucially, North Carolina’s statutes of limitations and adverse possession laws are designed to quiet title and promote certainty in land ownership. For a historical grant to be enforceable after such a long period, especially if there has been continuous possession or use of the land by others consistent with North Carolina’s laws, the claimant would face significant hurdles. The principle of *res judicata* and the concept of established property records would also be paramount. The legal system in North Carolina, like other U.S. states, generally requires that land titles be recorded and traceable through a chain of title that conforms to state statutes. A grant from a foreign jurisdiction, if not properly domesticated or recognized through specific legislative action or treaty, would likely be considered void or unenforceable against subsequent bona fide purchasers or those holding title under North Carolina’s established land registration system. The claimant would need to show a clear nexus between the historical grant and current North Carolina property law, which is often difficult for pre-statehood foreign grants that were not explicitly preserved. The legal framework prioritizes stability and predictability in property rights as defined by the state’s own laws and its federal constitutional obligations.

In North Carolina, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly those originating from civil law jurisdictions common in Latin America, are governed by principles that balance comity with the need to protect domestic public policy and due process. While North Carolina does not have a specific statute mirroring the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, it generally adheres to common law principles for enforcing such judgments. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, adopted by many U.S. states, provides a framework for recognizing foreign judgments unless certain grounds for non-recognition exist. These grounds typically include lack of due process in the foreign proceedings, the foreign court lacking jurisdiction, or the judgment being repugnant to North Carolina’s public policy. For a foreign civil judgment to be enforced in North Carolina, it must typically be final, conclusive, and enforceable where rendered. The enforcement process usually involves filing an action in a North Carolina court seeking domestication of the foreign judgment. The court will then examine the judgment for compliance with fundamental fairness and due process standards. A judgment obtained through fraud, or where the defendant was not afforded adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, would likely not be recognized. The question posits a scenario where a commercial dispute judgment from a Latin American civil law country is presented for enforcement in North Carolina. The key consideration for North Carolina courts in such a situation is whether the foreign judgment meets the foundational requirements for recognition under common law principles, which are heavily influenced by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the principle of comity. The absence of a direct statutory counterpart to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act means that the analysis relies more heavily on case law and general principles of international comity and due process. Therefore, the most critical factor is the procedural fairness and jurisdiction of the foreign court, as well as the judgment’s conformity with North Carolina’s fundamental public policy.

In North Carolina, the concept of “due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as analogous principles within state law, dictates that individuals must be afforded fundamental fairness and legal protections before the government deprives them of life, liberty, or property. This encompasses both procedural due process (the procedures the government must follow) and substantive due process (the fundamental rights the government cannot infringe upon). When considering the application of North Carolina law to individuals with ties to Latin American legal systems, it’s crucial to understand how these due process protections interact with international legal norms and treaties, particularly concerning extradition, immigration, and the recognition of foreign judgments. For instance, if a court in North Carolina is asked to enforce a civil judgment obtained in a Latin American country, the due process clause would require that the foreign proceeding afforded the defendant adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, in criminal matters, North Carolina courts must ensure that extradition proceedings adhere to both U.S. federal law and any applicable bilateral treaties, guaranteeing that the individual subject to extradition is not deprived of their liberty without proper legal safeguards. The question tests the understanding of how fundamental legal principles, like due process, are applied universally within the U.S. legal framework, even when dealing with individuals or legal matters originating from distinct legal traditions. The core idea is that while the *substance* of laws might differ, the *fundamental fairness* of legal proceedings is a paramount concern in North Carolina’s jurisdiction.

The core of this question lies in understanding the application of the principle of *res judicata* within the context of international legal interactions, specifically concerning judgments from Latin American civil law jurisdictions and their recognition in North Carolina’s common law system. *Res judicata*, meaning “a matter judged,” prevents the relitigation of claims that have already been finally decided by a competent court. When a judgment is rendered in a civil law country, such as Brazil, and it addresses specific claims and issues, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, while primarily applying to U.S. states, informs the general principles of comity and recognition of foreign judgments. North Carolina courts, in deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment, will generally consider whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, whether the judgment was rendered after due process, and whether the judgment is final and conclusive. The doctrine of *res judicata* is a key component of finality. If the Brazilian court’s decision on the breach of contract claim was final and involved the same parties and the same cause of action, then North Carolina courts are likely to recognize this preclusionary effect under the doctrine of comity, which often mirrors the principles of *res judicata*. Therefore, the Brazilian judgment on the breach of contract, having been finalized and precluding further litigation on that specific claim in Brazil, would similarly preclude the relitigation of that same claim in North Carolina, assuming the Brazilian proceedings met basic due process standards. The question focuses on the *effect* of the Brazilian judgment on a subsequent North Carolina action concerning the same contractual dispute. The fact that the North Carolina case involves a different legal theory (tortious interference) but arises from the same underlying facts and contractual relationship is crucial. However, *res judicata* applies not only to the exact claims litigated but also to claims that *could have been* litigated in the prior action. If the tortious interference claim was intrinsically linked to the breach of contract and could have been raised or was implicitly addressed in the Brazilian proceedings, then *res judicata* would bar it. Without specific details of the Brazilian proceedings and whether the tortious interference claim was a compulsory counterclaim or could have been brought as an alternative theory within the original contractual dispute, the most robust application of *res judicata* would prevent relitigation of the core dispute. The prompt specifies that the Brazilian judgment was final and precluded further litigation of the breach of contract claim. This finality, coupled with the shared factual basis and parties, strongly suggests that North Carolina would honor this preclusionary effect.

The core of this question lies in understanding the application of the principle of *res judicata* within the context of international arbitration, specifically as it might be interpreted or applied in a North Carolina court when enforcing a foreign arbitral award. *Res judicata*, or claim preclusion, prevents the relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated on their merits. In the international arbitration context, the finality of an arbitral award is crucial for its enforceability. When an arbitral tribunal, operating under rules that are recognized and respected, renders a final award on the merits of a dispute, that award generally has preclusive effect. This means that the same claims, between the same parties, cannot be brought again in a subsequent proceeding. In North Carolina, the Uniform Arbitration Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.1 et seq.) governs arbitration proceedings and the enforcement of arbitral awards. While the Act primarily deals with domestic arbitration, its principles and the broader common law doctrines of preclusion, including *res judicata*, are relevant when considering the enforceability of foreign awards under treaties like the New York Convention, which North Carolina, as part of the United States, adheres to. The New York Convention itself promotes the finality and enforceability of arbitral awards. Therefore, if a claim concerning the breach of a construction contract between a North Carolina-based firm and a Colombian company was fully litigated before an arbitral tribunal seated in Bogota, and a final award was rendered on the merits of that specific breach claim, a subsequent attempt to sue on the same breach of contract in a North Carolina state court would likely be barred by *res judicata*. The arbitration proceeding, if conducted fairly and with proper notice, is considered a valid adjudication of the claims presented. The fact that the award originated from a foreign jurisdiction does not negate the preclusive effect of the prior adjudication, especially when seeking enforcement or defense against relitigation in a jurisdiction that respects international arbitration principles and treaties. The specific claim of breach of contract, as determined by the arbitral tribunal, has reached its final disposition.

The scenario presented involves a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina, with one party claiming rights derived from a historical land grant issued under the Spanish colonial administration of Florida, which at one point encompassed territories that later became part of North Carolina. The core legal issue is the enforceability and interpretation of such a grant within the current U.S. federal and North Carolina state legal framework. U.S. federal law, specifically through treaties and congressional acts, has established mechanisms for adjudicating claims arising from foreign land grants made prior to the establishment of U.S. sovereignty. These mechanisms often involve a process of confirmation or rejection based on specific criteria, such as the validity of the original grant, the continuous occupation and cultivation of the land, and compliance with the terms of the grant. North Carolina law, while governing property rights within the state, generally defers to federal law in cases involving the adjudication of claims stemming from pre-existing foreign land grants. Therefore, the success of the claimant hinges on demonstrating that their title is recognized under the federal framework for confirming such claims. The claimant must present evidence that the Spanish grant meets the requirements for recognition under applicable federal statutes, which often require proof of the grant’s authenticity, the grantor’s authority, and the claimant’s continuous possession and improvement of the land in accordance with the grant’s terms. Without such federal recognition, the historical Spanish grant would not supersede the established property law and land records of North Carolina. The claimant’s reliance solely on the Spanish grant, without pursuing federal confirmation or demonstrating compliance with federal requirements, means their claim is unlikely to be legally recognized against a party holding title through North Carolina’s established land registration system. The question asks about the *most likely* legal outcome, considering the primacy of federal law in adjudicating historical foreign land claims and the established property law of North Carolina. The claimant’s current position, lacking federal confirmation and relying solely on a historical grant that predates U.S. sovereignty and North Carolina’s current land system, is insufficient to overcome a title derived through the state’s established processes.

The scenario involves a business dispute with cross-border elements, specifically between a North Carolina-based company and a business operating under Mexican civil law principles, which are heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Code and often incorporate elements of Roman law. The core issue is the enforceability of a contractual agreement for the supply of specialized agricultural equipment. In North Carolina, contract law is largely based on common law principles, emphasizing offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent. However, when dealing with international contracts, particularly those with a civil law jurisdiction, conflicts of law principles become paramount. North Carolina courts, when faced with a dispute involving a contract with significant connections to Mexico, would first determine which jurisdiction’s substantive law should apply. This is typically governed by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which often favors the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. Given that the equipment was manufactured and intended for use in Mexico, and the contract was negotiated and potentially performed there, Mexican law might be deemed more applicable to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract’s terms, including any implied warranties or specific performance obligations that might differ from common law. The question asks about the primary legal framework that would govern the dispute resolution for a contract between a North Carolina entity and a Mexican entity concerning goods to be delivered and utilized in Mexico. While North Carolina law provides the forum and procedural rules, the substantive contractual obligations and remedies are likely to be determined by the law of the place with the most significant connection. Mexican civil law, rooted in Roman-derived civil codes, often has distinct approaches to contract interpretation, force majeure, and remedies compared to common law systems. Therefore, understanding the foundational legal traditions that shape Mexican contract law, namely the civil law system with its emphasis on codified principles and the influence of Roman law, is crucial for predicting how such a dispute might be resolved.

The scenario involves a dispute over a property boundary in North Carolina, where one party claims ownership based on a cadastral survey that differs from historical land grants issued under Spanish colonial law, which influences some aspects of property law in certain Latin American jurisdictions that North Carolina might interact with through international law or comparative legal studies. North Carolina’s property law is primarily based on English common law, emphasizing deeds, adverse possession, and recorded surveys. However, when dealing with international property disputes or comparative legal analysis concerning Latin American legal systems, understanding the foundational principles of land registration and surveying in those systems is crucial. Spanish colonial law, for instance, often relied on metes and bounds descriptions tied to natural landmarks or specific measurements, with a strong emphasis on the role of a surveyor appointed by the Crown. The concept of *res judicata* (a matter already judged) is also relevant in legal systems, preventing relitigation of decided issues. In this context, the North Carolina court would likely prioritize evidence that aligns with its own established property law principles, such as the chain of title, recorded deeds, and the most recent, legally recognized survey within North Carolina’s jurisdiction. While the historical Spanish grants provide context, they would be evaluated against North Carolina’s statutory requirements for establishing property boundaries. The principle of *stare decisis* (to stand by things decided) guides the court to follow precedent within North Carolina’s own legal framework. Therefore, a survey conducted under North Carolina’s current legal standards, reflecting its codified property laws and surveying regulations, would generally hold greater weight than an older survey based on different legal traditions, unless specific international treaties or agreements dictate otherwise, which is not indicated in the problem. The core issue is the application of North Carolina’s property law to resolve a boundary dispute, where the most recent and legally compliant survey within the state’s jurisdiction is paramount.

The question probes the application of principles of transnational family law, specifically concerning child custody and recognition of foreign judgments, within the North Carolina legal framework, drawing parallels to Latin American civil law traditions. When a North Carolina court encounters a child custody order issued in a Latin American country, such as Brazil, it must consider several factors to determine enforceability and potential modification. North Carolina’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified in Chapter 52A of the North Carolina General Statutes, governs jurisdiction over child custody matters. While the UCCJEA primarily addresses interstate jurisdiction, its principles can be extended to international contexts through comity and specific statutory provisions or case law interpreting them. The recognition of foreign judgments is generally based on principles of comity, meaning the North Carolina court will give respect to the judicial acts of a foreign sovereign. For a foreign custody order to be recognized and enforced, it typically must have been issued by a court that had proper jurisdiction over the child and the parties, and the proceedings must have afforded due process. Furthermore, North Carolina law generally presumes that custody orders from other jurisdictions are valid and enforceable, unless there is a specific reason to question their validity or the child’s best interests require a different outcome. The “best interests of the child” is the paramount consideration in all custody determinations in North Carolina. If the foreign court had jurisdiction and provided due process, and enforcing the order is consistent with the child’s best interests, North Carolina courts will typically enforce it. Modification of a foreign custody order is a more complex issue. North Carolina can assert jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody order if it has become the child’s home state, meaning the child has lived in North Carolina with a parent or person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding, or if the child is present in North Carolina and has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child. However, even if North Carolina can assert jurisdiction for modification, it will still consider the prior foreign order and the reasons for modification. The key is that North Carolina courts will not automatically modify a foreign order; they will review it based on the child’s best interests and the jurisdictional prerequisites for modification. Therefore, the most accurate approach is that North Carolina courts will generally enforce a Brazilian custody order if it was issued by a court with proper jurisdiction and due process, and will consider modification only if North Carolina has jurisdiction and it serves the child’s best interests, aligning with the principles of comity and the UCCJEA’s underlying philosophy.

The core of this question lies in understanding the principles of comparative law, specifically how legal systems that stem from civil law traditions, common in many Latin American countries, interact with or are influenced by the common law system prevalent in North Carolina. The scenario involves a dispute over intellectual property rights concerning a novel agricultural technology developed by a Colombian inventor and sought to be commercialized in North Carolina. In a civil law system, intellectual property rights are often viewed as inherent rights that vest upon creation and are formally recognized through registration. The process of protection and enforcement might emphasize a more codified and administrative approach. Conversely, North Carolina’s legal framework, rooted in common law, relies heavily on precedent, judicial interpretation, and adversarial proceedings. When a civil law concept or right is brought into a common law jurisdiction, the interpretation and enforcement mechanisms must adapt. Specifically, the doctrine of “comity” plays a crucial role. Comity, in a legal context, refers to the principle by which courts in one jurisdiction will recognize and enforce the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not out of obligation, but out of mutual respect and deference. This is particularly relevant when dealing with international legal issues or when concepts from different legal traditions are encountered. Therefore, a North Carolina court would likely consider the Colombian patent, as granted under its civil law system, and apply principles of comity to determine the extent of recognition and enforceability of those rights within North Carolina, while still operating within the procedural and substantive framework of North Carolina law. This involves assessing the validity of the Colombian patent according to Colombian law and then determining how those rights translate and can be protected under North Carolina statutes and case law, potentially through mechanisms like an infringement action based on the recognized foreign right. The other options represent less accurate or complete understandings of how such cross-jurisdictional legal issues are typically handled. Option b) is incorrect because while registration is important in both systems, the fundamental basis and enforcement mechanisms differ significantly. Option c) is incorrect as the direct application of Colombian procedural rules in a North Carolina court is generally not permissible; rather, North Carolina’s procedural rules govern. Option d) is incorrect because while international treaties can be relevant, the question focuses on the direct interaction of two distinct legal systems without explicitly mentioning a treaty governing this specific IP right.

The core of this question lies in understanding the concept of *stare decisis* and its application within a civil law tradition, particularly when contrasted with common law systems. In North Carolina, as in most US states, the legal system is primarily based on common law, which heavily relies on judicial precedent. However, Latin American legal systems are predominantly civil law, rooted in codified statutes. While civil law systems do not adhere to *stare decisis* in the same binding manner as common law, judicial decisions, especially those from higher courts, carry significant persuasive authority and contribute to the interpretation and application of codes. The scenario describes a situation where a North Carolina court is asked to interpret a provision of a fictional trade agreement that incorporates principles often found in Latin American commercial law. The agreement’s language, however, mirrors provisions that have been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court of Justice of a fictional Latin American nation, “República del Sol.” The question asks how a North Carolina court would likely treat these prior interpretations. A North Carolina court, while not strictly bound by foreign judicial decisions, would give considerable weight to consistent interpretations from a high court of a civil law jurisdiction, especially when those interpretations clarify the meaning of codified principles that the trade agreement implicitly adopts. This persuasive authority is crucial for maintaining consistency and predictability in international commercial dealings. The court would analyze the reasoning behind República del Sol’s Supreme Court decisions to understand the underlying legal principles and their application, rather than simply following a binding rule. Therefore, the court would likely consider these prior interpretations as highly persuasive, guiding its own understanding of the agreement’s terms, especially given the agreement’s potential alignment with civil law commercial norms.

The scenario describes a situation where a company based in North Carolina is seeking to enforce a contract against a business entity operating primarily in Mexico, with a dispute arising over the interpretation of certain contractual clauses related to intellectual property rights. In the context of North Carolina’s legal framework, particularly concerning international commercial disputes, the principle of *comity* plays a significant role. Comity, in this legal context, refers to the deference by courts of one jurisdiction to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, based on mutual respect and the desire for harmonious international relations. When a North Carolina court is faced with a dispute involving parties and events spanning multiple jurisdictions, especially with a Latin American nation like Mexico, it must consider which jurisdiction’s laws apply (choice of law) and whether it has the proper authority to hear the case (jurisdiction). Furthermore, the enforceability of foreign judgments or arbitral awards is a crucial consideration. The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, adopted in North Carolina, provides a framework for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, subject to certain conditions and defenses. However, the question focuses on the *initial enforcement of a contract*, not a pre-existing judgment. The most appropriate legal mechanism for a North Carolina court to address a contract dispute with an international element, especially when seeking to enforce contractual obligations directly, would involve applying the principles of private international law to determine the governing law and the court’s jurisdiction. If the contract contains a valid choice of law provision specifying North Carolina law, or if North Carolina law is deemed applicable under conflict of laws principles, the court would proceed to interpret and enforce the contract according to those laws. The concept of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept) is a foundational principle of contract law in both civil and common law systems, including those in North Carolina and Mexico, and underpins the court’s obligation to enforce valid agreements. The question asks about the *basis* for enforcement, which fundamentally rests on the validity of the contract and the court’s authority. Given the international nature and the absence of a prior judgment, the court would analyze the contract’s enforceability under the applicable law and its own jurisdictional reach. The concept of *lex loci contractus* (law of the place where the contract was made) or *lex loci solutionis* (law of the place where the contract is to be performed) might be considered in determining the governing law if no explicit choice of law is present. However, the core of enforcement lies in the contractual agreement itself and the court’s power to adjudicate.

The scenario involves a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina, where the legal framework is influenced by both common law principles and the potential for recognizing customary land tenure systems that might have roots in Latin American legal traditions, particularly concerning communal property or ancestral rights. In North Carolina, while the Torrens Act provides a system for land registration and title assurance, its application can be complex when historical land use patterns or indigenous claims are involved. The question probes the understanding of how such historical claims might be adjudicated when they interact with the established statutory framework. Recognizing the inherent difficulty in quantifying historical use or customary rights in monetary terms for standard eminent domain or property disputes, the legal system often requires a nuanced approach that considers evidence beyond formal deeds and surveys. The core of the issue lies in determining which legal principles or evidentiary standards would be most appropriate for resolving a claim that may not fit neatly into traditional common law property paradigms. When dealing with claims that might originate from a legal system that prioritizes collective or customary ownership over individual title, a court would likely need to consider evidence of long-standing use, community recognition, and historical patterns of possession, even if formal documentation is absent or incomplete. This often involves a more qualitative assessment of rights, rather than a strictly quantitative one based on market value or documented transactions. The principle of *res judicata* would apply to any prior judicial decisions on the specific land parcel, but it would not preclude a new claim based on different legal grounds or evidence not previously presented. The concept of *stare decisis* would guide the court in applying precedents from similar cases, but the unique nature of customary land tenure may necessitate exploring analogous legal doctrines or equitable principles. The question tests the ability to identify the most fitting legal approach when faced with a claim that bridges common law property rights and potentially unwritten, customary rights, emphasizing the evidentiary and procedural challenges involved.

The question probes the application of North Carolina’s extraterritorial jurisdiction principles, specifically concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil matters involving residents of North Carolina who have engaged in business dealings in Latin American countries. North Carolina General Statute §1-220 outlines the conditions under which foreign judgments can be domesticated and enforced. This statute requires that the foreign court have had jurisdiction over the defendant, that the judgment be final and conclusive, and that it not be contrary to North Carolina public policy. In this scenario, the judgment was rendered by a Colombian civil court against a North Carolina resident for breach of contract. The critical factor is whether the Colombian court possessed personal jurisdiction over the North Carolina resident. Colombian law, like many civil law jurisdictions, often bases jurisdiction on factors such as the place of contract performance or the defendant’s domicile. However, for North Carolina to recognize and enforce this judgment under its domestication statutes, the basis of jurisdiction in Colombia must align with principles of due process recognized in North Carolina, which typically include concepts like minimum contacts or consent to jurisdiction. If the Colombian court’s assertion of jurisdiction was solely based on the plaintiff’s domicile in Colombia or the location of the contract’s negotiation rather than the defendant’s purposeful availment of the privileges of conducting activities within Colombia, or a specific contractual agreement for jurisdiction, North Carolina courts might decline enforcement. Therefore, the enforceability hinges on the specific jurisdictional grounds asserted by the Colombian court and their compatibility with North Carolina’s due process standards for recognizing foreign judgments. The question asks for the most likely outcome if the Colombian court’s jurisdiction was based solely on the plaintiff’s domicile in Colombia, implying a lack of sufficient connection to the defendant for North Carolina to recognize.

The question pertains to the concept of “transnational legal process” as it applies to North Carolina’s engagement with Latin American legal frameworks, specifically concerning environmental regulations. The core of the issue lies in understanding how domestic legal systems interact with international norms and the mechanisms through which such interactions occur. In this scenario, the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ) is seeking to adopt stricter emissions standards for industrial facilities that have operational ties to Latin American countries, particularly those with which North Carolina has significant trade or investment relationships. The legal basis for such adoption, while rooted in North Carolina’s General Statutes concerning environmental protection (e.g., NCGS Chapter 130A, Article 21 for air quality), must also consider the practical and legal implications of incorporating or harmonizing with international standards, which are often influenced by regional agreements or customary international law. The “transnational legal process” encompasses the ongoing interactions between domestic legal actors and international legal norms, including the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of laws across borders. This involves recognizing that legal rules are not confined by national boundaries and that domestic legal systems are often shaped by external influences. When NCDEQ considers standards that align with, or are inspired by, Latin American environmental accords or best practices, it is engaging in this process. The most appropriate legal mechanism for this would involve a formal process of regulatory rulemaking, which in North Carolina typically requires public notice, comment periods, and consideration of economic and environmental impacts, as outlined in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (NCAPA). The adoption of standards that reflect international best practices or agreements, even if not directly binding treaties under U.S. federal law for state agencies, falls under the purview of this rulemaking process where the agency can justify the standards based on broader public interest and environmental efficacy. This is distinct from simply citing international law as directly enforceable domestic law, which would require a different legal basis. The question tests the understanding of how a state agency in the U.S. can practically and legally engage with and incorporate foreign legal concepts or standards into its own regulatory framework, a key aspect of transnational legal studies.

The core of this question revolves around understanding the application of the doctrine of comparative negligence in North Carolina, particularly when assessing damages in a scenario involving a plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident with a defendant who operated their vehicle under the influence of alcohol. North Carolina follows a modified comparative negligence system where a plaintiff can recover damages if their contributory negligence is less than 50% of the total fault. If the plaintiff’s negligence is 50% or greater, they are barred from recovery. In this specific scenario, Elena is found to be 40% at fault for the accident, and Mateo is found to be 60% at fault. The total damages awarded by the jury are \$100,000. Under North Carolina’s modified comparative negligence rule, Elena’s recovery is reduced by her percentage of fault. Therefore, Elena can recover \$100,000 \* (1 – 0.40) = \$60,000. Mateo’s intoxication is a factor that the jury would have considered when assigning fault percentages, and it is relevant to the overall negligence assessment but does not alter the statutory calculation of damages based on comparative fault. The question tests the application of the 50% bar and the reduction of damages by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault.

The core of this question lies in understanding the application of principles of *ius commune* within a mixed legal system context, specifically as it might influence property rights disputes in North Carolina when engaging with legal traditions originating from Latin America. When a dispute arises in North Carolina concerning land ownership that has historical ties to colonial Spanish land grants, which are recognized under certain conditions, the court must navigate the potential conflict between common law property principles and the civil law concepts that may have governed the original grant. The principle of *usucapio*, or acquisitive prescription, in civil law systems allows for the acquisition of property through prolonged, open, and undisturbed possession, often with a good faith belief in ownership. This contrasts with North Carolina’s common law adverse possession, which typically requires a specific statutory period and a more stringent set of elements, including actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile possession. In a scenario where a claimant in North Carolina asserts ownership based on a historical Spanish land grant and subsequent possession that aligns more closely with the spirit of *usucapio* as understood in its country of origin, but falls short of North Carolina’s adverse possession statutes (e.g., lacking the “hostile” element as strictly defined by North Carolina common law, or having periods of interruption that don’t meet the common law continuity requirement), the court would need to determine the governing legal framework. North Carolina’s legal system, while primarily common law, has historically shown an openness to recognizing certain rights and customs derived from prior legal regimes, especially in areas with historical connections to Spanish or French colonial law. However, for a claim to succeed, it must ultimately be adjudicated under North Carolina’s statutory and common law. Therefore, the claimant would need to demonstrate that their possession, even if initiated under civil law principles, satisfies the specific, and often more demanding, requirements of North Carolina’s adverse possession statutes. This means that while the historical context and the original grant’s civil law underpinnings are relevant for establishing the chain of title and the initial claim, the dispositive legal test for asserting ownership against the record title holder within North Carolina’s jurisdiction will be the state’s own property law. The question is not about applying civil law directly to override North Carolina law, but rather about how civil law concepts might be interpreted or accommodated within the framework of North Carolina’s common law property regime. The correct answer reflects that adherence to North Carolina’s statutory adverse possession requirements is paramount for a successful claim in this context.

The core of this question lies in understanding the implications of a foreign judgment’s enforceability within North Carolina, particularly when it originates from a civil law jurisdiction like Mexico, which often employs a different procedural framework and evidentiary standards than common law systems. North Carolina, like most U.S. states, does not automatically enforce foreign judgments. Instead, it relies on principles of comity and specific statutory provisions. The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, adopted in North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-74.1 et seq.), provides a framework for recognition and enforcement. However, recognition is not guaranteed and can be denied under certain circumstances, such as lack of due process in the foreign proceeding, the foreign court lacking jurisdiction, or the judgment being repugnant to North Carolina public policy. In this scenario, the judgment from Jalisco, Mexico, concerning a commercial dispute, would first need to be presented to a North Carolina court for domestication. The court would then assess whether the Mexican court had proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, whether adequate notice and opportunity to be heard were provided to the defendant (adhering to North Carolina’s due process standards), and if the judgment itself violates North Carolina’s fundamental public policy. A judgment obtained through fraud or misrepresentation would also be a ground for refusal. The absence of a reciprocal enforcement treaty between the U.S. and Mexico, while not an absolute bar, means that enforcement relies more heavily on the discretionary application of comity and the statutory criteria. Therefore, the most accurate assessment is that the judgment’s enforceability hinges on a judicial review process in North Carolina, not automatic recognition. The existence of a valid, final, and conclusive judgment from a competent foreign court is a prerequisite, but the North Carolina court retains discretion to deny enforcement if statutory grounds for non-recognition are met.

The question probes the understanding of the application of North Carolina’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) in cases involving cross-border child support enforcement, specifically when a jurisdiction outside of the United States is involved. UIFSA, codified in North Carolina General Statutes Chapter 52A, provides a framework for establishing and enforcing child support orders across state lines and, through reciprocal agreements and international conventions, with foreign countries. Article 4 of UIFSA addresses the enforcement of support orders issued in foreign jurisdictions. When North Carolina courts are asked to enforce a foreign support order, they must determine if the foreign order is entitled to recognition and enforcement. This involves assessing whether the foreign jurisdiction had proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and whether the order was rendered under circumstances that comport with fundamental fairness and due process. If these conditions are met, the North Carolina court will generally recognize and enforce the foreign order as if it were a North Carolina order. This process often involves registration of the foreign order. The Uniform Law Commission’s model UIFSA, which North Carolina has adopted with some variations, explicitly contemplates international application. Therefore, a North Carolina court, when faced with a child support order from a country that has a reciprocal agreement with the United States or is a signatory to an international convention on child support, would likely apply the principles of UIFSA to enforce it. The key is the recognition of the foreign jurisdiction’s authority and the fairness of its proceedings.

The scenario describes a situation involving a dispute over land ownership in North Carolina, with one party claiming rights based on customary land use practices common in a Latin American civil law tradition, and the other party asserting ownership through a deed registered under the North Carolina Torrens Act. The core legal issue is the recognition and enforceability of customary land rights against a statutorily established title system. In North Carolina, the Torrens Act, codified in Chapter 39 of the North Carolina General Statutes, provides a system of land title registration intended to create indefeasible titles, meaning that once registered, the title is generally considered conclusive against all claims, including those not recorded. This system is designed to simplify and secure land transactions by providing a clear, state-guaranteed title. Customary land rights, while recognized in some civil law jurisdictions as a valid source of property rights, often lack the formal registration and documentation required by common law property systems and statutory frameworks like the Torrens Act. For a customary claim to be recognized in North Carolina, especially against a registered title, it would likely need to demonstrate a basis for recognition under North Carolina law that predates or supersedes the Torrens registration, or prove that the registration itself was flawed in a manner that would allow for an exception. However, the Torrens system’s purpose is precisely to eliminate such latent claims by requiring all interests to be brought forward and registered. Therefore, a claim based solely on customary use, without any accompanying legal documentation or a prior claim that was somehow protected from the Torrens registration process, would generally be subordinate to a title registered under the Act. The question asks about the most likely outcome in a North Carolina court. Given the strength of the Torrens Act in establishing conclusive titles, a court would likely uphold the registered deed. The concept of “adverse possession” is a common law doctrine that can lead to title acquisition through continuous, open, hostile, and exclusive possession for a statutory period, but this is distinct from customary use and typically requires a claim of right that is adverse to the true owner, not merely a traditional way of using land. The principle of *stare decisis* would guide the court to follow established precedent regarding the Torrens Act’s efficacy. The question tests the understanding of how different legal traditions and property registration systems interact within a common law jurisdiction like North Carolina, particularly when one system (Torrens) is designed to provide certainty and finality that may override unrecorded or customary claims.

The question revolves around the concept of *ius commune* and its influence on the development of civil law systems, particularly in the context of legal transplants and the reception of foreign legal principles. In North Carolina, as in many common law jurisdictions, the legal system is primarily based on English common law. However, understanding the historical trajectory and comparative aspects of civil law systems, which often draw heavily from Roman law and its medieval evolution through the *ius commune*, is crucial for a comprehensive grasp of Latin American legal systems. The *ius commune* represents a body of legal principles and scholarly interpretations that emerged in medieval Europe, synthesized from Roman law, canon law, and local customs. Its widespread study and application in universities across Europe facilitated a degree of legal uniformity and provided a common intellectual framework for legal development. When examining the legal systems of Latin America, which largely adopted civil law traditions, recognizing the foundational role of the *ius commune* is key to understanding their structural similarities and conceptual underpinnings, even when specific codified laws may differ. This historical influence explains why certain legal doctrines, procedural norms, and even the very structure of legal reasoning in Latin American countries often exhibit a shared heritage that contrasts with the inductive, precedent-driven approach of common law systems like that of North Carolina. The question probes the student’s ability to identify the historical legal tradition that most significantly shaped the conceptual framework of many Latin American civil law systems, distinguishing it from other influential legal historical currents.

The question probes the application of the principle of *res judicata* (claim preclusion) within the context of North Carolina’s engagement with international legal principles, specifically concerning civil judgments originating from Latin American jurisdictions. *Res judicata* prevents the relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated on the merits in a prior action between the same parties or their privies. In North Carolina, the enforceability of foreign judgments is governed by statutes and common law principles. While North Carolina does not have a specific statute mirroring the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, courts generally recognize and enforce judgments from foreign countries, including Latin American nations, under principles of comity, provided certain conditions are met. These conditions typically include that the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, that the judgment was rendered after due process, and that the judgment was not obtained by fraud or contrary to North Carolina public policy. In this scenario, the prior lawsuit in Colombia resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The subsequent lawsuit in North Carolina involves the same parties and the same cause of action. Therefore, the doctrine of *res judicata* would apply to bar the North Carolina action, assuming the Colombian court had competent jurisdiction and the proceedings met due process standards, which are the typical prerequisites for recognizing foreign judgments. The fact that the legal systems are different (Colombian civil law versus North Carolina common law) does not, in itself, preclude the application of *res judicata*. The core principle is that a matter once litigated and decided cannot be relitigated. North Carolina courts, in applying comity, will generally give conclusive effect to foreign judgments that are final, conclusive, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. The existence of a potential defense under North Carolina law that was not raised or litigated in the Colombian proceedings does not negate the preclusive effect of the prior judgment. The focus is on whether the claim itself was, or could have been, litigated in the first forum.

The scenario presented involves a dispute over water rights between two agricultural cooperatives in North Carolina, one with historical reliance on a shared river and another that has recently established irrigation systems drawing from the same source. This situation implicates principles of water law, particularly those that govern riparian rights and prior appropriation, as adapted within the North Carolina legal framework and potentially influenced by Latin American legal traditions concerning communal resource management. North Carolina primarily follows a riparian rights system, which grants rights to landowners whose property abuts a watercourse. Under this system, reasonable use of the water is permitted, but it cannot unreasonably interfere with the use of other riparian owners. However, the increasing demand and the establishment of new users necessitate a closer examination of how North Carolina courts balance competing water needs. The question asks about the most likely legal argument the newer cooperative would employ to secure its water access. Given the riparian system, the newer cooperative, even if not directly abutting the river but drawing from it via an established system, would likely argue for a right based on beneficial use and the historical context of water availability. They might also invoke principles of equitable apportionment if the river’s flow is insufficient for all. However, the core of their defense would likely hinge on demonstrating that their use is reasonable and does not unduly harm the established rights of the older cooperative. The concept of “prior use” is more central to appropriation systems, but in a riparian context, the length of time a user has relied on the water can be a factor in determining reasonableness and priority of use, especially in periods of scarcity. Therefore, arguing that their established irrigation system represents a reasonable and beneficial use that predates the current conflict, and that their withdrawal is not causing unreasonable harm, would be a strong legal stance. The older cooperative would counter with their historical riparian rights and the argument that the newer cooperative’s use is detrimental to their established needs. The legal system would then weigh these competing claims. The most effective argument for the newer cooperative would be to frame their usage as a reasonable and beneficial use that has become established, even if their claim is not based on direct riparian frontage in the strictest sense, but rather on a recognized water withdrawal system. This aligns with demonstrating that their water rights have accrued through consistent and beneficial use, which is a recognized, albeit often secondary, consideration in riparian law when balancing competing interests.

The question probes the application of principles of due process and procedural fairness within the context of a North Carolina civil dispute involving a party with a primary legal connection to a civil law jurisdiction in Latin America. Specifically, it tests the understanding of how a North Carolina court would balance the need for efficient adjudication with the fundamental rights of a defendant who may be unfamiliar with common law procedural norms. The core concept is the extraterritorial application of certain due process guarantees, particularly concerning notice and the opportunity to be heard, when a foreign national is involved in litigation in a US state. North Carolina’s Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly those governing service of process (e.g., Rule 4) and the broader principles of due process enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are central. A foreign national defendant, even if served via an internationally recognized method like through their country’s judicial authorities or a designated agent, must still receive notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise them of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their defenses. The principle of comity, which guides courts in respecting the laws and judicial decisions of foreign nations, also plays a role, but it does not supersede fundamental due process rights. Therefore, a court would consider whether the method of service, even if compliant with international conventions like the Hague Service Convention, genuinely provided the defendant with adequate knowledge of the proceedings and a meaningful chance to participate. The scenario implies a potential challenge to the jurisdiction or the validity of the judgment based on inadequate notice, even if the service itself followed a recognized international protocol. The correct approach involves assessing the *practical* effect of the service on the defendant’s ability to defend themselves, rather than merely adhering to a formalistic procedural step. This requires an examination of the specific circumstances of the notification and the defendant’s cultural and linguistic context, ensuring that the notice was indeed effective in enabling a defense.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the application of North Carolina’s principles of comity and the enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly those originating from civil law jurisdictions like Colombia, which have distinct procedural and substantive legal frameworks. North Carolina courts, when faced with a request to enforce a foreign judgment, will generally examine whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, whether due process was afforded to the defendant, and whether the judgment itself is contrary to North Carolina’s public policy. In this case, the Colombian judgment for restitution of assets derived from a corruption investigation presents a complex public policy question. While North Carolina generally favors the enforcement of foreign judgments, it also has a strong public policy against profiting from illicit activities. The concept of “unjust enrichment” is a relevant consideration, as is the principle that judgments obtained through fraudulent means or that violate fundamental fairness should not be enforced. The specific nature of the “restitution” ordered by the Colombian court, tied directly to recovered assets from corruption, implicates North Carolina’s policy against aiding or recognizing the fruits of corruption. Therefore, a thorough review would focus on the procedural regularity of the Colombian proceedings, the jurisdiction of the Colombian court, and whether the enforcement of this specific judgment would contravene North Carolina’s public policy regarding corruption and illicit gains. The question of whether the Colombian proceedings were fair and afforded adequate due process to the defendant, Mr. Ramirez, is paramount. If the Colombian court lacked jurisdiction or if Mr. Ramirez was not properly notified or given an opportunity to defend himself, North Carolina would likely refuse enforcement. Furthermore, if the Colombian judgment itself is seen as an attempt to legitimize or benefit from assets obtained through corruption, it could be deemed contrary to North Carolina’s public policy. The court would weigh the principles of international comity against the imperative to uphold domestic public policy. The determination hinges on a careful analysis of whether the Colombian judgment, in its substance and the process by which it was rendered, aligns with the fundamental legal and ethical standards recognized within North Carolina.

The core of this question lies in understanding the concept of *ius commune* and its influence on the development of civil law systems, particularly as it might be perceived or applied in a comparative context within North Carolina’s legal landscape, which, while primarily common law, has historical and ongoing interactions with civil law traditions through immigration and international trade. The question probes the practical application of Roman law principles, which form the bedrock of *ius commune*, in a contemporary common law jurisdiction. The scenario involves a dispute over contractual interpretation concerning a maritime salvage agreement. While North Carolina operates under a common law system, the principles of *ius commune*, particularly those derived from Roman law concerning obligations and contracts, can inform the understanding of foundational legal concepts that might be present in international maritime law, which often draws from civil law traditions. The task is to identify which foundational Roman legal principle, as codified or understood within the broader *ius commune*, would most directly influence the interpretation of such an agreement in a comparative legal analysis, even if not directly enforceable in a North Carolina court without statutory adoption. The principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept) is a fundamental tenet of contract law across most legal systems, including those derived from *ius commune*. This principle emphasizes the binding nature of contractual obligations. In the context of maritime salvage, where prompt action and clear agreements are crucial, the expectation that agreed-upon terms will be upheld is paramount. While specific North Carolina statutes or common law precedents would govern the actual adjudication in a North Carolina court, the question asks about the underlying legal philosophy that informs the interpretation of such agreements from a comparative civil law perspective. Therefore, *pacta sunt servanda* is the most fitting principle that aligns with the idea of enforcing contractual promises, a concept deeply embedded in the *ius commune* and relevant to understanding the civil law underpinnings that might influence international legal instruments. Other principles, while important in Roman law, are less directly applicable to the core contractual interpretation in this specific scenario. For instance, *res judicata* pertains to the finality of judgments, *res ipsa loquitur* is a doctrine of evidence concerning negligence, and *audi alteram partem* relates to the right to a fair hearing. None of these directly address the fundamental enforceability of contractual terms in the way *pacta sunt servanda* does.