In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the plaintiff’s contractual rights, causing damage. Improper interference can be established by showing that the defendant acted with malice or used unlawful means. The defendant’s conduct must be more than just negligent; it must be a deliberate act to disrupt the contractual relationship. The interference must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. New Hampshire law, as reflected in cases like Bell v.,’” emphasizes the need for a deliberate and wrongful act by the defendant. The analysis centers on the defendant’s intent and the nature of their actions, not merely the economic impact on the plaintiff. For instance, if a third party induces a breach of contract solely for their own legitimate business advantage without employing wrongful means, and without malice, it may not constitute tortious interference. The focus is on the wrongful nature of the interference itself. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were the direct and foreseeable cause of the loss of the contract or the benefits thereof.

The scenario involves a potential claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) in New Hampshire. For a bystander to recover for NIED, New Hampshire law, following the framework established in *Dillon v. Legg* and adopted with modifications in various jurisdictions, generally requires the plaintiff to demonstrate they were within the zone of danger of the defendant’s negligent conduct. This means the plaintiff must have been close enough to the accident that they could have been physically harmed themselves. Furthermore, the plaintiff must have a close relationship with the victim of the negligence, and they must have contemporaneously observed the injury to the victim. In this case, while Elara heard the crash and saw the aftermath, she was not present at the immediate scene of the accident and did not contemporaneously witness the negligent act that caused the injury to her brother, Silas. Her distress stems from learning about the incident and its consequences, rather than from witnessing the negligent act itself. Therefore, she does not meet the criteria for a bystander claim for NIED under New Hampshire’s established principles.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing severe emotional distress, and actual causation of severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or annoyances are insufficient. The emotional distress itself must be severe, meaning it is more than transient or trivial distress; it must be so profound that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. In this scenario, while Mr. Henderson’s actions were undoubtedly unpleasant and caused Mr. Davies significant distress, they do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as defined by New Hampshire law. The employer’s actions, though unprofessional and potentially a breach of workplace policy, were directed at the employee’s performance and were not intended to cause severe emotional distress through extreme means. The repeated criticism, while harsh, was delivered within the context of employment supervision. The distress experienced by Mr. Davies, while real, must be evaluated against the high threshold for severity required for IIED. Without evidence that the employer’s conduct was truly beyond the pale of civilized conduct and that the resulting distress was so profound as to be unendurable by a reasonable person, an IIED claim would likely fail. Therefore, the employer’s actions, while potentially actionable under other tort theories or employment law, do not satisfy the stringent requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress in New Hampshire.

In New Hampshire, the tort of battery occurs when a defendant intentionally causes harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff. The intent required is the intent to cause the contact, not necessarily the intent to cause harm or offense. The contact can be direct or indirect. For example, if a person intentionally throws an object at another person, and it strikes them, that constitutes battery if the contact is harmful or offensive. The plaintiff does not need to prove actual physical injury; the offense to personal dignity is sufficient. The defendant’s motive is generally irrelevant to the existence of battery, as long as the intent to make contact is present. In this scenario, Mr. Abernathy intentionally swung his briefcase, intending to make contact with Ms. Dubois. Even though his primary motive might have been to clear a path or express frustration, the act of swinging the briefcase with the intention of it hitting Ms. Dubois satisfies the intent element for battery. The resulting contact, being both harmful and offensive, establishes the tort.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove several elements. First, the existence of a valid contract or business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. Second, the defendant’s knowledge of this contract or relationship. Third, the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with that contract or relationship, which causes a breach or termination. Fourth, damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the interference. The “improper” nature of the interference is a key element, and New Hampshire courts consider factors such as the nature of the conduct, the defendant’s motive, and the relationship between the parties. Unlike some jurisdictions that might focus solely on malicious intent, New Hampshire law allows for a broader consideration of whether the interference was wrongful or exceeded the bounds of fair competition. This can include conduct that is fraudulent, deceitful, or involves the use of improper means. For instance, if a competitor in New Hampshire induces a party to breach a contract by making false representations about the plaintiff’s business, this would likely constitute improper interference. The measure of damages typically aims to compensate the plaintiff for the losses directly attributable to the interference, which could include lost profits or the cost of securing an alternative.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress or recklessness as to the probability of causing it, and actual causation of severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or trivial annoyances do not suffice. The distress must be severe, meaning it is more than mere upset, worry, or humiliation. The plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen that the conduct would cause severe emotional distress. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has emphasized that the context and the relationship between the parties are crucial in determining whether conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous. For instance, conduct by someone in a position of authority or power over the victim may be viewed differently than similar conduct between equals. The plaintiff’s particular susceptibility, if known to the defendant, can also be a factor. However, the conduct itself must be inherently extreme and outrageous, not merely the plaintiff’s reaction to it. In this scenario, while the actions were undoubtedly distressing and potentially actionable under other tort theories, the specific facts presented do not meet the high threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct required for IIED in New Hampshire. The employer’s actions, though unprofessional and creating a hostile work environment, are more akin to harassment or potentially negligent infliction of emotional distress, rather than the intentional, extreme, and outrageous conduct necessary for IIED. The employer’s behavior, while unpleasant, does not rise to the level of conduct that a reasonable person in New Hampshire would find utterly intolerable in a civilized community, especially when considering the context of a workplace dispute that did not involve threats of physical harm or prolonged, systematic psychological torment designed to break the victim.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this relationship or expectancy; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. New Hampshire law, like many jurisdictions, recognizes that “improper” interference can encompass a variety of actions, including those that are illegal, unethical, or malicious. The focus is on the defendant’s conduct and intent. A key element is whether the defendant’s actions were directed at the plaintiff’s contractual rights with the specific purpose of disrupting them, rather than merely a foreseeable consequence of legitimate business competition. For instance, inducing a party to breach a contract through fraudulent misrepresentation or threats would clearly be improper. Conversely, a competitor simply outbidding a party for a contract, even if it causes the plaintiff to lose the contract, is generally not considered tortious interference if the competition is fair and lawful. The analysis often involves weighing the defendant’s motives and the means employed against the plaintiff’s rights and the public interest. The plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between the defendant’s interference and their loss.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress. The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or petty oppressions do not suffice. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were directed at them and were intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, severe emotional distress. The distress itself must be severe, meaning more than transient or temporary annoyance or discomfort. New Hampshire law does not require physical manifestation of the emotional distress, but the severity is a key element. For instance, a single, isolated incident, even if unpleasant, may not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct unless it is coupled with a pattern of harassment or abuse, or targets a particularly vulnerable plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and their severe emotional distress.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended to cause severe emotional distress, and actually caused severe emotional distress. The “extreme and outrageous” standard is a high bar, meaning the conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. New Hampshire case law, such as *Chagnon v. Union-Leader Corp.*, emphasizes that mere insults, indignities, or petty oppressions do not suffice. The conduct must be directed at the plaintiff, or the defendant must know the plaintiff is present and the conduct is directed at a member of the plaintiff’s immediate family. The distress must be severe, meaning it goes beyond what a reasonable person would be expected to endure. For instance, if a plaintiff suffers from a pre-existing mental condition that is exacerbated by the defendant’s conduct, the defendant may be liable if they knew or should have known about the condition and the conduct was calculated to exploit it. However, if the conduct, while unpleasant, does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous, or if the resulting distress is not severe, the claim will likely fail. The analysis focuses on the nature of the conduct itself and the resulting impact on the plaintiff, considering all surrounding circumstances.

The scenario presents a situation involving a potential claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under New Hampshire law. New Hampshire follows the “zone of danger” rule for NIED claims when the plaintiff is not physically injured. This rule requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that they were in the zone of physical danger created by the defendant’s negligence and that they suffered serious emotional distress as a result of fearing for their own physical safety. In this case, Elara was not physically harmed, but she witnessed the near-miss accident involving her child, Finn, who was in the immediate path of the out-of-control vehicle. Elara’s distress stemmed directly from her fear for Finn’s safety, placing her within the zone of danger. The severity of her emotional distress, manifesting as severe anxiety and insomnia, is a critical element to prove. The defendant’s actions created the danger, and Elara’s close proximity to that danger, through her fear for her child, satisfies the “zone of danger” requirement. Therefore, Elara has a viable claim for NIED.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires proof of four elements: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, or a business relationship with a definite expectation of continuation; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this relationship or expectation; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with the relationship, which proximately causes the plaintiff to lose the benefit of the contract or relationship; and (4) actual damages. The “improper” nature of the interference is a key consideration, often assessed by examining the defendant’s motive, the means used, and the social interests involved. New Hampshire law, as reflected in cases like *Plante v. N.H. Bd. of Hearing & Appeal*, emphasizes that mere competition, even if aggressive, is generally not considered improper interference unless it involves unlawful acts or malicious intent. The interference must be directed at the contract itself, not merely at the plaintiff’s general business. The question hinges on whether the defendant’s actions, specifically the direct solicitation of the plaintiff’s existing clients under contract with the plaintiff, constituted an improper interference. Given that the defendant knew of the contracts and specifically targeted those clients with offers to terminate their existing agreements and enter into new ones with the defendant, this conduct goes beyond mere competition and directly undermines the plaintiff’s contractual rights, thus satisfying the elements of the tort.

The scenario involves a potential claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in New Hampshire. For IIED to be actionable in New Hampshire, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended to cause severe emotional distress, and that the conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. The standard for “extreme and outrageous” conduct is high, meaning it must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or annoyances, however, are not sufficient. In this case, while the repeated, baseless accusations and the public nature of the allegations are distressing, they do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required by New Hampshire law for IIED. The defendant’s actions, while malicious and damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation, are more likely to be addressed through a defamation claim, if the statements were false and caused reputational harm, or potentially a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations if specific business relationships were targeted. However, the specific elements of IIED, particularly the “extreme and outrageous” element, are not met by the described conduct alone. Therefore, an IIED claim would likely fail.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress. The standard for “extreme and outrageous” conduct is high, meaning it must go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or annoyances are generally insufficient. Causation requires a direct link between the conduct and the distress. The distress must be severe, meaning it would be unbearable for a reasonable person to endure. For instance, a landlord repeatedly threatening eviction without legal basis, coupled with the destruction of a tenant’s personal property and public humiliation, could potentially rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct if it causes severe emotional distress. However, a single instance of rude behavior or a false accusation, without more, would likely not meet the threshold in New Hampshire. The analysis centers on the nature of the conduct and the resulting harm.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress, and that such conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Merely rude or insensitive behavior, even if hurtful, is generally insufficient. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant acted with the intent to cause severe emotional distress or with reckless disregard of a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress would follow. New Hampshire follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 in defining the elements of IIED. For a claim to succeed, the distress must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. The scenario involves a landlord who, knowing of the tenant’s phobia of rodents, repeatedly leaves dead rodents in the tenant’s mailbox, accompanied by mocking notes. This conduct is extreme and outrageous, exceeding mere annoyance or inconvenience. The landlord’s knowledge of the tenant’s phobia and the deliberate placement of dead rodents, coupled with mocking messages, strongly suggests an intent to cause severe emotional distress. The recurring nature of the acts and the specific phobia targeted amplify the outrageousness. Such actions are likely to cause a reasonable person in the tenant’s position to suffer severe emotional distress, satisfying the final element. Therefore, the landlord’s actions would likely constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress under New Hampshire law.

In New Hampshire, the tort of malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to prove that the prior proceeding was (1) instituted by the defendant, (2) without probable cause, (3) with malice, and (4) terminated in favor of the plaintiff. The element of “termination in favor of the plaintiff” is crucial. This means that the underlying legal action must have concluded in a way that vindicates the plaintiff. A voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff without prejudice, while ending the prior action, does not necessarily imply a finding of no probable cause or a lack of wrongdoing by the party who initiated it. In contrast, a dismissal with prejudice, an acquittal in a criminal case, or a judgment in favor of the defendant in a civil case all satisfy this termination requirement. Therefore, if the initial defamation suit filed by Mr. Abernathy against Ms. Dubois was dismissed voluntarily by Mr. Abernathy without prejudice, Ms. Dubois cannot establish the fourth element of malicious prosecution under New Hampshire law. This is because such a dismissal does not amount to an adjudication on the merits that would prove Mr. Abernathy lacked probable cause to bring the suit.

The scenario presents a situation involving a potential claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) in New Hampshire. Under New Hampshire law, for a bystander to recover for NIED, they generally must have been within the “zone of danger” created by the defendant’s negligence, meaning they were at risk of physical harm themselves. Additionally, the emotional distress must be severe and a direct result of witnessing the negligent act or its immediate aftermath. In this case, while Elara suffered severe emotional distress, her distress stemmed from witnessing the aftermath of the accident involving her cousin, not from being in immediate danger of physical harm herself. She was not a direct participant in the event that endangered her cousin, nor was she in the zone of danger. Therefore, she cannot recover for NIED as a bystander under the traditional zone of danger rule applied in New Hampshire. The fact that she later learned her cousin was unharmed does not negate the initial severe emotional distress she experienced upon witnessing the scene, but it is the lack of being in the zone of danger that is the primary impediment to her claim in this context.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the plaintiff’s contractual rights, causing damage. The elements typically include: 1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; 2) the defendant’s knowledge of this contract; 3) the defendant’s intentional and improper act of inducing or causing a breach of the contract; and 4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. Improper interference can encompass a range of conduct, from direct persuasion to more subtle means. New Hampshire law, as reflected in cases like Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. John. D. Williams Co., emphasizes that the interference must be wrongful or improper, not merely that the defendant sought to gain a competitive advantage. The focus is on the nature of the defendant’s conduct and its effect on the contractual relationship. In this scenario, the plaintiff, a small artisanal cheese maker in Concord, New Hampshire, had a contract with a local gourmet food distributor. The defendant, a larger, established cheese producer from Vermont, knowing of this contract, began offering significantly lower prices to the distributor for their own products, thereby encouraging the distributor to reduce its orders from the plaintiff, ultimately leading to the plaintiff’s breach of contract with its supplier. The defendant’s actions were calculated to divert business away from the plaintiff by exploiting its existing contractual relationship with the distributor, thereby constituting an improper interference. The plaintiff’s damages would stem from lost profits and potential damage to its reputation due to the inability to fulfill its own supply obligations.

In New Hampshire, the tort of battery requires an intentional, unconsented, and harmful or offensive contact with the person of another. The intent element refers to the intent to cause the contact, not necessarily the intent to cause harm. Even if the actor did not desire the contact, but knew with substantial certainty that it would occur, the intent requirement can be satisfied. For example, if a person deliberately throws a rock with the intent to hit another person, and the rock strikes that person, it constitutes battery. The unconsented aspect means the contact was not permitted by the victim. Harmful contact involves physical injury, while offensive contact is one that would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity. The defendant’s motive or justification for the contact is generally irrelevant to the initial finding of battery, although it may be relevant to affirmative defenses.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal connection between the conduct and the distress, and severe emotional distress. The standard for “extreme and outrageous” conduct is high, meaning conduct that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or petty oppressions do not suffice. The conduct must be directed at the plaintiff, or the defendant must know the plaintiff is present and intend to cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff. New Hampshire case law emphasizes the objective nature of the conduct, looking at whether a reasonable person would find it outrageous. The distress must be severe, meaning it is more than mere worry, anxiety, or hurt feelings; it must be a significant emotional impact. The causal link requires that the outrageous conduct be the cause of the severe emotional distress.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires the plaintiff to prove four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or annoyances do not suffice. The severity of the emotional distress is also a critical factor; it must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. In this scenario, while the actions of the landlord were certainly unpleasant and arguably inconsiderate, they do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as defined by New Hampshire law. The landlord’s actions, though violating a lease provision regarding quiet enjoyment and potentially constituting a breach of contract, lacked the requisite intent to cause severe emotional distress and did not involve the kind of extreme or outrageous behavior typically required for an IIED claim. For instance, the landlord did not engage in threats, prolonged harassment, or public humiliation. The distress experienced by the tenant, while understandable, does not appear to meet the high threshold of severity required for this particular tort. Therefore, an IIED claim would likely fail.

The scenario describes a situation involving potential liability for negligent entrustment under New Hampshire law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person supplies a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or should know to be incompetent, reckless, or otherwise unfit for its use, or when the supplier fails to exercise reasonable care in entrusting the chattel. In this case, the owner of the antique firearm, Mr. Abernathy, is entrusting it to Ms. Gable. The critical factor is whether Mr. Abernathy knew or should have known that Ms. Gable was unfit to handle the firearm. The fact that Ms. Gable had previously demonstrated a lack of understanding of safe firearm handling, specifically by mishandling it and causing a minor injury to herself, establishes that Mr. Abernathy had notice of her potential incompetence or recklessness. Therefore, entrusting the firearm to her without further precautions or training, especially given its antique and potentially sensitive nature, could be considered a breach of his duty of care. The subsequent accidental discharge, causing damage to the historical artifact, directly flows from this negligent entrustment. The measure of damages would typically aim to restore the injured party to the position they would have been in had the tort not occurred, which in this context involves the cost of repairing or replacing the damaged artifact.

In New Hampshire, the tort of battery requires an intentional, unconsented harmful or offensive contact with the person of another. The intent element for battery, as with assault, is the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or the intent to cause apprehension of such contact. It is not necessary that the defendant intend to cause the specific harm that results. For instance, if a defendant intends to playfully push someone and that push causes the person to fall and break an arm, the intent to make contact is sufficient for battery. The crucial aspect is the volitional act of making contact, coupled with the lack of consent. In the scenario presented, the defendant’s action of deliberately knocking the plaintiff’s glass from his hand constitutes an intentional act. The contact with the plaintiff’s hand, which resulted in the glass shattering and causing injury, is a direct consequence of this intentional act. The lack of consent to this contact is evident, as no reasonable person would consent to having their drink forcefully removed from their hand in such a manner. Therefore, the elements of intent, unconsented contact, and resulting harm are all present, establishing a prima facie case for battery under New Hampshire tort law. The defendant’s subsequent apology or the minor nature of the initial contact (knocking the glass) does not negate the intentional unconsented contact that caused harm. The injury, even if unintended in its severity, flows from the intentional act of contact.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress. The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so terrible in form, as to shock the conscience and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mere insults, indignities, or petty oppressions do not suffice. The defendant must have intended to cause severe emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress would follow. Causation links the outrageous conduct to the distress, and the distress itself must be significant, not merely transient or trivial. For example, a single instance of verbal abuse, however unpleasant, is unlikely to meet the threshold for IIED in New Hampshire unless it is accompanied by other aggravating factors or a pattern of harassment that escalates to extreme and outrageous behavior. The severity of the emotional distress is a critical element, and the plaintiff must demonstrate more than mere upset or annoyance; it requires substantial and debilitating emotional harm.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, causation, and severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Merely insulting or offensive behavior is generally insufficient. In this scenario, while Mr. Abernathy’s actions were undeniably unpleasant and caused distress, they likely do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as defined by New Hampshire law for IIED. The employer’s actions, though potentially creating a hostile work environment claim under employment law, do not meet the high threshold for IIED. The actions, while unprofessional and potentially embarrassing, were confined to a workplace setting and did not involve physical threats or severe psychological manipulation that would be considered beyond the pale of civilized society. Therefore, the conduct, as described, would not typically support an IIED claim in New Hampshire.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the existence of a valid contract or business relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with the contract or relationship; and (4) resulting damages. The “improper” nature of the interference is a key element. New Hampshire courts consider several factors when assessing impropriety, including the nature of the actor’s conduct, the actor’s motive, the interests sought to be protected by the actor’s conduct, and the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other party. While a competitor may lawfully solicit business from a party to a contract, such solicitation becomes tortious if it is accompanied by fraudulent misrepresentations or other wrongful means designed to induce a breach. The focus is on the defendant’s intent and the methods employed. If the interference is merely incidental to legitimate business competition and lacks malicious intent or the use of unlawful means, it is generally not considered tortious. Therefore, if the defendant’s actions, though causing a breach, were primarily driven by a desire to secure a legitimate business advantage through fair means, and not by an intent to harm the plaintiff’s contractual interests, the interference may not be deemed improper under New Hampshire law. The absence of malice and the presence of a legitimate business purpose, when weighed against the impact on the plaintiff’s contract, are crucial considerations in determining impropriety.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress, and actual causation of severe emotional distress. The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. New Hampshire law, as established in cases like F.B. v. A.L. (2006), emphasizes that mere insults, indignities, or trivialities do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The distress must be severe, meaning it is more than mere temporary annoyance or fright; it must be substantial and significant. In this scenario, while the actions of Mr. Grimsby were certainly unpleasant and unprofessional, they do not meet the high threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct required by New Hampshire law for IIED. His actions, though embarrassing and causing significant worry and distress, likely fall short of conduct that would be considered utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The fact that the distress was temporary and resolved with medical attention further suggests it may not meet the severity requirement. Therefore, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress would likely fail.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove several elements. The plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy. Second, the defendant must have had knowledge of this relationship or expectancy. Third, the defendant must have intentionally and improperly interfered with the plaintiff’s contractual or business relationship. “Improperly” is a key element, and New Hampshire courts consider factors such as the nature of the conduct, the actor’s motive, and the interests sought to be protected. This interference must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. For instance, if a third party, knowing of a contract between two businesses, actively solicits the customer to break that contract and enter into a new one with them, and this solicitation is done through fraudulent misrepresentation or other wrongful means, the interference could be deemed improper. The damages sought would typically be the lost profits or other financial losses directly attributable to the breach caused by the interference. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has emphasized that the interference must be more than mere competition; it must involve some form of wrongful or malicious conduct.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause, and which does cause, severe emotional distress. The conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. New Hampshire law, as established in cases like *Chagnon v. Union-Leader Corp.*, emphasizes the severity of the emotional distress, which must be more than mere upset or annoyance. The conduct must be directed at the plaintiff, and the defendant must have intended to cause severe emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress would follow. For example, a single, albeit offensive, comment, even if made with malicious intent, may not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct if it does not result in severe emotional distress. The analysis hinges on the nature of the conduct, the context in which it occurred, and the impact on the plaintiff.

In New Hampshire, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires proof of four elements: (1) the existence of a valid contract or business relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this contract or relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with the contract or relationship; and (4) resulting damage to the plaintiff. The “improper” nature of the interference is a key element, often assessed by considering factors such as the motive of the interfering party, the social interests involved, the interests sought to be protected by the contract, and the relations between the parties. New Hampshire law, as articulated in cases like Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. J.W. Realty, Inc., emphasizes that mere competition, even if it causes financial harm, is generally not considered improper interference. The interference must go beyond fair competition and involve some wrongful act or motive. For instance, a competitor inducing a party to breach a contract through fraudulent misrepresentations or threats would likely be considered improper. Conversely, a competitor simply offering better terms or services, leading a customer to switch, is typically not actionable. The question revolves around whether the defendant’s actions, in this case, an aggressive marketing campaign that included disparaging remarks about the plaintiff’s product quality, constituted improper interference. While disparagement can be a tort in itself (defamation or trade libel), when used to induce a breach of contract, it can also be evidence of improper motive for the interference. However, if the disparaging remarks, while unpleasant, were not demonstrably false or did not rise to the level of defamation, and the primary driver for the customer’s decision to switch was the defendant’s superior product offering or pricing, then the interference might not be deemed improper under New Hampshire law. The crucial distinction lies in whether the defendant’s conduct was directed at disrupting the plaintiff’s contractual relationships through wrongful means, or if it was a legitimate, albeit aggressive, business practice aimed at gaining market share through superior offerings. Without evidence of wrongful acts or a primary motive to harm the plaintiff’s contractual relationships rather than to compete, the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations would likely fail.

The scenario involves a potential claim for intentional torts. The core issue is whether the defendant’s actions constituted battery. Battery, in tort law, is defined as the intentional touching of another person in a harmful or offensive manner without consent. The intent required for battery is the intent to cause the contact, not necessarily the intent to cause harm or offense. In this case, Bartholomew intentionally steered his snowmobile directly towards Penelope’s parked vehicle, knowing that this action would inevitably result in contact. The contact with Penelope’s vehicle, even if it was not directly with her person, can be considered offensive if it is an unpermitted invasion of her possessory interest in her property, and in this context, can be analogized to offensive contact with her person for the purposes of establishing the tort. The fact that Penelope was inside the vehicle at the time of the impact is crucial. The snowmobile’s impact with the vehicle directly transmitted force to Penelope. Therefore, Bartholomew’s action of steering the snowmobile with the intent to make contact with the vehicle, which resulted in contact with Penelope inside, satisfies the elements of battery under New Hampshire law. The proximate cause is established because the collision was a direct and foreseeable consequence of Bartholomew’s intentional act. The lack of consent is evident as Penelope did not agree to have her vehicle or herself impacted by Bartholomew’s snowmobile.