The core issue here revolves around the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States law, specifically as it pertains to acts of terrorism and the application of federal statutes like the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). While the ATS has been significantly narrowed by Supreme Court decisions, particularly regarding claims against corporations for violations of customary international law, it historically allowed for suits by aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations. The ATS, under its original interpretation, could potentially reach conduct occurring outside the U.S. if it violated established international norms and the defendant had sufficient connections to the U.S. However, post-Kiobel and Jesner decisions have emphasized a strong presumption against extraterritorial application unless Congress has clearly indicated otherwise. RICO, on the other hand, has a broader reach and can apply to conduct outside the U.S. if the predicate acts have a sufficient nexus to the United States. The question of whether a New Hampshire court, operating under state law, could directly prosecute an extraterritorial act of terrorism without specific federal authorization or a clear statutory basis for such extended jurisdiction is complex. New Hampshire, like other states, generally exercises jurisdiction based on territoriality, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or effects within the state. Prosecuting an act of terrorism committed entirely outside the U.S. by individuals with no direct ties to New Hampshire, even if the ultimate target was a U.S. interest or had downstream effects in New Hampshire, would require a specific legislative grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Such grants are rare in state law for international crimes, with primary jurisdiction typically residing with the federal government under specific international agreements and federal statutes. Therefore, without a specific New Hampshire statute explicitly granting extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorism committed abroad, or a direct connection to New Hampshire that triggers a recognized basis for jurisdiction, a prosecution under state law would likely be unsuccessful. The concept of universal jurisdiction, which allows states to prosecute certain international crimes regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, is primarily a matter of customary international law and is typically exercised by sovereign states through their national legal systems, often with specific legislative backing. New Hampshire’s criminal statutes are generally understood to apply within its territorial boundaries or to its residents. The scenario presented, involving an act of terrorism orchestrated and executed entirely outside the United States, with no direct New Hampshire residents as perpetrators or immediate victims, and no direct physical impact within New Hampshire, makes establishing state-level jurisdiction highly improbable under conventional legal principles.

The question pertains to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States, specifically concerning crimes committed by U.S. nationals abroad. Under U.S. federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 7, and further elaborated in cases like United States v. Bowman, the United States asserts jurisdiction over crimes committed by its citizens anywhere in the world. This principle is known as active personality jurisdiction. In the given scenario, Mr. Abernathy, a U.S. citizen residing in New Hampshire, commits an act of bribery against a foreign official in Canada. The act of bribery, even though occurring outside U.S. territory, is made criminal by U.S. law, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), when committed by a U.S. national. Therefore, the U.S. can exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Abernathy for this offense. The principle of territoriality, which bases jurisdiction on the location of the crime, would typically apply if the offense occurred within U.S. borders. The objective territorial principle could apply if the effects of the crime were felt in the U.S., but the primary basis for jurisdiction here is the nationality of the perpetrator. Universal jurisdiction applies to certain heinous crimes regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the location of the crime, but bribery of a foreign official by a U.S. national falls under active personality jurisdiction. The passive personality principle asserts jurisdiction when a national of the prosecuting state is the victim of a crime committed abroad, which is not the primary basis here.

The principle of complementarity in international criminal law, as established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC has jurisdiction only when national courts are genuinely unable or unwilling to prosecute. This principle is foundational to the ICC’s role as a court of last resort. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, has its own criminal justice system. The question probes the application of this international legal principle within a domestic context, specifically concerning the potential for a New Hampshire court to exercise jurisdiction over an act that might also fall under the ICC’s purview. The key is to understand how the ICC’s jurisdiction interacts with, and is limited by, the primary jurisdiction of states. If a New Hampshire court is actively and fairly prosecuting an individual for a crime that also constitutes a crime against humanity under international law, the ICC would generally defer to the state’s jurisdiction. This deference is not automatic; the ICC assesses whether the national proceedings are a sham or a genuine attempt to administer justice. The scenario implies a potential overlap in jurisdiction. The correct answer reflects the scenario where New Hampshire’s judicial system is demonstrably handling the case, thereby precluding ICC intervention due to the principle of complementarity. The question tests the understanding of jurisdictional hierarchies and the conditions under which international courts exercise their powers, particularly in relation to sovereign states like the United States, which is not a party to the Rome Statute but whose actions can still be scrutinized under certain circumstances. The focus is on the state’s primary right to prosecute its own citizens or those within its territory for crimes, even those with international dimensions, unless the state is demonstrably failing to do so.

The scenario presented involves a private entity, “Global AgriTech Solutions,” a corporation registered in New Hampshire, that has been accused of engaging in conduct that constitutes an international crime. Specifically, the allegations point to the deliberate contamination of staple crops in a developing nation, leading to widespread famine and significant loss of life. This act, if proven, would fall under the purview of crimes against humanity, particularly the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). New Hampshire, like all US states, is a sovereign entity within the United States federal system. The question of whether a New Hampshire-registered corporation can be prosecuted for international crimes abroad, or by an international tribunal, hinges on principles of jurisdiction and state responsibility. While the United States is not a state party to the Rome Statute, meaning US nationals are generally not subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction unless referred by the UN Security Council, this does not preclude national prosecution. New Hampshire’s own criminal statutes, and federal US law, may contain provisions that address extraterritorial offenses or complicity in international crimes. Furthermore, the concept of universal jurisdiction allows certain heinous crimes, regardless of where they are committed or the nationality of the perpetrator, to be prosecuted by any state. The key legal principle here is that a corporation, as a legal person, can be held accountable for criminal acts undertaken by its agents. Therefore, the question is not whether New Hampshire itself is prosecuting, but whether New Hampshire’s legal framework, or the framework of another jurisdiction with appropriate legal standing, can address the alleged actions of a corporation registered within its borders. The most direct and applicable legal avenue for holding a corporation accountable for such grave international offenses, especially when the conduct involves actions that could be characterized as war crimes or crimes against humanity, would be through its own national legal system or through an international mechanism if jurisdiction is established. Given the nature of the allegations, which imply systematic and widespread harm, the focus would be on the corporation’s intent and the consequences of its actions. The ability of a New Hampshire-registered corporation to be held accountable for international crimes hinges on the extraterritorial reach of national laws and the potential for international legal mechanisms to assert jurisdiction. The question tests the understanding of corporate criminal liability in the context of international law and the jurisdictional challenges involved.

The principle of universal jurisdiction allows national courts to prosecute individuals for certain heinous international crimes, regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. New Hampshire, like other states, can exercise this jurisdiction based on international customary law and, where applicable, treaty provisions. The key consideration for New Hampshire courts when asserting universal jurisdiction over a crime committed outside its territory, by a non-resident against a non-resident, is the presence of the alleged perpetrator within New Hampshire’s territorial boundaries at the time of prosecution. This physical presence is generally considered a prerequisite for a state to exercise jurisdiction, even under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, as it establishes a nexus between the accused and the forum state’s judicial system. Other jurisdictional bases like territoriality, nationality, or passive personality are not met in this scenario. Therefore, the most critical factor for New Hampshire to consider is whether the accused individual is physically present within the state’s jurisdiction, as this provides the territorial nexus required for the court to hear the case. This aligns with established principles of international law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the extraterritorial jurisdiction of New Hampshire law and the principles of international criminal law governing the prosecution of cybercrimes. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 632-A:1 et seq., concerning computer crimes, primarily focuses on offenses committed within the state’s territorial boundaries. However, international law recognizes principles like the “effects doctrine” or “objective territoriality,” which can extend jurisdiction to crimes committed abroad that have a substantial effect within a state’s territory. In this case, the unauthorized access and data manipulation, even if initiated in France, directly impacted the financial systems and customer data of a New Hampshire-based corporation, causing significant economic harm and disruption within New Hampshire. Therefore, New Hampshire courts could assert jurisdiction based on the effects of the criminal conduct within the state, despite the perpetrator’s location outside the United States. This is further supported by international legal principles that allow states to prosecute certain crimes that occur outside their territory but have a direct and substantial impact on their national interests or citizens. The principle of universal jurisdiction, while applicable to certain heinous crimes like genocide or piracy, is less likely to be the primary basis for jurisdiction in a case primarily involving financial cybercrime, although it could be considered if the scale of the disruption or the nature of the data compromised were sufficiently severe. The passive personality principle, which asserts jurisdiction when a national of the prosecuting state is a victim, is also relevant, as the corporation is a New Hampshire entity, and its customers, potentially New Hampshire residents, were affected. However, the objective territoriality principle, focusing on the situs of the harmful effects, provides the most direct and strongest basis for New Hampshire’s jurisdictional claim in this cybercrime context. The principle of nationality, asserting jurisdiction over a state’s own nationals regardless of where the crime occurs, is not applicable here as the perpetrator is not identified as a New Hampshire national.

The principle of complementarity, as enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC only intervenes when national jurisdictions are genuinely unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute core international crimes. This principle is fundamental to the ICC’s legitimacy and operational framework, ensuring that it acts as a court of last resort. The threshold for demonstrating unwillingness or inability is high. Unwillingness implies a deliberate intent to shield individuals from accountability, often through sham trials or politically motivated acquittals. Inability suggests a complete breakdown of the national legal system, rendering it incapable of functioning effectively, such as in situations of widespread conflict or state collapse where evidence cannot be collected or proceedings cannot be fairly conducted. The question probes the understanding of when the ICC would exercise its jurisdiction over alleged atrocities occurring within New Hampshire, considering the dual sovereignty of the United States and the ICC’s Statute. Given that the United States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction over US nationals or territory would typically arise only through a United Nations Security Council referral, or if the alleged crimes were committed in the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party. However, even in such a scenario, the principle of complementarity remains paramount. The ICC would not assert jurisdiction if New Hampshire’s state or federal courts were demonstrably capable and willing to prosecute the alleged crimes under relevant domestic and international law. The scenario presented implies that New Hampshire’s judicial system is functioning, thus the ICC would defer to its jurisdiction unless specific evidence of systemic failure or deliberate obstruction by the state or federal authorities to avoid prosecution was presented and accepted by the Court. Therefore, the most accurate assessment is that the ICC would not assume jurisdiction if New Hampshire’s legal system is functioning and capable of prosecuting the offenses.

The principle of universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute individuals for certain international crimes regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. This principle is rooted in the idea that some offenses are so heinous and universally condemned that any state has an interest in their suppression. In the context of New Hampshire, while the state itself does not directly prosecute international crimes under its own penal code in the same way a federal court might under federal statutes implementing treaties, New Hampshire courts could potentially encounter situations involving international criminal law principles through extradition requests or by applying principles of comity when dealing with foreign judgments or proceedings related to such crimes. However, the direct jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide primarily rests with the federal government of the United States, which has enacted legislation to implement its treaty obligations, such as the War Crimes Act. New Hampshire’s role would be ancillary, supporting federal efforts or dealing with issues arising from international legal interactions that might touch upon its borders or residents. The question probes the understanding of where primary jurisdiction for these severe international offenses lies within the U.S. legal framework, considering the distinct roles of federal and state legal systems. The correct answer identifies the primary locus of such prosecution, which is the federal system, as it is the U.S. federal government that ratifies treaties and enacts legislation to prosecute international crimes under its sovereignty.

The scenario presented involves an alleged violation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Specifically, the actions of the private security contractor, operating under contract with a foreign government but with alleged ties to a New Hampshire-based entity for recruitment and training, raise questions about extraterritorial jurisdiction and the scope of domestic law in addressing international human rights abuses. New Hampshire, like other US states, must consider how its own laws and the principles of international law intersect when individuals or entities within its borders are implicated in severe international crimes. The principle of universal jurisdiction, while not universally accepted for all crimes, is often applied to the most heinous offenses, such as torture. The legal basis for prosecuting such acts within the United States often relies on specific statutory grants of jurisdiction, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which allows civil actions against individuals for torture and extrajudicial killing committed under color of law. However, the question here is about criminal prosecution. Federal law, such as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), has historically provided a basis for civil claims by aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. For criminal matters, the question hinges on whether New Hampshire has enacted specific legislation that extends criminal liability for acts of torture committed abroad by its residents or entities operating under its jurisdiction, or if federal prosecution under international anti-torture statutes is the exclusive avenue. Given the complexity of establishing direct criminal jurisdiction for acts committed by a private contractor abroad, and the primary role of federal law in implementing international criminal norms within the US, the most appropriate response focuses on the existing framework for addressing such grave offenses. The scenario does not present a direct violation of New Hampshire’s penal code for acts committed entirely outside its territorial jurisdiction without a specific extraterritorial application clause relevant to torture. Therefore, the primary avenue for accountability, both civil and potentially criminal, would likely be through federal statutes and international cooperation, rather than a direct application of New Hampshire’s domestic criminal statutes for acts occurring solely in a foreign territory. The question asks about the *primary* legal basis for holding the New Hampshire-based entity accountable for the *criminal* aspects of the alleged torture. While civil liability might exist under federal law (like the TVPA if applicable to the entity’s role), and New Hampshire might have general aiding and abetting statutes, the specific criminal prosecution for an act of torture committed abroad by a contractor is most directly addressed by federal legislation designed to implement international obligations, such as those related to torture. Thus, the federal criminal statutes and their jurisdictional reach are the most pertinent legal framework to consider for criminal accountability in this context.

The principle of universal jurisdiction allows national courts to prosecute individuals for certain international crimes, regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. This principle is rooted in the idea that some crimes are so heinous they offend all of humanity, and thus any state has an interest in their suppression. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, operates within the framework of federal law regarding international criminal matters. While there is no specific New Hampshire statute creating a distinct international criminal jurisdiction separate from federal authority, New Hampshire courts can exercise jurisdiction over crimes that fall under international law if those crimes are also defined as offenses under New Hampshire or federal law, and if the jurisdictional nexus is established. The relevant jurisdictional bases for New Hampshire courts would typically involve the territorial principle (crime committed within New Hampshire), the nationality principle (perpetrator is a New Hampshire resident), or the passive personality principle (victim is a New Hampshire resident, though this is more commonly asserted in federal jurisdiction for international crimes). However, the question specifically asks about the *most direct* basis for prosecuting an individual for an international crime under New Hampshire law that is *not* explicitly codified as a distinct “international crime” statute within the state. This points towards the application of existing state criminal statutes to conduct that also constitutes an international crime, where the state has a clear jurisdictional link. For instance, if an act of torture, which is an international crime, also constitutes aggravated assault or a similar offense under New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA), and the act occurred within New Hampshire, the state court would have jurisdiction under the territorial principle to prosecute under the state law. The ability to prosecute under the umbrella of universal jurisdiction for crimes like genocide or war crimes is primarily a federal matter in the United States, often enacted through specific federal legislation like the War Crimes Act or statutes addressing torture. However, New Hampshire courts can and do prosecute crimes that overlap with international norms if a sufficient nexus exists under state law. The most direct and common basis for a state court to assert jurisdiction over an act that also constitutes an international crime, without a specific state “international crime” statute, is when the act violates existing state criminal laws and the territorial jurisdiction of New Hampshire is established. This allows the state to prosecute the conduct, thereby contributing to the enforcement of international norms without necessarily invoking the full scope of universal jurisdiction as exercised by federal courts or international tribunals.

The scenario presented involves a transnational criminal enterprise operating from a base in New Hampshire, engaging in cyber fraud that directly impacts individuals in Germany. The core legal issue revolves around establishing jurisdiction for prosecution. Under international criminal law, particularly concerning cybercrimes, several principles of jurisdiction can be invoked. The territorial principle asserts jurisdiction over crimes committed within a state’s territory. The nationality principle allows a state to prosecute its nationals for crimes committed abroad. The passive personality principle grants jurisdiction to a state when its nationals are victims of a crime committed abroad. The protective principle applies when conduct abroad threatens a state’s vital interests, such as its national security or economic integrity. Finally, the universality principle allows any state to prosecute certain heinous crimes regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. In this case, while the perpetrators are based in New Hampshire, the direct victims are in Germany, activating the passive personality principle for German authorities. However, for New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction over its own nationals or residents involved in the criminal activity, the territorial principle is primary, as the planning and execution originate from within its borders. Furthermore, if the cyber fraud impacts New Hampshire’s financial institutions or infrastructure, or if there’s evidence of conspiracy within New Hampshire, the protective principle could also be invoked by the United States, and by extension, New Hampshire authorities. The most robust basis for New Hampshire’s jurisdiction, given the origin of the criminal enterprise, is the territorial principle, as the acts constituting the conspiracy and enablement of the fraud occurred within its sovereign territory. The question asks for the *primary* basis of jurisdiction for New Hampshire. While other principles might be argued or used in conjunction, the location of the criminal enterprise’s operations is the most direct and foundational basis. Therefore, the territorial principle is the most applicable and primary basis for New Hampshire’s jurisdiction in this specific scenario.

The principle of universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute certain heinous international crimes regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. New Hampshire, as a sovereign state within the United States, generally exercises jurisdiction based on territoriality (crimes committed within its borders) or nationality (crimes committed by its citizens abroad). However, when addressing international crimes that shock the conscience of humanity, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, New Hampshire courts may look to the principles of universal jurisdiction, often as codified or enabled by federal law or international agreements to which the United States is a party. This is not an inherent power of every state court but rather an extension of international legal norms that can be incorporated into domestic law. The question tests the understanding of how a sub-national jurisdiction like New Hampshire would approach the prosecution of an individual for an international crime that falls under universal jurisdiction, considering the interplay between domestic law and international legal obligations. The correct answer reflects the mechanism through which such jurisdiction would be asserted, typically through legislative enactment or treaty incorporation that grants specific authority to domestic courts to exercise this broad jurisdictional reach for defined international offenses. The absence of a direct, explicit New Hampshire statute granting universal jurisdiction for all international crimes means that any such prosecution would rely on existing federal frameworks or specific legislative grants that align with international customary law.

The principle of complementarity, as enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction when national courts are unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute. This principle is foundational to the ICC’s role as a court of last resort. Unwillingness implies a deliberate intent to shield individuals from criminal responsibility, such as through sham trials or immunities not recognized by international law. Inability suggests a complete breakdown of the national judicial system, rendering it incapable of functioning effectively, perhaps due to widespread conflict or the collapse of state authority. For a state party to New Hampshire’s international criminal law framework, which often aligns with or supplements the ICC’s jurisdiction, assessing this “unwillingness” or “inability” is crucial before asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction or cooperating with international tribunals. The scenario presented involves a sovereign nation, Veridia, which has a functioning, albeit slow, judicial system. The delays and procedural irregularities, while concerning, do not inherently demonstrate a deliberate intent to shield perpetrators or a complete systemic collapse. Therefore, Veridia’s judicial system, despite its flaws, is considered capable of exercising jurisdiction. The core of complementarity is not about the efficiency or perfection of a national system, but its genuine capacity and willingness to prosecute. The actions of Veridia, while imperfect, do not rise to the level of demonstrating a lack of genuine will or capacity that would trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.

The scenario describes a situation where a New Hampshire resident, Ms. Anya Sharma, is accused of committing an act of financial fraud against individuals in Canada. The core legal issue here pertains to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of New Hampshire courts and the principles governing the prosecution of crimes with international elements. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, generally asserts jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territorial boundaries. However, when a crime has effects or is initiated outside the state but impacts its residents or economic interests, the concept of “long-arm jurisdiction” or the “effects doctrine” can come into play. In international criminal law, the principle of territoriality is primary, meaning jurisdiction is typically exercised by the state where the crime occurred. However, other bases for jurisdiction exist, including nationality (active personality principle), passive personality principle (where the victim is a national), and protective principle (where the crime affects state security). In this case, while the alleged fraud occurred in Canada, if Ms. Sharma is a New Hampshire resident and the planning or execution of the fraud involved actions within New Hampshire, or if the fraud directly impacted New Hampshire’s financial systems or residents in a significant way that warrants state intervention beyond what Canadian authorities might pursue, New Hampshire courts might assert jurisdiction. The question asks about the most appropriate basis for New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction. Given that Ms. Sharma is a resident of New Hampshire, the active personality principle, which allows a state to prosecute its nationals for crimes committed abroad, is a strong contender. However, the scenario emphasizes the impact on Canadian individuals. The passive personality principle, which allows jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim, would primarily be invoked by Canada. The protective principle is unlikely to apply here. The territorial principle would favor Canadian jurisdiction. Therefore, considering New Hampshire’s potential interest in regulating the conduct of its residents, even when the direct effects are abroad, and the potential for the planning or initiation of the fraud to have occurred within New Hampshire, the most fitting basis for New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction, particularly if the fraudulent scheme originated or was facilitated from within the state, would be a combination of territoriality (if acts occurred in NH) and potentially the active personality principle, or more broadly, the effects doctrine if the fraud had a demonstrable impact on New Hampshire’s interests or residents. However, without explicit evidence of planning within New Hampshire, and given the primary impact on Canadian victims, asserting jurisdiction solely based on the passive personality principle would be incorrect as it’s Canada’s interest. The question is designed to test the understanding of which principle *New Hampshire* would most likely rely upon. If the criminal conduct itself, or significant preparatory acts, occurred within New Hampshire, then territorial jurisdiction would be the primary basis. If the fraud was planned and initiated in New Hampshire by a New Hampshire resident, even if the victims were abroad, New Hampshire could assert jurisdiction. The question focuses on New Hampshire’s perspective. The active personality principle allows a state to prosecute its own nationals for offenses committed abroad. This is a well-established principle in international law and is often incorporated into domestic legal systems. Therefore, New Hampshire could prosecute Ms. Sharma based on her nationality and the commission of a criminal act, even if that act primarily affected foreign nationals in a foreign territory. The complexity arises from the international element and the potential for concurrent jurisdiction. However, for New Hampshire to assert its own jurisdiction, it needs a basis. The active personality principle provides this basis due to Ms. Sharma’s residency and presumed nationality. The effects doctrine is also relevant if the fraud had a substantial effect within New Hampshire, but the scenario focuses on Canadian victims.

The principle of universal jurisdiction allows certain international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture, to be prosecuted by any state, regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. New Hampshire, like other US states, can exercise jurisdiction over individuals present within its territory for crimes committed elsewhere, provided that such exercise of jurisdiction aligns with federal law and international legal norms. The scenario posits an individual accused of war crimes, specifically the systematic targeting of a civilian population in a conflict zone outside the United States. New Hampshire’s courts could potentially assert jurisdiction over this individual if they are apprehended within the state, under the principle of *exercising jurisdiction over persons present within the territory*. This is a well-established basis for jurisdiction in domestic and international law. The key is that the state is not asserting jurisdiction over the *territory* where the crimes occurred, but over the *person* who is now within its sovereign reach and is accused of grave international offenses. The concept of *aut dedere aut judicare* (extradite or prosecute) is also relevant, implying that if New Hampshire cannot or will not prosecute, it may have an obligation to extradite the individual to a state that can and will. However, the direct assertion of jurisdiction based on territorial presence for international crimes is a primary mechanism. The other options are less applicable. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator is usually exercised by the perpetrator’s home state. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim is less commonly the sole basis for universal jurisdiction unless specifically codified. Jurisdiction based on the effects of the crime within New Hampshire would typically apply to crimes like fraud or terrorism that have a direct and substantial impact on the state’s interests, which is not the primary basis for universal jurisdiction over war crimes.

The principle of complementarity, as established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of the most serious international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression) when national courts are genuinely unable or unwilling to do so. This principle is foundational to the ICC’s role as a court of last resort. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, has jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed within its territory. However, the question posits a scenario where a grave international crime is alleged to have occurred within New Hampshire, and the state’s legal system is demonstrably incapable of mounting a credible prosecution due to systemic failures, such as widespread corruption affecting the judiciary or law enforcement, or a complete breakdown of legal order rendering fair trials impossible. In such an extreme and hypothetical situation, the ICC’s jurisdiction would be triggered under the principle of complementarity. The ICC’s jurisdiction is not exclusive; it is complementary to national jurisdictions. Therefore, when a state, including a U.S. state like New Hampshire, is demonstrably unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute, the ICC may step in. This is not about overriding national sovereignty in ordinary circumstances, but about ensuring accountability for the most heinous international crimes when national systems fail. The ICC’s jurisdiction is thus contingent upon the absence of effective national proceedings.

The question probes the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States, specifically concerning criminal acts originating abroad but impacting the United States. Under international law principles, particularly the objective territoriality principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction over offenses that are completed or have substantial effects within its territory, even if the conduct itself occurred outside. New Hampshire, as a state within the U.S. federal system, can prosecute crimes that violate its specific laws and have a demonstrable impact within its borders. For instance, if a fraudulent scheme orchestrated in a foreign nation, like Canada, directly targets and causes financial harm to residents of New Hampshire, thereby violating New Hampshire’s fraud statutes, the state could assert jurisdiction. This is not based on the nationality of the perpetrator or victim alone, but on the situs of the harmful effect. The concept of “effects doctrine” is crucial here, allowing jurisdiction when the effects of an extraterritorial act are felt domestically. Therefore, the most appropriate legal basis for New Hampshire to prosecute such an offense, assuming the conduct meets the elements of a New Hampshire criminal statute and the impact is proven, would be the objective territoriality principle, as the harmful effects manifest within the state’s jurisdiction.

The principle of complementarity, as established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over international crimes when the relevant national legal system is unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute. This principle is central to the ICC’s mandate and aims to ensure that perpetrators of the most serious international crimes are held accountable. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, has its own criminal justice system. However, the question pertains to the extraterritorial reach and the potential for international prosecution, particularly in relation to crimes that might also fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. When considering a scenario where a New Hampshire resident is accused of a grave international crime committed outside the United States, the primary consideration for the ICC’s jurisdiction is the effectiveness of the national legal system where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator. If the United States, through its federal or state legal systems (including New Hampshire’s), is willing and able to prosecute the individual for these crimes, the ICC generally defers to that national jurisdiction. The U.S. is not a state party to the Rome Statute, but this does not preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction under specific circumstances, such as a referral by the UN Security Council or if the crime occurred on the territory of a state party. The core concept tested here is the primacy of national jurisdiction over international jurisdiction under the ICC framework, as embodied by the principle of complementarity. Therefore, the ICC’s ability to prosecute hinges on the failure of national systems, including those within the United States, to address the alleged crimes effectively.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the extraterritorial application of New Hampshire’s criminal statutes and the concept of universal jurisdiction. While New Hampshire has a vested interest in prosecuting crimes committed by its residents, the act of piracy, as defined under customary international law and codified in treaties like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a crime of universal jurisdiction. This means that any state, regardless of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, can assert jurisdiction. The question of whether New Hampshire can prosecute an act of piracy committed on the high seas by a citizen of Vermont against a vessel flagged by Panama, even if the accused is apprehended within New Hampshire’s borders, hinges on the interplay between state sovereignty, international law, and the specific extraterritorial reach of New Hampshire’s criminal code. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) Chapter 624 outlines general principles of jurisdiction, including extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances, typically involving effects within the state or crimes committed by its residents. However, piracy is a unique category. International law generally permits any nation to exercise jurisdiction over pirates apprehended on the high seas. If the individual is apprehended within New Hampshire, the state can exercise its territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, under the principle of passive personality jurisdiction, a state may assert jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad that harm its nationals. However, the primary basis for prosecuting piracy by a state not directly involved in the incident (i.e., not the flag state or the state of nationality of the victim) is universal jurisdiction. New Hampshire, as a sovereign state within the United States, can enact laws that align with its international obligations and can prosecute crimes falling under universal jurisdiction, provided such prosecution does not conflict with federal law or the U.S. Constitution. The most compelling basis for New Hampshire to prosecute is the universal jurisdiction over piracy, a crime recognized and condemned by the international community. While New Hampshire law might permit prosecution of its residents for crimes abroad, or for acts with effects within the state, the nature of piracy as a crime against all humanity makes it a prime candidate for universal jurisdiction, allowing any state to prosecute.

The question probes the extraterritorial application of New Hampshire’s criminal laws, specifically in the context of international cybercrime. New Hampshire, like other US states, generally exercises jurisdiction based on territoriality, effects, or nationality. For extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply in a cybercrime scenario involving a New Hampshire victim or entity, the conduct originating outside the state must have had a direct and substantial effect within New Hampshire. This principle is rooted in the concept of “long-arm jurisdiction” as applied in criminal law, often codified or interpreted to allow prosecution when criminal acts, even if initiated elsewhere, cause tangible harm or impact within the state’s borders. The scenario describes a sophisticated cyberattack originating in a foreign jurisdiction that disrupts critical infrastructure within New Hampshire. The “effects doctrine” is the most relevant legal basis for asserting jurisdiction in such a case. The cyberattack’s impact on New Hampshire’s infrastructure constitutes the necessary nexus for jurisdiction. Other potential bases, such as nationality of the perpetrator or victim, are not explicitly provided or are less directly applicable to establishing jurisdiction over a foreign actor in this context without further specific treaty or statutory provisions. The question requires understanding how the territorial principle is adapted to address modern transnational crimes.

The scenario involves a transnational crime where evidence is located in multiple jurisdictions, specifically New Hampshire, United States, and Quebec, Canada. The core issue is the mechanism by which law enforcement in New Hampshire can legally obtain and use evidence held by authorities in Quebec for a prosecution within New Hampshire. This necessitates an understanding of international legal cooperation mechanisms. Specifically, the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) framework, often facilitated by the U.S. Department of Justice and its Canadian counterparts, is the primary avenue for such cross-border evidence gathering. While informal requests might occur, they lack the legal weight and procedural safeguards required for admissibility in a formal criminal proceeding. Extradition is a process for surrendering individuals, not for obtaining evidence. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties governs treaty interpretation but does not directly provide the operational framework for evidence sharing. The principle of comity allows courts to recognize and enforce foreign legal decisions, but it is not the primary mechanism for proactive evidence acquisition. Therefore, the most appropriate and legally sound method for New Hampshire authorities to obtain evidence from Quebec for a criminal prosecution is through a formal Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request.

The core issue revolves around the extraterritorial application of New Hampshire law in relation to international criminal conduct. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, generally derives its criminal jurisdiction from territoriality, meaning crimes committed within its borders are subject to its laws. However, international law and treaties, as well as federal statutes that preempt state law in certain areas of foreign relations and national security, complicate direct extraterritorial application of state criminal statutes. The principle of territoriality is the primary basis for jurisdiction. When a crime has effects within New Hampshire, even if initiated abroad, New Hampshire courts may assert jurisdiction under the “effects doctrine” or “objective territoriality.” This doctrine allows for jurisdiction when conduct outside the state causes a substantial effect within the state. In this scenario, the conspiracy to defraud New Hampshire citizens and the resulting financial losses within the state constitute a sufficient nexus for New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction. However, the actual commission of the overt acts of cyber intrusion and fund diversion occurred entirely outside New Hampshire’s physical territory. International law principles, such as the nationality principle or protective principle, might be invoked by sovereign states where the acts occurred, but New Hampshire’s ability to prosecute based solely on its own statutes for acts committed abroad, without a specific treaty provision or federal delegation, is limited. The U.S. federal government typically handles international criminal matters and exercises jurisdiction based on broader principles like universal jurisdiction for certain heinous crimes or the nationality of the perpetrator. New Hampshire’s jurisdiction would likely be secondary or dependent on federal cooperation and the specific nature of the cybercrime, which often falls under federal purview. Therefore, while New Hampshire citizens were harmed, the direct extraterritorial application of New Hampshire’s criminal statutes for acts committed entirely outside its borders, without a clear statutory basis or federal coordination, is not the primary or most straightforward jurisdictional claim. The question probes the limits of state jurisdiction in an international context, where federal and international law often take precedence. The most accurate assessment is that New Hampshire’s ability to prosecute directly is questionable without a strong nexus to the state beyond the victimhood of its citizens and the effects of the crime, especially when the acts themselves occurred abroad. The question tests the understanding of jurisdictional principles in international criminal law as applied to a U.S. state.

The core of this question lies in understanding the principle of universal jurisdiction and its application in international criminal law, particularly concerning crimes against humanity and war crimes, which are often prosecuted under this doctrine. New Hampshire, like other US states, would look to federal statutes and international conventions to prosecute such offenses. The principle of universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute individuals for certain heinous crimes, regardless of where the crime was committed, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the nationality of the victim. This is particularly relevant for crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and piracy. In the scenario presented, the alleged acts constitute crimes against humanity, which are universally recognized as grave offenses warranting prosecution. The enabling legislation in the United States, such as the War Crimes Act, provides a basis for exercising jurisdiction over such crimes when committed by or against US nationals or when they occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state. However, the question probes the specific jurisdictional basis that would be most appropriate and legally sound for New Hampshire to consider, assuming it has enacted or intends to enact legislation that aligns with federal or international norms for prosecuting international crimes. The extraterritorial reach of US law, coupled with the universally condemned nature of crimes against humanity, supports the assertion of jurisdiction. The most direct and legally robust basis for New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction over an alien perpetrator for crimes against humanity committed abroad, when there is no clear territorial link to the US or New Hampshire, would be through the principle of universal jurisdiction as codified or recognized within its legal framework, often in conjunction with federal statutes that permit such prosecution. This allows for the prosecution of individuals for acts that shock the conscience of humanity, irrespective of traditional jurisdictional ties.

The principle of complementarity, as enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), dictates that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over a case when national courts are unable or unwilling to do so genuinely. This means that a state party to the Rome Statute, such as New Hampshire’s federal counterpart in the United States, retains primary jurisdiction over international crimes committed within its territory or by its nationals. The ICC’s role is therefore subsidiary. If a state has conducted or is conducting an investigation or prosecution of alleged perpetrators of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC will generally defer to that state’s efforts, provided the national proceedings are genuine. Genuineness is assessed based on whether the national proceedings are intended to shield individuals from criminal responsibility, are conducted without regard for due process, or are unduly delayed. In this scenario, New Hampshire, as a sovereign state, has the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes. The ICC’s intervention would only be warranted if New Hampshire’s legal system demonstrably fails to act in good faith or is incapable of bringing perpetrators to justice. The question hinges on understanding this fundamental jurisdictional relationship between national legal systems and the ICC.

The scenario presented involves the potential extraterritorial application of New Hampshire’s criminal statutes. New Hampshire, like other US states, generally exercises jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territorial boundaries. However, international criminal law and certain US federal statutes recognize exceptions to this territorial principle. When a crime has effects within New Hampshire, even if initiated elsewhere, New Hampshire courts may assert jurisdiction under specific legal doctrines. The principle of “effect” or “consequences” allows a state to prosecute conduct that, while occurring outside its territory, produces harmful effects within its borders. This is particularly relevant in cases involving organized crime, cybercrime, or environmental offenses that transcend state lines. For instance, if a fraudulent scheme orchestrated in another country directly defrauds numerous residents of New Hampshire, leading to financial losses within the state, New Hampshire could argue for jurisdiction based on the resulting harm. The specific statutory authority for such extraterritorial jurisdiction would need to be examined within New Hampshire’s Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA), particularly in sections dealing with crimes committed outside the state but with effects inside. Federal law also plays a role, as certain international crimes are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. However, for crimes not preempted by federal law, states can assert jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine. The question tests the understanding of when a state like New Hampshire can reach beyond its physical borders to prosecute criminal activity, focusing on the legal basis for asserting jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that impacts the state. The key is to identify the legal principle that allows for this assertion of authority, which is the “effects doctrine” or the principle of consequences.

The scenario involves a complex interplay of jurisdiction, evidence admissibility, and the principle of universal jurisdiction in international criminal law, as applied within the framework of New Hampshire’s legal context. The core issue is whether a New Hampshire court can exercise jurisdiction over a former official of a non-aligned nation for alleged crimes against humanity, based on the presence of the accused within New Hampshire and the nature of the alleged offenses. New Hampshire, like other U.S. states, operates under the broader U.S. federal system, which has specific statutes like the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350 note), which can provide a basis for civil claims related to international law violations. However, criminal jurisdiction for international crimes is primarily vested in federal courts and international tribunals. State courts generally lack inherent jurisdiction over such offenses unless specifically authorized by state or federal statute, or if the acts constitute crimes under New Hampshire state law that are also recognized as international crimes. The principle of universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute certain heinous crimes regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. For criminal prosecution in a state court, this would typically require a specific statutory grant of authority from the state legislature, often mirroring federal approaches or international conventions that the U.S. has ratified. The question hinges on whether New Hampshire has enacted legislation that explicitly confers criminal jurisdiction upon its state courts for international crimes prosecuted under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, irrespective of the location of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, when the accused is found within the state. Given that such broad criminal jurisdiction for international crimes is generally a federal or international matter, and state statutes typically focus on crimes with a nexus to the state, the most accurate assessment is that New Hampshire state courts would not possess this specific criminal jurisdiction without explicit legislative authorization. The presence of the accused within the state is a jurisdictional hook, but the nature of the crime and the basis of jurisdiction (universal) are key. Without a specific New Hampshire statute granting criminal jurisdiction for international crimes under universal principles, such prosecution cannot occur at the state level. Therefore, the absence of such explicit statutory authority in New Hampshire law means the state courts would not have the power to prosecute.

The scenario involves a potential violation of the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute individuals for certain international crimes, regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) enumerates crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, for which universal jurisdiction may be asserted. New Hampshire, as a sovereign state within the United States, generally operates under U.S. federal law regarding international criminal matters. However, the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law, particularly for crimes with international implications, is complex and often requires specific statutory authorization. The concept of “passive personality jurisdiction” allows a state to prosecute a crime committed abroad if the victim is one of its nationals. In this case, the alleged perpetrator, a citizen of a third country, committed acts against a citizen of New Hampshire while in another foreign state. While New Hampshire itself does not have direct jurisdiction over international crimes in the same way a national court might, the question probes the underlying principles that could inform potential prosecution under the broader framework of U.S. law or through international cooperation. The core issue is whether the nexus of the victim’s nationality and the state of New Hampshire provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction, even if the acts occurred elsewhere. The question tests the understanding of jurisdictional bases in international criminal law and their potential, albeit complex, application within a U.S. state context, considering the victim’s domicile. The correct answer hinges on the principle of passive personality jurisdiction, which is a recognized basis for asserting criminal jurisdiction in international law, and its potential, albeit indirect, relevance to a state like New Hampshire when its citizens are victims of grave international crimes. The question does not involve a calculation but rather an application of legal principles to a factual scenario.

The scenario involves the potential application of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States, specifically concerning criminal acts committed by a U.S. national abroad against another U.S. national. In international criminal law, the principle of nationality allows a state to prosecute its citizens for crimes committed anywhere in the world. This principle is distinct from the territorial principle (crimes committed within a state’s borders) and the passive personality principle (prosecuting based on the nationality of the victim). New Hampshire, as a U.S. state, would generally defer to federal jurisdiction for international crimes and crimes occurring outside its territorial boundaries unless specific state legislation grants such extraterritorial reach. However, the question implicitly asks about the foundational basis for such prosecution under general principles of U.S. international criminal law, which are primarily derived from federal statutes and international agreements. The fact that the act occurred in France and the perpetrator is a U.S. national aligns with the nationality principle. The victim’s nationality (also U.S.) is relevant for certain specific statutes, but the core basis for jurisdiction over the perpetrator’s actions, given they are a U.S. citizen, rests on the nationality principle. Therefore, the nationality principle is the most direct and applicable legal basis for the U.S. to assert jurisdiction in this instance, assuming appropriate statutory authority exists.

The scenario involves a complex interplay of jurisdiction, evidence admissibility, and the principles of universal jurisdiction as applied in international criminal law, particularly relevant to a state like New Hampshire which, while not a primary seat of international tribunals, engages with these concepts through extradition and cooperation treaties. The core issue is whether the evidence obtained through the covert surveillance in Vermont, which directly led to the apprehension of the suspect in New Hampshire, can be presented in a potential international criminal proceeding. Under the principle of territoriality, Vermont has jurisdiction over the surveillance activities. However, the admissibility of evidence in international tribunals often hinges on broader principles of due process and the legality of its acquisition, irrespective of minor jurisdictional technicalities between cooperating domestic jurisdictions. The fact that the surveillance was conducted without a warrant issued by a Vermont court, but with the cooperation of federal authorities who may have had a basis for such action under federal law (even if not explicitly stated in the prompt), complicates matters. The question of whether New Hampshire can even be the venue for prosecuting international crimes is secondary to the admissibility of the evidence itself in a forum that would likely be an international tribunal or a domestic court applying international law principles. The prohibition against using evidence obtained in violation of fundamental rights, even if collected in another U.S. state, is a key consideration. However, the prompt implies federal involvement which could legitimize the surveillance under federal wiretap statutes, making the Vermont warrant requirement less of a definitive bar if federal authorization existed. The critical factor for admissibility in an international context often involves whether the evidence was obtained in a manner that shocks the conscience or fundamentally violates due process as understood internationally. Given that the surveillance was conducted by U.S. authorities with implied federal cooperation, and the suspect was apprehended in New Hampshire, the most relevant legal consideration for admissibility in an international forum would be the adherence to due process standards that are broadly recognized. The absence of a Vermont warrant is a procedural defect under Vermont state law, but the question is about admissibility in an international criminal law context. The U.S. has mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition agreements that require adherence to certain evidentiary standards. If the surveillance was conducted pursuant to federal authority, even if the physical act occurred in Vermont, it might be deemed admissible. However, without a clear warrant or statutory authorization under federal law, the evidence could be challenged. The principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, for instance, requires that national jurisdictions have the opportunity to prosecute. If New Hampshire were to prosecute, it would need to consider the admissibility of this evidence. The more pertinent question for an international criminal law exam, especially in a state like New Hampshire which would likely be cooperating with international bodies rather than hosting a primary tribunal, is the general principle of evidence admissibility in international proceedings when collected through domestic means. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, while primarily a U.S. constitutional concept, has analogous considerations in international law regarding the taint of illegally obtained evidence. However, the prompt doesn’t explicitly state the surveillance was illegal under federal law, only that a Vermont warrant was absent. Federal law enforcement agencies can conduct surveillance under specific circumstances without state warrants if federal statutes permit. Therefore, the most accurate assessment of admissibility in an international context, considering the potential for federal involvement and the broad principles of due process, would focus on whether the evidence was obtained in a manner that fundamentally undermines the fairness of the proceedings. The lack of a Vermont warrant is a significant issue, but not necessarily a bar if federal authorization existed or if the evidence is deemed reliable and obtained through methods not universally condemned. The question asks about admissibility in an international criminal proceeding, not solely within New Hampshire’s state courts. The crucial element is whether the method of acquisition, even if technically violating a state law in Vermont, would be considered so fundamentally unfair or illegal under international standards as to render it inadmissible in an international forum. The U.S. generally adheres to high standards for evidence gathering, and evidence obtained without a warrant is often presumed inadmissible unless specific exceptions apply. However, the cross-jurisdictional aspect and the potential for federal authority are key. If the surveillance was indeed conducted by federal agents, their actions would be governed by federal law, not solely Vermont state law. Without a clear indication of illegality under federal law or a universally condemned practice, the evidence might be admissible. The principle of comity between states and cooperation in international law suggests that domestic procedural irregularities, if not amounting to a fundamental breach of due process recognized internationally, might not automatically lead to exclusion. The most challenging aspect is the potential for the evidence to be considered tainted under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, which could apply if the Vermont surveillance was indeed an illegal act under U.S. law. However, the prompt is deliberately vague about the specific legal basis for the surveillance, allowing for the interpretation that it might have been federally authorized. The question tests the understanding of how domestic procedural rules interact with international admissibility standards. The core concept being tested is whether a technical violation of state law in one jurisdiction within the U.S. would automatically render evidence inadmissible in an international criminal proceeding, especially when federal cooperation is implied. The correct answer hinges on the nuanced understanding that international tribunals have their own rules of evidence, and while they consider domestic legality, the ultimate decision rests on whether the evidence was obtained in a manner that undermines the fairness of the international proceeding. Given the potential for federal authorization and the principle of complementarity, the evidence might be admissible if it meets international standards of fairness, despite the absence of a Vermont warrant. The prompt does not provide enough information to definitively conclude the surveillance was illegal under federal law. Therefore, the most prudent answer is to acknowledge the potential for admissibility based on broader international due process considerations and implied federal authority. No calculation is required for this question.

The principle of complementarity in international criminal law refers to the idea that international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), are intended to be a court of last resort. This means that national courts have the primary responsibility for prosecuting international crimes. An international tribunal will only exercise jurisdiction if a state is unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute. Unwillingness implies a deliberate intention to shield individuals from justice, perhaps due to political considerations or a lack of good faith in the judicial process. Unavailability, on the other hand, refers to situations where a state’s judicial system has collapsed or is so dysfunctional that it cannot conduct proceedings, for example, due to widespread destruction, absence of judicial personnel, or complete lack of infrastructure. The ICC’s Statute, specifically Article 17, outlines the criteria for determining admissibility, which includes assessing whether a case has been subjected to judicial proceedings by a state with jurisdiction, or if the state has deliberately tried to shield the person from criminal responsibility. Therefore, a state’s failure to initiate proceedings due to a lack of resources or capacity, without any intent to subvert justice, would generally fall under the category of unavailability, allowing the ICC to potentially exercise jurisdiction. New Hampshire, as a state within the United States, would be subject to these principles if its citizens were accused of crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction, and its legal system was unable to address them.