In Missouri, a will is generally considered revoked if it is destroyed with the intent to revoke. This is a fundamental principle of wills law, often referred to as revocation by physical act. The statute, specifically Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.390, outlines the requirements for revocation by physical act, stating that a will may be revoked by “burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying” the will with the intent to revoke. The key elements are the physical act and the concurrent intent to revoke. The physical act must be done by the testator or by someone in the testator’s presence and at their direction. In this scenario, the act of tearing the will into pieces, coupled with the testator’s explicit statement of intent to revoke, satisfies the statutory requirements for revocation by physical act in Missouri. The subsequent attempt by the testator to tape the pieces back together does not negate the completed act of revocation, as the intent to revoke was present at the time of the physical destruction. Therefore, the will is considered revoked.

In Missouri, a holographic will is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. While many states recognize holographic wills, Missouri law, specifically Missouri Revised Statutes § 474.320, does not. This statute outlines the requirements for a valid will in Missouri, which include being in writing, signed by the testator (or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction), and attested to by two witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. Because the statute mandates specific witnessing requirements, a will that is solely in the testator’s handwriting without any witnesses does not meet the statutory definition of a valid will in Missouri and would therefore be considered invalid. This principle ensures a standardized and verifiable process for testament execution, protecting against fraud and ensuring the testator’s intent is accurately represented.

In Missouri, the concept of an “after-acquired property clause” in a will is significant. This clause, when properly drafted and executed, allows a testator to dispose of property that they do not own at the time of executing their will but subsequently acquire before their death. For such a clause to be effective in Missouri, it must clearly indicate the testator’s intent to cover after-acquired property. The will must be executed with the same formalities required for any other will under Missouri law, including being in writing, signed by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and by their direction, and attested to by two competent witnesses. The scenario describes a testator who, after executing a will that specifically devises a parcel of land in Boone County, later purchases an adjacent parcel of land in the same county. The original will contains a general provision stating that all property acquired after the date of the will should pass according to its terms. This general provision, when interpreted in light of Missouri’s statutory framework for will interpretation and the common law understanding of after-acquired property clauses, would encompass the newly purchased adjacent land. Therefore, the adjacent parcel of land would pass to the beneficiary designated in the will for the original Boone County property. The key is the testator’s intent, evidenced by the after-acquired property clause, and the proper execution of the will.

In Missouri, when a person dies intestate, their property is distributed according to the laws of descent and distribution. The Missouri Probate Code, specifically Chapter 474, outlines these rules. For a situation where a decedent is survived by a spouse and no children, the spouse inherits the entire estate. If there are children, the distribution depends on whether the children are also the children of the surviving spouse. If all surviving children are also the children of the surviving spouse, the spouse receives the first \( \$30,000 \) of the personal property plus one-half of the remaining estate, and the children share the other half. If the decedent has children from a previous relationship and is survived by a spouse and these children, the spouse inherits one-half of the estate, and the children inherit the other half. The question describes a scenario where Elias dies intestate, survived by his spouse, Willow, and two children from their marriage. Elias’s estate consists of \( \$100,000 \) in real property and \( \$80,000 \) in personal property, totaling \( \$180,000 \). According to Missouri law, the surviving spouse receives the first \( \$30,000 \) of personal property and one-half of the remaining estate. The remaining personal property after the spouse’s initial share is \( \$80,000 – \$30,000 = \$50,000 \). The spouse receives half of this remaining personal property, which is \( \$50,000 / 2 = \$25,000 \). The children receive the other half of the remaining personal property, which is also \( \$25,000 \). The real property is divided equally between the spouse and the children. Thus, the spouse receives \( \$100,000 / 2 = \$50,000 \) of the real property, and the children share the remaining \( \$50,000 \) of the real property equally, receiving \( \$25,000 \) each. Therefore, Willow’s total share is \( \$30,000 \) (initial personal property) + \( \$25,000 \) (half of remaining personal property) + \( \$50,000 \) (half of real property) = \( \$105,000 \). The children’s total share is \( \$25,000 \) (half of remaining personal property) + \( \$50,000 \) (half of real property) = \( \$75,000 \). This \( \$75,000 \) is divided between the two children, meaning each child receives \( \$37,500 \). The question asks for Willow’s total inheritance.

In Missouri, the concept of a “residuary estate” is crucial for understanding how a testator’s remaining assets are distributed after specific bequests and debts are settled. When a will is drafted, it typically outlines specific gifts of property to named beneficiaries. After these specific gifts are satisfied, and all lawful debts, funeral expenses, administration costs, and taxes are paid, any property that remains is considered the residuary estate. The residuary clause in a will dictates how this remaining property is to be distributed. If a will fails to dispose of all or part of the residuary estate, or if the residuary beneficiary predeceases the testator and the will does not provide for an alternative disposition, then that portion of the estate will pass by intestacy. Missouri law, specifically under the Missouri Uniform Trust Code and related probate statutes, governs the administration of estates and the interpretation of wills. Intestacy laws in Missouri dictate that property not effectively disposed of by a will passes to the decedent’s heirs-at-law. The order of succession for intestate estates is well-defined, prioritizing surviving spouses, children, parents, siblings, and so forth. Therefore, if the residuary clause is ineffective, the estate will be distributed according to this statutory scheme, ensuring that no property remains completely undisposed of. The scenario presented involves a will that does not specify an alternate beneficiary for the residuary estate should the named beneficiary predecease the testator. Consequently, the portion of the residuary estate intended for the deceased beneficiary will be subject to Missouri’s intestacy laws.

The Missouri Uniform Trust Code, specifically RSMo 456.1012, addresses the issue of trustee liability for torts committed by the trustee or for debts incurred in the course of administering the trust. Generally, a trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the course of administering the trust, unless the trustee is not personally at fault. However, the trustee can be indemnified from the trust property if the trustee was not personally at fault. For contracts entered into in the trustee’s capacity as trustee, the trustee is not personally liable on the contract unless the trustee failed to reveal the representative capacity or the liability was otherwise agreed upon. In the scenario presented, the trustee, acting in their fiduciary capacity, contracted for landscaping services for the trust’s property. The landscaping company, a third-party creditor, is seeking to recover from the trust. Under Missouri law, a trustee is not personally liable for a contract properly entered into in the trustee’s fiduciary capacity unless the trustee fails to reveal their representative capacity or agrees to be personally liable. Since the trustee acted within their authority, revealed their capacity as trustee, and did not agree to personal liability, the creditor must seek recourse against the trust itself, not the trustee personally. Therefore, the trust property is subject to the claim.

The Uniform Trust Code, as adopted in Missouri, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 456 addresses trusts. When a trustee fails to perform their duties or acts in a manner inconsistent with the trust’s terms or the law, a beneficiary may seek judicial intervention. Missouri law provides for the removal of a trustee under certain circumstances. Section 456.7-706 of the Missouri Revised Statutes outlines grounds for removal, including a substantial breach of trust, a lack of cooperation among co-trustees, or a significant change in circumstances rendering the trustee unsuitable. The statute emphasizes that removal is an equitable remedy and the court will consider the best interests of the beneficiaries and the purposes of the trust. While a trustee’s failure to respond to a beneficiary’s reasonable request for information is a breach of trust, it is not automatically grounds for removal unless it substantially impairs the administration of the trust or the trustee’s ability to perform their duties. The statute also allows for removal if the trustee becomes incapable of administering the trust or if the trustee has been found to have engaged in misconduct. The key is whether the actions or inactions of the trustee have created a situation that jeopardizes the trust’s proper administration or the beneficiaries’ interests. A single instance of non-responsiveness, without further context of persistent failure or significant harm, might be addressed through other means, such as a court order compelling the trustee to provide information, rather than immediate removal. However, if this failure is part of a pattern of neglect or demonstrates a fundamental disregard for the beneficiary’s rights and the trustee’s obligations under Missouri law, removal becomes a viable option.

In Missouri, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified by state law, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 456 addresses trusts. When a trustee fails to provide a required accounting to a qualified beneficiary, the beneficiary has several avenues for recourse. A qualified beneficiary is defined in Missouri law as a beneficiary to whom trust income or principal may be paid currently, or would be paid if the trust were terminated at that time, or who is a permissible appointee of a power of appointment that could be exercised in their favor. The statute provides for remedies when a trustee neglects their duties. A beneficiary can petition the court to compel the trustee to provide an accounting. This is a fundamental duty of a trustee, ensuring transparency and accountability to the beneficiaries. Failure to comply with such a petition can lead to further court action, including potential removal of the trustee. The law generally allows for reasonable attorney fees and costs to be awarded to the prevailing party in trust litigation, which would include a beneficiary successfully compelling an accounting. Therefore, the beneficiary can seek court intervention to enforce the trustee’s duty to account and may also recover their legal expenses incurred in this process.

In Missouri, when a testator makes a will that is not entirely disposed of by the will, the remaining property is considered intestate property. This property passes according to the laws of intestacy of Missouri. For a married decedent with no surviving descendants, the entire intestate estate passes to the surviving spouse. If there are surviving descendants, the spouse receives the first \$30,000 of the intestate property plus one-half of any balance. The remaining half of the balance passes to the descendants. In this scenario, Bartholomew died leaving a will that only disposed of his antique clock collection. His remaining estate consists of a savings account valued at \$150,000 and a vehicle valued at \$25,000, totaling \$175,000 in intestate property. Bartholomew was survived by his spouse, Penelope, and no descendants. Under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.010, when a decedent dies intestate and is survived by a spouse but no descendants, the surviving spouse inherits the entire intestate estate. Therefore, Penelope inherits the full \$175,000.

In Missouri, when a testator executes a will, it must be signed by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. Furthermore, the will must be attested by at least two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. The purpose of these requirements is to prevent fraud and undue influence, ensuring that the document reflects the testator’s true intent. A will that does not meet these statutory requirements may be deemed invalid, leading to the estate being distributed according to the laws of intestacy. The concept of a “holographic will,” which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and not witnessed, is generally not recognized in Missouri unless it meets the strict requirements for a will executed with witnesses. Therefore, a will that is entirely handwritten by the testator but lacks any attesting witnesses would likely be invalid in Missouri. The scenario describes a will that is entirely in the testator’s handwriting, but crucially, it lacks the signatures of two witnesses, which is a mandatory requirement for a valid will in Missouri under RSMo § 474.320.

In Missouri, the concept of abatement dictates the order in which assets are used to pay debts, expenses, and legacies when the estate’s assets are insufficient. Generally, specific bequests of tangible personal property are the last to be abated, followed by specific bequests of real property, then general bequests of personal property, and finally general bequests of real property. Residuary assets are abated first. Missouri law, specifically through statutes like RSMo § 473.620, outlines this order. In this scenario, the devise of the lakefront cabin in Branson is a specific devise of real property. The pecuniary legacy to the historical society is a general bequest of personal property. The residuary estate is what remains after specific and general gifts are satisfied. Therefore, the pecuniary legacy to the historical society would be abated before the specific devise of the cabin, and the residuary estate would be abated first to cover debts and expenses. The question asks about the order of abatement for the specific devise of the cabin and the pecuniary legacy. Following the general order, the residuary estate is exhausted first, then general bequests are abated, and finally specific bequests. Thus, the pecuniary legacy, being a general bequest, would be abated before the specific devise of the lakefront cabin.

The scenario involves the concept of a “pretermitted heir” under Missouri law. A pretermitted heir is a child or descendant of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will and who is neither provided for nor expressly excluded in the will. Under Missouri Revised Statutes § 474.450, if a testator fails to provide in their will for any of their children or descendants born to them after the execution of the will, and such child or descendant is not mentioned in the will or provided for, the testator shall be deemed to have died intestate as to that child or descendant. This means that the pretermitted child or descendant will inherit a share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died without a will. The calculation is based on the intestate succession laws of Missouri. For a sole surviving child, the share would be the entire estate. If there are other children, the pretermitted child would receive an equal share with the other children. In this case, the testator executed a will leaving their entire estate to their spouse. Subsequently, a child was born. This child was not mentioned or provided for in the will. Therefore, the child is a pretermitted heir. According to Missouri law, this pretermitted child will inherit as if the testator died intestate with respect to that child. If the testator’s spouse is still alive and is the sole beneficiary under the will, and no other descendants exist at the time of the will’s execution, the pretermitted child will receive a share of the estate. The extent of this share is determined by Missouri’s intestate succession statutes. Specifically, if the testator is survived by a spouse and one child, the spouse takes one-half of the estate, and the child takes one-half of the estate (Missouri Revised Statutes § 474.010). However, the question states the will left the *entire* estate to the spouse. The pretermitted heir statute specifically addresses situations where the testator fails to provide for after-born descendants. The statute’s intent is to prevent accidental disinheritance. The pretermitted heir receives a share that would have been theirs had the testator died intestate, but this share is carved out from the estate *after* any specific devises or bequests made to non-pretermitted heirs in the will are satisfied, to the extent possible without disturbing those provisions. In this specific case, the will only provided for the spouse. The pretermitted child is entitled to a share. The statute aims to give the pretermitted heir what they would have received through intestacy. If the testator had died intestate with a spouse and one child, both would receive half. The will, however, gave everything to the spouse. The pretermitted heir statute modifies the will’s effect. The pretermitted heir is entitled to their intestate share. If the will provided for *all* children and descendants, this would not apply. Since the will provided for the spouse but not the after-born child, the child is pretermitted. The child is entitled to the share they would have received under intestacy. In Missouri, if a decedent is survived by a spouse and one child, the spouse inherits one-half of the estate and the child inherits one-half of the estate. Therefore, the pretermitted child is entitled to one-half of the estate.

The scenario involves a testator, Bartholomew, who created a holographic will. A holographic will is one that is written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator. Missouri law, specifically Missouri Revised Statutes § 474.320, recognizes holographic wills if they are entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator. The statute does not require witnesses for a holographic will. Therefore, Bartholomew’s will, being entirely in his handwriting and signed by him, is valid under Missouri law, even though it was not witnessed. The issue of the will being discovered in a safety deposit box is relevant to the probate process, indicating it was a document Bartholomew intended to be his will, but it does not affect the validity of its creation as a holographic will. The specific wording regarding the disposition of his antique clock collection to his nephew, Silas, and the remainder of his estate to his niece, Clara, outlines the testamentary intent and distribution plan. The validity of this disposition hinges on the valid creation of the will itself.

The scenario involves a life estate with a remainder interest. In Missouri, a life estate grants the holder the right to use and possess property for their lifetime. Upon the death of the life tenant, the property passes to the designated remainderman. The key issue here is the extent of the life tenant’s rights regarding the disposition of the property during their lifetime. Generally, a life tenant cannot commit waste, which means they cannot significantly alter or destroy the property to the detriment of the remainderman. However, the language of the deed is crucial. If the deed grants the life tenant a power of sale or a power to consume, sell, or dispose of the property, their rights are expanded. In this case, the deed explicitly states that Elara has the “right to sell, convey, mortgage, and otherwise dispose of said real property as she sees fit, during her lifetime.” This language clearly grants Elara a fee simple absolute in the property, not merely a life estate with a power of sale. A fee simple absolute is the highest form of ownership, giving the owner complete control and the right to sell, gift, or devise the property to anyone. Therefore, Elara can sell the property and the proceeds would belong to her absolutely, free from any claim by the contingent beneficiaries. The concept of a life estate with a power of sale would typically involve language like “for her use and benefit during her lifetime, with the power to sell any portion thereof for her support and maintenance.” The absolute language used here removes any such limitations.

In Missouri, the concept of an “after-acquired title” clause in a deed is significant when a grantor conveys property they do not yet own but subsequently acquire. When a deed contains such a clause, and the grantor later obtains title to the property described in the deed, that after-acquired title automatically passes to the grantee. This doctrine operates to prevent the grantor from asserting their subsequently acquired interest against the grantee, effectively enforcing the original conveyance. This is rooted in principles of equity and the prevention of fraudulent conveyances. For instance, if Elias, residing in Missouri, purports to convey Lot 7 to Ms. Albright through a deed containing an after-acquired title clause, but at that time Elias only held a contract to purchase Lot 7, and subsequently Elias completes the purchase and obtains legal title to Lot 7, Ms. Albright automatically becomes the legal owner of Lot 7. This bypasses the need for Elias to execute a new deed. The operative statute in Missouri that underpins this concept, though not explicitly using the term “after-acquired title,” is found within the framework of conveyancing and the effect of deeds, particularly concerning warranties and representations made by the grantor. Missouri Revised Statutes § 442.130, concerning the effect of a deed with covenants, indirectly supports this by implying that a grantor who conveys with covenants of title is estopped from asserting after-acquired title against their grantee. While no specific calculation is involved, understanding the equitable principle and its statutory underpinnings is key. The core idea is that the grantor is estopped from denying the validity of their prior conveyance.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established under a Missouri will. The primary beneficiary, Elara, has a life interest in the trust’s income, with the remainder to her children. The trust instrument specifies that the trustee has discretion to invade the principal for Elara’s “health, education, and support.” Elara, a resident of Missouri, requires significant medical treatment for a chronic illness that is not life-threatening but necessitates ongoing, specialized care and expensive medication. This care is essential for maintaining her quality of life and managing her condition, but it goes beyond basic sustenance and extends to enhanced well-being and comfort, which could be interpreted as advanced care. In Missouri, the interpretation of “health, education, and support” (often referred to as the HEMS standard) in trust provisions is crucial for determining the permissible scope of principal distributions. Courts generally interpret HEMS liberally to allow for a broad range of expenditures that contribute to the beneficiary’s overall well-being, not merely bare necessities. The specific wording of the trust instrument is paramount. If the trust grants the trustee broad discretion under the HEMS standard, then expenditures for necessary, albeit costly, medical treatment that significantly impacts the beneficiary’s quality of life and ability to function would typically fall within this scope. The key is whether the treatment is reasonably necessary for Elara’s health and well-being, even if it exceeds basic subsistence. Missouri law, like that in many states, favors upholding the settlor’s intent, and a HEMS standard is generally understood to encompass more than just the absolute minimum required for survival. Therefore, the trustee’s decision to invade the principal for Elara’s extensive medical treatment, provided it aligns with a reasonable interpretation of the HEMS standard as applied in Missouri, would be permissible. The question hinges on the judicial interpretation of the HEMS standard within the context of Missouri trust law and the specific language of the testamentary trust.

Missouri law, specifically under the Missouri Uniform Trust Code, addresses the concept of a trustee’s duty to inform and report. A trustee has a duty to keep the qualified beneficiaries reasonably informed about the trust’s administration and the particulars of the trust property, including receiving and responding to requests for information related to the trust. This duty is ongoing. When a trust becomes irrevocable, the trustee must also notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trust’s existence, the trustee’s identity and contact information, and their right to request a copy of the trust instrument and the trustee’s reports. The Missouri Uniform Trust Code, Section 456.1-109, outlines the requirements for such notification. The statute states that the trustee shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trustee’s acceptance of trusteeship, the name and contact information of the trustee, and that the trust has become irrevocable. Furthermore, it specifies that the trustee shall provide the qualified beneficiaries with a copy of the trust instrument, or at least the portion of the trust instrument that describes or determines their beneficial interest and the beneficiaries’ right to a trustee’s report. This initial notification must occur within a reasonable time after the trustee has accepted trusteeship. Subsequent reporting obligations, detailed in Section 456.8-813, require the trustee to furnish to the current beneficiaries, at least annually and at the termination of the trust, a report on the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and amount of trustee’s fees. This reporting requirement is fundamental to ensuring transparency and accountability in trust administration under Missouri law.

In Missouri, when a decedent dies intestate, meaning without a valid will, the distribution of their estate is governed by the laws of descent and distribution. For a decedent who is survived by a spouse and children, where the children are also issue of that spouse, the Missouri Probate Code dictates a specific division. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.010 outlines that the surviving spouse inherits one-half of the estate, and the surviving children share the remaining one-half equally. In this scenario, Elias is survived by his wife, Beatrice, and their two children, Clara and David. The total value of Elias’s estate is $500,000. According to Missouri law, Beatrice, as the surviving spouse, will receive half of the estate, which is $500,000 / 2 = $250,000. The remaining half, $250,000, will be divided equally among the three surviving children: Clara, David, and their posthumous sibling, Finn. Therefore, each child will receive $250,000 / 3 = $83,333.33. The question asks for the total amount Beatrice will receive.

The Missouri Uniform Trust Code, specifically Chapter 456 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, governs the creation, administration, and termination of trusts. When a trust instrument is silent on the matter of trustee succession and the designated trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, Missouri law provides a framework for appointing a successor trustee. Section 456.0307 outlines the methods for judicial appointment of a trustee. The court’s primary consideration is the grantor’s intent as expressed in the trust instrument. If the instrument does not provide for succession, or if the provided method fails, the court will appoint a trustee. Section 456.0308 details the criteria for judicial appointment, emphasizing the need for a trustee who is capable of fulfilling the trust’s purposes and who is suitable for the role. This often involves considering the nature of the trust, the beneficiaries’ needs, and the grantor’s likely wishes. While a corporate trustee might be appointed, the statute does not mandate it. The appointment process involves petitioning the court and providing notice to interested parties, including the beneficiaries. The court then exercises its discretion to select an appropriate successor trustee. In this scenario, the trust instrument is silent, and the named trustee has resigned. Therefore, the process involves judicial intervention to appoint a successor trustee in accordance with Missouri law, prioritizing the grantor’s intent and the trust’s objectives.

Missouri law, specifically under RSMo. § 474.440, addresses the revocation of wills by subsequent instruments. A will can be revoked by another writing which declares an intention to revoke, or by another writing which is executed in the same manner as required for the execution of wills. This writing must demonstrate a clear intent to revoke the prior will. In this scenario, Beatrice’s second document explicitly states, “I hereby revoke any and all prior wills and codicils.” This unambiguous language clearly indicates Beatrice’s intent to revoke her 2018 will. The fact that the 2020 document does not dispose of her property in a new manner does not negate the revocatory clause. The statutory requirement is for a writing executed with the formalities of a will that expresses an intention to revoke. The 2020 document meets these criteria. Therefore, the 2018 will is revoked by the 2020 document.

In Missouri, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” or “omitted child” is addressed by statute. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.235 generally provides that if a testator fails to provide in their will for a child born or adopted after the execution of the will, and the child is not mentioned or provided for in the will, the child receives a share in the estate as if the testator died intestate, unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions include situations where the testator made other provisions for the child outside the will, or where the will indicates an intention not to make provision for after-born children. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance. In this scenario, the birth of a child after the will’s execution, without any subsequent codicil or mention in the will, triggers the pretermitted heir statute. Therefore, the after-born child is entitled to a share of the estate as if the decedent died intestate, meaning they would receive an equal share with any surviving children, after the spouse’s elective share and homestead allowance, if applicable. The calculation of the specific share would depend on the composition of the estate and the existence of a surviving spouse, but the underlying principle is that the child is not disinherited by default.

In Missouri, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” addresses situations where a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of their will. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.240 outlines the rights of such heirs. If a testator has a child born or adopted after the execution of a will, and that child is not provided for in the will and not mentioned in any way, the child is entitled to the same share of the estate that they would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will. This entitlement is subject to certain exceptions, such as if it appears from the will that the omission was intentional. The statute further clarifies that if the testator had other children when the will was executed and devised property to those children, the pretermitted child receives a share equal to what the other children received. However, if the testator had no other children when the will was executed, and no provision is made for the after-born or adopted child, that child receives a share equal to what they would have received if the testator died intestate. The question involves a testator who executed a will, subsequently had a child, and the will made no provision for this after-born child. The will also did not mention the child, nor did it indicate an intentional omission. Therefore, the after-born child is entitled to the intestate share of the estate. In Missouri, the intestate share for a surviving child, when there is no surviving spouse, is the entire estate.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by a Missouri resident. The core issue is the interpretation of the trust’s spendthrift provision and its effectiveness against a creditor seeking to satisfy a pre-existing debt. Missouri law, like many states, recognizes spendthrift provisions in trusts, which are designed to protect a beneficiary’s interest from their creditors. However, these provisions are not absolute and have certain limitations. Specifically, Missouri law, as codified in statutes such as those concerning fraudulent conveyances and certain mandatory exceptions to spendthrift protection, generally upholds spendthrift clauses against most general creditors. This means a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust cannot typically be reached by creditors to satisfy debts incurred by the beneficiary. The creditor in this case is seeking to attach the beneficiary’s interest in the trust to satisfy a debt that arose before the beneficiary’s interest vested. The spendthrift clause in the trust document explicitly prohibits the voluntary or involuntary alienation of the beneficiary’s interest. Unless the creditor falls into a recognized exception to spendthrift protection, such as for child support, alimony, or claims by the government for taxes, the spendthrift provision will be enforced. In this case, the debt is a general contractual obligation, not one of the enumerated exceptions. Therefore, the creditor’s attempt to attach the beneficiary’s interest in the trust for this debt will likely fail under Missouri law.

In Missouri, the concept of advancements relates to gifts made by a decedent to an heir during their lifetime that are intended to be in satisfaction of that heir’s share of the decedent’s estate. Missouri law, specifically RSMo § 474.090, addresses advancements. This statute provides that a gift is considered an advancement only if the decedent declared in writing that the gift was an advancement, or if the heir acknowledged in writing that the gift was in satisfaction of their share. Without such written evidence, a lifetime gift is generally considered absolute and not an advancement, meaning it does not reduce the heir’s intestate share. The purpose of the advancement statute is to ensure fairness and equality among heirs by accounting for substantial pre-mortem distributions. When an advancement is established, its value at the time of the gift is typically used to offset the heir’s inheritance. If the advancement’s value exceeds the heir’s intestate share, the heir is not required to return the excess. This ensures that the heir does not receive less than their rightful share due to the advancement.

In Missouri, the concept of an “omitted spouse” refers to a situation where a testator fails to provide for their spouse in their will, either by express terms or by omission, and the spouse was married to the testator after the execution of the will. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.235 governs the rights of an omitted spouse. This statute provides that if a testator fails to provide for their spouse in a will, and the spouse was married to the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional and not occasioned by mistake or accident. The statutory share for a surviving spouse in Missouri when the decedent dies intestate depends on whether there are surviving issue. If there are no surviving issue, the spouse receives the entire estate. If there are surviving issue, the spouse receives a child’s share but in no event less than one-third of the estate. In this scenario, Beatrice married Arthur after he executed his will. Arthur’s will, executed prior to their marriage, makes no mention of Beatrice and does not provide for her. Therefore, Beatrice qualifies as an omitted spouse under Missouri law. Since Arthur died without surviving issue, Beatrice is entitled to the entire estate as if Arthur had died intestate.

In Missouri, when a testator executes a will that is later revoked by a subsequent will, the revocation is generally considered effective even if the subsequent will is later lost or destroyed, provided the testator intended the revocation. This principle is rooted in the concept of dependent relative revocation, but more directly, in Missouri, a will can be revoked by the execution of another will, or by burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will with the intent to revoke. The crucial element is the intent to revoke. If the testator intended to revoke the earlier will by executing the new one, the revocation stands regardless of the fate of the new will, unless specific statutory exceptions apply, such as a conditional revocation where the intent to revoke the prior will was dependent on the validity or effectiveness of the new will. However, without evidence of such a condition, the intent to revoke through the act of executing a new will is typically paramount. This aligns with Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.400, which outlines methods of revocation. The destruction of the later will does not revive the earlier will unless it is re-executed with the formalities required for a will or by a codicil that revives it. Therefore, the earlier will remains revoked.

In Missouri, when a testator executes a will, it must be signed by the testator or in the testator’s name by some other person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. Additionally, the will must be signed by at least two witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. The purpose of witness signatures is to attest to the testator’s testamentary capacity and the voluntary nature of the will’s execution. If a will is not properly executed according to these statutory requirements, it may be deemed invalid. In this scenario, while Elias signed the will, and his signature was witnessed by two individuals, neither witness signed in the presence of Elias. This failure to adhere to the statutory requirement of witnesses signing in the testator’s presence renders the will invalid in Missouri. The validity of a will is strictly governed by state law, and Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.310 outlines these specific execution requirements. The absence of the witnesses signing in the testator’s presence is a fatal flaw to the will’s validity.

In Missouri, the doctrine of equitable conversion operates under the principle that when a contract for the sale of real property becomes binding, equity regards the buyer as the owner of the real estate and the seller as the owner of the purchase money. This conversion occurs at the moment the contract is executed, assuming it is specifically enforceable. Consequently, if the seller dies before the closing of a real estate transaction in Missouri, the real property, which has been equitably converted, passes as personal property to the seller’s heirs or beneficiaries under their will, rather than to the devisees of real estate. Conversely, the right to receive the purchase money becomes a chose in action, which is considered personal property and passes to the seller’s personal representative or beneficiaries. This doctrine is a fundamental concept in property and probate law, impacting how assets are distributed upon death when a binding contract for sale exists. The specific timing of the contract’s binding nature, often upon execution and mutual assent to all essential terms, is crucial for the doctrine’s application.

In Missouri, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” arises when a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of their will, or a child living at the time of the will’s execution but not mentioned. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.235 addresses this situation. If a testator has a child born or adopted after the execution of the will, and that child is not provided for in the will and not mentioned, the child is entitled to a share of the testator’s estate. This share is typically what the child would have received if the testator had died intestate (without a will), distributed from the portion of the estate not passing to a surviving spouse who has a right to a share. However, if the testator had other children living at the time of the will’s execution and devised property to them, the pretermitted heir receives a proportionate share of the property devised to those children. The statute also specifies that a pretermitted heir does not take if it appears from the will that the omission was intentional. In this scenario, Bartholomew’s will was executed before his daughter Eleanor was born. Eleanor was not provided for in the will and was not mentioned. Therefore, Eleanor is a pretermitted heir under Missouri law. The will left the entire estate to Bartholomew’s wife, Agnes. Since Agnes is the sole beneficiary and there are no other children to whom property was devised, Eleanor will receive a share of the estate that would have been hers had Bartholomew died intestate, as if Agnes had not been named as the sole beneficiary. Under intestacy, Eleanor would inherit the entire estate. However, the statute balances the rights of the pretermitted heir with the testator’s intent to provide for a spouse. Missouri law aims to protect the child while respecting the testator’s primary intent to benefit a spouse if that intent is clear and the omission of the child was unintentional. The statute dictates that the pretermitted heir takes from the portion of the estate that would have passed to the surviving spouse. Therefore, Eleanor would receive the share of the estate that would have passed to her had Bartholomew died intestate, to the extent it does not deprive the surviving spouse of their statutory share. In this specific case, since the entire estate was devised to Agnes, Eleanor’s claim is against Agnes’s inheritance. The statute intends for the pretermitted heir to receive what they would have gotten through intestacy, but it is usually carved out from the portion that would have gone to other beneficiaries, particularly if the will clearly shows intent to benefit them. Given the will leaves everything to Agnes, Eleanor’s entitlement is to a share of what Agnes receives. The statute states the pretermitted heir receives a share of the estate not exceeding what they would have received if the testator had died intestate. Since Eleanor is the sole heir under intestacy, she would inherit the entire estate. However, the statute also prioritizes the surviving spouse’s share. In this context, the pretermitted heir’s share is taken from the portion of the estate that would have passed to the surviving spouse. The calculation involves determining the intestate share and then applying it against the spouse’s inheritance. If the will provides for the spouse, the pretermitted heir’s share is generally taken from the portion devised to the spouse. Since the entire estate was devised to Agnes, Eleanor is entitled to the share she would have received had Bartholomew died intestate, which is the entire estate. This share is to be taken from the portion of the estate that would have passed to the surviving spouse. Thus, Eleanor is entitled to the entire estate.

In Missouri, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” or “omitted child” arises when a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of their will. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.235 governs this situation. This statute presumes that the omission was unintentional, unless the will itself provides evidence to the contrary. If the omission was unintentional, the pretermitted heir is entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate that they would have received if the testator had died intestate (without a will). This share is typically calculated from the portion of the estate that passes through the will, not from assets passing outside the will via beneficiary designations or joint tenancies. The statute outlines specific exceptions: the omission is considered intentional if the testator provided for the child outside the will with the intent that the provision be in lieu of a testamentary provision, or if the testator specifically referred to the child in the will, indicating an intent to disinherit. In this scenario, the testator executed a will in 2018, and their daughter, Clara, was born in 2020. The will makes no mention of Clara or any after-born children. Therefore, Clara is a pretermitted heir under Missouri law. She is entitled to a share of the estate as if the testator died intestate. This share is calculated based on the net estate distributable under the will. Assuming the testator died intestate, Clara would receive one-third of the estate, as the testator is survived by a spouse and one child. The spouse would receive two-thirds. The question asks what Clara is entitled to under the will. Since the will is silent, and no evidence suggests intentional omission, Clara is entitled to the intestate share. This means she receives a portion of the estate as if no will existed. The calculation of the intestate share in Missouri for a surviving spouse and one child is that the spouse receives two-thirds of the estate, and the child receives one-third. Therefore, Clara is entitled to one-third of the estate.