The Michigan Supreme Court, in cases such as *Fletcher v. City of Detroit*, has clarified the application of governmental immunity in the context of municipal liability for dangerous conditions on public property. Governmental immunity, as codified in Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) § 691.1401 et seq., generally shields governmental agencies from tort liability. However, MCL § 691.1406 provides a specific exception for liability arising from a “failure to maintain a highway in reasonable repair,” which includes sidewalks. To establish liability under this exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the governmental agency had actual or constructive notice of the defect and failed to take reasonable steps to repair it. Constructive notice is established by showing that the defect existed for a sufficient length of time that the agency should have discovered it through reasonable inspection. In this scenario, the fractured sidewalk has existed for a prolonged period, indicating that the city had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The plaintiff’s injury is a direct result of this unrepaired defect. Therefore, the city’s failure to maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair, despite having constructive notice, falls within the statutory exception to governmental immunity. The question tests the understanding of the governmental immunity exception for highway defects in Michigan, specifically concerning sidewalks, and the elements required to prove constructive notice and proximate cause.

In Michigan, the doctrine of respondeat superior holds an employer liable for the tortious acts of an employee committed within the scope of their employment. This doctrine is rooted in the idea that the employer benefits from the employee’s labor and therefore should bear the responsibility for the risks associated with that labor. To establish respondeat superior, the plaintiff must demonstrate an employer-employee relationship and that the employee’s actions were within the scope of employment. The scope of employment is a broad concept that includes acts authorized by the employer, incidental to the employment, or done in furtherance of the employer’s business. Michigan courts consider several factors, including whether the conduct was of the kind the employee was employed to perform, occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits, and was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. A key distinction is between an employee and an independent contractor. Employers are generally not liable for the torts of independent contractors because they do not control the manner and means of the contractor’s work. The control test is paramount in differentiating between the two. If the employer retains the right to control the details of the work, the individual is likely an employee. Conversely, if the employer only has the right to control the result of the work, the individual is likely an independent contractor. In this scenario, the delivery driver, employed by “Speedy Deliveries Inc.,” was performing a task directly related to his job duties by transporting packages. Even though the driver was speeding, which is a deviation from company policy, the act of speeding occurred while he was actively engaged in delivering packages for Speedy Deliveries Inc. The speeding was incidental to the overall task of making deliveries efficiently, which ultimately serves the employer’s business interest. Therefore, the act falls within the scope of employment, making Speedy Deliveries Inc. vicariously liable for the injuries caused by the driver’s negligence under Michigan law.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, as codified in MCL § 600.2949, generally reduces a plaintiff’s recovery by their percentage of fault. However, a crucial exception exists regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning a plaintiff’s fault in causing their own injuries. Specifically, MCL § 600.2959 prohibits the introduction of evidence concerning a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt in a civil action for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. This statute aims to prevent juries from attributing a portion of the plaintiff’s damages to their non-use of a seatbelt, thereby preventing a reduction in recovery based on this specific form of comparative fault. Therefore, in a case where a plaintiff sustains injuries in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan and did not wear a seatbelt, evidence of this failure cannot be presented to reduce the defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s damages. The plaintiff’s recovery is not diminished by their failure to use a seatbelt under Michigan law.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, as codified in MCL § 600.2949, generally reduces a plaintiff’s recovery by their percentage of fault. However, a critical exception exists for situations involving intoxication. Specifically, if a plaintiff is found to be intoxicated to the extent that their blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.08% or greater, and this intoxication was a proximate cause of their injuries, their recovery is barred entirely, regardless of the defendant’s fault. This is a significant departure from the standard comparative negligence rule where a plaintiff could still recover if their fault was less than 50%. The rationale behind this “intoxication defense” is to deter driving or engaging in activities while impaired and to place the full burden of responsibility on the intoxicated individual. Therefore, if a plaintiff’s BAC is proven to be 0.08% or higher and this directly contributed to their harm, they cannot recover damages in Michigan, even if the defendant was also negligent.

The scenario involves a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to another person whom they know, or should know, is incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless. In this case, Ms. Gable entrusted her vehicle to Mr. Henderson. The key elements to establish negligent entrustment in Michigan are: 1) The entrustment of a vehicle; 2) The entrustee’s incompetence, recklessness, or inexperience; 3) The entrustor’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of the entrustee’s incompetence, recklessness, or inexperience; and 4) The entrustee’s negligent operation of the vehicle causing injury. Here, Ms. Gable provided the vehicle, and Mr. Henderson was demonstrably intoxicated and reckless, leading to the accident. The crucial factor is whether Ms. Gable knew or should have known of Mr. Henderson’s intoxication or propensity for reckless driving. Given that Mr. Henderson had consumed a significant amount of alcohol at her home and was visibly unsteady, a jury could reasonably infer that Ms. Gable had actual or constructive knowledge of his impaired condition and unsuitability to drive. Therefore, a claim for negligent entrustment is viable.

The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). To establish IIED in Michigan, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, emotional distress, and that the defendant’s conduct actually caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. Mere insults, indignities, or annoyances do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The plaintiff’s emotional distress must also be severe, meaning it is of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. In this scenario, while the landlord’s actions of repeatedly entering the tenant’s apartment without notice and making offensive comments about the tenant’s lifestyle are certainly inappropriate and potentially a breach of the lease agreement or even a privacy violation, they may not meet the high threshold of “extreme and outrageous” conduct required for IIED in Michigan. The comments, while offensive, are not described as being so extreme or malicious as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Furthermore, the prompt does not indicate that the tenant suffered severe emotional distress; it only states that the tenant was “distressed.” Without evidence of severe emotional distress and conduct that clearly transcends all bounds of decency, an IIED claim would likely fail. Therefore, the most accurate assessment is that the landlord’s actions, while wrongful, likely do not satisfy the stringent requirements for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Michigan law.

The question concerns the application of Michigan’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases. Under Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) § 600.1483, noneconomic damages are capped at $450,000 unless the injured party can prove by clear and convincing evidence that their injury, by its nature, permanently impairs their bodily function, prevents them from enjoying an activity that was a major purpose of their life, or is the direct cause of death. The scenario describes a plaintiff who suffered a severe spinal cord injury resulting in quadriplegia. This injury permanently impairs the plaintiff’s bodily function and directly prevents them from engaging in their lifelong passion of competitive sailing, which was a major purpose of their life. Therefore, the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages are not subject to the statutory cap. The calculation to determine the cap, if applicable, would involve the statutory amount, but since the exception applies, the cap is not relevant to the maximum recoverable amount of noneconomic damages. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of noneconomic damages awarded by the jury, which was $1,200,000, as the severe spinal cord injury causing quadriplegia meets the clear and convincing evidence standard for the exception to the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in Michigan.

The scenario involves a claim of negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to someone they know or should know is incompetent, inexperienced, or otherwise unfit to use it safely. In Michigan, to establish negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the entrustor knew or had reason to know the entrustee was incompetent, reckless, or unfit to use the instrumentality; (2) the entrustment proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; and (3) the entrustor’s negligence in entrusting the instrumentality was a direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. Here, the owner of the snowmobile, Mr. Henderson, allowed his nephew, who he knew had a history of reckless driving and had previously operated the snowmobile in a dangerous manner, to use it. The nephew’s subsequent negligent operation, resulting in the collision with Ms. Gable’s vehicle, directly links the entrustment to the injury. The nephew’s prior recklessness, known to Mr. Henderson, establishes the entrustor’s negligence. Therefore, Mr. Henderson can be held liable for negligent entrustment. The key is the entrustor’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of the entrustee’s unfitness and the causal connection between the entrustment and the harm.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence generally applies to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery by their own percentage of fault. However, certain intentional torts are treated differently. For intentional torts, Michigan law, specifically MCL § 600.2949, does not permit a reduction of damages based on the plaintiff’s comparative fault. This means that if a plaintiff suffers damages due to an intentional tort, their own negligence, even if a contributing factor, will not reduce the amount of damages they can recover from the defendant who committed the intentional tort. The question presents a scenario where a plaintiff, attempting to retrieve a dropped item, is intentionally shoved by a store employee, causing injury. The plaintiff’s action of reaching into a restricted area could be seen as contributing to the situation, but the employee’s intentional shove is a distinct tort. Because the tort committed by the employee is an intentional tort (battery), the plaintiff’s comparative negligence, if any, is irrelevant to the calculation of damages under Michigan law. Therefore, the plaintiff can recover the full amount of their proven damages, which are stated to be \$50,000.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence significantly impacts damage awards in tort cases. Specifically, under the Pure Comparative Negligence statute (MCL § 600.2949), a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault. If the plaintiff’s fault equals or exceeds 50%, they are barred from recovery. This means that if a plaintiff is found to be 49% at fault, they can recover 51% of their total damages. Conversely, if they are 50% at fault, they recover nothing. This rule applies to all tort actions, including negligence, product liability, and intentional torts where damages are sought. The purpose is to allocate responsibility for harm proportionally. Therefore, in a scenario where a plaintiff sustains $100,000 in damages and is found 40% at fault, their recoverable damages would be $100,000 multiplied by (100% – 40%), which equals $100,000 * 60%, resulting in $60,000. If the plaintiff were found 50% at fault, the calculation would be $100,000 * (100% – 50%), which is $100,000 * 50%, resulting in $50,000, but since 50% fault bars recovery, the actual recovery would be $0.

The scenario involves a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to another person whom they know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, is incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless. In Michigan, the elements typically require: (1) entrustment of a chattel (here, a vehicle); (2) to a person incompetent to use it; (3) knowledge by the entrustor of the incompetence; (4) the chattel being used in a manner likely to cause harm; and (5) the incompetence of the driver being a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The core of the question is whether the owner’s knowledge of the driver’s past speeding tickets and a suspended license is sufficient to establish the “knowledge of incompetence” element, particularly when the license was later reinstated. The fact that the license was reinstated does not retroactively erase the period of suspension or the underlying reasons for it, nor does it automatically negate the owner’s prior knowledge of the driver’s risky behavior. The prior history of numerous speeding violations and driving with a suspended license demonstrates a pattern of recklessness and disregard for traffic laws, which a reasonable person would recognize as indicative of incompetence to operate a vehicle safely. Therefore, the owner’s awareness of this history, even with the subsequent reinstatement, can support a claim for negligent entrustment if the other elements are met. The critical factor is the owner’s knowledge at the time of entrustment, and the reinstatement does not absolve the owner of the consequences of entrusting the vehicle based on prior knowledge.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence generally applies. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to them. However, Michigan law, specifically MCL § 600.2949, provides an exception for claims involving product liability. For such claims, if the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the fault of the manufacturer, assembler, designer, distributor, retailer, or seller of a product, and the product was defective, the plaintiff can recover damages even if they were also negligent, provided their negligence was not the sole cause of the injury. The statute states that a plaintiff may recover damages if their own negligence was not greater than the negligence of the defendant. This means if the plaintiff’s fault is 50% or less, they can still recover. The damages are then reduced by the percentage of the plaintiff’s fault. Therefore, if a plaintiff is found to be 30% at fault for their injuries caused by a defective product, and the total damages are \$100,000, their recovery would be \$100,000 – (0.30 * \$100,000) = \$70,000. The crucial aspect here is that the plaintiff’s fault must not exceed the defendant’s fault for recovery in a product liability case in Michigan, unlike the general rule where recovery is barred if the plaintiff’s fault is 50% or more in non-product liability cases.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, specifically pure comparative negligence, applies. This means that a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault, but they can still recover damages even if they are more than 50% at fault. For instance, if a plaintiff is found to be 70% at fault for an accident and their total damages are $100,000, they would recover $30,000 ($100,000 – (0.70 * $100,000)). The question revolves around the concept of superseding cause in the context of proximate cause. A superseding cause is an intervening act that breaks the chain of proximate causation between the defendant’s negligent act and the plaintiff’s injury. For an intervening act to be superseding, it must be unforeseeable and extraordinary. In this scenario, the intervening act is the independent decision of the second driver to accelerate into the intersection after seeing the first driver’s vehicle already there and attempting to pass. This intentional, albeit reckless, decision to enter the intersection under those circumstances is considered an unforeseeable and extraordinary event that supersedes the original negligence of the first driver in failing to yield. Therefore, the first driver’s negligence is no longer the proximate cause of the collision and the resulting injuries. The calculation for determining the plaintiff’s recovery, while not directly applicable to the proximate cause analysis itself, would be $0 because the original defendant is not liable due to the superseding cause.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the application of Michigan’s statutory scheme for premises liability, specifically MCL § 691.1406, which addresses liability for injuries caused by the defective condition of public highways, streets, alleys, sidewalks, crosswalks, or other public places. The statute generally requires notice of the defect to the governmental agency responsible for maintenance, either actual or constructive. Constructive notice arises when the defect has existed for a sufficient length of time that the governmental unit should have discovered it through reasonable inspection. In this case, the broken paving stone in the city park’s walkway has been present for approximately three months. This duration is generally considered sufficient to establish constructive notice for a municipality under Michigan law, as it provides ample opportunity for regular maintenance crews to observe and repair such a condition. Therefore, the City of Riverwood would likely be deemed to have had constructive notice of the defect, satisfying the statutory requirement for establishing liability in a premises liability claim related to a defective public place. The absence of direct, actual notice does not preclude liability if constructive notice can be proven.

The scenario involves a potential claim for intentional torts, specifically focusing on the elements of assault and battery under Michigan law. Assault is generally defined as an intentional act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. Battery is the actual harmful or offensive contact. In Michigan, the key is the intent to cause the apprehension of immediate contact for assault, and the intent to cause the contact itself for battery. The plaintiff, Ms. Dubois, experienced both the fear of being struck and the actual physical contact. The defendant, Mr. Henderson, swung a golf club in her general direction, causing her to flinch and then striking her arm. This action demonstrates the intent to create apprehension (swinging the club) and the intent to make contact (the club hitting her arm). The fact that the contact was offensive and harmful is evident from the injury. The question tests the understanding of how these two torts can be committed in a single course of action and the specific elements required for each in Michigan. The defendant’s actions directly caused the apprehension and the subsequent contact, satisfying the causation element for both torts.

The scenario involves a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to another person whom the entruster knows, or should know, is incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless, and this incompetence, inexperience, or recklessness is a proximate cause of the injury. In this case, the owner of the vehicle, Mr. Abernathy, lent his truck to Ms. Gable. The critical element to consider is whether Mr. Abernathy knew or should have known that Ms. Gable was incompetent or reckless in her operation of a motor vehicle. The facts state that Ms. Gable had a valid driver’s license, which generally indicates a basic level of competence. However, the fact that she had received multiple speeding tickets and had a recent license suspension for reckless driving in the past year strongly suggests a pattern of reckless behavior. This pattern would likely put a reasonable person on notice that entrusting a vehicle to Ms. Gable could lead to harm. Therefore, Mr. Abernathy’s knowledge of Ms. Gable’s driving history, particularly the recent suspension for reckless driving, would be sufficient to establish that he knew or should have known of her incompetence or recklessness. The subsequent accident, caused by Ms. Gable’s excessive speed, would then be a foreseeable consequence of this negligent entrustment. The absence of a direct showing that Mr. Abernathy personally witnessed Ms. Gable’s reckless driving is not determinative; constructive knowledge, based on readily available information about her driving record, is sufficient. This aligns with the principles of negligent entrustment as applied in Michigan, which focuses on the entruster’s knowledge of the entrustee’s propensity for danger.

The scenario describes a situation involving a private nuisance claim in Michigan. A private nuisance occurs when a person’s use and enjoyment of their land is unreasonably interfered with by another person’s use and enjoyment of their land. To establish a claim for private nuisance in Michigan, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that they have a possessory interest in the land; (2) that the defendant’s conduct was an intentional or negligent act or omission; (3) that the conduct caused an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land; and (4) that the interference was substantial. The reasonableness of the interference is determined by balancing the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Factors considered in this balancing test include the character of the locality, the nature of the use of the land, the nature and extent of the harm, and whether the interference is foreseeable. In this case, the constant, loud music emanating from the adjacent nightclub, which begins late at night and continues into the early morning hours, clearly interferes with the ability of the residents to sleep and enjoy their homes. The interference is substantial because it impacts their health and well-being. The nightclub’s business interest in playing music must be weighed against the residents’ right to peaceful enjoyment of their property. Given the late hours and the disruptive nature of the music, a court would likely find the interference to be unreasonable. Therefore, the residents have a strong basis for a private nuisance claim.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence generally applies. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to them. If the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds 50%, they are barred from recovery. This case involves a situation where a plaintiff, Ms. Albright, is injured due to a defective product manufactured by “GizmoCorp.” The jury finds GizmoCorp 60% at fault and Ms. Albright 40% at fault for her injuries. Ms. Albright’s total damages are assessed at $100,000. To calculate her recovery, we first determine the percentage of fault attributable to her, which is 40%. This percentage is then applied to her total damages to find the amount of her recovery. Calculation: Total Damages = $100,000 Plaintiff’s Fault Percentage = 40% Reduction Amount = Total Damages * Plaintiff’s Fault Percentage Reduction Amount = $100,000 * 0.40 = $40,000 Recoverable Damages = Total Damages – Reduction Amount Recoverable Damages = $100,000 – $40,000 = $60,000 Therefore, Ms. Albright would be entitled to recover $60,000. This outcome reflects Michigan’s modified comparative negligence rule where a plaintiff can recover damages as long as their own negligence does not exceed 50%. The principle of comparative negligence aims to apportion fault and damages among parties involved in an accident, preventing a completely negligent plaintiff from recovering any damages while still allowing recovery for plaintiffs who bear some responsibility but less than the defendant. This approach contrasts with contributory negligence, which would bar any recovery if the plaintiff was even slightly negligent. The application of this rule is crucial in product liability cases where both the manufacturer’s defect and the user’s conduct can contribute to an injury.

The scenario describes a situation involving a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to someone they know or should know is incompetent or reckless. In Michigan, this tort focuses on the entrustor’s negligence in allowing the use of the instrumentality, not solely on the driver’s negligence. The key elements are: (1) the entrustor had control over the instrumentality; (2) the entrustor knew or should have known the entrustee was incompetent, reckless, or unfit to use it; and (3) the entrustee’s use of the instrumentality caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Here, the owner of the antique firearm, Mr. Abernathy, is aware of Mr. Gable’s well-documented history of impulsive behavior and prior incidents involving firearms, including a near-miss with a projectile that narrowly avoided a bystander. This knowledge, coupled with his decision to lend the firearm to Mr. Gable for an unsupervised shooting session, establishes a strong basis for negligent entrustment. The fact that the firearm was antique and not commonly used does not alter the core principle of entrustment; rather, it might amplify the potential danger given its specialized nature. The proximate cause of Ms. Chen’s injury is directly linked to Mr. Gable’s reckless handling of the firearm, which Mr. Abernathy facilitated through his negligent entrustment. The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized negligent entrustment as a distinct cause of action separate from vicarious liability. The damages suffered by Ms. Chen, including medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost earning capacity, are all foreseeable consequences of such entrustment. Therefore, Mr. Abernathy’s actions in entrusting the firearm to Mr. Gable, given his knowledge of Gable’s propensities, constitute negligent entrustment.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, specifically pure comparative negligence, dictates that a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault. However, when a plaintiff’s negligence is found to be greater than or equal to the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. This is often referred to as the “50% bar” rule. For example, if a plaintiff is found to be 40% at fault and the defendant 60% at fault, the plaintiff can recover 60% of their damages. If the plaintiff is found to be 50% at fault and the defendant 50% at fault, the plaintiff recovers nothing. If the plaintiff is found to be 51% at fault and the defendant 49% at fault, the plaintiff also recovers nothing. This rule applies across all tort actions in Michigan, including negligence and strict liability, unless a specific statutory exception exists. The rationale is to prevent parties who are primarily responsible for their own injuries from recovering damages from others. This principle is fundamental to understanding damage apportionment in Michigan tort law.

In Michigan, the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the existence of a valid contractual or advantageous business relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional and improper interference with the relationship; and (4) resulting damages. The “improper” nature of the interference is a key element and is often determined by considering factors such as the actor’s intent, the nature of the contractual relationship, the social interests involved, and the relationship between the parties. Michigan law does not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with malice. Instead, the focus is on whether the interference was wrongful or improper. In this scenario, the defendant’s direct solicitation of the plaintiff’s clients, knowing of the existing contracts and intending to divert business, constitutes intentional interference. The fact that the defendant might have believed their actions were ultimately beneficial to the clients or that they did not act with malice does not negate the tort if the interference was indeed improper under the circumstances. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were more than just competition; they must show that the defendant’s conduct was independently wrongful or exceeded the bounds of fair competition. The plaintiff’s damages are the lost profits and the cost of acquiring new clients to replace those lost due to the defendant’s interference.

The scenario presented involves a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to someone they know or should know is incompetent, inexperienced, or otherwise unfit to use it, and that incompetence or unfitness is a proximate cause of the resulting harm. In Michigan, the elements generally require: (1) entrustment of a chattel; (2) to a person whom the entrustor knows or should know is incompetent, reckless, or otherwise unfit to use it; (3) the entrustor’s knowledge or notice of the unfitness; (4) the chattel being used in a manner likely to cause harm; and (5) the incompetent use being a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. In this case, the key is whether Ms. Albright had knowledge or should have had knowledge of Mr. Henderson’s alleged impaired driving ability when she allowed him to use her vehicle. The fact that Mr. Henderson had a prior DUI conviction within the last five years, coupled with the recent incident where he was observed swerving and was later cited for driving with a suspended license, provides strong evidence of his unfitness to drive. Ms. Albright’s claim that she was unaware of his driving record or the recent circumstances leading to his license suspension would likely be insufficient to defeat a claim of negligent entrustment, especially given the readily available public information regarding driving records and the common knowledge that driving with a suspended license indicates a serious disregard for traffic laws. The proximate cause element is met because Mr. Henderson’s impaired and illegal driving directly led to the collision and Ms. Petrova’s injuries. Therefore, Ms. Albright’s actions in entrusting her vehicle to Mr. Henderson, knowing or having reason to know of his demonstrated unfitness to drive, would establish liability for negligent entrustment in Michigan.

The Michigan Supreme Court case of *Rinaldo v. Burger King* established that a restaurant owner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition for invitees. This duty includes taking reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm. In this scenario, the spilled soda on the floor of the establishment, which had been there for an indeterminate but potentially significant period, presents a foreseeable hazard. The plaintiff, an invitee, slipped and sustained injuries. The defendant’s failure to discover and remedy the slippery condition, despite the potential for a patron to be injured, constitutes a breach of its duty of care. To establish negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate duty, breach, causation (both actual and proximate), and damages. The existence of the spilled soda and the resulting fall directly links the defendant’s inaction to the plaintiff’s injuries, satisfying the causation element. The damages are the documented medical expenses and pain and suffering. Therefore, the restaurant owner is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries under Michigan premises liability law, specifically under the theory of negligence for failing to maintain a safe environment for its invitees.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the concept of proximate cause, specifically the “but-for” test and the substantial factor test, as applied in Michigan tort law. The “but-for” test asks whether the injury would have occurred if the defendant’s conduct had not happened. If the answer is no, then the conduct is a cause in fact. However, when multiple independent causes could have produced the same result, the “but-for” test can lead to an inability to assign liability to any single actor. In such situations, Michigan courts, like many others, employ the “substantial factor” test. This test asks whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. A factor is substantial if it is more than a trivial or insignificant contribution. Here, even though the fire would have spread to the adjacent property regardless of Mr. Henderson’s negligent storage of flammable materials due to the inherently dangerous nature of the adjacent industrial process, his actions still played a role. The question is whether his negligence was a substantial factor in the *extent* of the damage or the *timing* of the fire’s spread to Ms. Chen’s property, or if it was merely incidental to an inevitable outcome. Michigan law emphasizes that proximate cause requires a direct causal connection that is not superseded by an independent intervening cause. While the adjacent industrial process might be considered an intervening cause, the foreseeability of its interaction with negligently stored flammable materials is key. If the negligent storage significantly increased the risk of a larger, more rapid fire, it could be considered a substantial factor. However, if the fire would have reached Ms. Chen’s property with the same intensity and at the same time due to the inherent risks of the adjacent operation, Mr. Henderson’s negligence might not be deemed a proximate cause of the damage to her property. The analysis hinges on whether Henderson’s actions were a substantial factor in causing *this specific harm* to Ms. Chen, not just in contributing to a fire generally. Given that the fire would have reached her property anyway due to the adjacent industrial operation, the negligent storage did not make the harm to her property occur when it otherwise would not have, nor did it substantially increase the magnitude of that harm independent of the primary cause. Therefore, his conduct is not a proximate cause of Ms. Chen’s loss.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, as codified in MCL §600.2959, generally reduces a plaintiff’s recovery by their percentage of fault. However, a crucial exception exists for intentional torts. For intentional torts, a plaintiff’s recovery is not barred or reduced by their own comparative fault. This means if a plaintiff is injured by an intentional battery, even if they contributed to the provocation or their own injury through their own negligence, their damages are not diminished based on their fault. The rationale is that the law does not permit a wrongdoer to benefit from their intentional misconduct by shifting blame to the victim, regardless of the victim’s actions. Therefore, in a scenario involving an intentional tort, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is irrelevant to the calculation of their damages. The focus remains solely on the defendant’s intentional conduct and the resulting harm.

In Michigan, the concept of proximate cause is crucial for establishing liability in tort law. It requires that the defendant’s negligent act be a direct and foreseeable cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The “but-for” test, or cause-in-fact, establishes that the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s actions. However, proximate cause goes further, examining whether the injury was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, and if the chain of causation was broken by an intervening superseding cause. An intervening cause is one that occurs after the defendant’s negligent act, while a superseding cause is an intervening cause that is so unforeseeable and extraordinary that it breaks the causal chain, relieving the original tortfeasor of liability. The foreseeability of the intervening event is the key factor. If the intervening cause was foreseeable, the original defendant may still be liable. Michigan law emphasizes that the harm suffered must be of the general type that the defendant’s negligent conduct created a foreseeable risk of.

The scenario involves a potential claim for negligent entrustment under Michigan law. Negligent entrustment occurs when a person entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to another person whom the entruster knows or should know is incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless, and this incompetence, inexperience, or recklessness causes harm. In this case, the owner of the powerboat, Mr. Henderson, allowed his nephew, who he knew had a history of reckless boating and had been cited for operating under the influence of alcohol, to operate the vessel. The nephew’s subsequent reckless operation, which led to the collision and injury to Ms. Albright, directly links the entrustment to the harm. Michigan follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, which outlines the elements of negligent entrustment. The key is that the entruster had knowledge or reason to know of the entrustee’s incompetence or recklessness. Mr. Henderson’s knowledge of his nephew’s prior DUI and reckless behavior satisfies this element. Therefore, a claim for negligent entrustment against Mr. Henderson is likely to succeed. The damages awarded to Ms. Albright would be for her injuries, medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and any other proximately caused losses. The question asks about the basis for holding Mr. Henderson liable. His direct negligence in entrusting the boat to an obviously unfit operator is the foundation for his liability, separate from any vicarious liability for the nephew’s direct negligence in operating the boat.

The scenario involves the tort of intentional battery, which requires an unconsented, harmful or offensive touching. In Michigan, the standard for offensive touching is an affront to a reasonable sense of personal dignity. The question asks about the liability of a patron who intentionally spills a drink on another patron. To determine liability for battery, we must assess if the touching was offensive. A reasonable person would likely consider having a drink intentionally spilled on them to be an affront to their personal dignity. Therefore, the patron who spilled the drink likely committed battery. The Michigan Supreme Court case of *Holcomb v. Walter* (1981) established that a touching is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. This standard is met when a drink is intentionally poured on someone. The specific amount of liquid or the immediate aftermath of the spillage does not negate the offensive touching itself. The intent to make contact is sufficient, even if the intent was not to cause physical injury.

The question pertains to the Michigan equivalent of the “dram shop” or “liquor liability” laws, specifically concerning the liability of a social host for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest. Michigan’s Civil Liability Act, specifically MCL § 436.1701, addresses this. This statute generally prohibits furnishing alcohol to a minor or a visibly intoxicated person. However, the key distinction for social hosts versus commercial establishments is that Michigan law, as interpreted by cases like *Long v. Fitzell*, generally shields social hosts from liability for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated adults, absent specific exceptions like furnishing to a minor. The scenario describes a social host providing alcohol to an adult who later causes injury. The statute’s focus is on commercial vendors and furnishing to minors. Therefore, without evidence of furnishing to a minor or a specific statutory exception applying to social hosts in this context, the social host would not be liable under Michigan law for the guest’s subsequent actions. The core of the analysis lies in distinguishing between commercial liquor licensees and social hosts under Michigan’s specific statutory framework and case law. The absence of a direct statutory provision imposing liability on social hosts for the actions of visibly intoxicated adult guests, unlike the liability imposed on commercial licensees, is the determining factor.

In Michigan, the doctrine of comparative negligence, as codified in MCL § 600.2949, dictates that a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault. If a plaintiff is found to be more than 50% at fault, they are barred from recovering any damages. In this scenario, the jury determined that Mr. Abernathy was 40% at fault for the accident and Ms. Chen was 60% at fault. Mr. Abernathy’s total damages were assessed at \$150,000. Because Mr. Abernathy’s fault (40%) is not greater than 50%, he is not barred from recovery. His recovery will be reduced by his percentage of fault. Therefore, the amount Mr. Abernathy can recover is calculated as his total damages multiplied by (1 minus his percentage of fault): \$150,000 * (1 – 0.40) = \$150,000 * 0.60 = \$90,000. This calculation reflects the application of Michigan’s modified comparative fault system. The principle ensures that plaintiffs contribute to their own losses in proportion to their fault, but only up to a certain threshold. Understanding this threshold is crucial for predicting outcomes in tort litigation within Michigan. The concept of proximate cause and duty of care are foundational to establishing liability in the first place, but the allocation of damages is governed by the comparative fault statute.