The Indiana Probate Code, specifically under IC 29-1-7-7, addresses the appointment of a personal representative when a will names an executor but that person is unable or unwilling to serve. In such situations, the court will appoint a successor personal representative. The statute prioritizes certain individuals for this appointment. If the will designates a successor, that designation is generally followed. If no successor is named, or if the named successor is unavailable, the court will appoint a suitable person. Indiana law generally prioritizes the surviving spouse, then other heirs, and then creditors. However, when a will is involved, the testator’s intent, as expressed in the will, carries significant weight in the appointment process, provided the named individual is qualified. The question presents a scenario where the named executor is deceased. The will does not name a successor executor. Therefore, the court must appoint a personal representative. Indiana law, in the absence of a named successor, generally looks to the surviving spouse and then other heirs. The specific wording of IC 29-1-7-7(a) states that if the person named in the will fails to qualify, or if no person is named, the court shall appoint a personal representative. While the statute generally outlines a preference for surviving spouse and heirs, the primary consideration in a testate estate is to effectuate the testator’s intent as much as possible. In this case, the will is silent on a successor. Therefore, the court will appoint a suitable person, generally following the statutory preference for surviving spouse and heirs.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by the will of Bartholomew Higgins. The trust instrument specifies that income from the trust corpus is to be distributed to Bartholomew’s nephew, Silas, during Silas’s lifetime. Upon Silas’s death, the trust corpus is to be distributed to Silas’s children, per stirpes. Indiana law, specifically Indiana Code § 30-4-3-7, governs the powers and duties of trustees. A trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and in accordance with its terms. In this case, the trustee’s primary duty is to manage the trust assets and distribute the income to Silas as directed. The question asks about the trustee’s obligation regarding a potential sale of the trust corpus. While a trustee generally has the power to sell trust assets if it is prudent and in the best interest of the beneficiaries, this power is not absolute. The trustee must consider the terms of the trust and the impact of the sale on the beneficiaries. Since the trust provides for income distribution to Silas during his life and then distribution of the corpus to Silas’s children, a sale of the corpus during Silas’s lifetime would fundamentally alter the trust’s purpose and potentially prejudice the remainder beneficiaries by depleting the asset that would eventually pass to them. Indiana law emphasizes the trustee’s fiduciary duty to preserve the trust property for the benefit of all beneficiaries, both present and future. Therefore, unless the trust instrument explicitly grants the trustee the power to invade the corpus for Silas’s benefit, or if there is a demonstrated necessity to sell the corpus to preserve its value or to generate income that cannot otherwise be obtained, the trustee should not sell the corpus. In the absence of such specific provisions or compelling circumstances, the trustee’s duty is to maintain the corpus for the eventual distribution to Silas’s children. The trustee’s role is to manage and preserve the trust assets according to the settlor’s intent, which in this case is to provide income to Silas and then pass the corpus to his descendants. A sale of the corpus without clear authorization or necessity would violate this duty.

In Indiana, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child born or adopted after the execution of a will who is not provided for in that will. Indiana Code § 29-1-6-8 addresses this situation. If a testator fails to make any provision in their will for a child born or adopted after the execution of the will, and the will does not indicate an intention to disinherit such child, the pretermitted heir is entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate. This share is generally equivalent to what the child would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance of after-born or after-adopted children. The calculation for the intestate share is determined by Indiana’s laws of intestacy, which vary based on whether the surviving spouse is also present and the number of children. However, the core principle is that the pretermitted heir receives a portion of the estate as if the will did not exist for their benefit, unless the will clearly demonstrates an intent to exclude them. The statute provides a safeguard against oversight, ensuring that children who were not contemplated at the time the will was drafted are not entirely excluded from their parent’s estate without a clear intent to do so. This protection is a fundamental aspect of Indiana’s probate law designed to uphold familial obligations.

The core issue revolves around the enforceability of a testamentary gift conditioned upon a beneficiary’s religious affiliation. Indiana law, like many jurisdictions, generally upholds conditions precedent or subsequent in wills, provided they are not against public policy or impossible to fulfill. However, conditions that are deemed to foster religious discrimination or impose undue religious pressure on a beneficiary can be scrutinized and potentially invalidated as against public policy. In this scenario, the testator’s desire to ensure the beneficiary remains affiliated with a specific religious denomination, while seemingly a personal preference, touches upon the sensitive area of religious freedom and the potential for coercion. Indiana courts, when interpreting such provisions, would likely consider whether the condition is merely a reflection of the testator’s beliefs or an attempt to control the beneficiary’s religious choices in a manner that infringes upon their autonomy. The concept of “public policy” in Indiana estate law is broad and can encompass evolving societal values regarding individual liberties. A condition that mandates adherence to a specific religion for inheritance could be viewed as an overreach, particularly if it forces a beneficiary to maintain a belief system they do not genuinely hold or actively discourages them from exploring other faiths or no faith at all. The Indiana Probate Code, while granting testators considerable latitude in distributing their property, does not grant unlimited power to impose conditions that violate fundamental rights or societal norms. Therefore, a condition that is overly restrictive or punitive regarding religious affiliation is likely to be deemed void as against public policy, allowing the gift to pass to the beneficiary without the offending condition, or potentially to an alternate beneficiary if the will provides for such an eventuality.

In Indiana, a will contest action generally must be commenced within three years after the admission of the will to probate. This period is established by Indiana Code § 29-1-7-17. The statute provides that “If a will is probated on the petition of the executor or any other person, the probate of the will shall be conclusive in the absence of a contest. A contest of the will must be commenced within three years after the probate of the will.” This limitation period is crucial for providing finality to the probate process. However, there are specific exceptions to this general rule. One significant exception applies when the contestant was an infant or of unsound mind at the time of the probate of the will. In such cases, Indiana law, as reflected in Indiana Code § 29-1-1-11, allows the contestant to commence a contest within one year after the disability is removed. This means if a person was under 18 years old or legally incapacitated when the will was admitted to probate, they have an extended period to challenge the will, starting from the date they reach the age of majority or their disability is otherwise removed. The question asks about the absolute latest a contest can be filed, implying a scenario where the contestant was under a disability. If a contestant was an infant and the will was probated on January 1, 2018, they would reach the age of majority (18) on January 1, 2026. The three-year probate contest period would have expired on January 1, 2021. However, because they were an infant at the time of probate, the disability exception applies. They have one year after the removal of the disability to file the contest. Therefore, the latest they could file would be one year after January 1, 2026, which is January 1, 2027.

In Indiana, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child or descendant of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will and who is not provided for in the will, nor is their omission intentional. Indiana Code § 29-1-5-8 addresses the rights of such heirs. The statute presumes that the omission was unintentional unless the will provides evidence to the contrary. If a pretermitted heir is identified, they are generally entitled to receive the same share of the estate that they would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning as if there were no will. This share is typically taken from the portions of the estate that would have passed to the beneficiaries named in the will. The statute distinguishes between children born or adopted before the will’s execution and those born or adopted after. For those born or adopted after, the presumption of unintentional omission is stronger. The will must clearly indicate an intention to disinherit or a specific provision for the after-born or after-adopted descendant to overcome this presumption. Without such clear indication, the pretermitted heir inherits as if the testator died without a will, meaning they receive a share of the estate distributed according to Indiana’s intestacy laws. This does not necessarily mean the entire estate, but a proportional share based on the number of other heirs.

The Indiana Trust Code, specifically IC 30-4-3-10, governs the termination of trusts. A trust may be terminated by the settlor if the settlor has capacity and the trust is irrevocable. However, the scenario states that the trust instrument is silent on irrevocability. Under Indiana law, a trust is presumed to be revocable unless expressly made irrevocable. Since Eleanor created the trust and the instrument does not state it is irrevocable, it is presumed revocable. Therefore, Eleanor, possessing the sole beneficial interest and retaining the power to revoke, can terminate the trust. The key legal principle here is the settlor’s retained power to revoke a trust that is not expressly made irrevocable, allowing them to reclaim the trust property. This is distinct from situations where a trust might be terminated by beneficiaries under specific statutory conditions or court order, which require different legal thresholds and consent from all beneficiaries, and potentially the settlor if they have a retained interest.

The Indiana Code, specifically IC 29-1-5-1, addresses the requirements for a valid will in Indiana. A will must be in writing, signed by the testator, or by another person in the testator’s presence and at the testator’s direction. Furthermore, the will must be attested by two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. In the scenario presented, Mr. Abernathy signed his will. However, the critical deficiency is that the two witnesses, Ms. Gable and Mr. Finch, did not sign the will in Mr. Abernathy’s presence. Indiana law requires that the attestation occur in the testator’s presence. This presence requirement is a crucial element for a will to be considered properly executed under Indiana law. Without this, the will is generally considered invalid. Therefore, the will fails to meet the statutory requirements for proper execution in Indiana.

The Indiana Code, specifically IC 29-1-3-1, governs the elective share of a surviving spouse. This statute provides that a surviving spouse is entitled to an elective share of the augmented estate. The augmented estate is defined to include certain property interests of the decedent and the surviving spouse. For a transfer to be considered part of the augmented estate under IC 29-1-3-3, it must be a transfer made by the decedent during marriage to a person other than the surviving spouse, where the decedent retained a power to revoke or consume the property, or where the property was held by the decedent and another person with a right of survivorship. In this scenario, the certificate of deposit was owned solely by the decedent, Arthur, and was transferred to his sister, Beatrice, with Arthur retaining the right to withdraw or consume the funds during his lifetime. This retention of control and the transfer during marriage, without consideration from Beatrice for Arthur’s benefit, makes it a testamentary substitute includible in the augmented estate for the purpose of calculating the elective share. The elective share is one-third of the augmented estate under IC 29-1-3-1(a). Therefore, the correct calculation involves identifying all assets that constitute the augmented estate, including the CD. The question asks about the legal status of the CD in relation to the elective share, not a specific monetary calculation. The CD is considered part of Arthur’s augmented estate because he retained the right to consume the funds, making it a testamentary substitute under Indiana law.

The scenario presented involves a testator who executed a will in Indiana. Subsequently, the testator married and had a child. Indiana law addresses the impact of marriage and birth of a child after a will’s execution. Specifically, Indiana Code § 29-1-5-10 provides that if a testator marries after making a will, and the spouse is not provided for in the will, the spouse shall receive the same share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless the spouse is provided for by a marriage settlement. Similarly, if a testator has a child after making a will, and the child is not provided for in the will, the child shall receive a share of the estate as if the testator had died intestate. When both events occur, and neither the spouse nor the child is provided for in the will, the will is generally revoked by implication with respect to the omitted spouse and child. However, the statute further clarifies that if the testator had a child born after the will was made, and the testator also devised property to that child in the will, or if the testator made provision for that child by some other instrument, or if the testator left no provision for the child, the will is not revoked. The critical element here is whether the will makes any provision for the after-born child. Since the will was executed before the birth of the child and the marriage, and no codicil or new will was executed to account for these changes, the will is subject to revocation by implication concerning the omitted spouse and child. However, the question states the testator left no provision for the child. Under Indiana Code § 29-1-5-10, if the testator leaves no provision for the child, the will is revoked as to that child. The statute’s wording regarding “devised property to that child in the will” or “made provision for that child by some other instrument” implies that if the will is entirely silent regarding the after-born child, and no other provision is made, then the revocation by implication applies to the child’s share. The spouse is also an omitted spouse. Therefore, the will would be revoked as to the shares of both the omitted spouse and the omitted child, meaning they would inherit as if the testator died intestate. The question specifically asks about the effect on the child. Given the absence of any provision for the child in the will, the will is effectively revoked with respect to the child’s intestate share.

The Indiana Code, specifically IC 29-1-5-1, addresses the requirements for a valid will in Indiana. A will must be in writing, signed by the testator or on the testator’s behalf by some other person in the testator’s presence and under the testator’s direction, and attested to by two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. The scenario describes a will that was signed by the testator, Elara Vance, in the presence of two witnesses, but one witness, Silas, signed in a separate room after the testator had left the initial signing location. This critical detail means the attestation requirement of witnesses signing in the presence of the testator was not met for Silas’s signature. Therefore, the will would be considered invalid in Indiana due to the improper attestation by Silas, as he did not sign in the testator’s presence. The presence requirement for witnesses is crucial to ensure that the witnesses can attest to the testator’s mental capacity and voluntary act of signing. The fact that the other witness, Beatrice, did sign in Elara’s presence fulfills part of the requirement, but the failure of the second witness to do so renders the entire attestation process defective under Indiana law.

In Indiana, a holographic will is a will that is written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. Indiana Code § 29-1-5-3(b) specifically addresses holographic wills, stating that “A will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting is not required to be witnessed.” This statute provides an exception to the general rule requiring two witnesses for a valid will under Indiana law, which is typically found in Indiana Code § 29-1-5-3(a). The key element is that the entire document, including the signature, must be in the testator’s handwriting. If any part of the will, such as an attestation clause or an amendment, is typed or written by another person, the holographic nature is destroyed, and it would likely be treated as an invalid will or a will that requires witness attestation. Therefore, for a will to be considered holographic and thus valid without witnesses in Indiana, every word must be in the testator’s own script.

In Indiana, when a testator executes a will and subsequently marries, the will is generally revoked by operation of law as to the surviving spouse, unless the spouse is provided for in the will or the will expressly states that it is made in contemplation of the marriage. This is codified in Indiana Code § 29-1-5-10. The statute aims to protect a spouse who might otherwise be unintentionally disinherited. If the marriage occurs after the will’s execution, and the spouse is not mentioned or contemplated, the spouse is entitled to the same share of the estate they would have received if the testator had died intestate, as if the testator had died unmarried. This share is typically one half of the intestate estate if there are no surviving children, or one third if there are surviving children. The remaining portion of the estate passes according to the will’s provisions as if the spouse had predeceased the testator. Therefore, the spouse receives their intestate share, and the will’s dispositions are applied to the residue of the estate.

In Indiana, a trust that is established for the benefit of a specific class of beneficiaries, and which does not have ascertainable beneficiaries at the time of its creation, may still be valid if the settlor provides a mechanism for identifying those beneficiaries. This is often achieved through a power of appointment granted to a trustee or another designated person. The Indiana Uniform Trust Code, specifically IC 30-4-2-1 et seq., addresses the requirements for a valid trust, including the need for definite beneficiaries. However, exceptions exist for charitable trusts and trusts where a power of appointment is exercised. In this scenario, the trust was created for the benefit of “my deserving employees.” While this initially appears to lack definite beneficiaries, the trustee’s discretion to select from this class, acting reasonably and in good faith, fulfills the requirement of ascertainability for the purpose of trust administration and distribution. The key is that the class itself is defined, and a method for selection is provided, even if the specific individuals are not named at the outset. This aligns with the principle that a trust is not invalid merely because beneficiaries are not ascertainable at the time of its creation, provided there is a mechanism for their determination.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust created by a will. Under Indiana law, specifically Indiana Code § 29-1-6-1, a will is generally considered revoked if the testator makes a subsequent will that is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the prior will. If the subsequent will is only partially inconsistent, the prior will remains in effect to the extent it is not revoked by the later instrument. In this case, the second will, executed in 2022, explicitly revokes all prior wills. While the second will does not specifically mention the testamentary trust established in the 2018 will, the language of complete revocation is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, the 2018 will, including its provisions for the testamentary trust, is revoked by the 2022 will. The trust’s existence is contingent upon the validity of the testamentary instrument that created it. Since the 2018 will is revoked, the testamentary trust fails for lack of a valid testamentary foundation. The assets intended for the trust would then pass according to the laws of intestacy in Indiana, or as directed by any other valid testamentary disposition made by Ms. Gable that was not revoked.

In Indiana, the doctrine of equitable conversion dictates that when a contract for the sale of real property is executed, the buyer’s interest in the land is considered personal property, and the seller’s interest is considered real property. This conversion occurs at the moment the contract is signed, assuming it is a binding and enforceable agreement. This principle is crucial in determining how the property is treated for purposes of inheritance, creditors’ rights, and taxation. For instance, if the seller dies after entering into a binding contract for the sale of their Indiana real estate but before the closing, the real estate itself, as part of their estate, would generally pass according to the terms of their will or the laws of intestacy as real property. However, the proceeds from the sale, which represent the seller’s converted interest, would be treated as personal property. Conversely, if the buyer dies after signing the contract, their interest in the property, now considered personal property, would pass as personal property under their will or intestacy laws. The question hinges on the status of the seller’s interest at the time of their death. Since the contract was binding and enforceable, equitable conversion had already occurred, transforming the seller’s real property interest into a personal property interest (the right to receive the purchase price). Therefore, the seller’s interest in the property would be administered as personal property within their estate.

The scenario presented involves the concept of an “interested witness” in Indiana. Indiana Code § 29-1-5-7 outlines the requirements for a valid will. This statute states that a will must be signed by the testator and attested to by at least two competent witnesses. Crucially, a witness is generally considered competent if they are of sound mind and can attest to the testator’s signature. However, a beneficiary under the will is considered an “interested witness.” While the will itself remains valid, the legacy or devise to that interested witness may be voided to the extent of their interest. This means that if Elias, who is named as a beneficiary in his aunt’s will, also acts as a witness to that will, his gift under the will is presumed to be void. The presumption can be rebutted if the witness would have inherited under Indiana’s laws of intestacy had the will been invalid, or if the witness can prove they did not know the will contained a provision for them. In this case, Elias is aware of his beneficial interest and his actions as a witness create a conflict. Indiana law aims to prevent undue influence or fraud by interested parties. Therefore, Elias’s specific devise is likely to be voided unless one of the statutory exceptions applies, which are not indicated by the facts provided. The will itself, however, would likely still be admitted to probate, but Elias would not receive his bequest. The question asks about the validity of the devise to Elias, not the entire will.

The scenario describes a situation where a will is being contested on the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. In Indiana, for a will to be admitted to probate, the testator must have possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution. Testamentary capacity generally means the testator understood the nature and effect of the act of making a will, the nature and extent of their property, and the natural objects of their bounty. Undue influence occurs when a person’s free will is overcome by another, causing them to dispose of their property in a way they would not have otherwise. The burden of proof for undue influence typically rests with the contestant. However, if the contestant can show that a confidential relationship existed between the testator and the primary beneficiary, and that the primary beneficiary was active in procuring the will, the burden may shift to the proponent of the will to prove the absence of undue influence. In this case, while there is a confidential relationship and active procurement, the key factor is the testator’s mental state. If the testator, despite these influences, had sufficient mental capacity to understand the will’s provisions and the natural objects of their bounty, the will would likely be upheld. The question focuses on the legal standard for testamentary capacity in Indiana, which is a subjective test of the testator’s understanding at the time of signing.

In Indiana, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” is governed by Indiana Code § 29-1-5-8. This statute addresses situations where a testator fails to provide in their will for a child born or adopted after the execution of the will, or for a child or other descendant born or adopted after the testator’s death. Such an omitted individual is generally entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless certain exceptions apply. The exceptions include instances where the omission was intentional and this intention appears from the will itself, or where the testator had other children or descendants and devised substantially all of their estate to the other parent of the omitted child. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance. In this scenario, the will was executed in 2018, and the child, Amelia, was born in 2020, after the will’s execution. The will makes no provision for Amelia, nor does it indicate an intention to omit her. Furthermore, the will does not devise substantially all of the estate to the other parent of Amelia. Therefore, Amelia qualifies as a pretermitted heir under Indiana law and is entitled to a share of Mr. Abernathy’s estate. The share she would receive is determined by the intestacy laws of Indiana, which generally provide for equal distribution among children.

The Indiana Code, specifically IC 29-1-5-3, governs the requirements for a valid will in Indiana. For a will to be considered valid, it must be in writing, signed by the testator (or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction), and attested to by at least two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. The scenario describes a will that was signed by the testator and then by one witness. The second witness signed the will later, in the testator’s absence, and without the testator’s direction. This means the will fails to meet the statutory requirements for attestation as stipulated by Indiana law, specifically the requirement that witnesses sign in the testator’s presence. Consequently, the will would be considered invalid. The concept of “testator’s presence” is crucial here, and it generally means that the testator must be able to see or at least be aware of the act of signing by the witnesses. Signing in a separate room, or at a later time without the testator’s immediate awareness or direction, negates this requirement. Therefore, the will is not validly executed under Indiana law.

In Indiana, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), codified at Indiana Code § 32-18-2 et seq., governs the circumstances under which a transfer of property can be challenged by creditors. A transfer is considered voidable if it was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, or if it was made without receiving reasonably equivalent value and the transferor was engaged or about to engage in a business or transaction for which the transferor’s remaining assets were unreasonably small. In the given scenario, Bartholomew made the transfer of his antique coin collection to his nephew, Cassian, within one year of his substantial debt to the State Bank of Indiana becoming due. Bartholomew received no consideration for this transfer, and the coin collection was his only significant asset. The State Bank of Indiana, as a creditor, can seek to avoid this transfer. Under the UVTA, a transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is voidable. The facts strongly suggest this intent, given the timing of the transfer relative to the debt and the lack of consideration for a valuable asset. Even if actual intent were not proven, the transfer would likely be deemed voidable because Bartholomew received no value, and his remaining assets (none) were unreasonably small after the transfer, leaving him unable to satisfy his debt. The State Bank of Indiana would initiate a civil action to have the transfer set aside, allowing them to reach the coin collection to satisfy Bartholomew’s debt. This is a standard application of the UVTA’s provisions concerning fraudulent conveyances.

The Indiana Code addresses the concept of abatement, which is the process of reducing or eliminating bequests when the estate’s assets are insufficient to satisfy all claims and bequests. Indiana Code § 29-1-2-10 outlines the order of abatement. Generally, residue of the estate is abated first, followed by general bequests, then specific bequests of personal property, and finally specific bequests of real property. However, the testator can specify a different order of abatement in their will. In this scenario, the testator’s will explicitly states that the specific bequest of the antique clock should not be subject to abatement until all other specific bequests have been exhausted. The general bequest of $10,000 to the local historical society is a general legacy. The specific bequest of the waterfront property in Michigan City is a specific devise of real property. The specific bequest of the antique clock is a specific legacy of personal property. When the estate’s value is insufficient, the general legacy to the historical society would abate first. Following that, specific bequests of personal property (other than the clock, due to the testator’s direction) would abate. If further abatement is necessary, specific bequests of real property would abate. The testator’s clear directive regarding the antique clock means it enjoys a protected status, abating only after other specific bequests are depleted. Therefore, the waterfront property, being a specific devise of real property, would be the next to abate after the general legacy, assuming no other specific bequests of personal property (other than the clock) exist or are insufficient.

The Uniform Trust Code, as adopted in Indiana (Indiana Code Title 30, Article 4), governs the creation, administration, and termination of trusts. When a trustee’s actions are challenged, a court may order remedies to protect the trust’s beneficiaries. Indiana Code § 30-4-3-11 outlines the duties of a trustee, including the duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. Indiana Code § 30-4-3-12 addresses the duty to administer the trust with reasonable care, skill, and caution. If a trustee breaches these duties, the court has broad powers to fashion remedies. Indiana Code § 30-4-9-1 discusses remedies for breach of trust. These remedies can include compelling the trustee to perform their duties, enjoining them from further breaches, compelling the payment or restoration of trust property, ordering the trustee to account for profits, removing the trustee, appointing a receiver, or setting aside a transaction. In this scenario, the trustee’s unauthorized investment in speculative ventures constitutes a breach of the duty to administer the trust with reasonable care and prudence, and to act solely in the beneficiaries’ interest. The beneficiaries are seeking to recover the lost principal. The most direct remedy for recovering lost trust property due to a trustee’s breach is compelling the trustee to restore the trust property. This means the trustee must personally reimburse the trust for the amount lost due to their imprudent investment. The question asks for the most appropriate remedy to restore the trust’s corpus.

In Indiana, the concept of a “holographic will” is not recognized as a valid form of will. Indiana Code § 29-1-5-3 outlines the requirements for a valid will, specifying that a will must be in writing, signed by the testator (or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction), and attested to by at least two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. A will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting, but not witnessed, fails to meet these statutory requirements. Therefore, such a document would be considered invalid in Indiana for the disposition of property. The purpose of the witness requirement is to provide evidence of the testator’s intent and to guard against fraud and undue influence. Without these formalities, the will lacks the necessary legal validation for probate and estate administration in Indiana.

The scenario involves the transfer of property by a grantor to a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary. In Indiana, a trust is generally considered irrevocable unless the terms of the trust expressly state otherwise or the grantor retains certain powers. The Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified in Indiana, governs the interpretation and administration of trusts. Specifically, Indiana Code § 30-4-2-1 discusses the revocation of trusts. If a trust instrument does not contain a provision for revocation or modification, and the grantor has not retained any powers to amend or revoke, the trust is generally considered irrevocable. In this case, the trust document created by Ms. Albright is silent on revocation. She did not retain any power to amend or revoke the trust. Therefore, under Indiana law, the trust is irrevocable. An irrevocable trust cannot be unilaterally altered or terminated by the grantor without the consent of all beneficiaries or a court order, absent specific provisions within the trust document itself allowing for such action. The purpose of making a trust irrevocable is often to achieve certain estate planning goals, such as asset protection or reducing estate taxes, which are undermined if the grantor can freely change their mind. The intent of the grantor, as expressed in the trust document, is paramount. Since the document is silent and no powers were retained, the default legal presumption is irrevocability.

The scenario describes a situation where a beneficiary, Elara, is challenging the validity of a will executed by her uncle, Silas. The grounds for the challenge are Silas’s alleged lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence exerted by his caregiver, Marcus. Indiana law, specifically Indiana Code § 29-1-5-3, outlines the requirements for a valid will, including the testator’s sound mind and freedom from undue influence. Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of the act of making a will, the nature and extent of their property, and the natural objects of their bounty. Undue influence occurs when a person in a position of trust or confidence exploits that position to improperly influence the testator’s disposition of property, overcoming the testator’s free will. In this case, Elara must present evidence to demonstrate that Silas did not possess the requisite mental capacity at the time of executing the will or that Marcus exerted such influence that Silas’s intentions were not his own. The burden of proof initially rests on the proponent of the will to show it was duly executed. However, if Elara presents a prima facie case of lack of capacity or undue influence, the burden may shift to the proponent to demonstrate the will’s validity. The effectiveness of Elara’s challenge will depend on the strength and admissibility of her evidence regarding Silas’s mental state and Marcus’s actions. The specific details of the medical evidence, the nature of Marcus’s relationship with Silas, and the circumstances surrounding the will’s execution will be crucial.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established in Indiana. The primary beneficiary, Elara, is to receive income from the trust for her lifetime. Upon her death, the remaining trust corpus is to be distributed to her children. The question concerns the nature of Elara’s interest in the trust property. In Indiana, a beneficiary of a trust who is entitled to receive income from the trust for their life, with the principal to be distributed to others upon their death, holds a life estate in the trust’s income, but not the corpus itself. The trustee holds legal title to the trust property. Elara possesses an equitable interest, specifically a right to receive income generated by the trust assets. This equitable interest is often described as a life interest in the income. The trustee, holding legal title, has the power to manage and invest the assets to produce income for Elara. Her interest is not a fee simple interest, nor is it a remainder interest, as those are the interests of the beneficiaries who will receive the corpus after her death. Her interest is also not a reversionary interest, which would occur if the property were to revert to the grantor or their estate. Therefore, Elara’s interest is best characterized as a life interest in the income generated by the trust.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by a will, which becomes operative upon the testator’s death. The question focuses on the proper procedure for a trustee to manage trust assets in Indiana. Indiana law, specifically the Indiana Trust Code (IC 30-4-3-1 et seq.), governs the administration of trusts. A trustee has a fiduciary duty to manage the trust property prudently and in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument and applicable law. This includes the duty to segregate trust property from the trustee’s personal property, to keep accurate records, and to account for all trust transactions. When a trustee receives a specific asset, such as antique furniture, the trustee must take possession and control of it. If the trustee intends to sell the asset, they must do so in a manner that maximizes the value for the beneficiaries, which may involve appraisal or seeking competitive bids, depending on the trust’s terms and the nature of the asset. However, the initial step upon receiving the asset is to take possession and control. The question asks about the *initial* step in managing the furniture. Holding it for the beneficiary’s personal use is a potential distribution, but not the immediate management step. Placing it in storage without taking possession or control is insufficient. Transferring it to a beneficiary before the trust is fully administered and before distribution is finalized is premature. Therefore, the most accurate initial step in managing the antique furniture as a trust asset is to take possession and control of it, ensuring it is properly accounted for and preserved.

The Indiana Code, specifically IC 29-1-7-1, addresses the statutory requirements for a valid will in Indiana. A will must be in writing, signed by the testator or on their behalf by another person in the testator’s presence and under their direction, and attested to by at least two competent witnesses. These witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. In this scenario, Elara’s will was drafted and signed by her. However, the crucial deficiency lies in the attestation. While the will was signed by Elara, it was not witnessed by two competent individuals who also signed the will in her presence. The fact that a notary public acknowledged Elara’s signature does not substitute for the statutory requirement of attestation by two witnesses. A notary’s acknowledgment primarily verifies the identity of the signer and the voluntariness of the signature, but it does not fulfill the role of a witness to the testator’s testamentary intent and capacity at the time of signing, as required by Indiana law for a valid will. Therefore, the will is likely invalid in Indiana due to the lack of proper attestation.

In Indiana, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” is governed by Indiana Code § 29-1-5-8. This statute addresses situations where a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of the will, or a child in being at the time of the execution of the will for whom no provision is made and who is not named or otherwise provided for in the will. Such an omitted child is generally entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate. The amount they receive is typically equivalent to what they would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will, and is taken from the portion of the estate that passes to the beneficiaries named in the will. However, the statute also outlines exceptions. If it appears from the will that the omission was intentional, or if the testator provided for the child outside of the will in a manner that demonstrates an intent to disinherit, then the pretermitted heir will not receive a share. The question focuses on the testator’s intent as expressed within the will itself. A specific statement in the will indicating that a particular child is not to receive any portion of the estate, even if that child was alive at the time the will was made, is sufficient to overcome the pretermitted heir statute. This demonstrates a clear intention on the part of the testator to disinherit that specific child, thereby negating the child’s claim under the statute. The distribution of the remaining estate would then proceed according to the terms of the will, excluding the disinherited child.