Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 103D, the Hawaii Public Procurement Code, governs the process by which state and county agencies procure goods, services, and construction. The code emphasizes principles of full and open competition, transparency, and fairness. When a solicitation for a construction project exceeds a certain dollar threshold, specific requirements regarding bid security and performance bonds are mandated to protect the public interest and ensure project completion. For construction contracts estimated to cost $100,000 or more, a bid guarantee is generally required from prospective bidders. This guarantee, typically a bid bond, ensures that if a bidder is awarded the contract, they will enter into the contract and provide the required performance and payment bonds. The amount of the bid guarantee is usually a percentage of the bid amount, commonly 5% to 10%. If a bidder fails to meet these obligations after award, the bid guarantee is forfeited. Similarly, upon successful award and execution of the contract, the contractor must provide a performance bond and a payment bond. The performance bond guarantees the contractor’s faithful performance of the contract, while the payment bond ensures that subcontractors and suppliers are paid for their labor and materials. The amount for these bonds is also typically a percentage of the contract price, often 100%. The question asks about the required bid security for a construction contract valued at $250,000. According to HRS § 103D-302(b), a bid guarantee is required for construction contracts estimated to cost $100,000 or more. The question specifies a bid guarantee of 10% of the bid amount. Therefore, for a $250,000 contract, the bid guarantee would be 10% of $250,000. Calculation: \(0.10 \times \$250,000 = \$25,000\). This amount ensures that the awarded contractor has the financial capacity to proceed with the contract and provide the necessary performance and payment bonds, thereby safeguarding the public funds and project integrity.

The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically HRS §46-1.5, addresses the powers of counties. This statute grants counties broad authority to enact ordinances for the general welfare, including provisions related to land use and zoning. When a county ordinance is enacted, it must be consistent with state law. The question presents a scenario where the County of Maui enacts an ordinance that appears to conflict with a statewide environmental protection policy. HRS §46-1.5(a) states that counties may enact ordinances for the general welfare, health, peace, and safety of the county, provided that these ordinances are not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of Hawaii. The concept of home rule in Hawaii, while granting significant autonomy to counties, is subject to the overarching authority of the state legislature. Therefore, an ordinance that directly contradicts a statewide policy, particularly one concerning environmental protection which is a matter of statewide concern, would likely be deemed invalid if it exceeds the county’s delegated authority or contravenes state law. The doctrine of preemption, where state law can supersede local ordinances, is relevant here. If the state has legislated comprehensively on a particular subject, such as statewide environmental standards, local attempts to create conflicting regulations may be preempted. The question tests the understanding of the balance of power between the state and its counties in Hawaii, particularly concerning matters of statewide importance like environmental regulation. The county’s authority is derived from the state and is not absolute.

The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically HRS §46-14, outlines the powers of counties to adopt and amend zoning ordinances. This statute grants counties the authority to regulate land use, including the establishment of zoning districts and the types of activities permitted within those districts. When a county council adopts a new zoning ordinance or amends an existing one, it is an exercise of legislative power. The process for adopting or amending such ordinances typically involves public hearings, notice requirements, and a vote by the county council, as mandated by HRS §46-14 and any applicable county charters or ordinances. The question asks about the legal classification of adopting or amending a zoning ordinance. This action is fundamentally a legislative act because it involves the creation or modification of general rules and regulations that apply to all property within the defined zoning districts. It is not an administrative act, which typically involves the implementation or enforcement of existing laws. It is also not a judicial act, which involves the interpretation and application of laws to specific disputes or cases. While it may involve quasi-judicial elements during public hearings where evidence is presented, the ultimate decision to adopt or amend the ordinance is a legislative one. Therefore, the most accurate classification is a legislative action.

The scenario involves the county of Maui’s authority to impose a transient accommodations tax (TAT) on short-term rentals. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 237D establishes the framework for TAT. Specifically, HRS §237D-2 grants counties the authority to levy a TAT, provided it does not exceed the state’s rate, which is currently 10.25%. The statute also outlines the allocation of TAT revenues, with a portion going to the counties. The key consideration here is the county’s power to supplement this tax with its own local excise tax on the same base, provided it’s authorized by state law and doesn’t create an impermissible double taxation or conflict with state preemption. The County of Maui’s General Excise Tax (GET) Ordinance, which applies to businesses operating within the county, can indeed be levied on transient accommodations. The question hinges on whether the county can apply its general excise tax to the same revenue stream already subject to the state TAT. Under HRS §237D-10, counties are permitted to levy and collect a tax on transient accommodations in addition to the state TAT, as long as the combined rate does not exceed the limits set by state law for county TAT. The Maui County ordinance is an exercise of this general taxing authority. The total tax burden on the transient accommodation provider would be the sum of the state TAT and the county GET. Therefore, if the state TAT is 10.25% and the county GET is 4%, the total tax burden is 14.25%. The question asks for the total tax burden on the provider. Calculation: State TAT Rate = 10.25% Maui County GET Rate = 4% Total Tax Burden = State TAT Rate + Maui County GET Rate Total Tax Burden = 10.25% + 4% Total Tax Burden = 14.25% This scenario highlights the principle of concurrent taxing powers between the state and its political subdivisions in Hawaii, subject to limitations and specific statutory authorizations. The state TAT is levied under HRS Chapter 237D, while the county GET is a general excise tax authorized under county charters and state statutes that permit counties to levy excise taxes. The crucial element is that state law, specifically HRS §237D-10, explicitly allows counties to impose their own taxes on transient accommodations in addition to the state TAT, thereby permitting the combined tax burden to exceed the state TAT rate. This is not considered impermissible double taxation because the taxes are levied by different governmental entities for different purposes and are authorized by distinct statutory provisions. The county’s GET is a general revenue measure for county services, while the state TAT has specific allocations, often for tourism promotion and development.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92F, the Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA), specifically regarding access to government records and the exemptions that may apply. The scenario involves a county council member requesting access to detailed constituent communication logs from a county department. The UIPA generally presumes that government records are open to public inspection unless a specific exemption applies. HRS § 92F-13 outlines various exemptions, including those related to personal privacy and law enforcement investigations. In this case, the county department is withholding the logs, citing privacy concerns for the constituents and the potential for disruption to ongoing departmental operations if constituent communications were fully disclosed without proper anonymization or redaction. The core legal issue is whether the department’s justification for withholding the records, based on potential privacy infringements and operational disruption, aligns with the statutory exemptions under UIPA. The UIPA mandates that agencies must provide access unless a specific exemption is applicable and the agency can demonstrate that disclosure would harm an interest protected by the exemption. The department’s assertion of “potential disruption” is not a standalone exemption but would need to be tied to a specific harm outlined in HRS § 92F-13, such as an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or interference with law enforcement proceedings. Without more specific information about the nature of the communications and the departmental operations, it is difficult to definitively conclude whether the department’s actions are fully compliant. However, the question asks about the *primary* legal basis for the department’s refusal. While privacy is a strong consideration under HRS § 92F-13(1), the department’s broader claim of “disruption to ongoing departmental operations” points towards the exemption related to the premature disclosure of information that could compromise the effectiveness of government functions, which is often interpreted to include protecting the integrity of ongoing processes or investigations. HRS § 92F-13(3) exempts information that would “substantially and irreparably damage the competitive position of an agency or private enterprise,” which is not directly applicable here. HRS § 92F-13(1) exempts “personal facts the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The department’s rationale is a combination of privacy and operational concerns. However, the most encompassing justification for withholding detailed communication logs, especially if they reveal patterns of inquiry or complaints that could inform future policy or departmental actions, often falls under the broader umbrella of protecting the deliberative process or preventing interference with the effective functioning of government, which can be linked to the spirit of exemptions that protect sensitive governmental information from premature or disruptive disclosure. Considering the scenario’s emphasis on both privacy and operational disruption, the most fitting exemption is the one that addresses privacy concerns, as constituent communications inherently involve personal information. If the department were to argue that disclosure would impede its ability to gather information or conduct its business effectively, it would need to link that disruption to a specific statutory exemption. The most direct and commonly invoked exemption for personal communications with government agencies, when privacy is a concern, is the unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Therefore, the primary legal basis for withholding such records, absent a compelling argument for another exemption, would be the protection of constituent privacy.

The scenario involves the county of Maui’s zoning ordinance and the potential for a variance to be granted. A variance is an exception to zoning regulations, typically granted when strict adherence would cause undue hardship. In Hawaii, county zoning ordinances are enacted under the authority granted by state statutes, such as Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46. For a variance to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate specific criteria, which usually include that the hardship is unique to the property and not self-imposed, that the variance will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood, and that the hardship is not solely economic. The Maui County Zoning Ordinance, like most, will have specific provisions detailing these requirements. Without a specific calculation to perform, the explanation focuses on the legal principles governing variance approvals in Hawaii’s local government context. The core concept is that variances are exceptions, not entitlements, and require a compelling justification based on unique circumstances causing hardship, while ensuring public welfare and the integrity of the zoning plan are maintained. The applicant must prove that the literal interpretation of the zoning ordinance would deprive them of all reasonable use of their land, that the hardship is not self-created, and that granting the variance would not be detrimental to the public good or the surrounding neighborhood. These principles are consistent across most US jurisdictions but are implemented through specific local ordinances.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically regarding the powers of counties and their ability to enact ordinances. County ordinances must be consistent with state law. In this scenario, the County of Maui is attempting to regulate short-term rentals through an ordinance that imposes stricter zoning requirements than those established by HRS Chapter 205, the Land Use Law, which grants the Land Use Commission authority over certain land use decisions. While counties have broad powers to enact ordinances for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens, these powers are not absolute and are subject to preemption by state law. HRS § 46-1.5 outlines the powers of counties, but it also specifies that these powers are subject to state law. Furthermore, HRS § 205-1 mandates that all lands in the state are subject to the provisions of the Land Use Law and the regulations and controls of the Land Use Commission. Therefore, an ordinance that directly conflicts with or attempts to usurp the authority granted to the state Land Use Commission under Chapter 205 would likely be deemed invalid due to state preemption. The county’s ordinance, by imposing zoning restrictions that are more stringent and potentially contradictory to statewide land use policies or the commission’s authority, exceeds its delegated powers when such conflict arises. The concept of home rule in Hawaii, while granting significant autonomy to counties, does not permit them to enact laws that contravene express provisions of state statutes or undermine statewide regulatory schemes. The specific zoning and land use regulations established by the state Land Use Commission under HRS Chapter 205 represent a statewide interest that generally preempts conflicting county ordinances.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92, the Sunshine Law, which governs open meetings of state and county boards and commissions. Specifically, it addresses the conditions under which a board can convene in a closed executive session. HRS § 92-5 outlines the permissible reasons for closing a meeting, including discussions of sensitive personnel matters, consultations with legal counsel, and discussions that could adversely affect the reputation of an individual. In this scenario, the county planning commission is considering a proposal that involves a detailed review of an applicant’s financial stability and past business practices, which are considered confidential commercial information and potentially personal information that could harm the applicant’s reputation if disclosed publicly before a final decision. Therefore, a closed executive session is appropriate under HRS § 92-5(a)(2) and (a)(3). The key is that the discussion must be limited to the specific matters for which the executive session is authorized. The statute requires that before closing the session, the board must publicly announce the general nature of the business to be discussed and the specific provision of law authorizing the executive session. The commission must also reconvene in public session to vote on any matter discussed in the closed session, unless the matter is purely informational or involves personnel actions. The scenario implies a need to discuss sensitive financial and reputational information, which falls within the statutory exceptions. The timing of the announcement of the executive session is also crucial, typically occurring at the public meeting itself before the session is convened.

The State of Hawaii’s approach to land use regulation, particularly concerning development in environmentally sensitive areas, is governed by a comprehensive framework. The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS), Chapter 343, mandates environmental impact assessments for certain proposed actions. This statute requires that an environmental assessment (EA) or, if significant impacts are likely, an environmental impact statement (EIS) be prepared for actions that may have a significant effect on the environment. The Land Use Commission (LUC), established under HRS Chapter 205, is the primary state agency responsible for classifying Hawaii’s lands into four major districts: agricultural, conservation, rural, and urban. Any proposed development that requires a change in land use classification from one district to another, especially from agricultural or conservation to urban, necessitates a formal review process. This process typically involves public hearings, consideration of the LUC’s land use plan, and adherence to the state’s sustainable growth policies. The LUC’s decisions are guided by principles that balance development needs with the preservation of Hawaii’s unique natural resources and cultural heritage. For instance, a proposal to develop a large resort complex on land currently zoned as conservation would trigger the requirement for an EA or EIS under HRS Chapter 343, and a petition for a district boundary amendment before the LUC under HRS Chapter 205. The LUC would then evaluate the proposal against criteria such as the need for the proposed use, its compatibility with the surrounding area, the availability of public facilities, and its potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts. The ultimate decision to approve or deny such a change rests with the LUC, after considering all relevant evidence and public testimony.

The question revolves around the concept of extraterritorial application of Hawaii’s environmental review process, specifically the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). HEPA requires environmental assessments (EAs) and environmental impact statements (EISs) for actions that may have a significant impact on the environment. The key consideration here is whether an action occurring outside of Hawaii’s physical borders but having a direct and significant environmental impact within Hawaii can be subject to HEPA. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 343 outlines the procedures for EAs and EISs. While HEPA primarily applies to actions taken by Hawaii agencies or funded by the state, its interpretation has evolved to include impacts that occur within the state, regardless of where the action originates. The scenario describes a proposed industrial facility in a neighboring U.S. state that is projected to release pollutants into the Pacific Ocean, with prevailing currents carrying these pollutants to Hawaii’s shores and impacting its marine ecosystems and coastal communities. This constitutes a direct and significant environmental impact within Hawaii. Therefore, the state of Hawaii, through its environmental agencies, has the legal basis to require an EA or EIS from the entity proposing the action, even if that entity is not a Hawaii state agency and the action is not physically located in Hawaii. This is a matter of protecting Hawaii’s unique and vulnerable environment from transboundary pollution. The legal precedent for such extraterritorial application often hinges on demonstrating a substantial nexus or connection to the state’s jurisdiction through the environmental harm itself.

The State of Hawaii, through its Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), manages public lands and resources under a trust doctrine. This trust is for the benefit of the people of Hawaii. When considering the disposition of ceded lands, which are lands historically controlled by the Kingdom of Hawaii and later transferred to the U.S. federal government and then to the State upon admission, the State has a fiduciary duty. This duty requires that such lands be managed for the benefit of the people of Hawaii, which includes native Hawaiians. The Hawaii Admission Act and subsequent state legislation outline specific obligations regarding the use and management of these lands. The allocation of revenue generated from these lands is a complex process, often involving appropriations by the State Legislature for various public purposes, including programs benefiting native Hawaiians, as well as general public infrastructure and services. The question revolves around the legal framework governing the use of these revenues, specifically when a county government in Hawaii seeks to utilize funds derived from the sale of ceded lands for a project that has broader public benefit but also a direct impact on native Hawaiian homesteading programs. The State’s obligation to native Hawaiians, as beneficiaries of the public land trust, is a paramount consideration in any such disposition or revenue allocation. Therefore, the State must ensure that any use of these funds, even for a project with general public utility, does not diminish or contravene its trust obligations to native Hawaiians. This means that while a county might propose a project with wide-reaching benefits, the State’s review and approval process would scrutinize the impact on the public land trust and its beneficiaries, particularly native Hawaiians. The legal precedent and statutory mandates emphasize the State’s role as a trustee.

No calculation is required for this question. The question tests the understanding of Hawaii’s unique approach to local governance, specifically concerning the powers and limitations of counties in relation to state law. Hawaii is a unique case among U.S. states because it has only four counties, and their powers are generally enumerated and limited by the state constitution and statutes. Unlike many other states where counties have broad home rule powers, Hawaiian counties operate under a system that is often described as more centralized. The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46 outlines the powers of counties, but these powers are subject to state preemption and specific legislative grants. The concept of ” Dillon’s Rule” or “Dormant Commerce Clause” are not the primary frameworks for understanding county powers in Hawaii; rather, it is the specific statutory grants and constitutional limitations that define their authority. The state legislature holds significant power in shaping county functions and fiscal matters, including the ability to preempt local ordinances when deemed necessary for statewide interests. Therefore, the extent of a county’s authority is primarily derived from and constrained by state legislative action.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically concerning county powers and limitations, and how these interact with state-level environmental protection mandates. The scenario involves a county ordinance that, while seemingly aimed at local beautification and public health, has a direct and substantial impact on the state’s ability to implement its environmental regulations, particularly those concerning waste management and pollution control under HRS Chapter 342D. The core issue is whether the county ordinance is preempted by state law or if it represents a valid exercise of local police power that complements, rather than conflicts with, state objectives. In Hawaii, counties derive their powers from the state constitution and HRS Chapter 46. However, these powers are not absolute and are subject to state preemption where the state has occupied the field or where local regulations conflict with state law. The Department of Health is the primary state agency responsible for environmental protection, including solid waste management. A county ordinance that effectively prohibits the operation of a state-permitted solid waste facility, even if framed as a zoning or aesthetic measure, could be seen as directly interfering with the state’s regulatory scheme. The doctrine of preemption, particularly implied preemption, is key here. If a local ordinance frustrates the purpose of a state statute, or makes it impossible to comply with both, the local ordinance is invalid. In this case, the county’s action, by imposing an outright ban on a specific type of waste processing facility that is subject to state permitting and oversight, undermines the state’s comprehensive approach to waste management. The state’s interest in a uniform and effective statewide system for managing solid waste, as outlined in HRS Chapter 342D, is paramount. Therefore, the county ordinance would likely be found to be preempted because it conflicts with the state’s regulatory authority and the objectives of its environmental protection laws. The county’s desire to enhance local aesthetics or public health, while legitimate in principle, cannot be pursued in a manner that directly obstructs a comprehensive state regulatory program. The state’s regulatory framework for solid waste facilities, including siting, permitting, and operational standards, is designed to address environmental and public health concerns on a statewide basis, and local actions that negate this framework are generally invalid.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii’s Public Records Law, Chapter 92F of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS). Specifically, it tests the understanding of exemptions and the process for requesting and accessing government records. The scenario involves a county planning department and a request for detailed traffic impact studies for a proposed development. HRS §92F-13 outlines the general exceptions to public access. Subsection (4) of this section, regarding “personal privacy,” is relevant but often narrowly construed. Subsection (3) concerning “trade secrets and proprietary information” is more directly applicable to detailed technical studies that might be considered proprietary by the developer or consultant. However, the law also balances this with the public’s right to know, particularly concerning matters of public interest like traffic impact. The key is to determine if the requested studies fall under a specific exemption that allows withholding. If the studies contain genuinely proprietary business information or trade secrets that would be harmed by disclosure, they might be partially or wholly exempt. However, the underlying data and analysis related to public infrastructure and environmental impact are generally considered public information. The process for withholding requires the agency to cite the specific exemption and provide a written explanation, allowing the requester to challenge the decision. The question probes the nuanced interpretation of “proprietary information” in the context of public interest and the procedural safeguards in place.

The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically HRS §46-1.5, addresses the powers of counties concerning zoning and planning. This statute grants counties the authority to adopt and enforce zoning ordinances, including those that regulate the use of land, building heights, setbacks, and lot sizes. The county’s legislative body, typically the county council, is responsible for enacting these ordinances. The process usually involves public hearings and review by a planning commission. Once enacted, these ordinances are binding on all property owners within the county. The question asks about the county’s authority to restrict the development of a specific parcel of land based on its environmental sensitivity, which falls directly under the purview of zoning and land use regulations. Therefore, the county council, through its legislative power to enact zoning ordinances, possesses the authority to implement such restrictions, provided they are reasonably related to public health, safety, and welfare, and do not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The county’s ability to designate certain areas as environmentally sensitive and impose development limitations is a core aspect of its land-use planning authority.

The question probes the understanding of the Hawaiian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine, specifically as it relates to the dedication of land for public use within the context of private development. In the landmark case of In re Water Use Permit Applications, Case No. 23432 (Haw. 1991), the court affirmed that the public trust doctrine encompasses not only water resources but also the lands underlying them and the uses of those resources. This doctrine imposes a duty on the state to protect and preserve public trust resources for the benefit of present and future generations. When private developers seek to undertake projects that may impact these resources, the state has a heightened responsibility to ensure that such impacts are minimized and that the public’s right to access and use these resources is not unduly burdened or extinguished. The dedication of land for public use, particularly in areas adjacent to or encompassing public trust resources, is often a condition imposed to mitigate potential negative impacts and to ensure continued public access and benefit. The court’s jurisprudence emphasizes that these dedications are not merely administrative conveniences but are integral to upholding the state’s fiduciary duty under the public trust. Therefore, a developer’s obligation to dedicate land for public use, especially in coastal areas or near significant water bodies in Hawaii, is a direct manifestation of the state’s mandate to preserve and protect these vital public trust resources for the benefit of all citizens. The scope of this dedication is determined by the specific nature of the project, the potential impact on public trust resources, and the need to maintain public access and enjoyment, all guided by the overarching principles of the public trust doctrine as interpreted by Hawaii’s highest court.

The question probes the understanding of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically concerning the powers and limitations of counties. HRS §46-1.5 outlines the general powers of counties, including the authority to enact ordinances for the health, safety, and welfare of their inhabitants. However, this power is not absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by state law. HRS §46-1.5(a) explicitly states that county ordinances shall not be inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the State of Hawaii. Furthermore, HRS §46-1.5(b) specifies that counties may enact ordinances that are not in conflict with general laws of the state. In the given scenario, the County of Maui’s proposed ordinance banning single-use plastic bags, while well-intentioned for environmental protection, directly addresses an issue that the State of Hawaii has already legislated upon through HRS §339D-2, which establishes a statewide ban on single-use plastic bags and provides specific regulations for its implementation. A county ordinance that mirrors or attempts to supersede a statewide ban on the same subject matter, especially one with detailed statewide provisions, would likely be considered inconsistent with or in conflict with general state law, thus exceeding the county’s delegated authority. Therefore, the proposed ordinance would likely be deemed invalid as it infringes upon the state’s preemptive authority in this regulatory area.

The County of Maui, under its charter and Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 46, has the authority to enact ordinances related to land use and zoning, including the regulation of short-term rentals. The Maui County Council, as the legislative body, is responsible for drafting, debating, and passing such ordinances. The Mayor then has the option to approve or veto the ordinance. If the ordinance is vetoed, the Council can override the veto with a supermajority vote. The question revolves around the process of enacting a new zoning ordinance to restrict short-term rentals in residential areas. This process involves legislative action by the County Council and executive action by the Mayor. Public hearings are a mandatory component of the zoning ordinance process, ensuring community input. The final approved ordinance would then be codified and enforced by county departments. The scenario describes a situation where the Maui County Council passes an ordinance, the Mayor vetoes it, and the Council overrides the veto. This sequence of events is a direct application of the legislative and executive powers vested in local government bodies in Hawaii, as outlined in their respective charters and state statutes. The correct answer reflects this procedural progression.

The question probes the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92, specifically the Sunshine Law, concerning public access to government meetings and records. The scenario involves a county council member requesting access to draft minutes of a closed executive session that has already concluded. Under HRS § 92-5(a)(3), a meeting of a board may be closed to the public for specific enumerated reasons, including the discussion of sensitive personnel matters. However, the statute also mandates that minutes of all meetings, including closed sessions, must be kept and made available to the public, with certain exceptions for information that would be detrimental to the public interest if disclosed (HRS § 92-9(a)). Crucially, the law distinguishes between the discussion during a closed session and the resulting decisions or actions. While the deliberations themselves may be shielded, the outcomes and the factual basis for those outcomes, as reflected in minutes, are generally public. The request here is for draft minutes of a session that has already concluded, implying a need to understand the factual basis and any actions taken. The most appropriate action for the council member to take, given the Sunshine Law’s intent to promote transparency, is to formally request the minutes through the established procedures, acknowledging that some content might be redacted if it falls under specific statutory exemptions. The council member’s ability to access these minutes is not contingent on their personal approval of the closed session’s purpose but on the public’s right to information about governmental proceedings. Therefore, the council member should request the minutes, understanding that the county clerk is the custodian of such records and will provide them in accordance with HRS Chapter 92.

The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, Section 46-71, outlines the powers and duties of counties concerning the acquisition, improvement, and disposal of real property. This statute grants counties the authority to condemn private property for public use, a power derived from the state’s eminent domain authority. The process for condemnation typically involves a declaration of necessity, appraisal of the property, and an offer to purchase. If negotiations fail, a condemnation action is filed in court. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the Hawaii State Constitution mandate that just compensation be paid for any property taken for public use. Just compensation is generally defined as the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking. The county must demonstrate a public purpose or necessity for the taking. In Hawaii, the determination of public purpose is broad and can include economic development, blight removal, and provision of public services. The county’s ability to condemn property is not absolute and is subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements. The process is designed to balance the public’s need for infrastructure and services against the private property rights of individuals. The question tests the understanding of the statutory framework and constitutional limitations governing a county’s power to acquire private land for public projects in Hawaii, specifically focusing on the conditions and constitutional safeguards involved.

The State of Hawaii operates under a unified county system, meaning that counties do not have home rule authority to create their own charters independent of state legislative approval for significant structural changes. Unlike many other U.S. states where counties can adopt charters that grant them broad powers and autonomy, Hawaii’s counties derive their powers directly from the State Legislature. The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically HRS §46-1.5, outlines the powers of counties. This statute grants counties broad authority to enact ordinances for the health, safety, and welfare of their inhabitants, but it is subject to limitations and the overarching authority of the state. Any attempt by a county to establish a new governmental structure or significantly alter its powers would require state legislative action, typically through an enabling statute or amendment to existing county law. The concept of county charters in Hawaii is therefore fundamentally different from states with strong home rule provisions, where counties can define their own governmental framework with minimal state intervention. This structure reflects Hawaii’s unique history and its approach to governance, emphasizing a strong central state authority.

The question revolves around the Hawaii State Land Use Commission’s (LUC) authority to reclassify land and the conditions under which such reclassification is permissible. Specifically, it probes the LUC’s power to impose conditions on reclassifications, particularly when an applicant seeks to change land from a conservation district to a urban district. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 205 outlines the framework for land use. HRS §205-4(a) grants the LUC the power to impose conditions when approving reclassifications. These conditions are typically tied to ensuring that the reclassification serves the public interest and aligns with the goals of the Hawaii State Land Use Commission. When an applicant proposes a change from a conservation district, a highly protected category, to an urban district, which allows for more intensive development, the LUC must carefully consider the environmental, social, and economic impacts. The commission is empowered to attach conditions that mitigate potential negative consequences and ensure the development is consistent with the State’s overall land use policies. These conditions can include requirements for environmental impact statements, provision of public facilities, limitations on development density, or dedication of land for public use. The core principle is that the LUC’s conditions must be reasonable, directly related to the proposed reclassification, and serve a legitimate public purpose, often related to protecting the State’s unique natural resources and promoting orderly growth. The authority to impose conditions is not unlimited; it must be exercised within the statutory framework and in accordance with due process. The LUC’s decision to approve a reclassification with conditions is a quasi-judicial act, subject to judicial review.

The scenario involves a county ordinance in Hawaii that establishes a tiered system for business licensing fees based on gross revenue. The ordinance specifies that businesses with gross revenue between \$100,000 and \$500,000 pay an annual fee of \$250. A new business, “Aloha Surf Gear,” opened and reported gross revenue of \$325,000 for its first year of operation. To determine the applicable license fee, one must locate the revenue bracket that encompasses \$325,000. The ordinance clearly states that revenues falling within the range of \$100,000 to \$500,000, inclusive of the lower bound and exclusive of the upper bound, are subject to the \$250 fee. Since \$325,000 is greater than or equal to \$100,000 and less than \$500,000, it falls squarely within this specified tier. Therefore, Aloha Surf Gear is obligated to pay \$250. This illustrates how local governments in Hawaii utilize fee structures to generate revenue and regulate businesses, often tying these fees to the economic capacity of the enterprise as measured by gross revenue. The specific thresholds and rates are determined by the respective county’s legislative body, reflecting local economic conditions and policy objectives. Understanding these fee structures is crucial for businesses operating within Hawaii’s various counties, as compliance is mandatory. The principle here is the application of a defined regulatory framework to a specific factual situation, a common task in administrative and local government law.

The County of Maui, like other local governments in Hawaii, operates under a charter system that grants it specific powers. The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS), particularly Chapter 46, outlines the general powers of counties. However, the extent of a county’s authority to enact ordinances that may conflict with state law is a crucial point of contention. The Hawaii Supreme Court has consistently held that counties have only those powers expressly granted to them by the state legislature or necessarily implied from those grants. This principle is often referred to as the “Dillon’s Rule” or a variation thereof, which limits municipal powers to those granted by the state. In this scenario, Maui County’s ordinance regulating short-term rentals, if it directly contradicts or imposes stricter regulations than those established by HRS Chapter 486K (which governs transient accommodations statewide), would likely be found invalid. HRS Chapter 486K establishes a framework for transient accommodations, and any county ordinance that creates a direct conflict or an irreconcilable difference with this statewide scheme would be preempted by state law. The authority of counties to regulate land use and zoning, while broad, is still subject to overarching state statutes and constitutional principles, including the prohibition against local ordinances that undermine statewide policies or create undue burdens on businesses operating under state authority. Therefore, the validity of Maui’s ordinance hinges on whether it directly conflicts with HRS Chapter 486K or usurps a power exclusively reserved for the state.

The Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, Section 46-16, outlines the general powers and limitations of counties. Specifically, it addresses the authority of counties to enact ordinances for the health, safety, and welfare of their inhabitants. When a county ordinance conflicts with state law, the principle of preemption generally applies, meaning state law supersedes county law. However, this is not absolute and depends on the nature of the state law and the specific area of regulation. In Hawaii, the counties possess significant home rule powers, but these powers are not unlimited and are subject to the overarching authority of the state legislature. HRS §46-16.5 grants counties the power to enact and enforce ordinances relating to zoning and planning, but this power is exercised within the framework established by state statutes and constitutional provisions. The Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) plays a crucial role in managing state lands and resources, and its regulations can influence county land use decisions. The question tests the understanding of the hierarchy of laws and the scope of county authority in Hawaii, particularly concerning land use and environmental regulations, where state oversight is often significant. The scenario highlights a potential conflict between a county ordinance and a state agency’s regulatory purview, requiring an understanding of which level of government has the ultimate authority in such matters. The correct answer reflects the principle that state law and agency regulations can preempt county ordinances when they pertain to areas of statewide concern, such as the management of natural resources.

The question probes the understanding of Hawaii’s Sunshine Law, specifically Chapter 92 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, concerning public access to government records and meetings. The scenario involves a county council member seeking to discuss a sensitive land use proposal with a single constituent outside of a formally noticed meeting. While informal discussions between council members and constituents are generally permitted, the key issue here is the potential for this discussion to constitute a “meeting” as defined by the Sunshine Law if it involves collective discussion or decision-making by a quorum of the council, or if it is designed to circumvent the public notice requirements for official business. Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 92-3 mandates that all meetings of a government agency shall be open to the public and shall be preceded by public notice. A “meeting” is broadly defined to include any gathering of a majority of the members of a multi-member body for the purpose of discussing or transacting public business. If the council member is meeting with a constituent to gather information or gauge public opinion on a matter that will be discussed by the full council, and this discussion does not involve other council members or pre-determine council action, it likely does not violate the Sunshine Law. However, if the council member were to, for instance, invite another council member to join the discussion, or if the discussion was intended to reach a consensus or make a decision that would then be presented as a foregone conclusion to the rest of the council, it could be construed as a serial meeting or a de facto meeting. The scenario as presented, focusing on a single constituent and a single council member, is generally permissible as it does not involve a quorum or collective deliberation that would necessitate public notice. Therefore, the council member can proceed with the discussion without violating the Sunshine Law, provided the discussion remains solely between them and the constituent and does not involve other council members in a manner that creates a quorum or serial meeting.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 46, specifically regarding county powers and limitations, and how these interact with the concept of eminent domain and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The scenario involves a county’s attempt to acquire private property for a public park expansion. The county council, after a public hearing, passed a resolution authorizing the acquisition. However, the property owner, Mr. Kaimana, claims the county did not provide adequate notice of the specific intended use of his land beyond the general park expansion, thus violating his due process rights. In Hawaii, while counties possess broad powers to acquire property for public use, this power is circumscribed by constitutional and statutory due process requirements. HRS § 46-15 outlines the general powers of counties, including the power to condemn property. However, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, mandates “just compensation” for private property taken for public use, and also implies a right to procedural due process. This includes notice and an opportunity to be heard. The critical element here is the specificity of the notice. A general notice of a public park expansion might not be sufficient if the property owner can demonstrate that a more specific, potentially more detrimental, or differently compensated use was contemplated and not disclosed. The legal standard for adequate notice in eminent domain proceedings requires informing the property owner of the nature and extent of the proposed taking and the intended public use. If Mr. Kaimana can prove that the county had a more specific plan for his parcel (e.g., a commercial concession stand, a parking lot extension with associated fees, or a specific type of recreational facility that might impact his adjacent property differently) and failed to disclose this in the notice, his due process claim could be viable. The county’s resolution authorizing acquisition for a “public park expansion” is broad. The question hinges on whether this breadth constitutes a failure of due process if a more specific use was known or intended by the county. The correct answer reflects the legal principle that while a general public purpose is sufficient for eminent domain, the notice provided must be sufficiently specific to allow the owner to meaningfully participate in the process and understand the implications of the taking, especially if there are variations in how different parts of the park might be utilized. The county’s action would be challenged based on the adequacy of the notice given the potential for specific impacts not conveyed.

The State of Hawaii, through its Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), manages state lands under a trust doctrine. This trust mandates that these lands be managed for the benefit of the people of Hawaii. When considering the disposition of state lands, particularly for economic development, the state must adhere to the principles of public trust and ensure that any alienation or use of these lands serves a public purpose or provides a public benefit. Chapter 171 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) governs the management and disposition of state lands. Specifically, HRS §171-5 governs the powers and duties of the Board of Land and Natural Resources in managing state lands, which includes leasing, selling, or otherwise disposing of these lands. The concept of “public purpose” is crucial in this context. While economic development can be considered a public purpose, it must be balanced against the broader public trust obligations, which can encompass environmental protection, cultural preservation, and public access. When a state agency proposes to lease land for a private commercial venture, the board must demonstrate that this lease aligns with the public trust and serves a demonstrable public benefit. This often involves a rigorous review process, including public hearings and environmental impact assessments, to ensure that the proposed use does not unduly harm the public interest. The question probes the underlying legal framework that governs such decisions, emphasizing the state’s fiduciary duty. The correct answer reflects the primary legal and ethical obligation of the state in managing its lands for the welfare of its citizens, which is rooted in the public trust doctrine.

The question concerns the application of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 92, specifically the Sunshine Law, to a scenario involving a county council committee meeting. The Sunshine Law mandates that all meetings of a state or county board, commission, committee, department, or other state or county agency that are open to the public shall be open to all persons and shall be held in a place accessible to the public. HRS § 92-3 requires that notice of meetings be given in advance, and HRS § 92-5 prohibits closing meetings except under specific circumstances outlined in the statute, such as discussing personnel matters or pending litigation. In this scenario, the committee chair unilaterally decided to exclude a resident who was not a registered participant but was present and observing. This action directly violates the principle of open access to public meetings guaranteed by the Sunshine Law. The law does not permit exclusion based on non-registration if the meeting is open to the public. Therefore, the resident’s presence and observation rights were infringed. The committee’s action constitutes a violation of HRS § 92-3 and § 92-5.

The question pertains to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 (HHCA) and its impact on land management and beneficiary rights within the state. The HHCA established a system of land trusts specifically for native Hawaiians, aiming to provide homesteads and opportunities for economic self-sufficiency. The core principle is the fiduciary duty of the state, acting through the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), to manage these lands for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries. This fiduciary duty is a fundamental aspect of trust law, requiring the trustee to act with utmost loyalty, prudence, and good faith in managing trust assets. The HHCA’s provisions are unique in that they are rooted in a federal statute and address historical injustices. The question asks about the primary legal basis for the state’s obligation to manage these lands. The HHCA itself, as federal legislation that Hawaii adopted and continues to implement, is the foundational document. While the Hawaii State Constitution and various state statutes provide frameworks for state governance and land management, the specific mandate and the unique trust relationship for native Hawaiians are directly established by the HHCA. The concept of a public trust, while relevant in Hawaii for managing natural resources like water and shorelines, is not the *primary* legal basis for the HHCA lands; the HHCA establishes a distinct trust for a specific beneficiary group. Similarly, the concept of sovereign immunity, while a general principle of governmental law, does not define the *nature* of the state’s obligation to manage HHCA lands. The HHCA is the direct source of this obligation, creating a unique trust relationship that supersedes general land management principles. Therefore, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 is the definitive legal instrument.