The question pertains to the customary international law principle of state immunity, specifically in the context of commercial activities. The International Law Commission’s Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, which reflect customary international law, distinguish between acts *jure imperii* (acts of a sovereign nature) and acts *jure gestionis* (acts of a commercial nature). States generally enjoy immunity for acts performed in their sovereign capacity. However, this immunity is typically waived or does not apply to commercial transactions, where the state acts more like a private entity. In this scenario, the State of Borealis, through its Ministry of Natural Resources, entered into a contract for the purchase of specialized geological survey equipment with a private firm based in Alaska. This contractual agreement for the procurement of goods constitutes a commercial activity. Therefore, if Borealis fails to fulfill its payment obligations under this contract, the Alaskan firm can likely initiate legal proceedings against Borealis in the Alaskan courts, as the doctrine of restrictive immunity would preclude Borealis from claiming sovereign immunity for this commercial transaction. The underlying principle is that states should not be able to shield themselves from the normal legal consequences of their commercial dealings.

The question concerns the interpretation of treaty provisions under international law, specifically focusing on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 31 of the VCLT establishes the general rule of treaty interpretation, emphasizing that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. The ordinary meaning refers to the plain, literal meaning of the words used, assuming they are not used in a technical or specialized sense. Context includes not only the treaty text itself but also any annexes, and any instrument which was made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted as a record thereof. The object and purpose are the overarching goals the treaty aims to achieve. Article 32 provides for supplementary means of interpretation, such as preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, to be used only to confirm the meaning derived from Article 31 or to determine the meaning when interpretation according to Article 31 results in ambiguity or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Therefore, the primary method of treaty interpretation under the VCLT is the textual approach, which prioritizes the ordinary meaning of the terms within their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose.

The question probes the application of the precautionary principle within the context of international environmental law, specifically concerning a novel biotechnological product developed in Alaska and intended for export. The precautionary principle, as enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, states that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. In this scenario, the Alaskan government faces the decision of whether to permit the export of a genetically modified organism (GMO) designed to enhance salmon resilience to ocean acidification, a phenomenon exacerbated by climate change. While the potential benefits for the Alaskan fishing industry are significant, there are documented, albeit not fully quantified, concerns regarding the potential for unintended ecological consequences, such as gene flow into wild populations or disruption of existing marine food webs. The precautionary principle mandates that in the face of such scientific uncertainty regarding potential harm, protective measures should be implemented proactively. This means that rather than waiting for definitive proof of harm, which might be impossible to obtain before irreversible damage occurs, the government should err on the side of caution. This could involve rigorous pre-market testing, strict containment protocols during transport and cultivation, or even a temporary moratorium until more conclusive data is available. The core of the principle is to avoid a “wait and see” approach when potential for severe, widespread, or irreversible harm exists. Therefore, the most appropriate course of action, guided by the precautionary principle, is to implement stringent regulatory controls and ongoing monitoring to mitigate potential risks, even in the absence of absolute scientific certainty of harm. This aligns with the broader goal of sustainable development, which seeks to balance economic progress with environmental protection.

The scenario describes a situation where a foreign-flagged vessel, operating within Alaska’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is discovered to be engaged in activities that violate both international environmental regulations and specific Alaskan state statutes designed to protect its marine resources. The question asks about the primary legal basis for Alaska to assert jurisdiction and take enforcement action. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), states have sovereign rights within their EEZ for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and non-living natural resources. This includes jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. While customary international law and general principles of law are foundational sources, UNCLOS specifically grants coastal states extensive rights and jurisdiction in their EEZ concerning environmental protection and resource management. The vessel’s actions, if violating established environmental norms and regulations, fall directly under the purview of these UNCLOS provisions. The state of Alaska, as the administrative entity within the U.S. federal system responsible for managing its coastal resources and implementing federal law, would enforce these rights. Therefore, the most direct and encompassing legal framework for asserting jurisdiction in this context is UNCLOS, as implemented through national legislation.

The question probes the understanding of customary international law, specifically focusing on the elements required for its formation and how it interacts with treaty law, particularly in the context of maritime boundaries relevant to Alaska. Customary international law arises from two principal elements: state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis. State practice refers to the actual conduct of states, which must be widespread, consistent, and generally followed. This practice can manifest in various ways, including diplomatic acts, policy statements, legislative and administrative acts, and judicial decisions. Opinio juris signifies a belief by states that their conduct is legally obligatory, not merely a matter of habit or courtesy. This subjective element distinguishes customary law from mere usage or comity. In the scenario presented, the State of Alaska, acting on behalf of the United States, is asserting a claim to an extended exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the traditional 200 nautical miles. This assertion is based on geological data suggesting the presence of a continental shelf that extends further. For this claim to be recognized as a potential source of customary international law, or to be interpreted in line with existing customary law as codified in UNCLOS, the United States’ practice must be consistent with the actions of other states regarding their continental shelf claims. Furthermore, the United States must demonstrate that it acts with the belief that such an extended claim is legally permissible under international law, not simply as a political maneuver. The question tests whether the student understands that treaty provisions, like UNCLOS, can codify or crystallize customary international law, but also that state practice and opinio juris are the bedrock of its formation and evolution. The specific mention of Alaska’s unique geographical position and potential resource claims highlights the practical application of these principles in a region with significant maritime interests. The key is to identify which aspect of international law formation is being primarily tested: the elements of customary law itself or the interplay between treaty law and emerging state practice. The scenario focuses on the *process* of establishing a claim that could contribute to or be interpreted under customary international law, rather than a dispute solely about treaty interpretation. Therefore, the core concept is the formation of customary international law.

The scenario describes a situation where a new state, the Republic of Borealia, is seeking recognition and has established a territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its coastline. The Republic of Borealia has also enacted domestic legislation that purports to grant its vessels exclusive fishing rights within its EEZ, but this legislation conflicts with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Specifically, UNCLOS grants other states the right to fish in a portion of Borealia’s EEZ, subject to Borealia’s sovereign rights to manage and conserve living marine resources. The question asks about the legal status of Borealia’s domestic legislation in relation to its obligations under international law. The Republic of Borealia’s domestic legislation, which asserts exclusive fishing rights within its EEZ that contradict UNCLOS, is invalid to the extent of the conflict. Article 58 of UNCLOS explicitly states that in the EEZ, other states enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea, but these freedoms are exercised with due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state and in compliance with the law of the sea. Crucially, Article 56 of UNCLOS grants the coastal state sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters above the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. However, this is exercised subject to the provisions of UNCLOS itself. Therefore, Borealia cannot unilaterally expand its exclusive rights beyond what UNCLOS permits by its domestic law. The principle that international law prevails over domestic law in cases of conflict regarding treaty obligations is a fundamental tenet of international law, often referred to as the “pacta sunt servanda” principle, meaning agreements must be kept. Alaska, as a US state, is bound by federal law, which in turn is bound by international treaties ratified by the United States, such as UNCLOS (though the US has not ratified UNCLOS, it generally adheres to its provisions as customary international law). Therefore, Borealia’s domestic legislation would be superseded by its treaty obligations under UNCLOS, making its claimed exclusive fishing rights beyond what UNCLOS allows unenforceable against other states that are parties to UNCLOS. The correct answer is that Borealia’s domestic legislation is invalid to the extent it contradicts UNCLOS, as treaty obligations generally supersede conflicting domestic laws when the state is a party to the treaty.

The question probes the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to a scenario involving a treaty amendment and the subsequent withdrawal of a signatory state. Specifically, it tests understanding of Article 41 of the VCLT, which addresses agreements to modify multilateral treaties between particular parties only. This article permits such modifications if they are not prohibited by the treaty and do not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations. Furthermore, the scenario involves a state withdrawing from the original treaty after acceding to the amending agreement. Article 56 of the VCLT addresses the right of withdrawal from a treaty, stating that such a right may only be exercised if it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of withdrawal or if the right of withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. In this case, the original treaty did not explicitly provide for withdrawal. However, the subsequent agreement to amend the treaty between a subset of parties, and the accession of the state to this amending agreement, could be interpreted as creating a new legal regime between those parties, potentially implying a right of withdrawal from the original treaty in relation to their participation in the amended framework. The key is whether the amendment process and the subsequent accession created a new, distinct agreement that supersedes the original treaty for those parties, or if it merely modified the original treaty while maintaining its core obligations and rights for all. Given that the amending agreement was not prohibited by the original treaty and did not affect the rights or obligations of non-parties, it is legally permissible under Article 41. The subsequent withdrawal, while not explicitly provided for in the original treaty, can be seen as a consequence of the state’s participation in the new amending agreement, especially if the amending agreement fundamentally altered the state’s obligations or rights under the original treaty, thereby implying a right to exit the original framework. Therefore, the state’s withdrawal, contingent on its accession to the Article 41 agreement, is generally considered valid under the VCLT framework, provided the amending agreement did not violate the object and purpose of the original treaty. The scenario is designed to test the interplay between treaty modification, accession, and withdrawal provisions within the VCLT.

The scenario involves a dispute over maritime boundaries between the United States, specifically concerning waters adjacent to Alaska, and a neighboring state. The core issue is the interpretation and application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The question probes the understanding of how customary international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, interacts with specific treaty provisions when determining the extent of a coastal state’s jurisdiction, particularly in the context of defining the outer limit of the continental shelf. The correct answer hinges on the principle that while UNCLOS provides a framework, the precise delimitation of maritime boundaries, especially beyond the territorial sea, often requires agreement between states or adjudication based on equitable principles, considering all relevant circumstances. The concept of the continental shelf extends naturally from the land territory, but its economic rights can be claimed up to a specified distance or geological feature, subject to international agreement. In the absence of a treaty, customary international law, which is heavily influenced by UNCLOS, would still guide the process, emphasizing the natural prolongation of the land territory. However, the practical application requires careful consideration of all relevant geographical, geological, and legal factors, often leading to complex negotiations or judicial interpretation. The specific mention of Alaska grounds the question in the context of the exam’s focus on public international law as it pertains to U.S. states. The interpretation of UNCLOS Article 76 regarding the continental shelf, and the role of geological evidence in determining its outer edge, is central. The correct answer reflects the nuanced approach required for boundary delimitation, acknowledging that while UNCLOS codifies principles, their application in specific disputes often necessitates further agreement or judicial pronouncements based on established international legal principles and evidence. The principle of natural prolongation, while fundamental, is not a self-executing boundary marker and requires detailed scientific and legal analysis to translate into a defined maritime limit.

The question asks to identify the primary legal basis for the United States’ assertion of sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast, specifically in the context of Alaska. While the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953 is a foundational U.S. statute governing OCS activities, it operates within the framework of international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the preeminent international treaty that defines the rights and responsibilities of states concerning their maritime zones, including the continental shelf. Article 76 of UNCLOS specifically outlines the criteria for determining the extent of the continental shelf, which can extend beyond 200 nautical miles if the natural prolongation of the land territory meets certain geological and geomorphological conditions. The United States, although not a party to UNCLOS, generally adheres to its provisions concerning the continental shelf as customary international law. Alaska’s extensive Arctic coastline and potential for extended continental shelf claims make this aspect of UNCLOS particularly relevant. Therefore, the legal basis for asserting rights beyond 200 nautical miles is primarily derived from the principles codified in UNCLOS, which are widely recognized as customary international law, and the subsequent establishment of claims based on these principles. The OCSLA provides the domestic legal framework for managing these resources once jurisdiction is established under international law.

The question concerns the attribution of conduct to a state under international law, specifically when a non-state entity acts with the direction or control of a state. Article 8 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) addresses this. It states that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the person or group of persons is, in fact, acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out that conduct. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case elaborated on the “effective control” test, requiring a high threshold of proof to demonstrate that a state directed or controlled the specific actions of the non-state actor. Simply providing financial or logistical support is generally insufficient to establish attribution. Therefore, for the actions of the “Northern Lights Militia” to be attributable to the United States, it must be shown that the US government effectively controlled the militia’s specific acts of piracy against Canadian fishing vessels. The scenario does not provide evidence of such direct control, only of general support and a shared interest in disrupting foreign fishing. The concept of state responsibility for the acts of non-state actors is crucial for maintaining international order and ensuring accountability, especially in areas like maritime security and resource management, which are pertinent to states like Alaska.

The scenario involves a dispute over maritime boundary delimitation in the Bering Sea, a region with significant geopolitical and economic implications for both the United States (specifically Alaska) and Russia. The question probes the applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to a historical agreement that predates its entry into force for one of the parties. The core issue is whether the VCLT, as a codification of customary international law in many respects, can be applied retroactively to interpret a treaty between two states, even if one state became a party to the VCLT after the treaty’s conclusion and the dispute arose. The VCLT, in Article 4, explicitly states that it applies to treaties which are the constituent instruments of international organizations and to treaties subsequent to its entry into force. However, the VCLT’s provisions on interpretation, particularly Article 31 (general rule of interpretation) and Article 32 (supplementary means of interpretation), are widely considered to reflect customary international law. Therefore, even if the VCLT as a whole does not apply retroactively, its interpretive rules, derived from customary practice, can be used to interpret treaties concluded before its entry into force, provided those rules themselves are established as customary international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently applied these interpretive principles to treaties predating the VCLT’s existence, recognizing their customary character. The dispute resolution mechanism under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is also relevant, as it provides for compulsory dispute settlement, but the primary interpretive framework for the treaty itself, regardless of the dispute resolution forum, would be the VCLT’s principles if they are considered customary. The question requires an understanding of the VCLT’s scope of application versus the customary nature of its interpretive rules. The correct answer hinges on the recognition that while the VCLT itself does not apply retroactively to treaties concluded before its entry into force for a state, its interpretive rules, if they reflect customary international law, can be used to interpret such treaties.

The scenario involves the interpretation of a bilateral treaty between the United States, specifically concerning fishing rights in waters adjacent to Alaska, and a hypothetical nation, “Nordia.” The treaty, signed in 1985, grants Nordia certain fishing quotas within the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Alaskan coast. A dispute arises when a new scientific assessment, published in 2023, indicates a significant decline in a key fish stock previously managed under the treaty. Nordia argues that the treaty’s provision regarding “sustainable yield” necessitates a recalculation of quotas based on the most current scientific data, even if it means a reduction in their allocated catch. The United States, while acknowledging the new data, contends that the treaty’s language, particularly the phrase “as determined by mutually agreed upon scientific bodies at the time of ratification,” binds the quota calculation to the understanding and data available in 1985, unless a formal amendment process is undertaken. The core issue is the interpretation of treaty terms in light of changed circumstances and evolving scientific understanding. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which informs general principles of treaty interpretation, emphasizes that treaties should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. Article 31 of the VCLT outlines this general rule. However, it also allows for supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. In this case, the phrase “as determined by mutually agreed upon scientific bodies at the time of ratification” is crucial. This language suggests an intention to anchor the determination of sustainable yield to the scientific consensus and mechanisms in place at the time the treaty was concluded. While international law generally recognizes the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* (fundamental change of circumstances) as a potential ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, its application is exceptionally narrow and requires a radical transformation of the obligations. A change in scientific data, while significant, typically does not meet this high threshold unless it fundamentally alters the basis of consent to be bound. Furthermore, the VCLT, in Article 31(3)(c), requires that the treaty be interpreted in conjunction with any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. However, the specific wording of the treaty, referencing the “time of ratification,” points towards a more fixed or original intent regarding the quota determination mechanism. The principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept) underscores the binding nature of treaties. Unless the treaty itself provides for a mechanism to adjust quotas based on new scientific findings or is amended, relying on a fundamental change of circumstances to unilaterally alter obligations is problematic. The most appropriate approach to resolving this dispute, according to the VCLT’s principles of treaty interpretation, would be to examine the treaty’s context, object, and purpose, as well as any preparatory materials that might shed light on the intended meaning of the disputed clause. Given the explicit reference to the “time of ratification,” a strict interpretation favoring the original understanding of the scientific determination mechanism is likely to prevail. This would mean that the United States’ position, emphasizing the need for a formal amendment process to incorporate new scientific data into quota calculations, is more aligned with established principles of treaty interpretation under international law. The treaty’s framework for determining quotas was established at its inception, and subsequent scientific developments, while relevant for future discussions, do not automatically alter the existing legal obligations without a formal amendment procedure.

The question probes the application of the principle of *res judicata* within the framework of international dispute resolution, specifically concerning the finality of decisions rendered by international tribunals. *Res judicata*, a Latin term meaning “a matter judged,” is a fundamental legal doctrine that prevents the relitigation of a case or issue that has already been finally decided by a competent court. In international law, while not always explicitly codified in the same manner as domestic law, the principle of finality of judgments is crucial for maintaining the stability and predictability of international legal order. International courts and tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral tribunals, strive to ensure that their judgments are conclusive and binding on the parties involved. This promotes legal certainty and prevents parties from forum-shopping or endlessly challenging adverse decisions. The scenario involves the fictional “Arctic Seabed Boundary Commission” (ASBC), a body established by a hypothetical treaty between the United States (specifically relevant to Alaska’s maritime interests) and Canada. The ASBC issued a final award concerning a maritime boundary dispute. Subsequently, the United States sought to reopen the case based on newly discovered evidence that, if known at the time of the original proceedings, might have led to a different outcome. The core issue is whether the principle of *res judicata* would prevent the ASBC from reconsidering its award under these circumstances. Under general principles of international law, and as reflected in the Statute of the ICJ (Article 60), judgments are final and without appeal, unless there is a discovery of a fact that was unknown to the Court and the applicant state, provided that the ignorance was not due to negligence. This “discovery of a new fact” exception is narrowly construed and requires strict adherence to procedural requirements, including prompt notification. The question implies that the newly discovered evidence could have influenced the outcome, suggesting it might be significant. However, the critical factor for *res judicata* is the finality of the initial judgment. International tribunals generally adhere to the principle that once a judgment is final, it cannot be reopened, except in very limited circumstances akin to the ICJ’s provision for the discovery of new facts. The ASBC, as an arbitral tribunal established by treaty, would likely operate under similar principles of finality. The question asks about the *legal effect* of the ASBC’s final award on subsequent attempts to revisit the matter. The most direct legal effect of a final judgment from a competent international tribunal is its binding and conclusive nature, precluding relitigation. Therefore, the primary legal effect is the preclusion of further proceedings on the same matter.

The scenario involves a dispute over maritime boundaries and resource exploitation in the Bering Sea, a region of significant geopolitical and economic importance to both the United States (Alaska) and Russia. The core issue is the interpretation and application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the rights of states within their continental shelves. Specifically, the question probes the legal basis for a coastal state’s jurisdiction over natural resources on its continental shelf, as defined by UNCLOS. Article 77 of UNCLOS clearly states that the coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. This right is exclusive, meaning that if the coastal State does not explore or exploit them, no one else may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. The dispute arises from Russia’s assertion of rights to explore for and exploit certain polymetallic sulfide deposits located on a portion of the seabed that the United States, through Alaska’s maritime claims, considers part of its continental shelf. The United States’ claim is based on the geological configuration of the seabed and its consistent practice of asserting jurisdiction over resources within its EEZ and continental shelf, aligning with the principles of UNCLOS, which the U.S. has signed but not ratified, yet generally adheres to in practice. Russia’s counterclaim likely relies on its own interpretation of delimitation lines or potentially on customary international law principles that might predate or supplement UNCLOS. However, the question specifically asks about the *basis* of the United States’ claim to exclusive rights for exploration and exploitation. This basis is found in Article 77 of UNCLOS, which grants sovereign rights over the continental shelf for these purposes, irrespective of occupation, effective or nominal, or any proclamation. The fact that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS does not negate the customary international law principles it embodies, particularly those concerning the continental shelf, which have been widely accepted and practiced by states. Therefore, the most direct and accurate legal basis for the United States’ claim to exclusive rights over the natural resources on its continental shelf, as described, is the sovereign rights granted by Article 77 of UNCLOS.

The scenario involves a dispute over maritime boundaries between the United States, specifically Alaska, and a neighboring state. The core issue is the interpretation and application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. The United States, while not a full party to UNCLOS, generally adheres to its provisions concerning navigation and resource rights. The neighboring state, however, claims a broader EEZ and continental shelf based on a different interpretation of UNCLOS provisions related to equidistance and special circumstances. Alaska’s unique geographical position, with its extensive coastline and proximity to international waters, makes such disputes particularly relevant. The question tests the understanding of how UNCLOS provisions are applied in practice, particularly concerning the principles of delimitation in areas where coastlines are adjacent or opposite. The correct answer hinges on the established principles of international maritime law for delimiting maritime boundaries, which aim for an equitable solution, often involving the median line in the absence of special circumstances. The interpretation of “special circumstances” is a key element in such disputes and is often a point of contention. The question also implicitly touches upon the role of customary international law in areas not explicitly covered or universally accepted within UNCLOS, and how judicial decisions, like those from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), shape the understanding of these principles. The complexity arises from the interplay of treaty law, customary law, and the specific geographical context of Alaska.

The question probes the nuanced application of customary international law in a scenario involving a territorial dispute between the United States and Canada concerning maritime boundaries in the Bering Sea, adjacent to Alaska. Customary international law is derived from two primary elements: consistent state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis, meaning a belief that such practice is legally obligatory. For a norm to crystallize into customary international law, state practice must be widespread, consistent, and representative. Opinio juris is the subjective element, requiring states to act in a certain way out of a sense of legal obligation, rather than mere comity or habit. In this scenario, Canada’s assertion of exclusive fishing rights in a specific sector of the Bering Sea, which the United States considers international waters, hinges on whether this assertion, coupled with the United States’ consistent protest and non-acquiescence, has contributed to the formation or modification of customary international law. A persistent objector, a state that has consistently objected to a customary rule from its inception, is generally not bound by that rule. However, the formation of new customary law is a complex process. The United States’ continuous diplomatic protests and naval patrols in the disputed area demonstrate its non-acquiescence, which is crucial for preventing the formation of a new customary rule that would bind it. Canada’s practice, even if consistent, would need to be accompanied by opinio juris, and the United States’ consistent opposition would likely prevent the rule from becoming binding on all states, including itself, under the persistent objector principle. Therefore, the United States’ consistent diplomatic protests and assertion of its rights are the most relevant factors in preventing Canada’s claimed practice from solidifying into a binding rule of customary international law that would diminish US sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the area. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) often examines state practice and opinio juris in territorial and maritime boundary disputes, as seen in cases like the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, where it elaborated on the criteria for customary law formation. The United States’ actions are aimed at demonstrating that it does not accept Canada’s claim as legally binding, thereby challenging the opinio juris element and potentially the consistency of state practice if other states also do not follow Canada’s asserted practice.

The scenario involves a dispute over fishing rights in the Bering Sea, a region of significant international legal importance due to its complex maritime boundaries and the presence of shared fish stocks. The State of Beringia, a fictional new state claiming sovereignty over islands previously considered unincorporated territories of the United States, asserts exclusive fishing rights within a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) it claims around these islands. The United States, however, continues to assert its established rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law, which include rights of navigation and potentially access to certain resources in areas that overlap with Beringia’s claimed EEZ, particularly concerning migratory fish stocks that traverse international waters. The core legal issue revolves around the recognition of Beringia’s statehood and the validity of its maritime claims. For a new entity to be recognized as a state under international law, it generally must meet the criteria of statehood outlined in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. The prompt implies that Beringia is a “new state” and has declared sovereignty over islands previously under U.S. jurisdiction, suggesting a potential territorial dispute. The United States’ position is likely based on its adherence to UNCLOS, which defines maritime zones, including the EEZ, and the rights and duties of coastal states within these zones. UNCLOS also addresses the management of shared and highly migratory fish stocks, often requiring cooperation between states. Customary international law, particularly regarding maritime boundaries and resource rights, also plays a crucial role. The United States’ continued assertion of its rights implies it does not recognize Beringia’s unilateral claims or its capacity to alter established maritime arrangements without international agreement. The question asks about the most appropriate recourse for the United States to resolve this dispute. Given the nature of the dispute, which concerns maritime zones, resource rights, and potentially the recognition of a new state, several dispute resolution mechanisms under international law are available. These include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement. Negotiation is a direct diplomatic approach where parties attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution. Mediation involves a third party assisting the disputing states. Arbitration offers a binding decision by an arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties. Judicial settlement, most notably through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), provides a binding legal ruling based on international law. Considering the complexity of maritime law, the potential for differing interpretations of UNCLOS and customary law, and the need for a definitive resolution that respects the rights of both parties, a structured legal process is often preferred. The ICJ, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, is competent to hear disputes between states concerning the interpretation and application of international law, including matters related to the law of the sea. The prompt does not suggest any existing treaty between the U.S. and Beringia that would mandate a specific dispute resolution mechanism other than those generally available under international law. Therefore, seeking a judicial determination from the ICJ, which can definitively interpret UNCLOS and customary international law as applied to the Bering Sea, and rule on the validity of maritime claims and resource rights, represents a robust and appropriate legal avenue for the United States. This would provide a legally binding outcome that addresses the underlying issues of statehood and maritime jurisdiction.

The scenario involves the interpretation of a treaty provision concerning maritime boundary delimitation between two fictional states, Northland and Southland, which share a contiguous coastline along the Arctic Ocean. Northland, a state with a significant Arctic coastline, ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1995. Southland, a smaller coastal state, has not ratified UNCLOS but has consistently applied its principles in its maritime practice. The disputed area lies within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and extends to the continental shelf. The treaty provision in question states that “the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles.” Northland argues for a median line based on the equidistance principle, citing Article 74 of UNCLOS, which it contends reflects customary international law applicable even to non-parties. Southland contends that the “equitable principles” language allows for a more flexible approach, considering factors like the historical fishing rights of its coastal communities and the differing lengths of their respective coastlines, thereby advocating for a modified median line that grants it a larger portion of the disputed seabed. The core issue is how to interpret the treaty provision and the role of customary international law in its application. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides guidance on treaty interpretation. Article 31 of the VCLT mandates that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. Article 31(3)(c) also states that “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” shall be taken into account. While Southland is not a party to UNCLOS, Northland, as a party, is bound by its obligations. The question of whether Article 74 of UNCLOS, regarding the delimitation of the EEZ, has crystallized into customary international law is crucial. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases like the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases emphasized the importance of state practice and *opinio juris* for the formation of customary international law. Even if Southland is not bound by UNCLOS *as a treaty*, it could be bound by its provisions if they have become customary international law. However, the ICJ’s jurisprudence also indicates that the equidistance principle in EEZ delimitation, while a significant guideline, is not an absolute rule and can be modified by equitable principles. The phrase “equitable principles” in the treaty provision itself suggests a degree of flexibility beyond strict equidistance. The ICJ’s approach in delimitation cases often involves a two-stage process: first, the drawing of a provisional median line, and second, the consideration of any special circumstances that would necessitate an adjustment to achieve an equitable result. Therefore, the interpretation must balance the treaty text, the object and purpose of UNCLOS (which aims for equitable solutions), and the potential crystallization of customary norms. Considering Northland’s position as a party to UNCLOS and Southland’s general adherence to its principles, the most likely outcome involves an interpretation that acknowledges the general guidance of equidistance while allowing for adjustments based on equitable considerations, as contemplated by the treaty language and judicial precedent. The equitable principles are not merely a subjective determination but are informed by established jurisprudence, which often involves considering factors that contribute to an equitable outcome in maritime boundary disputes. The question asks about the most probable outcome of an interpretation process that considers these elements. The most nuanced approach acknowledges the interplay of treaty obligations, customary law, and the specific wording of the agreement, leading to a flexible application of equitable principles.

The scenario describes a situation where a newly discovered marine species, exhibiting unique biological characteristics, is found within Alaska’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The question probes the legal framework governing the exploration and exploitation of such resources, specifically focusing on the rights and obligations of the United States as a coastal state under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Alaska, as a US state, operates within the federal framework established by the US for implementing international maritime law. UNCLOS, particularly Part V concerning the EEZ, grants coastal states sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. This includes living organisms belonging to sedentary species, which are bottom-dwelling organisms. The discovery of a new species, even if mobile, falls under the general resource management mandate within the EEZ. While the US has not ratified UNCLOS, it generally adheres to its provisions as customary international law. The primary legal instrument governing the exploration and exploitation of resources within the EEZ is UNCLOS. Therefore, the legal basis for Alaska’s or the United States’ authority over this new species within the EEZ stems directly from the provisions of UNCLOS related to sovereign rights over natural resources in this maritime zone.

The question probes the interpretation of treaty provisions in the context of state practice and the evolution of customary international law, particularly as it relates to maritime boundaries and resource rights. The scenario involves a hypothetical treaty, the “Arctic Waters Stewardship Accord,” which delineates certain fishing quotas and environmental protection zones in the Bering Sea. Alaska, a US state, is directly affected by this international agreement. The core issue is how subsequent state practice, particularly by coastal states bordering the Bering Sea, might influence the interpretation or even the continued validity of specific provisions of the Accord, especially concerning the exploitation of newly discovered deep-sea mineral resources within the previously defined zones. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides the framework for treaty interpretation. Article 31 emphasizes the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. However, Article 31(3)(b) also allows for the consideration of “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” This means that if states consistently act in a certain way in applying the treaty, and this practice is accepted by other parties as a correct interpretation, it can become binding. In this scenario, if multiple signatory states, including Russia and potentially Canada, begin to assert rights to exploit deep-sea mineral resources within the zones established by the Accord, and this practice is not objected to by other parties, it could be argued that this establishes a new understanding of the Accord’s provisions regarding resource exploitation, potentially overriding or modifying the original intent concerning fishing quotas. This subsequent practice, if widespread and accepted, could be seen as an informal amendment or a clarification of the treaty’s scope. Furthermore, if such state practice becomes sufficiently widespread, consistent, and accompanied by *opinio juris* (a belief that the practice is legally required), it could contribute to the formation of new customary international law, which might then coexist with or even supersede treaty provisions, particularly if the treaty is silent or ambiguous on the new issue of deep-sea mining. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the role of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation and the formation of customary international law in cases like the *North Sea Continental Shelf* cases. Therefore, the most accurate assessment is that the interpretation of the “Arctic Waters Stewardship Accord” could be influenced by the subsequent, consistent, and accepted practice of the signatory states regarding deep-sea mineral extraction within the defined zones, potentially leading to a modification of the treaty’s application or the emergence of new customary norms. This is because the VCLT explicitly allows for the consideration of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation, and customary international law can evolve through state practice and *opinio juris*. The question tests the understanding of how treaties are interpreted and how customary international law can interact with treaty law, especially in evolving geopolitical and technological contexts like Arctic resource development.

The question probes the understanding of customary international law, specifically focusing on the formation of new norms and the role of state practice and opinio juris in this process. Customary international law arises from two key elements: consistent and widespread state practice, and the belief by states that such practice is legally required (opinio juris sive necessitatis). The scenario describes a situation where a new practice is emerging, but the crucial element of opinio juris is either absent or ambiguous. The state of Borealia, despite engaging in a particular behavior concerning its maritime resources off the coast of Alaska, has not clearly articulated or demonstrated a belief that this behavior is legally obligatory under international law. Instead, Borealia’s actions are presented as potentially driven by economic necessity or strategic advantage, rather than a sense of legal duty. Therefore, while there might be evidence of state practice, the lack of clear opinio juris prevents the crystallization of this practice into a binding rule of customary international law. The other options present scenarios that either misinterpret the elements of customary law, suggest premature conclusions about norm formation, or focus on treaty law rather than custom. The crucial distinction lies in the psychological element of belief in legal obligation, which is underdeveloped in Borealia’s actions.

The question concerns the interpretation of a hypothetical treaty provision concerning the shared management of migratory fish stocks that traverse the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the United States (specifically, Alaska’s waters) and a neighboring state, “Nordland.” The core issue is how to interpret such a treaty provision when it conflicts with established customary international law regarding EEZ jurisdiction. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides the framework for treaty interpretation. Article 31 of the VCLT mandates interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Article 31(3)(c) also requires that account be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” Customary international law, such as the rights and obligations of states within their EEZs as codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a primary source of such applicable rules. If a treaty provision appears to contradict or modify customary international law, the VCLT’s approach generally prioritizes the treaty’s specific terms, provided the treaty does not violate a *jus cogens* norm. However, the interpretation must still consider the existing legal landscape. In this scenario, the treaty’s explicit language on joint management, even if it deviates from a strict interpretation of EEZ rights under customary law, would likely be given primacy within the treaty’s scope, assuming Nordland and the US are parties to both the treaty and UNCLOS. The interpretation would focus on the mutual understanding and intent of the parties at the time of treaty conclusion, seeking a harmonious reading that respects both treaty obligations and existing international law where possible. The existence of a specific treaty governing the shared resource would generally supersede general customary rules on the matter between the parties to that treaty, unless the treaty itself is void or its provisions violate peremptory norms. The principle of *lex specialis derogat legi generali* (a specific law overrides a general law) is relevant here, suggesting the treaty’s specific provisions on shared management would take precedence over general customary rules on EEZ jurisdiction for the parties to the treaty. Therefore, the treaty’s text, interpreted in good faith, would guide the resolution, acknowledging but not necessarily being bound by the customary law if the treaty clearly modifies it for the parties.

The scenario involves a dispute over the interpretation of the maritime boundary between the United States, specifically Alaska, and a neighboring state, tentatively named “Nordland” for illustrative purposes. The core issue is the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to a newly discovered deep-sea resource deposit that straddles what was previously considered the agreed-upon median line. The United States, as a party to UNCLOS, asserts its rights to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf as defined by the convention. Nordland, however, argues for a revised interpretation based on equitable principles and the potential economic impact on its coastal communities, citing the “special circumstances” provision that can allow for deviations from strict median lines in specific geographical situations. The United States counters by emphasizing the customary international law principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept) as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and that UNCLOS itself provides a framework for delimitation that prioritizes the median line principle unless compelling evidence of historical title or special circumstances, as narrowly interpreted by state practice and jurisprudence, dictates otherwise. The discovery of a significant deposit that was not contemplated during the initial delimitation negotiations introduces a novel element. The United States’ position is that the existing treaty framework, as interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases like the *North Sea Continental Shelf cases* and *Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain*, mandates a strict adherence to the median line principle for EEZ delimitation unless proven special circumstances exist. These special circumstances are generally understood to be geographical features or historical factors that would lead to an inequitable result if the median line were strictly applied. The existence of a valuable resource deposit, while economically significant, is not typically considered a *legal* special circumstance in itself, but rather a factor that might highlight the inequity of a strict median line if it disproportionately benefits one party without a strong legal basis. The question revolves around which source of international law, or which interpretation of UNCLOS, would be most persuasive in resolving such a dispute, particularly concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles where the definition of special circumstances can be more complex. The correct answer focuses on the established jurisprudence of the ICJ regarding the interpretation of UNCLOS and the delimitation of maritime zones, which prioritizes the median line principle as the default method for both the EEZ and the continental shelf, while acknowledging the limited scope for exceptions based on proven special circumstances.

The question revolves around the concept of customary international law, specifically the elements required for its formation and the role of international judicial decisions in its recognition. Customary international law is derived from the consistent practice of states coupled with a belief that such practice is legally obligatory (opinio juris). The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, plays a crucial role in identifying and articulating customary international law through its judgments. In the case of the *North Sea Continental Shelf cases*, the ICJ elaborated on the criteria for the formation of customary international law. The court stated that state practice must be extensive and virtually uniform, and that opinio juris must be present. The ruling in the *Nicaragua v. United States* case further solidified the understanding that even if a treaty provision codifies existing customary law, the customary law continues to exist and bind states independently. Therefore, the assertion that a state’s reservation to a treaty provision that merely reflects existing customary international law automatically negates the existence of that customary rule for all states is incorrect. Reservations, while important, do not unilaterally extinguish a customary rule that has been established through widespread state practice and opinio juris, especially when that rule has been recognized and applied by international courts. The ICJ’s pronouncements are highly influential in confirming the existence and scope of customary international law, serving as authoritative interpretations of state practice and opinio juris. The question tests the understanding that customary international law is a source of law independent of treaties and that judicial pronouncements can clarify, rather than nullify, its existence.

The question pertains to the interpretation of a hypothetical treaty concerning shared marine resources between the United States (specifically referencing Alaska’s maritime interests) and a neighboring state, “Nordlandia.” The scenario involves a dispute over the interpretation of a clause regarding the “equitable sharing” of fish stocks in a newly discovered, previously unexploited deep-sea fishing ground. The core issue is how such a treaty provision, lacking precise quantification, should be interpreted under international law, particularly in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 31 of the VCLT mandates interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. However, it also allows for recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, if the ordinary meaning leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. In this case, the term “equitable sharing” is inherently open to interpretation and requires consideration of factors beyond the literal text. Such factors would include the historical fishing patterns of both states in adjacent waters, the ecological sustainability of the fishing grounds, the technological capacity of each state to exploit the resources, and the overall economic benefit derived by each state. The absence of specific quantifiable metrics within the treaty text necessitates a broader, context-driven approach, aligning with the VCLT’s emphasis on good faith interpretation. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence on maritime boundary delimitation and resource allocation, such as the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, provides guidance on the principles of equitable sharing, emphasizing proportionality and relevant circumstances. Therefore, an interpretation that considers all these factors, aiming for a fair and balanced outcome reflecting the treaty’s intent to foster cooperation and mutual benefit, would be the most legally sound. The correct option reflects this comprehensive approach to treaty interpretation, incorporating both textual analysis and contextual elements informed by international legal principles and judicial precedent.

The question revolves around the concept of state practice and opinio juris, the two fundamental elements required for the formation of customary international law. State practice refers to the actual conduct of states, including their legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic statements, and administrative actions. Opinio juris, on the other hand, signifies the belief by states that such practice is legally obligatory. The scenario presented involves the Bering Sea, a region with historical and ongoing maritime disputes involving the United States and Russia. The United States’ assertion of jurisdiction over certain fishing activities in the Bering Sea, specifically its prohibition of foreign fishing beyond the 3-nautical-mile territorial sea but within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without prior consent, reflects a consistent pattern of behavior by the U.S. government. This consistent behavior, coupled with the U.S.’s stated justifications for such actions, which imply a belief in the legality of these measures under international law (e.g., asserting rights related to conservation or management within its EEZ), contributes to the development of customary international law. While Russia’s consistent protest against these actions demonstrates a lack of acceptance, the question asks about the U.S. position and its contribution to a potential norm. The U.S. actions, if viewed in isolation from Russia’s protests, demonstrate both consistent state practice and an implied opinio juris regarding its regulatory authority in its EEZ concerning specific resource management, which is a key aspect of maritime international law. Therefore, the U.S. actions are indicative of its contribution to the formation of customary international law concerning maritime resource management within its EEZ, even if other states do not universally agree.

The scenario involves a dispute over maritime boundaries and resource exploitation between the United States, specifically Alaska, and a neighboring nation, “Nordlandia.” Alaska’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from its baseline, and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nautical miles from the same baseline. Nordlandia claims a similar maritime jurisdiction. The dispute arises from Nordlandia’s issuance of licenses for deep-sea mining operations within a zone that the United States asserts falls within Alaska’s EEZ, specifically in an area where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states have sovereign rights over their continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. This right extends to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory. If the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the coastal state has rights over this extended shelf. The determination of the outer edge of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is governed by specific geological and geomorphological criteria outlined in UNCLOS Article 76, which includes factors like the thickness of sedimentary rock. However, the question focuses on the general principle of EEZ rights and the UNCLOS framework for resource exploitation. Nordlandia’s actions, if indeed within the US EEZ as asserted by the United States, would constitute a violation of the US’s sovereign rights over its natural resources within that zone. The United States, as a party to UNCLOS (though its ratification process has been complex, it generally adheres to its customary international law provisions), would have grounds to protest and seek dispute resolution. The core issue is the assertion of sovereign rights over natural resources in the EEZ, which is a fundamental tenet of UNCLOS. Therefore, the most appropriate international legal framework to address this dispute is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically its provisions concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf.

The scenario describes a situation where a non-state actor, a multinational corporation named “Arctic Petro-Corp,” operating within Alaska’s maritime zones, has allegedly violated international environmental standards through its offshore drilling activities. The core issue revolves around the attribution of conduct to a state and the subsequent responsibility of that state for the actions of a private entity. Under customary international law, and as codified in Article 8 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of the State if they are, in fact, acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in the performance of that conduct. The key here is the level of control the state exercises. If Arctic Petro-Corp is merely operating under a concession granted by the United States, and the US has not exercised specific direction or control over the particular environmentally harmful actions, then the conduct is not directly attributable to the US for purposes of state responsibility under international law. However, if the US regulatory framework was demonstrably inadequate, or if US officials actively directed or were aware of and failed to prevent the specific wrongful acts, then attribution could be established. The question asks about the primary legal basis for holding the United States responsible. The most direct and encompassing legal framework for state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, including those involving environmental damage that breaches international obligations, is the law of state responsibility, particularly concerning the conduct of non-state actors operating within a state’s jurisdiction or control. This framework examines the relationship between the state and the actor, and whether the state’s actions or omissions, or its failure to exercise due diligence, led to the breach of an international obligation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deals with treaty interpretation and application, not directly with state responsibility for acts of private entities. Customary international law is a source, but the specific rules on attribution and state responsibility are now largely codified in the Articles on State Responsibility. International human rights law, while important, is not the primary legal basis for environmental damage claims against a state stemming from corporate activity. Therefore, the law of state responsibility, encompassing the rules on attribution of conduct, is the most relevant legal basis.

The question tests the understanding of the legal basis for asserting jurisdiction over maritime areas beyond the territorial sea, specifically the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The United States, like most states, asserts sovereign rights over its EEZ, which extends 200 nautical miles from its baselines. Within this zone, the U.S. has exclusive rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) outlines these rights. Alaska’s extensive coastline and proximity to rich fishing grounds and potential offshore resources make the EEZ particularly relevant. The assertion of jurisdiction in the EEZ is based on a treaty regime (UNCLOS, though the U.S. has not ratified it, it generally adheres to its provisions as customary international law) and domestic legislation, such as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which establishes the U.S. EEZ and its management framework. Therefore, the legal basis for Alaska’s claims to resources within its EEZ is derived from the international law of the sea, as codified and applied through domestic law, recognizing sovereign rights for economic purposes. The question requires understanding that while states have sovereignty over their territorial sea, rights in the EEZ are more specific and relate to economic exploitation and resource management, not full sovereignty.

The question probes the understanding of customary international law, specifically focusing on the dual-element test: state practice and opinio juris. State practice refers to the consistent and widespread behavior of states. Opinio juris sive necessitatis signifies a belief that such practice is legally required or permitted under international law. For a norm to crystallize into customary international law, both elements must be present. The scenario describes the Republic of Svalbard’s consistent refusal to allow foreign vessels access to its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for scientific research, coupled with official statements from Svalbard’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserting a legal right to prohibit such activities. This consistent behavior (state practice) and the explicit assertion of a legal entitlement (opinio juris) strongly suggest the formation of a customary rule. The mention of the United States’ similar policy, while indicative of widespread practice, is secondary to Svalbard’s specific actions and pronouncements in establishing its own claim. The absence of a treaty or a binding Security Council resolution means that the basis for Svalbard’s claim must be examined through the lens of customary international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently applied this two-part test in cases like the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the Nicaragua case. Therefore, the most compelling basis for Svalbard’s asserted right is the development of customary international law through its state practice and opinio juris.