The scenario presents a conflict of interest under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7. Attorney Anya represents a client, Mr. Davies, in a personal injury claim against a construction company, “BuildRight.” Simultaneously, Anya’s firm has a long-standing, substantial corporate client, “Global Holdings,” which is the parent company of BuildRight. While Anya herself does not directly represent Global Holdings on any matter, her firm’s business development partner, Mr. Chen, actively manages that relationship and has previously advised Global Holdings on unrelated corporate governance issues. The key issue is whether this situation creates a concurrent conflict of interest for Anya. A concurrent conflict exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. Here, representing Mr. Davies against BuildRight is directly adverse to the interests of BuildRight, which is a subsidiary of Anya’s firm’s corporate client, Global Holdings. Even though Anya does not directly represent Global Holdings, the firm’s relationship with Global Holdings is a material consideration. Rule 1.7(b) allows for representation despite a conflict if the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, the representation is not prohibited by law, the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. However, the question implies that the firm’s broader relationship with Global Holdings, managed by Mr. Chen, creates a significant risk that Anya’s representation of Mr. Davies could be materially limited. This material limitation arises from the potential for the firm to be perceived as undermining its relationship with Global Holdings, or for confidential information learned through the Global Holdings relationship to inadvertently influence Anya’s strategy against BuildRight, or vice-versa. Even if Anya believes she can be diligent, the rule focuses on whether a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the representation will be materially limited. Given the direct corporate hierarchy and the firm’s active management of the parent company relationship, a reasonable lawyer would likely conclude that the firm’s broader interests with Global Holdings could materially limit Anya’s ability to zealously represent Mr. Davies against its subsidiary, BuildRight. Therefore, the conflict is not waivable unless both clients give informed consent in writing, and even then, only if the lawyer reasonably believes they can provide competent and diligent representation. The core of the conflict lies in the potential for the firm’s broader business interests to compromise the specific client representation.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client in a civil litigation matter in Alaska. The client, Mr. Kai Petersen, has provided Ms. Sharma with a significant volume of electronic documents, including emails, financial records, and internal company memos, all of which are potentially relevant to the case. Ms. Sharma engages a third-party vendor to assist with the e-discovery process, specifically for document review and identification of privileged information. The vendor’s personnel are not attorneys. The core ethical issue here pertains to the duty of confidentiality and the proper delegation of tasks involving sensitive client information. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(c) addresses confidentiality and the protection of client information. It states that a lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client. When a lawyer delegates work to a third-party vendor, the lawyer remains responsible for ensuring that the vendor’s actions are compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. This includes ensuring that the vendor maintains the confidentiality of client information. The rule implicitly requires that the lawyer take reasonable steps to ensure the vendor has adequate safeguards in place. This might involve a written agreement with the vendor that includes confidentiality clauses, assurances regarding data security, and limitations on the vendor’s use of the information. Simply providing the documents without any such precautions would likely fall short of the “reasonable efforts” standard. Therefore, Ms. Sharma’s most prudent course of action, to satisfy her ethical obligations under Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct, is to enter into a written agreement with the e-discovery vendor that explicitly outlines the confidentiality requirements for the client’s documents and information. This agreement should detail how the vendor will protect the data, who will have access to it, and what measures will be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosure. This proactive step demonstrates the “reasonable efforts” required to safeguard client confidences.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client in a complex real estate transaction in Juneau, Alaska. A potential conflict of interest arises because Ms. Sharma’s firm also represents the seller of a neighboring property, and the success of her client’s transaction is contingent on certain zoning approvals that could be impacted by the neighboring property’s development. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 governs concurrent conflicts of interest. This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, the firm’s representation of the seller of the neighboring property creates a significant risk that Ms. Sharma’s representation of her client will be materially limited by her firm’s responsibilities to the seller, particularly concerning the zoning approvals that affect both properties. Therefore, Ms. Sharma must assess whether she reasonably believes she can still provide competent and diligent representation to her client despite this potential limitation. If she reasonably believes she can, she must then obtain informed consent, confirmed in writing, from both her client and the seller whose property is also represented by her firm. The question tests the understanding of when a conflict exists and the necessary steps to manage it under Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The correct course of action is to identify the conflict, assess the ability to provide representation, and obtain informed consent.

The scenario involves a potential conflict of interest under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest concerning current clients. When a lawyer represents multiple clients whose interests are directly adverse, a concurrent conflict of interest exists. In this case, Ms. Anya represents both the seller, Mr. Petrov, and the buyer, Ms. Petrova, in a real estate transaction. The seller’s interest is to maximize the sale price and ensure the buyer fulfills all obligations, while the buyer’s interest is to obtain the property at the lowest possible price and with minimal encumbrances. These interests are inherently and directly adverse. Even if Ms. Anya believes she can represent both diligently, the rules presume a conflict exists when direct adversity is present. The exception, allowing representation if the lawyer reasonably believes they can provide competent and diligent representation to each client and each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, is unlikely to be met here due to the direct adversity. The nature of a real estate transaction, where the seller and buyer have opposing goals regarding price and terms, creates a situation where a lawyer cannot simultaneously champion both parties’ best interests without compromising one or both. Therefore, Ms. Anya must withdraw from representing both clients in this transaction.

The scenario describes a situation where an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, is representing a client, Mr. Kai Tanaka, in a complex corporate dissolution matter in Alaska. Mr. Tanaka has provided Ms. Sharma with numerous documents, some of which contain sensitive proprietary information about his company’s trade secrets. Ms. Sharma is also simultaneously representing another client, Ms. Lena Petrova, who is a minority shareholder in a different company that is a direct competitor to Mr. Tanaka’s business. The core ethical issue here revolves around conflicts of interest, specifically the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality owed to current clients. Under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, Ms. Sharma’s representation of Ms. Petrova, a competitor to Mr. Tanaka’s company, creates a significant risk that her representation of Mr. Tanaka will be materially limited. Her knowledge of Mr. Tanaka’s trade secrets, obtained through the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality, could inadvertently or intentionally be used to the detriment of Ms. Petrova’s interests, or conversely, her duty to Ms. Petrova might influence her advice to Mr. Tanaka in a way that is not solely in his best interest. Even if Ms. Sharma believes she can compartmentalize this information, the appearance of impropriety and the potential for actual prejudice to either client are substantial. The question asks about the most ethically sound course of action. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct require that if a concurrent conflict of interest exists, the lawyer must not represent the client unless certain conditions are met. These conditions typically involve the lawyer reasonably believing that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, the representation is not prohibited by law, the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Given the direct competitive relationship between the clients and the nature of the information involved (trade secrets), it is highly unlikely that Ms. Sharma could reasonably believe she can provide competent and diligent representation to both without material limitation, even with informed consent. The risk of impermissible disclosure or use of confidential information is too high. Therefore, the most ethically sound and prudent action is to decline or withdraw from one of the representations. Specifically, if the representation of Ms. Petrova commenced after the representation of Mr. Tanaka, and the new representation involves a directly adverse matter, she must withdraw from the new representation unless the client gives informed consent in writing. If both representations are ongoing and create a concurrent conflict, she must withdraw from one or both representations if necessary to comply with the Rules. In this scenario, the most appropriate action is to withdraw from representing Ms. Petrova because her interests are directly adverse to Mr. Tanaka’s company, and the information Ms. Sharma possesses about Mr. Tanaka’s trade secrets creates a significant risk of material limitation in her representation of Ms. Petrova. Continuing to represent Ms. Petrova under these circumstances, even with consent, would likely violate the duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed to Mr. Tanaka, and it would be difficult to satisfy the “reasonable belief” standard for competent representation. The calculation is conceptual, not mathematical. It involves analyzing the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct concerning concurrent conflicts of interest (Rule 1.7) and the duties of confidentiality (Rule 1.6) and loyalty. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the representation of Ms. Petrova, a competitor of Mr. Tanaka’s company and whose interests are adverse to Mr. Tanaka’s, creates a direct conflict of interest. The attorney’s knowledge of Mr. Tanaka’s trade secrets further exacerbates this conflict due to the duty of confidentiality. The rules require withdrawal from such a representation unless specific conditions, including reasonable belief in competent representation and informed consent, can be met. In this scenario, the risk to both clients is too high to reasonably believe competent representation can be provided, making withdrawal from the representation of the competitor the most ethically sound course of action.

The scenario presents a situation involving potential conflicts of interest and the duty of confidentiality. Attorney Anya Sharma represents a client, Mr. Thorne, in a contentious divorce proceeding in Alaska. During the representation, Mr. Thorne divulges sensitive, non-public financial information about his business, which is a significant asset in the divorce. Subsequently, Anya’s firm hires a new associate, Ms. Chen, who previously worked at the opposing counsel’s firm. Ms. Chen had direct involvement in the Thorne divorce case while at her former firm, having reviewed some of Mr. Thorne’s initial financial disclosures. The question asks about the ethical obligations of Anya and her firm. The primary ethical considerations here are imputed disqualification and the duty of confidentiality. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10 (Imputed Disqualification: General Rule) states that while lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client if any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. Rule 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in the same or a substantially related matter in which a former client had a materially adverse interest, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. In this case, Ms. Chen is prohibited from representing Mr. Thorne due to her prior work on the case at the opposing firm, which would create a conflict under Rule 1.9. This disqualification is imputed to the entire firm under Rule 1.10. The exception for informed consent under Rule 1.9 requires consent from the former client, which is Mr. Thorne. However, the information Ms. Chen possesses is confidential and relates to the current representation of Mr. Thorne. Even if Mr. Thorne were to consent, the firm must ensure that Ms. Chen does not work on the case and that all confidential information she gained is protected. The critical question is whether the firm can continue representation. Under Rule 1.10, if a lawyer is disqualified from representing a client, the firm can still represent the client if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter, is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom, and written notice is promptly given to the relevant client and any other party or the tribunal. This “screening” mechanism is designed to allow firms to continue representation when a new lawyer with a potential conflict joins the firm, provided strict safeguards are in place. In this scenario, Ms. Chen’s prior involvement means she is disqualified from representing Mr. Thorne. The firm must implement effective screening measures to prevent Ms. Chen from accessing any information related to Mr. Thorne’s case and from participating in the representation. This includes segregating her files, preventing her from discussing the case with other attorneys in the firm, and ensuring she receives no financial benefit from this specific representation. Anya must also ensure that Ms. Chen does not use any confidential information gained from her previous employment to the detriment of Mr. Thorne. The prompt and written notice to Mr. Thorne and opposing counsel about the screening is also a crucial step. The correct course of action is to screen Ms. Chen from the Thorne matter and provide prompt written notice to Mr. Thorne and opposing counsel, assuming Mr. Thorne does not object and the screening is effective. The question focuses on the firm’s ability to continue representation, which hinges on the successful implementation of a conflict screen under Rule 1.10.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, who is representing a client in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. The client, Mr. Kai Chen, has provided Ms. Sharma with a substantial amount of proprietary business information that is crucial for negotiating the sale of his commercial property. This information includes trade secrets and financial projections that, if disclosed, could severely damage Mr. Chen’s ongoing business operations and competitive advantage. Ms. Sharma is ethically bound by the duty of confidentiality, which is a cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship and is reinforced by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) mandates that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) lists specific exceptions, none of which appear to apply in this situation as there is no indication of preventing a crime, fraud, or securing legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with the Rules. The information provided by Mr. Chen is not related to any ongoing criminal or fraudulent activity that Ms. Sharma is aware of, nor is she seeking advice on her own compliance. Therefore, Ms. Sharma’s obligation to maintain Mr. Chen’s confidential information is paramount. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct do not compel disclosure in this context, and any voluntary disclosure without a valid exception would constitute a breach of confidentiality. The duty of confidentiality extends to all information relating to the representation, regardless of the source, and is broader than attorney-client privilege. It is a fundamental ethical obligation designed to encourage clients to communicate fully and frankly with their attorneys. The question tests the understanding of the scope of the duty of confidentiality and its exceptions under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically in the context of sensitive business information provided by a client in a real estate transaction.

The scenario presents a complex conflict of interest situation involving a former client and a current client in distinct matters, but with a potential for shared confidential information that could be material to the new representation. Under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.9 concerning duties to former clients, a lawyer shall not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. The key here is “substantially related.” Matters are substantially related if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there is a substantial risk that confidential factual information obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter. In this case, the prior representation involved advising on the regulatory framework for salmon fishing quotas in Alaska, which would undoubtedly involve detailed knowledge of specific quota allocation strategies, lobbying efforts, and potentially proprietary data related to fishing operations. The new representation involves defending a different fishing cooperative against allegations of illegal quota manipulation. The factual information learned during the prior representation regarding quota allocation mechanisms and potential loopholes or vulnerabilities in the regulatory system is highly likely to be material and useful in defending against allegations of illegal manipulation. Therefore, the matters are substantially related, and the lawyer cannot proceed without the former client’s informed consent. The question asks about the *ethical obligation* to the former client, which is to avoid representing the new client if the matters are substantially related without consent. The lawyer’s obligation is to cease representation of the new client if consent cannot be obtained.

The scenario presents a conflict of interest for Attorney Anya Petrova, who is representing a client in a real estate transaction in Alaska. The potential conflict arises because Anya’s firm has previously provided legal advice to the seller of the property Anya’s current client wishes to purchase. This prior representation involved advising the seller on the very same property’s zoning regulations and potential environmental liabilities. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.7, govern concurrent conflicts of interest. A conflict exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, the firm’s prior advice to the seller on zoning and environmental issues creates a significant risk that Anya’s representation of the buyer will be materially limited. The firm possesses confidential information from the seller that could be relevant to the buyer’s negotiation or due diligence. Even if Anya herself did not personally handle the seller’s matter, the information is likely imputed to her and the firm under Rule 1.10, which deals with imputed disqualification. Without informed consent, confirmed in writing, from both the current client (the buyer) and the former client (the seller), Anya cannot ethically proceed with representing the buyer. The question asks for the most appropriate action Anya should take. The options present various courses of action. Anya must first identify the conflict, which she has done. Then, she must determine if the conflict is waivable. In this situation, the firm’s prior representation of the seller on matters directly related to the current transaction, involving potentially sensitive information about zoning and environmental issues, makes it highly probable that the conflict is not waivable. Even with informed consent, the risk of material limitation is too high. Therefore, the most prudent and ethically sound course of action is to decline representation of the buyer to avoid jeopardizing the interests of both parties and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession. The other options involve proceeding without full disclosure, attempting to waive a non-waivable conflict, or assuming the conflict is not significant, all of which would violate ethical rules.

The scenario involves a conflict of interest under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.7 concerning concurrent conflicts of interest. Attorney Anya represents a client in a real estate transaction. Subsequently, Anya is asked to represent a different client whose interests are directly adverse to her existing client in a separate matter. Rule 1.7(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, the representation of the new client is directly adverse to the existing client in a separate matter, triggering the prohibition. While Rule 1.7(b) permits representation if the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, the lawyer has a reasonable belief that the representation will not be adversely affected, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, the facts presented do not suggest that Anya can form such a reasonable belief given the direct adversity. The question asks about the ethical obligation when Anya is asked to represent the new client. The primary ethical obligation is to decline the representation due to the direct adversity, as continuing would violate Rule 1.7. There is no calculation involved in this question; it is purely an application of ethical rules.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Kai Chen, in a complex contract dispute in Alaska. Mr. Chen has provided Ms. Sharma with a significant volume of electronic documents. A crucial ethical consideration arises when Ms. Sharma discovers a confidential settlement offer from the opposing party within these documents, which Mr. Chen had explicitly instructed her not to pursue or even acknowledge due to a personal vendetta. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, which governs confidentiality, states that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) lists exceptions such as preventing a criminal act, preventing substantial financial injury to another, or complying with other law or a court order. In this case, Mr. Chen’s instruction is a direct prohibition on disclosing the information. While the settlement offer might seem beneficial from a purely strategic standpoint, the client’s explicit instruction overrides the attorney’s discretion to unilaterally use or disclose such information, even if it appears to be in the client’s best interest. The attorney’s duty of loyalty and confidentiality is paramount. Ms. Sharma cannot use or reveal the confidential settlement offer without Mr. Chen’s informed consent, even if she believes it would lead to a more favorable outcome. The core of the issue is respecting the client’s autonomy and explicit directives regarding confidential information. The duty of confidentiality extends to all information relating to the representation, regardless of its source or the form in which it is communicated. The fact that the information was discovered within provided documents does not diminish its confidential nature. Therefore, Ms. Sharma must refrain from acting on or disclosing the settlement offer unless Mr. Chen provides explicit consent.

The scenario involves an attorney, Anya, representing a client, Mr. Silas, in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. Anya discovers a significant undisclosed environmental contamination issue on the property that could drastically reduce its value and create substantial liability for Mr. Silas. The seller’s attorney, Mr. Thorne, is aware of the contamination and has instructed his client not to disclose it, believing it falls outside the scope of required disclosures under Alaska law. Anya’s ethical duty of confidentiality, as outlined in the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, generally prohibits her from revealing information relating to the representation of her client without the client’s informed consent. However, Rule 1.6(b) of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct provides exceptions to confidentiality. Specifically, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial financial injury to another person. In this situation, Anya reasonably believes that failing to disclose the contamination will lead to substantial financial injury to the buyer, who is unaware of the issue and will likely suffer significant losses. While Anya also has a duty of candor to the tribunal (Rule 3.3) and to opposing parties and counsel (Rule 4.1), these duties are generally subservient to the duty of confidentiality unless specific exceptions apply. Rule 4.1, concerning truthfulness in statements to others, requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. If Anya remains silent and the buyer proceeds with the purchase, her silence could be construed as facilitating a fraudulent transaction, potentially violating Rule 4.1. However, the most direct and permissive exception for Anya to act without explicit client consent, to prevent harm to another party, is found within the exceptions to confidentiality itself. Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent substantial financial injury to another. Therefore, Anya may reveal the information to prevent the buyer from suffering substantial financial harm, provided she reasonably believes it is necessary. The question asks about the most appropriate ethical course of action. Revealing the information to the buyer’s representative or directly to the buyer, after attempting to persuade her client to disclose, is the most ethically justifiable action to prevent significant harm to a third party, as permitted by the exceptions to confidentiality in the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.

The scenario presents a situation involving a lawyer, Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Silas Croft, in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. Anya discovers a previously undisclosed environmental remediation lien on the property that significantly impacts its market value and the client’s projected profit. Anya’s duty of zealous representation under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 requires her to act with diligence and promptness. However, Rule 1.6 mandates that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) lists exceptions, none of which clearly apply here, such as preventing a criminal act or fraud likely to result in substantial financial injury. While Anya has a duty to keep her client informed under Rule 1.4, and to provide competent representation under Rule 1.1, the core ethical dilemma revolves around the revelation of the lien. Disclosure to the buyer’s counsel without Mr. Croft’s consent would violate confidentiality. Anya must advise Mr. Croft about the lien, its implications, and explore options for disclosure or mitigation, respecting his ultimate decision-making authority. If Mr. Croft insists on non-disclosure, Anya must consider whether continuing the representation would involve assisting in a fraudulent or illegal act, which would trigger a duty to withdraw under Rule 1.16. However, the question asks about the immediate ethical obligation upon discovery. The most appropriate action is to communicate the discovery to the client and discuss the implications, seeking their instructions. This upholds both confidentiality and the client’s right to make informed decisions about the representation. The other options involve unauthorized disclosure or inaction that could lead to further ethical breaches. The obligation to inform the client of material facts impacting the representation is paramount.

The scenario involves a conflict of interest arising from a lawyer’s prior representation of a client’s business competitor. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 governs conflicts of interest. Specifically, Rule 1.7(a)(2) states that a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, the lawyer previously represented Arctic Seafoods Inc. in a patent dispute concerning fishing vessel technology. Now, the lawyer is asked to represent Bering Sea Fisheries LLC, a direct competitor of Arctic Seafoods Inc., in a similar patent dispute. The information obtained during the prior representation of Arctic Seafoods Inc. is directly relevant to the new matter for Bering Sea Fisheries LLC. This creates a significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent Bering Sea Fisheries LLC zealously and effectively will be materially limited by the lawyer’s duty of loyalty and confidentiality to Arctic Seafoods Inc. and the knowledge gained from that prior representation. Even if the lawyer believes they can be impartial, the appearance of impropriety and the potential for using confidential information against a former client is problematic. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, concerning duties to former clients, also prohibits a lawyer from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Here, the matters are substantially related, and the interests are materially adverse. Therefore, without informed consent, confirmed in writing, from Arctic Seafoods Inc., the lawyer must decline the representation of Bering Sea Fisheries LLC. The critical factor is the substantial relationship between the matters and the material adversity of interests, which triggers the conflict.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Kenji Tanaka, in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. Mr. Tanaka has provided Ms. Sharma with sensitive financial documents that, if disclosed without his consent, could severely damage his business reputation and potentially lead to regulatory scrutiny. The core ethical principle at play is the duty of confidentiality owed by an attorney to their client, as codified in the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6. This rule establishes a broad obligation to protect client information. The question probes the understanding of exceptions to this duty. Generally, an attorney may reveal confidential information only with the client’s informed consent, to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury to another, to secure legal advice about compliance with the Rules, or as permitted by the Rules. In this case, there is no indication of imminent harm or a client intent to commit a crime or fraud that would justify a mandatory or permissive disclosure without consent. The information is related to a past transaction and potential future regulatory issues, not an ongoing criminal or fraudulent act that the attorney is obligated to prevent through disclosure. Therefore, Ms. Sharma cannot ethically disclose this information to the opposing party or their counsel without Mr. Tanaka’s explicit, informed consent, even if she believes it might facilitate the negotiation or expose a potential misrepresentation by Mr. Tanaka that she suspects but has not confirmed. The duty of confidentiality is paramount unless a specific, narrowly defined exception applies. The scenario does not present any of these exceptions.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Ben Carter, in a complex contract dispute in Alaska. Mr. Carter has provided Ms. Sharma with numerous documents, some of which contain highly sensitive personal information unrelated to the contract dispute but potentially damaging if disclosed. Ms. Sharma’s ethical duty of confidentiality, as governed by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, extends to all information relating to the representation of a client, regardless of the source, and even if the information is not legally privileged. This duty is broad and encompasses not only information conveyed by the client but also information obtained from third parties or discovered through investigation. The primary purpose of this rule is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and clients, thereby promoting effective representation. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6, define confidentiality broadly. It prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is implicitly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) lists specific exceptions, such as preventing a criminal act or fraud, preventing substantial financial injury to another, or securing legal advice about compliance with the rules. In this case, the information is sensitive personal data, not directly related to the contract dispute, and its disclosure would not fall under any of the permissive exceptions to confidentiality without Mr. Carter’s informed consent. Therefore, Ms. Sharma must maintain the confidentiality of this unrelated sensitive information. The duty of confidentiality is distinct from attorney-client privilege, which is a rule of evidence protecting communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. While the sensitive personal data might not be privileged, it is still subject to the broader ethical duty of confidentiality. Ms. Sharma’s ethical obligation is to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Ben Carter, in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. Mr. Carter has provided Ms. Sharma with a substantial retainer. The core ethical issue revolves around the proper handling of client funds, specifically the retainer, under Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.15, “Safekeeping Property,” dictates that client funds must be held in a separate, identifiable client trust account. The retainer, even if advanced for future services, is considered client property until earned. Therefore, Ms. Sharma cannot simply deposit the retainer into her operating account or use it for personal expenses. The funds must be segregated. When Ms. Sharma incurs fees for services rendered, she can then withdraw those earned fees from the trust account, provided she has properly notified Mr. Carter of the fees and they are indeed earned according to their fee agreement. Failure to maintain funds in a trust account and commingling them with personal or firm funds constitutes a serious ethical violation, potentially leading to disciplinary action. The Alaska Bar Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct, mirroring the ABA Model Rules, emphasize this strict separation to protect client assets and maintain public trust in the legal profession. The question tests the understanding of the fundamental duty to safeguard client property and the specific requirements for handling client funds, particularly retainers, in Alaska.

The scenario presents a situation involving potential conflicts of interest and the duty of confidentiality under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Attorney Anya is representing a client in a real estate transaction in Juneau, Alaska. She previously represented the seller of the property in an unrelated matter. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.7, govern concurrent conflicts of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this case, Anya’s prior representation of the seller, even if unrelated, creates a potential conflict because the seller’s interests in the current transaction (as the seller) are directly adverse to Anya’s current client (the buyer). Rule 1.9 addresses duties to former clients. While this is a concurrent representation, the principles of avoiding adverse effects on former clients are relevant. The critical question is whether the prior representation is “substantially related” to the current matter. Even if the prior representation was unrelated, the mere fact that Anya possesses confidential information about the seller from her prior representation could be imputed as a conflict under Rule 1.10, which imputes conflicts to other lawyers in the firm unless certain conditions are met. However, the most direct issue is the adverse representation. For Anya to continue representing the buyer, she must reasonably believe that she can provide competent and diligent representation to both clients and that each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. If the prior representation involved confidential information that is material to the current transaction, or if the matters are substantially related, then Anya likely cannot proceed even with consent. Given that Anya previously represented the seller in a real estate transaction involving the same property, it is highly probable that her prior representation is substantially related to the current transaction. Therefore, Anya must decline or withdraw from the representation of the buyer if she cannot reasonably believe she can provide competent and diligent representation to both, or if informed consent cannot be obtained. The question asks about Anya’s ethical obligation if she cannot obtain informed consent, confirmed in writing, from both the buyer and the seller. Under Rule 1.7(b), even if a concurrent conflict of interest exists, a lawyer may represent a client if the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; the representation is not prohibited by law; the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. If informed consent cannot be obtained, or if the lawyer cannot reasonably believe they can provide competent and diligent representation, the lawyer must withdraw. The most appropriate action, absent the ability to secure informed consent, is to withdraw from representing the buyer, as continuing the representation would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The scenario presents a conflict of interest under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically concerning concurrent representation. An attorney representing a client in a transactional matter, such as a real estate closing, owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to that client. If the attorney subsequently learns that a former client, with whom the attorney had a substantially related matter, is now involved in a dispute with the current client, and this dispute directly relates to the subject matter of the previous representation, a conflict arises. Rule 1.7 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct addresses concurrent conflicts of interest, stating that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer. In this situation, the attorney’s knowledge gained from the former client in the prior real estate transaction is directly relevant to the current dispute involving the property. The attorney’s duty of loyalty to the new client is directly adverse to the continuing duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed to the former client. Even if the attorney believes they can be impartial, the appearance of impropriety and the potential for using confidential information against a former client necessitate withdrawal. The rule also mandates that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a former client. Here, the attorney’s knowledge from the prior representation creates a significant risk of materially limiting their representation of the new client, as they would be constrained from fully utilizing all information and strategies that might be beneficial, due to their ongoing duties to the former client. Therefore, the attorney must decline the new representation.

The scenario involves an attorney, Anya, representing a client, Boris, in a complex commercial dispute in Alaska. Anya discovers a significant, previously undisclosed email that is highly favorable to Boris’s position but was inadvertently sent to her by a third party who is not a party to the litigation and was not involved in the communication chain between Anya and Boris. The email contains privileged information belonging to the opposing party, “Crimson Corp.” Anya’s duty of confidentiality under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 generally prohibits revealing information relating to the representation of a client. However, this email was not obtained through means that violate Crimson Corp.’s rights or Anya’s professional duties in its acquisition. The core ethical question is whether Anya can ethically use this inadvertently received email. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) addresses receipt of documents or electronic information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know was sent inadvertently. This rule states that a lawyer who receives information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know was sent inadvertently must promptly notify the sender. Crucially, the rule does not prohibit the lawyer from reviewing or using the information if the sender is notified. The duty is to notify the sender, not to refrain from using the information. Anya has a duty to her client, Boris, to zealously represent him within the bounds of the law and ethical rules. Using the email, provided it was obtained without violating any rights and she notifies the sender of the inadvertent transmission, is permissible and indeed may be required to effectively represent Boris. The rule focuses on the manner of receipt and the obligation to inform the sender, not on a blanket prohibition of use. Therefore, Anya can ethically use the email after notifying Crimson Corp.’s counsel of the inadvertent transmission.

This question explores the ethical duty of confidentiality under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically focusing on the exceptions related to preventing reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct permits disclosure of confidential information if the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent the client or another person from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury to another. However, the exception for preventing death or substantial bodily harm is more direct. If Attorney Anya reasonably believes that her client, Mr. Petrov, is about to commit an act that is reasonably certain to result in the death of Ms. Chen, she is permitted, but not required, to disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent that harm. The Alaska Rules do not mandate such disclosure, leaving the decision to the attorney’s discretion based on their professional judgment. The core of the ethical consideration is the balancing act between the duty of confidentiality and the duty to prevent serious harm. The scenario does not involve preventing financial injury, nor does it involve a past crime or fraud. The focus is solely on preventing imminent, severe physical harm. Therefore, the most ethically permissible action, while still respecting the general duty of confidentiality, is to disclose only what is necessary to prevent the threatened harm.

The scenario describes a situation where an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, is representing a client in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. The client, Mr. Ben Carter, has specifically requested that Ms. Sharma not disclose certain information about the property’s environmental remediation history to the buyer, Mr. David Lee. This information, while not legally required to be disclosed under Alaska statutes governing real estate transactions, is known by Ms. Sharma to be material to the buyer’s decision-making process and could significantly impact the property’s value and future usability. The core ethical issue here revolves around the duty of candor to the tribunal and the duty of honesty in dealing with third persons, specifically the opposing party in a transaction. While the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality protect client information, these duties do not extend to facilitating or concealing fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1, which mirrors the ABA Model Rule 4.1, prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in the course of representing a client. Furthermore, while there might not be a specific statutory disclosure requirement in Alaska for this particular environmental history, a deliberate omission intended to mislead or deceive the buyer can still constitute a violation of ethical duties. Ms. Sharma’s knowledge that the information is “material to the buyer’s decision-making process” is crucial. Even if not legally mandated for disclosure, her client’s instruction to conceal it, coupled with the knowledge of its materiality, creates an ethical quandary. Allowing the transaction to proceed with this deliberate omission, where the attorney knows the buyer is likely to be deceived about a material aspect of the property, would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of ethical rules governing honesty in dealings. The attorney cannot assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is fraudulent or criminal. While not outright fraud in the statutory sense of a required disclosure, actively concealing a known material fact to induce a transaction can be viewed as a deceptive practice. Therefore, Ms. Sharma cannot ethically assist Mr. Carter in this specific concealment if it amounts to a deceptive practice. The attorney’s duty to the legal system and the integrity of transactions generally outweighs the client’s instruction to conceal a material fact that would likely mislead the other party.

The scenario presents a situation where an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, is representing a client, Mr. Kai Chen, in a complex commercial dispute in Alaska. Mr. Chen is a principal in a technology startup that is being sued for patent infringement. During discovery, Mr. Chen inadvertently provides Ms. Sharma with an internal company email that contains a highly damaging admission regarding the alleged patent violation. This email was sent by a junior engineer who has since left the company and is not a party to the litigation. The core ethical issue revolves around Ms. Sharma’s duty of confidentiality under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6, and her obligations concerning inadvertently produced privileged or confidential information. Under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b), when a lawyer receives a document relating to the representation of the client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent, the lawyer shall promptly notify the sender. However, this rule does not explicitly dictate the subsequent course of action regarding the use or return of the document. The crucial consideration here is the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, which protect communications and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. The email, while damaging, is an internal communication and its inadvertent production does not automatically waive the privilege, especially if Ms. Sharma acts appropriately. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Rule 1.6, emphasize the broad duty of confidentiality, which extends to information relating to the representation of a client, however its source. This includes information gained from third parties or from the client’s own actions, even if that information is publicly available or is damaging to the client. The duty of confidentiality is paramount and generally cannot be overridden by a mere inadvertent production by the opposing party, unless an exception applies, such as implied consent to use or a court order. Given that the email was inadvertently sent by the opposing party, Ms. Sharma’s primary ethical obligation is to notify the sender of the inadvertent transmission. Beyond notification, the decision on how to proceed with the document involves a careful balance of ethical duties and strategic considerations. She must avoid using the information if it would be unethical to do so, particularly if it was obtained in violation of the opposing party’s rights or expectations of confidentiality. However, if the document is discoverable and its production was merely an administrative error by the opposing party, and not a breach of privilege by the sender, Ms. Sharma may be permitted to use it, subject to any court orders. The most prudent and ethically sound approach is to notify opposing counsel, discuss the inadvertent production, and potentially seek a stipulation or court guidance on its admissibility and handling, while also considering whether the document is truly privileged or simply damaging. The duty of competence (Rule 1.1) and diligence (Rule 1.3) also require her to understand the implications of this information and act accordingly to protect her client’s interests within ethical boundaries.

This scenario tests the understanding of Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct regarding conflicts of interest, specifically concerning concurrent representation and the imputation of conflicts. When an attorney leaves a firm, the entire firm is generally imputed with the knowledge of any conflict that the departing attorney had. In this case, Ms. Petrova’s prior representation of “Arctic Ventures LLC” created a conflict. This conflict is imputed to her new firm, “Polaris Legal Group,” even though she is the only one with direct knowledge. The subsequent representation of “Northern Lights Corp.” by another attorney at Polaris Legal Group, where Northern Lights Corp. is directly adverse to Arctic Ventures LLC, triggers a direct conflict of interest for Polaris Legal Group. Rule 1.10 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, which deals with imputation of conflicts, states that when lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9. Rule 1.7 prohibits representation if it involves a concurrent conflict of interest, which occurs if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. Since Ms. Petrova’s prior representation of Arctic Ventures LLC is imputed to her new firm, and Northern Lights Corp. is directly adverse to Arctic Ventures LLC, the firm is prohibited from representing Northern Lights Corp. unless an exception applies. The only potential exception is if the firm can demonstrate that no confidential information obtained during the representation of Arctic Ventures LLC was relevant to the representation of Northern Lights Corp., and that all clients give informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. Without such a waiver, the firm must decline or withdraw from the representation. The question asks what the firm *must* do, implying the absence of a valid waiver. Therefore, the firm must decline representation.

This scenario tests the understanding of Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) and its interplay with the duty of candor toward the tribunal under Rule 3.3. An attorney has a duty to maintain client confidentiality, which is a cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship. However, this duty is not absolute and is subject to certain exceptions, most notably when disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, as outlined in Rule 1.6(c)(1). In this case, the client has confessed to a past violent act that poses no ongoing threat and is unrelated to the current representation. Revealing this information would violate the duty of confidentiality, as there is no exception applicable under the Rules of Professional Conduct for past crimes that do not pose an ongoing threat. Furthermore, Rule 3.3, which deals with candor toward the tribunal, requires disclosure of material facts or law adverse to the client when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client, or when the client intends to engage in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. However, this rule is typically invoked when the client is actively perpetrating a fraud on the court or obstructing justice in the current proceeding. Here, the client’s confession is about a past event, and there is no indication that the client intends to commit any future crime or fraud related to the current litigation or that the past act is material to the current proceedings in a way that requires disclosure to prevent a fraud on the court. The attorney’s obligation is to zealously represent the client within the bounds of the law and ethical rules. Disclosing the client’s past, unrelated criminal confession would breach confidentiality without a valid exception and would not be required by the duty of candor to the tribunal in this context. Therefore, the attorney must maintain the confidentiality of this information.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Ben Carter, in a complex commercial dispute in Alaska. Ms. Sharma discovers a significant internal document that appears to exonerate her client but was inadvertently produced by the opposing counsel during discovery, potentially due to a clerical error in their document management system. The core ethical consideration here revolves around the duty of candor to the tribunal and the rules governing the discovery process, specifically regarding inadvertently produced privileged or protected material. Under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(a), a lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. Rule 3.4(b) also prohibits a lawyer from counseling or assisting another person to do any such act. Furthermore, Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal, mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a)(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; or (a)(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. While the document was inadvertently produced, its retention and use without disclosure to opposing counsel and the court could be construed as an unlawful obstruction of access to evidence or an attempt to benefit from a mistake in a manner that undermines the integrity of the discovery process. The Alaska Supreme Court, in cases interpreting the Model Rules, has emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the adversarial system. The inadvertent production of a document does not automatically waive privilege or protection, but it does create an obligation on the receiving lawyer. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) states that when a lawyer receives a document relating to the representation of the client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent, the lawyer shall promptly notify the sender. This rule is crucial in balancing the duty to zealously represent a client with the overarching duty of fairness and candor to the legal system. In this situation, Ms. Sharma’s ethical obligation is to promptly notify opposing counsel of the inadvertent production. Failing to do so, and instead using the document to her client’s advantage without disclosure, would violate her duty of candor and potentially the rules against obstructing access to evidence. The correct ethical course of action is to inform opposing counsel and the court about the inadvertent production, allowing them to take appropriate steps to reclaim or address the document, even if it is detrimental to her client’s immediate position. The duty to the tribunal and the integrity of the discovery process outweigh the tactical advantage gained by withholding the information.

The scenario involves an attorney, Anya, representing a client, Mr. Henderson, in a complex real estate transaction in Juneau, Alaska. Anya also represents a separate client, Ms. Chen, who is the seller in a different, unrelated real estate transaction in Anchorage. Anya discovers that a property Mr. Henderson is interested in purchasing, which is being sold by an unrelated third party, has a title defect that could significantly impact its market value. Anya’s duty of confidentiality under Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 prevents her from disclosing this title defect to Mr. Henderson without his informed consent. However, the rule also permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain substantial financial harm to another. In this case, the title defect directly impacts Mr. Henderson’s transaction. Anya’s obligation to her client, Mr. Henderson, under Rule 1.1 (Competent Representation) and Rule 1.3 (Diligence) requires her to act in his best interest and provide competent representation. While Rule 1.6 generally prohibits disclosure of confidential information, an exception exists when disclosure is necessary to prevent substantial financial harm to another. In this situation, the harm to Mr. Henderson is substantial and directly related to the representation. Anya must obtain Mr. Henderson’s informed consent to disclose the defect to him, enabling him to make an informed decision about proceeding with the purchase. If Mr. Henderson consents, Anya can then proceed with addressing the title defect. If Mr. Henderson does not consent to disclosure, Anya would be ethically bound by confidentiality and would have to consider whether she could continue the representation competently and diligently without revealing the information that could harm her client’s interests, potentially leading to a withdrawal from representation under Rule 1.16 if the defect’s impact makes effective representation impossible without breaching confidentiality. The question asks about Anya’s immediate ethical obligation concerning the discovered title defect in Mr. Henderson’s transaction. The core issue is balancing the duty of confidentiality with the duty to inform the client about material information affecting the representation. Anya must inform Mr. Henderson about the title defect so he can make an informed decision. This is not a situation where disclosure to a third party is permitted or required without client consent; rather, it is a disclosure to her own client about a matter material to their representation.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client, Mr. Ben Carter, in a contract dispute in Alaska. Mr. Carter had previously consulted with another attorney, Mr. David Lee, regarding the same matter. Mr. Lee had provided a brief written opinion but had not been formally retained or paid for his services. Ms. Sharma’s firm has a conflict-checking system that identified Mr. Lee as a former consultant. The core ethical issue here revolves around imputed disqualification and the duty of confidentiality owed to a prospective client. Under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.18, a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship is a prospective client. Even if no client-lawyer relationship is ultimately formed, the lawyer generally owes a duty of confidentiality to that person. Furthermore, Rule 1.10(a) imputes disqualification to other lawyers in a firm when any lawyer is disqualified, unless certain conditions are met. In this case, Mr. Lee’s prior consultation with Mr. Carter, even without formal retention, creates a duty of confidentiality. Since Ms. Sharma’s firm did not take reasonable steps to screen Mr. Lee from participating in Mr. Carter’s representation and did not obtain informed consent, the firm is likely disqualified from representing the opposing party. The question asks about the most appropriate ethical course of action for Ms. Sharma’s firm. The firm cannot proceed with representing the opposing party without addressing the conflict. The most ethical and legally sound approach is to decline representation of the opposing party to avoid violating duties owed to Mr. Carter as a prospective client and to prevent imputed disqualification of the entire firm. The firm should not attempt to proceed without screening or consent, as this would be a direct violation of the rules. The firm also cannot simply ignore the potential conflict, as that would be negligent and unethical. Therefore, declining representation of the opposing party is the correct and most prudent course of action.

The scenario presents a situation where an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, is representing a client, Mr. Silas Croft, in a complex real estate transaction in Juneau, Alaska. Mr. Croft has specifically requested that Ms. Sharma not disclose to the seller’s counsel that a significant environmental remediation project on the property was completed just prior to listing, even though this remediation was legally mandated and successfully executed. Ms. Sharma has confirmed the remediation was thorough and met all regulatory standards. The core ethical issue here revolves around the duty of candor owed to the tribunal and third parties versus the duty of zealous representation and client confidentiality. Under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person on behalf of a client. While the remediation was completed, failing to disclose its existence, especially when it addresses a material aspect of the property’s condition (environmental status), could be construed as an implied misrepresentation or an omission of a material fact that could mislead the buyer. The rule does not permit a lawyer to assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. While the remediation itself was legal, the intentional withholding of this information in a transaction where it is material could be seen as facilitating a deceptive practice. Furthermore, Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal) is generally applicable to proceedings before a tribunal, but the underlying principles of honesty and not misleading others extend to transactional contexts, especially concerning material facts. While there is no affirmative duty to volunteer information that is not requested, actively concealing a material fact that one knows would likely influence the other party’s decision-making, particularly when it was a legally mandated corrective action, treads into problematic territory. The duty of confidentiality (Rule 1.6) protects information relating to the representation, but it does not extend to assisting a client in perpetrating a fraud or misrepresentation. The client’s instruction not to disclose a fact that is material to the transaction, and which the lawyer knows to be true and important, requires careful consideration of whether compliance would involve assisting in a misrepresentation. In this specific scenario, the successful completion of a legally mandated environmental remediation, which directly impacts the property’s value and usability, is a material fact. A failure to disclose its existence, particularly when the client instructs the lawyer to conceal it, could be interpreted as assisting the client in making a misleading representation about the property’s condition. The lawyer must balance the duty of zealous advocacy with the fundamental obligation to avoid assisting in dishonest or fraudulent conduct. The most ethically sound approach is to advise the client that the law and ethical rules may require disclosure of such material facts and that the lawyer cannot participate in a transaction where material information is deliberately withheld in a manner that constitutes a misrepresentation. If the client insists on withholding this information, the lawyer may need to withdraw from the representation if continuing would result in assisting in a violation of the rules. The question asks about the lawyer’s ethical obligation to the buyer’s counsel regarding the remediation. The lawyer cannot actively mislead the buyer’s counsel, and withholding the fact of the remediation, when it is material to the property’s condition, could be considered misleading. Therefore, the lawyer must advise the client of the ethical implications and potential need for disclosure.

The scenario involves an attorney, Ms. Anya Sharma, representing a client in a complex real estate transaction in Alaska. The client, Mr. Boris Volkov, has instructed Ms. Sharma to proceed with a specific contractual term that Ms. Sharma believes is detrimental to Mr. Volkov’s long-term interests, although not illegal. Ms. Sharma’s ethical obligations in this situation are governed by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly those pertaining to competence, diligence, communication, and client autonomy. Rule 1.2(a) of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. However, this rule is balanced by Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.4 (Communication). Ms. Sharma must competently advise Mr. Volkov about the potential negative consequences of his chosen course of action. This advice must be clear and comprehensive, enabling Mr. Volkov to make an informed decision. If, after receiving competent advice, Mr. Volkov insists on the detrimental course of action, Ms. Sharma must generally abide by his decision, provided it is not illegal or unethical. However, if the client’s instructions would result in the lawyer’s participation in illegal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must refuse to assist and may have to withdraw. In this specific scenario, the instruction is not illegal, but potentially against the client’s best interest. The core ethical duty is to provide thorough advice and then follow the client’s informed decisions regarding objectives. Ms. Sharma’s role is to be a skilled advisor, not to impose her own judgment on the client’s objectives. The question tests the balance between client autonomy and the lawyer’s duty to provide competent advice. The correct approach is for Ms. Sharma to fully advise Mr. Volkov of the risks and then proceed according to his informed instructions, assuming they are not illegal.