The scenario presents a situation involving a testamentary trust established under a will that has been modified by a codicil. The core issue is the validity of a specific provision within the codicil that attempts to alter the distribution scheme of the testamentary trust. In Alabama, a codicil is a supplement or addition to a will, which must be executed with the same formalities as the original will to be effective. This includes being signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses in the testator’s presence. The original will created a trust for the benefit of Beatrice, with the remainder to her children. The codicil, however, was signed by the testator but was not witnessed. Under Alabama law, specifically Alabama Code Section 35-4-252 (which governs the execution of wills and codicils), a codicil that purports to alter the dispositive provisions of a will must generally be executed with the same formalities as the original will. Since the codicil here was not witnessed, it fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid testamentary disposition. Therefore, the provision in the unwitnessed codicil that attempts to redirect the trust remainder from Beatrice’s children to a new beneficiary, Silas, is ineffective. The trust provisions as originally established in the will remain operative. The testamentary intent to change the beneficiaries is present, but the lack of proper execution prevents this intent from being legally recognized. The law requires strict adherence to execution formalities to prevent fraud and ensure the testator’s wishes are clearly established. Consequently, the trust assets will pass according to the terms of the original will.

The question concerns the validity of a will amendment made by a testator who later becomes incapacitated. In Alabama, a testator must possess testamentary capacity at the time the will or any amendment thereto is executed. Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and extent of their property, the natural objects of their bounty, and the disposition they are making of their property. The Alabama Code, specifically Title 43, Chapter 8, governs wills. Section 43-8-131 outlines the requirements for a will, which implicitly include the testator’s capacity at the time of execution. While a will remains valid if the testator later becomes incapacitated, an amendment or codicil must also meet the same capacity requirements as the original will at the time of its creation. Therefore, if the testator lacked the requisite mental capacity at the time they signed the codicil, that codicil would be invalid, and the original will’s provisions would remain in effect. The codicil’s validity is judged by the testator’s state of mind when it was signed, not at some later point. The fact that the codicil was properly witnessed and signed by the testator is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its validity; testamentary capacity is also a prerequisite. The scenario describes a testator who, after executing a valid will, later attempts to amend it via a codicil. Crucially, at the time of executing this codicil, the testator was suffering from advanced dementia and was unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of their actions. This lack of testamentary capacity at the time of the codicil’s execution renders the codicil invalid. Consequently, the original will, which was validly executed when the testator possessed the requisite capacity, remains the operative document governing the distribution of the estate. The codicil, being invalid due to the testator’s incapacity, has no legal effect on the disposition of assets.

The scenario involves a testator who, while of sound mind and memory, executes a will on January 15, 2023, with the required number of witnesses in Alabama. Subsequently, on March 10, 2023, the testator scribbles “This is no longer my will” on the back of the will and signs it, but without any witnesses. Later, on May 20, 2023, the testator executes a new will, properly witnessed, which explicitly revokes all prior wills. Under Alabama law, a will can be revoked by a subsequent written instrument that is executed with the same formalities as required for the execution of a will, or by a physical act of destruction done with the intent to revoke. The scribbling on the back of the original will, lacking testamentary intent and witness attestation, is insufficient to revoke the January 15, 2023 will under Alabama Code § 35-4-261 or § 43-8-104. However, the subsequent will executed on May 20, 2023, which expressly revokes all prior wills and is properly executed, effectively revokes the January 15, 2023 will. Therefore, the will of May 20, 2023, is the operative document.

The scenario involves a will executed in Alabama that is later altered by a codicil. A codicil is a legal document that modifies, amends, or revokes provisions in an existing will. For a codicil to be valid in Alabama, it must meet the same formalities as a will itself, as per Alabama Code § 43-8-131. This means it must be in writing, signed by the testator (or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction), and attested by at least two witnesses who sign the codicil in the presence of the testator. In this case, the codicil was signed by the testator but only witnessed by one person, Ms. Gable. This lack of a second witness means the codicil fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid codicil in Alabama. Consequently, the codicil is ineffective in altering the original will. The original will, having been properly executed with the requisite number of witnesses, remains the operative document governing the disposition of the testator’s estate. Therefore, the entire estate passes according to the terms of the original will, without any changes introduced by the invalid codicil. The question tests the understanding of the formal requirements for codicils in Alabama and the consequence of failing to meet those requirements.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Ms. Eleanor Vance, executed a will in Alabama. Subsequently, she made a handwritten addition to the will that was not witnessed. This addition purports to revoke a specific bequest made to her nephew, Barnaby, and instead leaves that portion of her estate to her niece, Clarissa. Alabama law, specifically Alabama Code Section 28-2-1, governs the revocation of wills. This statute permits revocation by a subsequent will, by a written instrument intended as a will or codicil, or by burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will with the intent to revoke. While a holographic will, which is entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is valid in Alabama without attestation by witnesses (Alabama Code Section 28-2-1(b)), a partial revocation of an attested will typically requires the same formalities as the execution of the will itself, unless it falls under the specific exceptions for physical acts of destruction or cancellation. The handwritten addition here is not a complete holographic will, but rather an attempted amendment to an existing attested will. Crucially, for an attested will, any subsequent modification or revocation that is not a physical act of destruction or cancellation must be executed with the same testamentary formalities as the original will, meaning it must be signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses. Since Ms. Vance’s handwritten addition was not witnessed, it fails to meet the requirements for revoking a portion of her attested will. Therefore, the attempted partial revocation is ineffective, and the original bequest to Barnaby remains valid. The disposition of that portion of the estate will follow the terms of the original, properly executed will.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Bartholomew, executed a will. Subsequently, he made a codicil that specifically revoked a prior provision in his will regarding the disposition of his antique clock collection. The codicil, however, did not mention or revoke the entire original will. In Alabama, a codicil serves to modify or amend an existing will. If a codicil expressly revokes a specific gift or provision within the original will, that specific gift or provision is revoked. However, unless the codicil explicitly states that the entire will is revoked, or it is so inconsistent with the original will that it effectively revokes it by implication, the remainder of the original will remains valid and in full force. Therefore, Bartholomew’s original will, except for the provision concerning the clock collection which was revoked by the codicil, remains the operative testamentary instrument. The disposition of the residue of his estate, as outlined in the original will, will be carried out according to those terms, as the codicil only targeted a specific bequest. The concept being tested is the partial revocation of a will through a codicil and the preservation of the remaining provisions of the original will. This is governed by Alabama Code § 35-4-70, which addresses the revocation of wills, and general principles of testamentary law concerning the effect of codicils.

The scenario presented involves a deceased individual, Mr. Silas Croft, who executed a will in Alabama. The will, dated August 15, 2018, names Ms. Elara Vance as the sole beneficiary and executor. Crucially, the will was entirely handwritten by Mr. Croft and signed by him, but it was not witnessed by any individuals. Alabama law, specifically Alabama Code Section 35-4-40, governs the validity of wills. For a will to be considered valid in Alabama, it must be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by at least two witnesses who sign in the presence of the testator. While Alabama recognizes holographic wills, which are entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator, they do not require witnesses. Therefore, Mr. Croft’s will, being entirely in his handwriting and signed by him, qualifies as a valid holographic will under Alabama law, even in the absence of witnesses. The question asks about the validity of this will in Alabama. Since it meets the criteria for a holographic will, it is valid.

In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a subsequent will or codicil that expressly revokes the prior will, or by a subsequent will or codicil that is wholly inconsistent with the prior will. Alternatively, a will can be revoked by a physical act of destruction done with the intent to revoke. This physical act must be done by the testator, or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. The Alabama Code specifies that the testator’s intent to revoke must be present at the time of the physical act. If a testator tears their will with the intent to revoke it, this constitutes a valid revocation by physical act. In this scenario, Mr. Abernathy’s tearing of his will, accompanied by his explicit statement of intent to revoke, satisfies the requirements for revocation by physical act under Alabama law, specifically Ala. Code § 43-8-104. The will is therefore no longer legally valid.

In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a subsequent will, by a written instrument intended to revoke the will, or by burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will with the intent to revoke. The key here is the intent to revoke. If Ms. Albright, while experiencing a moment of frustration and believing she was destroying her original will, instead accidentally destroyed a codicil that was attached to the will, and there was no concurrent intent to revoke the entire will, then the will itself would likely remain valid. The destruction of the codicil, without the intent to revoke the will, does not automatically revoke the will. The Alabama Code § 43-8-104 addresses the revocation of wills. If the will remains substantially intact and the intent to revoke the entire testamentary plan was absent, the original will would still be considered valid. The act of destroying a codicil, even if it’s the only document destroyed, does not equate to the destruction of the will itself if the testator’s intent was focused solely on the codicil or was unclear regarding the entire will. Therefore, the original will, assuming it was properly executed and not otherwise revoked, would remain in effect.

The core issue revolves around the validity of a will that was executed under duress, specifically economic duress, which is a form of undue influence. In Alabama, as in many jurisdictions, a will procured by undue influence is void. Undue influence is typically characterized by the exertion of such pressure or persuasion that it overcomes the free will of the testator, causing them to dispose of their property in a manner different from what they would have done had they been left to their own judgment. While the scenario does not explicitly state the testator’s mental state at the time of execution, the threat of financial ruin and the testator’s subsequent dependence on the beneficiary are strong indicators of susceptibility. The beneficiary’s actions in threatening to withdraw crucial financial support, which directly led to the testator’s decision to alter the will in their favor, constitutes the exertion of improper pressure. This pressure, by exploiting the testator’s vulnerable financial position and creating a situation where they felt they had no other recourse, can be considered undue influence, rendering the will invalid. The Alabama Code, particularly sections related to will contests, would be the primary legal framework for such a dispute, focusing on whether the testator’s volition was compromised. The key is to demonstrate that the beneficiary’s actions destroyed the testator’s free agency and substituted their own desires for those of the testator.

The core issue here is the effectiveness of a partial revocation of a will through a physical act, specifically by obliterating a single bequest. In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a physical act, such as burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the will, with the intent to revoke. This revocation must be done by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. Crucially, for a partial revocation by physical act, the act must clearly and unequivocally demonstrate an intent to revoke only a specific part of the will, without intending to revoke the entire instrument. The obliteration of a single bequest, if done with the intent to remove only that provision, can be effective as a partial revocation. However, if the obliteration is so extensive that it fundamentally alters the scheme of the will or suggests an intent to revoke the entire will, it may be treated as a complete revocation. In this scenario, the testator’s clear intent to remove only the bequest to the estranged nephew, evidenced by the precise obliteration of that specific clause and the continued presence of all other clauses and the residuary provision, indicates a valid partial revocation. The remaining portions of the will, which were not affected by the physical act, continue to be valid and operative. Therefore, the estate would pass according to the unaltered provisions of the will, with the omitted bequest treated as if it never existed, and the residuary clause operating to distribute the remainder of the estate.

In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a subsequent will, by a writing intended to revoke a prior will, or by burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will with the intent to revoke. The scenario describes a testator who, after executing a valid will, attempts to revoke it by writing “VOID” across the face of the document and tearing it into several pieces. This action, when performed with the specific intent to revoke, constitutes a valid revocation under Alabama law, even if the pieces are not immediately destroyed or if the testator later changes their mind and attempts to reassemble the torn document. The key elements are the physical act of destruction or alteration and the concurrent intent to revoke. The subsequent attempt to tape the will back together does not reinstate the will unless it is re-executed with the same formalities as required for the original execution of a will, or unless it is revived by a codicil that is properly executed. Therefore, the destruction, even if incomplete, coupled with the clear intent expressed by the testator’s words and actions, effectively revokes the will.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by a will. The core issue is the trustee’s duty to account for trust property and provide information to the beneficiaries. Alabama law, specifically the Alabama Uniform Trust Code (Ala. Code § 19-3B-101 et seq.), governs the administration of trusts. Section 19-3B-813 of the Alabama Uniform Trust Code outlines the trustee’s duty to respond to reasonable requests for information from a beneficiary. This duty includes providing a copy of the trust instrument, information about the trust property, and the trust’s accounts. The trustee is obligated to provide the beneficiaries with an annual report detailing the trust’s activities, income, disbursements, and assets, unless the trust instrument explicitly waives this requirement. Failure to comply with these reporting obligations can lead to a breach of fiduciary duty, potentially resulting in court intervention, removal of the trustee, or other remedies. The trust instrument itself can modify certain default provisions, but it cannot eliminate the trustee’s fundamental fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty and the duty to act in good faith. In this case, the trustee’s refusal to provide any information about the trust’s assets or financial status, despite repeated requests from the beneficiaries, constitutes a clear violation of these statutory duties. The beneficiaries are entitled to receive comprehensive information regarding the trust’s administration to ensure their interests are protected and that the trustee is acting in accordance with the trust’s terms and applicable law.

The scenario involves a will that, while seemingly valid on its face, contains a provision that attempts to create a perpetual trust for the care of a specific pet, a Siamese cat named “Cleopatra.” In Alabama, perpetuities are governed by the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP), which generally requires that an interest in property must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. While there are statutory exceptions and common law modifications, a trust that is intended to last indefinitely for the care of a pet would typically violate the RAP because the duration is not tied to a human life in being plus 21 years. Alabama Code § 35-4-261 specifically addresses the validity of trusts for the care of animals, allowing for such trusts to be valid for the lifetime of the animals named in the trust. However, the question implies a perpetual care, which would extend beyond the lifespan of any specific animal. Even if interpreted as being for the life of Cleopatra, the phrasing of “perpetual care” suggests an intent to go beyond that. The crucial element here is how the law views such provisions. Alabama law, like many jurisdictions, allows for specific statutory exceptions or interpretations for pet trusts to avoid the strict application of the RAP, often by deeming the trust to terminate upon the death of the last surviving animal named, with the remaining corpus passing to a designated remainder beneficiary. However, the question presents a situation where the trust’s purpose is “perpetual care,” which is the problematic element. Given the options, the most accurate assessment is that the provision would likely be considered void as an unlawful perpetuity, though a court might interpret it to last for the life of the cat and then pass to the residuary beneficiary. The key is the “perpetual” nature.

The scenario presented involves a potential challenge to a will based on allegations of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. In Alabama, for a will to be deemed valid, the testator must possess testamentary capacity at the time of its execution. This means the testator must understand the nature and effect of the act of making a will, the nature and extent of their property, and the natural objects of their bounty (their family members or those they would normally provide for). Furthermore, undue influence occurs when a person in a position of trust or confidence exploits that position to improperly influence the testator’s decisions, overcoming their free will and substituting the influencer’s desires. In this case, Ms. Albright’s nephew, Mr. Silas, exerted significant pressure and isolation on her in the months leading up to her death. He controlled her finances, limited her contact with other family members, and was the primary beneficiary of her revised will, receiving a substantially larger portion of her estate than previously intended. The fact that Ms. Albright’s cognitive abilities were reportedly declining, coupled with Mr. Silas’s active involvement in managing her affairs and isolating her, strongly suggests that his actions may have constituted undue influence. The timing of the will revision, immediately following a period of intense influence and isolation, further supports this contention. The question of testamentary capacity is also raised by the reports of her declining mental state. However, the most direct and actionable claim arising from the described circumstances, particularly the nephew’s active manipulation and isolation of the testator to his financial benefit, is undue influence, as it directly addresses the improper exertion of pressure that overrode the testator’s free will. While lack of capacity is a related concept, the specific actions of Mr. Silas in controlling access and finances, and the significant shift in the will’s beneficiaries, point most strongly to undue influence as the primary ground for contest.

The scenario presented involves a testator, Beatrice, who executed a will in Alabama. Subsequently, she moved to Georgia and, while domiciled there, wrote a letter to her nephew expressing her desire to revoke her Alabama will. The key legal principle here is the revocation of a will. Alabama law, like many jurisdictions, recognizes several methods of will revocation, including physical destruction with intent to revoke and the execution of a subsequent will or codicil that expressly revokes the prior will or is wholly inconsistent with it. A written declaration of intent to revoke, even if not executed with the formalities of a will, can be effective if it meets specific statutory requirements. Alabama Code Section 28-2-11 provides that a will can be revoked by “some other writing of the testator, signed by him, or by his direction, and attested by two witnesses in the same manner as a will.” However, the statute also addresses revocation by acts, stating a will may be revoked by “burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating or destroying the same with the intent to revoke.” The letter Beatrice wrote to her nephew, while expressing clear intent, was not signed by her in a manner that would satisfy the statutory requirements for a formal written revocation, nor was it attested by two witnesses. Furthermore, the act of writing a letter does not constitute a physical act of destruction. While Beatrice was domiciled in Georgia when she wrote the letter, the validity of the revocation of a will is generally governed by the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of their death, or the law of the state where the will was executed if that state’s law permits it. However, even if Georgia law were to be considered, a mere letter expressing intent without proper execution formalities would likely not be sufficient for revocation. Therefore, the Alabama will remains valid because the attempted revocation did not comply with the statutory requirements for revocation in Alabama, either through a properly executed writing or a physical act of destruction. The letter, lacking the required testamentary formalities of signing and attestation, does not serve as a valid instrument of revocation under Alabama law.

In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a subsequent instrument that expressly revokes the prior will, or by a physical act performed with the intent to revoke. The Alabama Code, specifically Section 26-5-1, outlines the requirements for a valid will, including that it must be in writing, signed by the testator or another person in the testator’s presence and by their direction, and attested by at least two witnesses who sign in the presence of the testator. When a testator creates a new will that disposes of their entire estate, it generally implies a revocation of all prior inconsistent wills, even if the new will does not contain an express revocation clause. This is based on the principle of implied revocation by inconsistency. If the second will does not dispose of the entire estate but is inconsistent with certain provisions of the first will, it revokes those specific provisions by implication. However, if the second will is entirely consistent with the first, or if it only disposes of a portion of the estate and does not conflict with the remaining provisions of the first, the first will may still be partially or wholly valid. In this scenario, the second will, by its comprehensive nature and disposition of the entire estate, supersedes the first will entirely, effectively revoking it by implication. The act of destroying the first will is also a physical act of revocation, which, when coupled with testamentary intent, would also effectuate revocation. The combination of the new, comprehensive will and the physical destruction of the old will provides clear evidence of the testator’s intent to revoke the first will.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Elara Vance, executed a will in Alabama. Subsequently, she moved to Florida and later to Georgia, dying in Georgia. Her Alabama will was properly executed according to Alabama law at the time of its execution. Alabama Code Section 26-5-11 states that a will executed in compliance with the laws of the state where it was executed, or the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of execution, or the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of death, is valid in Alabama. Since Elara’s will was validly executed in Alabama, its validity is preserved. The subsequent moves to Florida and Georgia do not invalidate the Alabama-executed will, as Alabama law recognizes the validity of wills validly executed in other jurisdictions according to their respective laws or the testator’s domicile at execution. Therefore, the Alabama will remains valid for the disposition of her property, including any property located in Alabama. The question tests the understanding of the validity of a will executed in one state when the testator later changes domicile, and how Alabama law treats such situations, specifically referencing the principle of continuity of validity for properly executed instruments.

The core issue here is the interpretation of a will containing an ambiguous residuary clause and the application of Alabama’s rules of construction, specifically regarding the presumption against intestacy. When a will’s language is unclear, particularly concerning the disposition of the residue of an estate, courts strive to ascertain the testator’s intent. Alabama law, like many jurisdictions, presumes that a testator intended to dispose of their entire estate through their will, meaning they did not intend for any portion to pass via intestate succession. This presumption is a guiding principle in interpreting ambiguous clauses. In this scenario, the phrase “all my remaining personal property” is ambiguous when the testator also owned significant real property not otherwise disposed of. The legal principle is that “personal property” in a will generally refers to movable possessions and does not typically include real estate unless the context strongly suggests otherwise or the testator uses the term in a broader, less precise manner. Given the presence of both real and personal property, and the lack of a clear residuary clause encompassing all assets, the court would likely look to the testator’s intent. However, without further evidence or clarification in the will, the presumption against intestacy would compel the court to interpret the residuary clause as broadly as possible to capture all remaining assets, including the real property, to avoid partial intestacy. This interpretation aligns with the general purpose of a residuary clause, which is to catch all property not otherwise effectively devised or bequeathed. Therefore, the real property would pass under the residuary clause.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the interpretation of a will that contains potentially conflicting provisions regarding the distribution of a specific asset. In Alabama, as in many jurisdictions, the primary goal of will interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the testator’s intent. When a will contains seemingly contradictory clauses, courts will attempt to harmonize them if possible. If harmonization is not feasible, the court may look to established rules of construction. One such rule, particularly relevant when a specific gift is made and then a residuary clause attempts to dispose of the same property, is the principle that specific bequests generally take precedence over general residuary dispositions of the same asset. This means that if a testator clearly intends to give a particular item of property to a specific beneficiary, that intent should be honored even if a later, broader clause might appear to encompass that same property. The Alabama Code, particularly provisions related to the construction of wills, guides this process. While the question doesn’t involve a calculation, it tests the understanding of how courts resolve ambiguities in testamentary documents by prioritizing the testator’s specific intent as evidenced by the language used. The testator’s initial specific devise of the antique grandfather clock to Beatrice, coupled with the subsequent residuary clause that broadly covers “all remaining personal property,” creates an ambiguity. However, the rule of construction that specific bequests are not revoked by general residuary clauses unless there is clear intent to revoke favors the specific bequest. Therefore, Beatrice would receive the clock.

The core issue in this scenario is the effect of a subsequent marriage on a previously executed will in Alabama. Alabama law, specifically Alabama Code § 34-4-7, addresses the impact of marriage on a will. This statute provides that if a testator marries after making a will, the surviving spouse is entitled to the same share of the testator’s estate that they would have received if the testator had died intestate, unless the will was made in contemplation of the marriage, or the spouse is provided for in the will, or the spouse relinquishes their right to the share in a valid antenuptial agreement. In this case, Mr. Abernathy executed his will in 2018, naming his sister, Beatrice, as the sole beneficiary. He then married Ms. Clara in 2020. There is no indication that the will was made in contemplation of this marriage, nor is Ms. Clara mentioned or provided for in the will. Furthermore, no antenuptial agreement was executed. Therefore, under Alabama law, Ms. Clara, as the surviving spouse, is entitled to her intestate share of Mr. Abernathy’s estate. Intestate succession in Alabama for a surviving spouse when there are no surviving children is that the spouse inherits the entire estate. Thus, Ms. Clara will receive the entirety of Mr. Abernathy’s estate, and Beatrice will receive nothing.

In Alabama, the validity of a will hinges on several key elements. Testamentary capacity requires the testator to be of sound mind, meaning they understand the nature and extent of their property, the natural objects of their bounty, and the disposition they are making of their property. This is a subjective standard assessed at the time the will is executed. The will must also demonstrate testamentary intent, the clear purpose of the document to dispose of property upon death. For an attested will, which is the most common type in Alabama, the testator must sign the will in the presence of two credible witnesses. These witnesses must then sign the will in the presence of the testator and each other. Crucially, Alabama law (Ala. Code § 43-8-131) does not recognize holographic wills, which are entirely written, dated, and signed in the testator’s handwriting, unless they meet the strict requirements for an attested will. Therefore, a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting but lacking the required witness attestation would be invalid in Alabama. The scenario describes a document entirely in the testator’s handwriting, signed by the testator, but with no mention of witnesses. This lack of witness attestation, coupled with Alabama’s rejection of purely holographic wills, renders the document invalid as a will.

The Alabama Uniform Trust Code, specifically Ala. Code § 19-3B-414, addresses the modification of a trust. A trust can be terminated or modified if all beneficiaries consent and the court finds that continuation of the trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose. Alternatively, a trustee can modify a trust without beneficiary consent if the trust has become uneconomic, meaning the value of the trust property is insufficient to carry out the trust’s purposes. This “uneconomic trust” provision allows for termination or modification if the trust’s value is less than $50,000 and the trustee determines that the cost of administration is not justified by the trust’s value. In this scenario, the trust’s current value is $45,000, which falls below the $50,000 threshold. Furthermore, the trust’s purpose is to provide supplemental income for the beneficiary, and the current income generated is minimal, making it difficult to achieve this material purpose effectively without incurring disproportionate administrative costs relative to the benefit provided. Therefore, the trustee is authorized to terminate the trust.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the validity of a will that was altered after execution and the potential for a codicil to effectuate those changes. In Alabama, a will can be revoked or altered by a subsequent testamentary instrument, such as a codicil, which must be executed with the same formalities as a will. Alternatively, a will can be revoked by a physical act of destruction with the intent to revoke. Here, the testator’s handwritten changes to the original will, without re-execution or the presence of witnesses as required for a formal codicil under Alabama law (Ala. Code § 43-8-131), would generally not be considered a valid revocation or amendment of the original will. However, if these handwritten additions were made with testamentary intent and signed by the testator, they could potentially be considered a holographic will or a codicil to the original will, provided they meet the specific requirements for such instruments in Alabama. Alabama recognizes holographic wills, which are written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed, without the need for attesting witnesses (Ala. Code § 43-8-131). If the handwritten additions are entirely in the testator’s handwriting and demonstrate testamentary intent, they would be treated as a holographic codicil, effectively modifying the original will. The question hinges on whether these additions, even if not executed as a formal codicil, meet the criteria for a holographic instrument that can alter the prior will. The key is the entirety of the writing being in the testator’s hand, coupled with the intent to make a testamentary disposition. The original will’s validity is not in question, only the effect of the post-execution alterations. Since the alterations are entirely in the testator’s handwriting and express a clear intent to change the disposition of property, they would likely be deemed a valid holographic codicil, thereby revoking the prior inconsistent provisions of the original will. The correct answer is the one that reflects the recognition of the handwritten additions as a valid holographic codicil, which modifies the original will.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Ms. Albright, executed a will in Alabama. Subsequently, she made handwritten changes to a specific provision in her will after its initial execution. The question revolves around the validity of these handwritten alterations under Alabama law. Alabama Code Section 28-2-15 governs the revocation and alteration of wills. Specifically, it states that a will can be revoked or altered by a subsequent will, or by an instrument executed with the same formalities as a will, or by burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will with the intent to revoke. Handwritten changes made directly to a validly executed will, without re-execution or attestation by witnesses, are generally considered valid alterations if they meet the requirements of a codicil or are viewed as a form of obliteration or cancellation intended to effect a partial revocation. However, for a handwritten change to be an effective codicil, it must be executed with the same formalities as a will, which typically includes being signed by the testator and attested by two witnesses in Alabama. If the changes are not attested, they are not valid as a codicil. The critical factor here is whether the testator intended these handwritten changes to be a partial revocation by obliteration or cancellation. If the intent was to revoke the original provision by defacing it (e.g., by crossing out words with the intent to remove them from the will), and this act of defacement is accompanied by testamentary intent, then it can be effective as a partial revocation. The Alabama Supreme Court has held that a testator can revoke part of a will by physical act such as cancellation or obliteration, provided the intent to revoke is present and the act itself is done with the purpose of revoking. The key is that the act of cancellation must be the testator’s intent to revoke, not an attempt to substitute a new provision without the proper formalities of a new testamentary instrument. In this case, Ms. Albright’s handwritten notations are described as “changes,” implying an intent to modify the existing provisions. If these changes were made by crossing out words and writing new ones, and the intent was to revoke the original language and substitute new terms, then the cancellation of the original language, if done with testamentary intent, can be a valid partial revocation. The question hinges on whether the act of writing the new provisions constitutes a republication of the will or an attempt to make an unattested amendment. Under Alabama law, a testator can revoke a portion of a will by physical act of cancellation or obliteration with the intent to revoke. The handwritten changes, if they involve crossing out existing text and writing new text with the intent to modify, can be viewed as a physical act of cancellation and substitution. The crucial element is the intent to revoke the original language. Since the question states she made “handwritten changes” to a specific provision, it implies an intent to alter the disposition. If these changes are understood as an attempt to revoke the original text through cancellation and substitute new terms, and this act is performed with testamentary intent, then the original provision is effectively revoked by cancellation. The new provisions, however, would not be valid as a codicil without proper attestation. Therefore, the original provision is revoked by cancellation, but the new provisions are not validly incorporated. This leaves the estate to be distributed according to the remaining valid provisions of the will or by intestacy if the revoked provision was essential. However, the question asks about the validity of the *changes* themselves as a means of altering the will. The act of physically altering the text with intent to change the disposition can effect a partial revocation by cancellation. Thus, the original provision is revoked.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Bartholomew, executed a will in Alabama. Subsequently, he made handwritten changes to a specific bequest within that will. Alabama law, specifically Alabama Code Section 43-8-131, addresses the formal requirements for revoking or altering a will. This statute generally requires that any revocation or alteration must be executed with the same formalities as the original will, meaning it needs to be signed by the testator and witnessed by two individuals. However, the statute also permits a testator to revoke a will or any part thereof by an act of destruction done with the intent to revoke. The question hinges on whether Bartholomew’s handwritten additions and interlineations constitute a valid revocation or alteration under Alabama law. Since these changes were not witnessed, they do not meet the requirements for a formal codicil or amendment. Furthermore, the act of writing new terms or modifying existing ones, without accompanying physical destruction of the original text or clear intent to obliterate, is generally not considered a valid “act of destruction” for the purpose of revocation under Alabama law. The intent appears to be to modify the existing bequest, not to destroy the will itself. Therefore, the handwritten alterations are ineffective to change the original terms of the will. The disposition of the antique clock will follow the terms as originally written in the properly executed will.

The question tests the understanding of the effect of a divorce on a previously executed will under Alabama law, specifically concerning the revocation of provisions in favor of an ex-spouse. Alabama Code Section 28-5-1 specifically addresses this issue. This statute provides that if a testator is divorced after making a will, all provisions in the will in favor of the testator’s former spouse are revoked. This revocation applies unless the will expressly provides otherwise, or the former spouse is specifically named to receive an interest despite the divorce. The statute aims to prevent a testator from inadvertently benefiting an ex-spouse after the marital relationship has ended. Therefore, in the scenario presented, the divorce of Eleanor and Bartholomew revokes any provisions in Eleanor’s will that would have benefited Bartholomew, unless the will contained language to the contrary, which is not indicated. The will’s validity as a whole remains, but the specific bequests to Bartholomew are voided by operation of law due to the subsequent divorce.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Bartholomew, executes a will that is later modified by a codicil. The codicil explicitly revokes a specific bequest made in the original will and substitutes a new beneficiary for that particular asset. The original will also contained a residuary clause that directed the remainder of Bartholomew’s estate to be divided equally between his niece, Clara, and his nephew, David. When a specific bequest is revoked by a codicil, the property that was the subject of that bequest typically falls into the residuary estate. Alabama law, like many jurisdictions, follows the principle that a revocation of a specific gift, without a disposition of the subject matter, causes that property to pass under the residuary clause. Therefore, the property previously designated for Elias will now be distributed according to the residuary clause. The residuary estate is to be divided equally between Clara and David. Since the revoked bequest constitutes a portion of what would have been the residuary estate, Clara and David will each receive half of that portion, in addition to their original shares of the remainder of the estate. The question asks about the distribution of the specific asset that was revoked. This asset, no longer specifically bequeathed, becomes part of the residue. The residue is divided equally between Clara and David. Thus, Clara receives half of the revoked asset, and David receives the other half of the revoked asset.

The scenario describes a situation where a testator, Beatrice, executed a valid will in Alabama. Subsequently, she moved to Georgia and, while experiencing a period of mental decline due to illness, wrote a letter to her sister, Clara, stating, “I want to change my will. You should get the lake house instead of the art collection. I’m too weak to go to a lawyer now, but this is my final wish.” Beatrice died shortly thereafter. Under Alabama law, a will can be revoked by a subsequent writing executed with the same formalities as a will, or by physical act (e.g., burning, tearing, canceling) with the intent to revoke. A holographic will, which is written entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is valid in Alabama if properly executed, but this letter does not meet the requirements of an attested will, as it lacks witnesses. Furthermore, while Alabama recognizes oral wills (nuncupative wills) in limited circumstances, they are generally restricted to personal property and require specific formalities, including witnesses, and are not applicable to real property like a lake house. The letter, even if considered an attempt to create a new testamentary disposition, fails as an attested will due to the absence of witnesses and does not qualify as a valid holographic will because it was not executed with the intent to be a will in and of itself, but rather a modification of an existing one, and it attempts to dispose of real property. The critical element here is that Beatrice’s letter, while expressing testamentary intent, does not meet the statutory requirements for revocation or alteration of a will in Alabama, particularly concerning real property and the lack of proper execution. Therefore, the original will remains in effect. The question tests the understanding of revocation methods and the validity of different will types under Alabama law, specifically highlighting that informal writings, even with clear intent, are insufficient to alter or revoke a will disposing of real property without adhering to the statutory formalities for attested wills.

The scenario involves the revocation of a will by a subsequent instrument. In Alabama, a will can be revoked by a subsequent will or codicil that expressly revokes the prior will, or by a subsequent will or codicil that is wholly inconsistent with the prior will. If the subsequent instrument is only partially inconsistent, the prior will remains in effect to the extent it is not revoked by the inconsistent provisions. Here, the 2020 codicil expressly revokes “any and all former wills and codicils.” This clear and unambiguous language of revocation in the codicil, which is a testamentary instrument executed with the same formalities as a will, effectively revokes the entire 2018 will. The fact that the codicil does not provide alternative dispositions of the testator’s property does not invalidate the revocation itself. The property will then pass according to the laws of intestacy if no other valid will exists. The core legal principle tested is the effect of an express revocation clause in a subsequent testamentary instrument on a prior will under Alabama law. This principle is found in Alabama Code Section 35-4-43, which addresses the revocation of wills. The codicil, being a later valid testamentary document, supersedes the earlier will due to the explicit revocation clause.