In New Hampshire, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” is governed by RSA 551:13. This statute addresses situations where a testator fails to provide for a child born or adopted after the execution of the will. The statute presumes that such an omission was unintentional unless the will expressly states a contrary intention or provides for the child outside the will in a way that clearly demonstrates this intent. If the omission is deemed unintentional, the pretermitted child receives a share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, meaning they inherit as if there were no will. This share is typically taken from the portions of the estate that would have passed to the beneficiaries under the will, not from any specific bequests that might be adeemed or abated. The purpose is to prevent accidental disinheritance of a child who was not contemplated by the testator at the time the will was drafted. The statute’s application hinges on whether the omission was intentional, which is a question of fact to be determined by the court, often based on the language of the will and any surrounding circumstances. The distribution to the pretermitted heir is calculated as if the testator died intestate, meaning they receive the share they would have been entitled to under New Hampshire’s intestacy laws. For example, if a testator has one child and dies intestate, that child would inherit the entire estate. If the testator had a will that omitted this after-born child, and the omission was unintentional, the child would receive the entire estate, potentially abating other gifts under the will proportionally.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Probate Code, adopted with modifications, governs the administration of estates. Specifically, RSA 551:3 outlines the requirements for a valid will, which include being in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by at least two credible witnesses in the testator’s presence. The concept of “testamentary capacity” is crucial, meaning the testator must understand the nature and extent of their property, the natural objects of their bounty, and the disposition they are making. The scenario describes a will signed by Elara, witnessed by two individuals who were present when she signed and who then signed in her presence. This meets the statutory requirements for due execution in New Hampshire. The question probes the validity of the will based on these execution formalities. A will that fails to meet these requirements is generally considered invalid. Therefore, if the witnesses did not sign in Elara’s presence, the will would likely be deemed invalid. The explanation focuses on the statutory requirements for will execution in New Hampshire, emphasizing the importance of the witnesses signing in the testator’s presence as a key element of due execution. This ensures the testator is aware of the attestation and that the witnesses are observing the signing process, thereby reducing the risk of fraud or undue influence.

In New Hampshire, the doctrine of equitable conversion treats real property as personal property for the purposes of a will when there is a binding contract for its sale before the testator’s death. This doctrine is rooted in the principle that equity regards that as done which ought to be done. Therefore, if a testator enters into a valid contract to sell real estate, and the testator dies before the closing, the testator’s interest in the real property is deemed to have been converted into personal property (the right to receive the purchase price). Consequently, the devise of the real property in the will fails, and the proceeds from the sale will pass as personalty, typically to the residuary estate or as personal property to the heirs at law if there is no residuary clause. This is distinct from a situation where the contract is contingent or not binding, in which case equitable conversion might not apply, and the real property would pass according to the will’s disposition of real estate. The testator’s intent, as expressed in the will and the contract, is paramount.

The scenario presented involves a testamentary trust established under a New Hampshire will. The question hinges on the interpretation of a specific provision within that trust concerning the distribution of income. The testator, Elara Vance, directed that the net income of her trust be paid to her nephew, Finnian, during his lifetime. Upon Finnian’s death, the trust corpus is to be distributed to Finnian’s children, per stirpes. Finnian has two children, Anya and Rhys. Anya has three children, and Rhys has one child. The term “per stirpes” means “by the roots” or “by representation.” This method of distribution dictates that if a beneficiary dies before the testator or before the trust terminates, that beneficiary’s share passes to their descendants. In this case, upon Finnian’s death, the trust corpus will be divided into as many equal shares as there are children of Finnian who are living or who have predeceased Finnian but left surviving issue. Since Finnian has two children, Anya and Rhys, the corpus will be divided into two equal primary shares. Anya’s share will go to her children, and Rhys’s share will go to his child. Therefore, Anya and Rhys will each receive one-half of the trust corpus.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Trust Code, adopted with modifications, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, RSA 564-B:8-802 addresses the trustee’s duty to provide information to beneficiaries. This statute outlines the types of information a trustee must provide, the frequency of such disclosures, and the conditions under which a beneficiary may request additional information. The core principle is that beneficiaries are entitled to sufficient information to enforce their rights under the trust. This includes a copy of the trust instrument, a statement of accounts, and any information necessary to protect their interest. However, the trustee’s duty to provide information is not absolute and can be limited by the trust instrument itself, provided such limitations do not violate public policy or fundamental trust principles. The statute also distinguishes between mandatory reporting and information available upon reasonable request. The question hinges on the trustee’s obligation to provide a copy of the trust instrument to a beneficiary upon their initial request, even if the beneficiary has not yet demonstrated a specific need or concern. Under RSA 564-B:8-802, a trustee must provide a beneficiary with a copy of the trust instrument, along with a statement of accounts, within 60 days after the trustee’s acceptance of the trust, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise. This duty arises from the fundamental right of a beneficiary to understand the terms governing their beneficial interest. Therefore, the trustee’s assertion that the beneficiary must first demonstrate a need before receiving a copy of the trust instrument is contrary to the statutory mandate in New Hampshire.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), codified in RSA Chapter 545-A, governs situations where a transfer of property is made with the intent to defraud creditors or without receiving reasonably equivalent value. A transfer is considered voidable if it was made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. Factors considered in determining actual intent include whether the transfer was to an insider, whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer, whether the transfer was disclosed or concealed, and whether the value received was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. If a creditor proves a transfer is voidable under the UVTA, remedies can include avoidance of the transfer or an attachment of the asset transferred. The statute of limitations for avoiding a transfer based on actual fraud is generally within four years after the transfer was made or the action could reasonably have been discovered. In this scenario, Mr. Abernathy’s transfer of his valuable antique clock to his nephew, Mr. Finch, shortly before his known financial insolvency and without receiving any consideration, strongly suggests an intent to place the asset beyond the reach of his existing creditors, particularly the bank to whom he owes a substantial debt. This aligns with the criteria for a fraudulent transfer under New Hampshire law.

In New Hampshire, a will is generally considered revoked if the testator intentionally burns, tears, cancels, obliterates, or destroys it with the intent to revoke. RSA 551:3 outlines the methods of revocation. This statute requires a physical act upon the will itself, coupled with the specific intent to revoke. Merely writing “VOID” on a separate piece of paper that is not attached to the will, or expressing an intent to revoke without performing a statutory act of revocation, is insufficient to revoke a will in New Hampshire. The physical act must be done by the testator or by someone in the testator’s presence and by their direction. The act of burning or tearing must be substantial enough to affect the entire will or a material part of it. The explanation of the law regarding revocation of wills in New Hampshire is crucial for understanding the validity of testamentary instruments. The statute emphasizes the need for both a physical act and the accompanying intent to revoke. Without both components, a prior will generally remains in effect.

In New Hampshire, when a will is contested and a caveat is filed, the probate court process is initiated to determine the validity of the will. If the caveat is filed before the will is admitted to probate, the court will hold a hearing to resolve the dispute. The burden of proof generally rests with the proponent of the will, who must demonstrate that the will was properly executed according to New Hampshire law, which typically requires it to be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by at least two credible witnesses in the testator’s presence. If the caveat alleges undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity, the proponent must present evidence to rebut these claims. The court will consider evidence presented by both parties, including witness testimony and documentary evidence. If the court finds the will invalid, it will be set aside, and the estate will pass according to the laws of intestacy or a prior valid will. The specific outcome depends on the strength of the evidence presented by each side concerning the testator’s intent, the circumstances of the will’s execution, and the testator’s mental state at the time.

The Uniform Trust Code, adopted in New Hampshire with modifications, governs the administration of trusts. When a trustee resigns, New Hampshire law, specifically RSA 564-B:7-701, outlines the process for filling the vacancy. A trustee may resign by giving notice to the settlor, if living, all co-trustees, and the beneficiaries who are currently entitled to receive distributions. If there is no settlor living, or if the settlor is incapacitated, notice is given to all qualified beneficiaries. In the absence of a designated successor trustee, or if the designated successor is unable or unwilling to serve, the current trustee can petition the court for appointment of a successor. However, the trust instrument itself often provides a mechanism for appointing a successor trustee. If the trust instrument grants a power to appoint a successor trustee to a specific person or class of persons, that power must be exercised according to its terms. If no successor is named and no power to appoint is granted, or if the designated appointer is unable or unwilling to act, then the qualified beneficiaries can petition the court to appoint a successor. The court has broad discretion in appointing a successor trustee, prioritizing the best interests of the beneficiaries and the purposes of the trust. In this scenario, since the trust instrument specifically grants the power to appoint a successor trustee to Elara, and Elara is alive and capable of acting, her appointment of Silas is valid, and no further court action is required for Silas to assume the role, provided Silas is willing to accept the appointment.

The scenario involves the distribution of an estate in New Hampshire where a beneficiary, Elara, predeceases the testator, Mr. Abernathy. Elara was a named beneficiary in Mr. Abernathy’s will. The will does not contain a residuary clause, nor does it specify an alternative beneficiary for Elara’s share. New Hampshire law, specifically RSA 551:12, addresses the lapse of devises. This statute provides that if a devisee dies before the testator, and the devisee is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator, the devise shall not lapse but shall pass to the issue of the devisee who survive the testator. In this case, Elara is Mr. Abernathy’s granddaughter, making her a lineal descendant of his grandparent. Therefore, Elara’s share of the estate will not lapse. Instead, it will pass to her surviving issue, which in this case is her son, Finn. The estate assets will be distributed such that Finn receives the portion of the estate that would have gone to Elara.

In New Hampshire, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” is addressed by RSA 551:13. This statute presumes that a testator intends to provide for any child born or adopted after the execution of a will, or a child born posthumously, unless the will expressly states otherwise or provides for the child in some other way. When a will fails to provide for such a child, and there is no indication of intentional omission, the pretermitted heir is entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate. This share is typically equivalent to what the child would have received if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will. The distribution is made from the residue of the estate, meaning after specific bequests and devises have been satisfied. If the residue is insufficient, the property is taken proportionally from all beneficiaries named in the will. The key is the testator’s intent; if the will clearly demonstrates an intent to disinherit the after-born child, the statute will not apply to grant them a share. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance due to a testator’s oversight or failure to update their will after the birth or adoption of a child.

The scenario involves the distribution of a residuary estate in New Hampshire where the decedent died intestate. New Hampshire’s intestacy laws, specifically RSA 561:1, govern the distribution of property when there is no valid will. In this case, the decedent, Elara Vance, is survived by her spouse, Liam, and two children, Finn and Maya. Under New Hampshire law, when a decedent is survived by a spouse and two or more children, the spouse inherits one-third of the real estate and all of the personal estate, and the children share the remaining two-thirds of the real estate equally. The total value of Elara’s estate is $600,000. The spouse, Liam, inherits one-third of the real estate. The real estate is valued at $300,000. Liam’s share of the real estate = \( \frac{1}{3} \times \$300,000 = \$100,000 \). The spouse also inherits all of the personal estate. The personal estate is valued at $300,000. Liam’s share of the personal estate = $300,000. Therefore, Liam’s total inheritance = Liam’s share of real estate + Liam’s share of personal estate Liam’s total inheritance = $100,000 + $300,000 = $400,000. The remaining two-thirds of the real estate is to be shared equally by the children, Finn and Maya. The remaining real estate to be shared by children = \( \frac{2}{3} \times \$300,000 = \$200,000 \). Each child’s share of the remaining real estate = \( \frac{\$200,000}{2 \text{ children}} = \$100,000 \). So, Finn inherits $100,000 and Maya inherits $100,000. The question asks for the total amount Liam would inherit. Based on the calculations, Liam inherits $400,000. This distribution reflects New Hampshire’s statutory scheme for intestate succession, which prioritizes the surviving spouse and then divides the remainder among the children. The distinction between real and personal property in the spouse’s share is a key feature of this statute. The remaining portion of the real property is then divided per stirpes or per capita among the descendants, depending on the specific statutory language, which in this case, with surviving children, is an equal division among them.

In New Hampshire, a trust that is not registered with the probate court and for which no trustee has been appointed or qualified in accordance with New Hampshire law is generally considered an unregistered trust. The Uniform Trust Code, as adopted in New Hampshire (RSA Chapter 564-B), governs the administration of trusts. RSA 564-B:1-108 addresses the jurisdiction of the court over the trust and its trustees. If a trust is not registered, and no trustee has qualified in New Hampshire, the court may not have the necessary jurisdiction to compel the trustee to perform specific duties or to resolve disputes concerning the trust’s administration within the state. This lack of registration can create significant procedural hurdles for beneficiaries or other interested parties seeking to enforce trust terms or challenge trustee actions in New Hampshire courts. The Uniform Trust Code prioritizes a system where trusts are either registered or subject to court oversight through other means, ensuring accountability. The failure to register, when required or when seeking the court’s affirmative intervention, can lead to the trust being deemed outside the direct supervisory purview of the New Hampshire probate court for certain actions.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration and interpretation of trusts. Specifically, RSA 564-B:4-416 addresses the effect of a beneficiary’s death on a trust. This statute generally provides that if a beneficiary’s interest is conditioned on surviving the settlor or another beneficiary, the interest fails if the beneficiary does not survive. However, the statute also outlines exceptions and alternative distributions. If a trust instrument does not specify an alternative disposition of a beneficiary’s interest upon their death, and the beneficiary’s interest is not a present interest in income or principal, then the beneficiary’s interest passes to the beneficiary’s estate. This is a default rule that applies in the absence of express provisions to the contrary within the trust document itself. Therefore, when a trust instrument is silent on the disposition of a beneficiary’s interest upon their death, and that interest is not a present right to income or principal that would lapse or be distributed, the interest typically becomes part of the deceased beneficiary’s probate estate.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established under a New Hampshire will. The trust instrument specifies that the income is to be paid to the testator’s daughter, Elara, during her lifetime, and upon her death, the principal is to be distributed to her children who survive her. This is a classic example of a life estate with a remainder interest. The key legal concept here is the nature of the remainder interest. In New Hampshire, as in most common law jurisdictions, a remainder interest can be vested or contingent. A vested remainder is one where the identity of the taker is certain and the right to the estate is not subject to any condition precedent. A contingent remainder, conversely, is subject to a condition precedent or the uncertainty of the taker’s identity. In this case, the beneficiaries are Elara’s children who survive her. Since the identity of the takers (Elara’s children) is not yet certain at the time the trust is created (as Elara could have more children, or existing children could predecease her), and the right to receive the principal is contingent upon surviving Elara, the remainder interest is contingent. Specifically, it is a contingent remainder subject to a condition of survivorship. The New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) Chapter 552, concerning the distribution of property, and RSA Chapter 564-B, the Uniform Trust Code, govern the interpretation and administration of such trusts. The Uniform Trust Code, adopted in New Hampshire, provides rules for determining whether a remainder is vested or contingent, and how contingent interests are handled. The question asks about the nature of the interest held by Elara’s unborn children. Since Elara is alive and capable of having more children, any children born to her after the trust is established would also have a contingent remainder interest, conditioned on surviving Elara. This type of interest is known as a contingent remainder subject to open, as the class of beneficiaries can expand. Therefore, the interest held by Elara’s unborn children is a contingent remainder.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Probate Code, adopted with modifications, governs the administration of estates. RSA 554:19 addresses the priority of payment of debts and charges against an estate. The statute establishes a specific order, ensuring that certain claims are satisfied before others. The general hierarchy mandates that expenses of administration, including funeral expenses and the cost of maintaining the family, are paid first. Following these are claims for medical expenses incurred during the last illness of the decedent. Next in line are taxes, then secured debts, followed by unsecured debts. The final category for distribution consists of legacies and devises. In this scenario, the outstanding medical bills for the decedent’s final illness, along with the ongoing costs of maintaining the family during the administration period, fall within the higher priority categories. The unsecured personal loan, while a valid debt, is subordinate to these expenses. Therefore, the medical bills and family maintenance costs would be prioritized over the personal loan under New Hampshire law.

In New Hampshire, when a testator executes a will, the validity of that will is governed by specific statutory requirements to ensure authenticity and prevent fraud. RSA 551:2 outlines the essential elements for a valid will. These include the will being in writing, signed by the testator, or by some other person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s express direction. Crucially, the will must be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by at least two credible witnesses. The witnesses must understand that the instrument they are signing is intended to be the testator’s will. In this scenario, the witness, Ms. Gable, signed the document in the testator’s kitchen, but the testator, Mr. Finch, was in the adjacent living room and could not see Ms. Gable sign through the doorway. New Hampshire law generally requires that witnesses attest to the will in the testator’s presence. While “presence” can sometimes be interpreted broadly, the prevailing view, particularly in cases involving a direct line of sight, requires the testator to be able to see the act of signing. If the testator cannot see the witnesses sign, even if they are in the same building or room, the will may be deemed invalid due to lack of proper attestation in the testator’s presence. Therefore, because Mr. Finch could not see Ms. Gable sign the will from his position in the living room, the attestation requirement under RSA 551:2 is not met. This failure to adhere to the statutory requirements for witnessing renders the will invalid in New Hampshire. The court would likely deem the will to be improperly executed, leading to an intestacy distribution of Mr. Finch’s estate according to New Hampshire’s laws of intestate succession.

The scenario presented involves a testamentary trust established in New Hampshire. The trust instrument specifies that income is to be paid to the settlor’s daughter, Elara, during her lifetime, and upon her death, the principal is to be distributed to her children. Elara has two children, Finn and Clara. However, Finn predeceases Elara, leaving behind a surviving child, Leo. Clara survives Elara. New Hampshire law, particularly RSA 551:12, addresses the lapse of devises and legacies, including provisions for the issue of a deceased beneficiary. This statute is analogous to anti-lapse statutes found in other jurisdictions. Under RSA 551:12, if a devisee or legatee dies before the testator, and the devisee or legatee leaves lineal descendants who survive the testator, the lineal descendants take the property as if the devisee or legatee had survived the testator. In this trust context, the remainder interest is a future interest. When Elara dies, Finn is already deceased. The trust instrument does not contain a specific provision addressing what happens if a remainder beneficiary predeceases the income beneficiary. In the absence of such a provision, the common law rule against perpetuities and the principles of intestacy or the trust’s terms would typically govern. However, the key is how RSA 551:12 applies to a trust remainder interest. While RSA 551:12 primarily deals with direct bequests in wills, its underlying principle of preventing a gift from lapsing when a beneficiary leaves issue is often extended by courts or by the trust’s own terms to similar situations in trusts. Assuming the trust is intended to distribute the principal to the issue of Elara’s children, and given that Finn has lineal descendants (Leo), the anti-lapse principle suggests that Leo should take Finn’s share. Clara, having survived Elara, will receive her share outright. Therefore, the principal would be divided equally between Clara and Leo, with Leo taking the share Finn would have received. This results in Clara receiving one-half of the principal and Leo receiving the other half.

The scenario involves a devisee who predeceases the testator, creating an issue of lapse. In New Hampshire, the primary statute addressing lapse is RSA 551:12, which provides an anti-lapse statute. This statute generally prevents a gift to a relative who predeceases the testator from lapsing if the relative leaves lineal descendants who survive the testator. These descendants take the share that the deceased relative would have taken. In this case, the devisee is the testator’s niece, who is a relative. The niece has a surviving son, who is a lineal descendant. Therefore, the devise to the niece does not lapse; instead, her son will inherit the property. The question tests the application of New Hampshire’s anti-lapse statute to a specific familial relationship and the survival of a lineal descendant. The key is recognizing that the niece’s son, as a lineal descendant, steps into her shoes to receive the devise. The absence of a residuary clause in the will is relevant in that if the devise had lapsed, it would have passed via intestacy or to the residuary estate if one existed. However, because the anti-lapse statute applies, the devise passes to the lineal descendant.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by a New Hampshire resident, Elara Vance, for the benefit of her grandson, Finn. The trust instrument dictates that Finn receives income annually and can request principal distributions for specific purposes, including “educational pursuits” and “medical emergencies.” Finn, now 25, has requested a principal distribution to fund a year-long backpacking trip through Southeast Asia, which he describes as a “cultural immersion and personal growth experience.” The trust’s trustee, Silas, must determine if this request qualifies under the terms of the trust, specifically the “educational pursuits” clause, as interpreted under New Hampshire law. New Hampshire law, like many jurisdictions, interprets trust provisions based on the grantor’s intent. When a term like “educational pursuits” is used, courts will often look at the context and common understanding at the time the trust was created, as well as the overall purpose of the trust. A backpacking trip, while potentially enriching, is not typically considered a direct educational pursuit in the same vein as formal schooling, vocational training, or academic research. The language “educational pursuits” generally implies a structured learning environment or a direct pursuit of knowledge through formal or semi-formal means. While personal growth and cultural immersion are valuable, they are distinct from the more direct connotation of education. Therefore, a request for funds to support a recreational travel experience, even if framed as self-improvement, would likely not satisfy the “educational pursuits” requirement as narrowly defined in a trust instrument, unless the trust specifically allowed for broader interpretations or had a history of liberal distribution for such purposes. The trustee’s duty is to administer the trust according to its terms, and a distribution for this purpose would likely be considered outside the scope of the specified purpose.

The scenario involves a deceased individual, Elara Vance, who resided in New Hampshire. She left behind a will that was executed in accordance with New Hampshire law. The will designates her nephew, Finnigan, as the sole beneficiary of her residuary estate. However, Finnigan predeceased Elara. The crucial question is how the residuary estate will be distributed. New Hampshire law, specifically RSA 551:12, addresses the lapse of devises and legacies when a beneficiary predeceases the testator. This statute states that if a devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving a lineal descendant who survives the testator, the devise or legacy shall pass to the descendant. In this case, Finnigan predeceased Elara, and the will does not contain a residuary clause that specifies an alternative disposition. Crucially, the question does not state whether Finnigan left any lineal descendants. Without information about lineal descendants, the default rule for the disposition of a lapsed residuary devise under New Hampshire law is that the residuary estate will be distributed as intestate property. This means it will pass to the decedent’s heirs at law as if no will had been made. The heirs at law are determined by RSA 561:1, which outlines the order of inheritance. Typically, this would be surviving spouse, children, parents, siblings, and so on. Since Finnigan was the sole beneficiary of the residuary estate and he predeceased Elara without leaving lineal descendants to take under RSA 551:12, the residuary estate will be divided among Elara’s heirs at law.

In New Hampshire, a will is generally considered revoked if it is physically destroyed with the intent to revoke. This destruction can be an act like burning, tearing, or obliterating the will. The key elements are the physical act of destruction and the concurrent intent to revoke the entire will. Partial revocation by physical act is generally not permitted for a will in New Hampshire; the act must go to the entire document. If a testator tears a will in half with the intent to revoke it, and then later changes their mind and attempts to tape it back together, the revocation is generally considered effective because the intent to revoke was present at the time of the physical act. The subsequent act of taping it back together, without re-executing the will with the proper formalities (witnesses and signature), does not revive the revoked will. New Hampshire follows the principle that a revoked will cannot be revived by mere physical acts; revival requires a new testamentary disposition executed with the formalities of a will, or a codicil that republishes the original will. Therefore, the will remains revoked despite the testator’s change of heart and attempt to repair the document.

In New Hampshire, a will contest based on undue influence requires the contestant to prove that the testator’s free will was overcome by the influence of another. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has established a framework for analyzing undue influence claims, often considering factors such as the susceptibility of the testator, the opportunity of the alleged influencer to exert influence, the disposition of the alleged influencer to exert influence, and the result which appears to be the effect of the alleged influence. A presumption of undue influence may arise if a confidential relationship existed between the testator and the beneficiary, coupled with suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. However, overcoming such a presumption requires evidence demonstrating the testator acted freely and voluntarily. In this scenario, the fact that the beneficiary, who was also the testator’s primary caregiver, prepared the will and was the sole beneficiary, coupled with the testator’s advanced age and declining health, raises significant suspicion. The absence of independent legal advice for the testator and the substantial increase in the beneficiary’s inheritance compared to prior testamentary plans are critical factors. To rebut the potential presumption, the proponent of the will would need to present clear and convincing evidence that the testator was not unduly influenced and that the will reflects her true intentions. Merely showing the testator was of sound mind at the moment of signing is insufficient if the signing was the product of coerced volition. The beneficiary’s actions, including isolating the testator from other family members and controlling communication, further bolster the claim of undue influence. Therefore, the will would likely be deemed invalid.

In New Hampshire, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child or descendant of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will and is not provided for in the will, nor is their omission intentional. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 551:12 outlines the rights of such heirs. If a testator has a child born or adopted after the will is made, and that child is not provided for in the will and their omission was not intentional, the law presumes the testator would have provided for them had they known of the child’s existence or the change in circumstances. Consequently, the pretermitted heir is entitled to a share of the estate. This share is typically calculated as if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will, but it is satisfied from the portions of the estate that would have gone to the beneficiaries under the will. The statute specifies that the estate should be distributed as if the testator had left no other children, and the share of the pretermitted heir is taken proportionally from the interests of the beneficiaries named in the will. This proportional distribution ensures that the original beneficiaries still receive a portion of the estate, but their inheritance is reduced to accommodate the pretermitted heir’s statutory entitlement. The intention of the statute is to prevent accidental disinheritance due to circumstances arising after the will’s creation.

In New Hampshire, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration of trusts. A key aspect of trust administration involves the trustee’s duty to inform and report to beneficiaries. RSA 564-B:8-813 outlines the trustee’s duty to provide beneficiaries with information about the trust. Specifically, within 60 days after accepting trusteeship, the trustee must provide a notice to all qualified beneficiaries. This notice must include the trustee’s name and address, the court where the trust is registered (if applicable), and the trustee’s powers and the beneficiaries’ rights to request information. Furthermore, RSA 564-B:8-813(c) mandates that upon reasonable request, a trustee must provide a beneficiary with a copy of the trust instrument, a statement of accounts, and any other information the trustee reasonably deems appropriate. The question concerns the timing of a beneficiary’s right to receive a statement of accounts. While the initial notice is due within 60 days of accepting trusteeship, the right to request a statement of accounts arises once the trust is established and the trustee has accepted the role. There is no statutory waiting period after the initial notice before a beneficiary can request a statement of accounts, provided the trustee has begun administering the trust. The obligation to provide the statement is triggered by the beneficiary’s reasonable request. Therefore, a beneficiary can request a statement of accounts at any time after the trust is operational and the trustee has accepted the position, even if the trustee has not yet provided the initial statutory notice. The trustee’s obligation to provide the statement of accounts is triggered by the beneficiary’s request, not by the completion of the initial notice period.

The scenario presented involves the concept of abatement in New Hampshire, which dictates the order in which legacies are reduced when the assets of an estate are insufficient to satisfy all bequests. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 561:5 provides the statutory framework for abatement. According to RSA 561:5, the general rule is that specific bequests abate last, meaning they are protected from reduction until all other types of bequests have been exhausted. Among the different types of general bequests, those that are not for a sum of money or a specific article of personal property are abated before pecuniary legacies. Pecuniary legacies, which are gifts of a specific sum of money, abate before specific bequests. Property passing by intestacy also abates, but the statute prioritizes the abatement of residuary legacies first, then general legacies, and finally specific legacies. In this case, the residuary estate is entirely depleted. Next, the pecuniary legacy of \$50,000 to Amelia is considered. Since the remaining assets are insufficient to cover this, it abates. The statute mandates that pecuniary legacies abate before specific bequests. Therefore, Amelia’s \$50,000 legacy will be reduced. The specific bequest of the antique grandfather clock to Bartholomew will abate only if the remaining assets after abating the pecuniary legacy are still insufficient. Since the remaining estate after the residuary is exhausted is \$30,000, and Amelia’s legacy is \$50,000, the entire \$30,000 will be applied to Amelia’s legacy, leaving her with \$30,000 and Bartholomew with his full bequest. The question asks how much Bartholomew receives. As the pecuniary legacy abates before the specific legacy, and there are only \$30,000 available after the residuary is gone, this \$30,000 goes towards Amelia’s \$50,000 legacy. Bartholomew’s specific bequest of the clock is not abated because the available funds are applied to the pecuniary legacy first, and there are no remaining funds to affect the specific bequest. Therefore, Bartholomew receives the full value of the grandfather clock, which is stated as \$40,000.

In New Hampshire, the doctrine of exoneration dictates whether a beneficiary who receives encumbered property in a will is entitled to have the debt secured by that property paid off from the residue of the testator’s estate. Generally, unless the will expressly or by implication indicates a contrary intention, specific devises of encumbered property are not exonerated from the encumbrance. This means the beneficiary takes the property subject to the mortgage or lien. The testator’s intent is paramount. If the will demonstrates an intent for the debt to be paid from the estate, such as through a general direction to pay all debts and encumbrances, or by specifically mentioning the encumbrance and directing its discharge, then exoneration will occur. The New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) § 554:19 addresses the payment of debts and expenses, but the common law doctrine of exoneration, as interpreted by New Hampshire courts, governs the specific question of whether estate assets must be used to clear liens on specific bequests. Without a clear expression of intent to exonerate, the beneficiary bears the burden of the encumbrance.

In New Hampshire, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of the testator’s will and is not provided for in the will, nor are they mentioned as an intention to disinherit. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) Chapter 551, specifically RSA 551:11, addresses the rights of such pretermitted heirs. If a testator has a child born or adopted after the execution of their will and that child is not provided for in the will, and there is no provision in the will showing an intent to disinherit, the law presumes that the omission was unintentional. In such a case, the pretermitted child is entitled to receive a share of the testator’s estate. This share is typically calculated as if the testator had died intestate, meaning without a will, but is limited to the portion of the estate that was not devised to the surviving spouse or to lineal descendants of the testator who were alive when the testator executed the will. The statute aims to prevent accidental disinheritance of after-born or adopted children. The calculation for the share involves determining the total value of the estate, then subtracting any specific devises to the spouse or prior lineal descendants that would not be abated. The remaining estate is then divided as if the testator died intestate, with the pretermitted heir receiving their statutory intestate share from that portion. For instance, if the testator had two children at the time of the will and one child was born after the will’s execution, and the will left the entire estate to the spouse, the pretermitted child would receive a share from the portion of the estate that is not needed to satisfy the spouse’s elective share or other prior claims, effectively receiving what they would have inherited had the testator died intestate with that after-born child in existence, from the disposable portion of the estate. The specific amount depends on the size of the estate and the shares of other heirs.

In New Hampshire, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child or other descendant of the testator who is born or adopted after the execution of a will, and who is neither provided for nor mentioned in the will. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 551:12 addresses the rights of such pretermitted heirs. This statute provides that if a testator fails to provide in their will for any child born or adopted after the execution of the will, such child shall receive a share in the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate. The share is determined by dividing the estate among the surviving spouse and children, including the pretermitted heir, according to the laws of intestacy. Importantly, the statute clarifies that this provision does not apply if it appears from the will that the omission was intentional, or if the testator provided for the child by some other settlement or advancement. The calculation of the share would involve determining the total value of the estate after debts and expenses, and then distributing it according to the intestate succession laws of New Hampshire, which generally prioritize a surviving spouse and then descendants. For instance, if a testator had a spouse and two children at the time of making the will, and then had a third child after the will was executed, and the will made no provision for this after-born child, the estate would be divided among the spouse and all three children. The specific division depends on whether there is a surviving spouse and the number of children. RSA 551:13 further specifies that if the testator had no children living at the time of the execution of the will, but had children born or adopted afterward, the will is to be treated as if the testator had died intestate, meaning the entire estate passes to these after-born children. This ensures that children born after a will is made are not inadvertently disinherited.

In New Hampshire, the concept of a “per stirpes” distribution is a method of dividing an estate among beneficiaries. When a decedent’s will or the laws of intestacy specify a per stirpes distribution, the estate is divided into equal shares at the generation closest to the decedent that contains living beneficiaries. Each living beneficiary at that generation receives one share, and the issue of any deceased beneficiary at that generation also receive a share, which is then further divided among them in the same manner. Consider an intestate estate in New Hampshire where the decedent, Elara, is survived by her daughter, Beatrice, and two grandchildren, Charles and Diana, who are the children of Elara’s predeceased son, Arthur. Arthur would have been in the first generation of descendants. Since Arthur is deceased, the estate is divided into shares at that generation. Beatrice, being Elara’s living child, receives one share. Arthur’s share, which he would have received had he survived Elara, is then divided among his issue, Charles and Diana. Therefore, Charles receives half of Arthur’s original share, and Diana receives the other half. If Charles also had children, they would inherit Charles’s portion per stirpes. This method ensures that a deceased beneficiary’s portion passes down to their direct descendants.