The core issue in this scenario revolves around the interpretation of a testamentary disposition that attempts to create a condition precedent tied to an unlawful act. In New York, conditions precedent that require the commission of an illegal act are void as against public policy. When a condition precedent is void, the gift itself fails unless the will provides for an alternative disposition or the doctrine of alternative contingencies applies. Here, the testator’s intent was to provide for Anya only if she ceased all contact with her estranged sibling. This condition, by its nature, is not illegal in the sense of requiring a criminal act. However, courts may scrutinize conditions that are considered against public policy, such as those that unduly restrain marriage or encourage divorce. A condition that requires a beneficiary to sever ties with a family member, while perhaps socially undesirable or emotionally difficult, is not inherently illegal or against public policy in a way that would automatically void the condition and the gift under New York law. Instead, the condition is likely to be considered valid, and Anya would need to fulfill it to inherit. If the condition were deemed void, the gift would fail, and the property would pass according to the residuary clause or intestacy laws. However, the phrasing “shall have no contact whatsoever” does not inherently compel an illegal act. Therefore, the condition is likely to be upheld. The question asks what happens if Anya fails to meet the condition. If the condition is valid and she fails to meet it, the bequest to her fails. The property then passes according to the will’s further provisions, which in this case would be the residuary clause to her cousin, Mateo.

In New York, a will is generally considered to have been duly executed if it meets the requirements of EPTL § 3-2.1. This statute mandates that a will must be signed by the testator, or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. Furthermore, the testator must acknowledge the signature to at least two attesting witnesses, each of whom signs the will in the testator’s presence and at the testator’s direction. The attestation clause, while not strictly required for due execution, serves as prima facie evidence that the will was executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. In this scenario, the testator, Elias Vance, signed the will in the presence of Ms. Albright, who then signed as a witness. Subsequently, Mr. Vance acknowledged his signature to Mr. Chen, who also signed as a witness. This sequence of events satisfies the New York statutory requirements for due execution, as the testator’s signature was acknowledged to both witnesses, and both witnesses signed in the testator’s presence. The fact that the witnesses did not sign in each other’s presence is permissible under New York law, as the critical element is that each witness signs in the testator’s presence.

In New York, the concept of ademption by satisfaction occurs when a testator makes a lifetime gift to a beneficiary that is intended to be in satisfaction of a future legacy or devise provided for that beneficiary in the testator’s will. For ademption by satisfaction to apply, there must be clear evidence of the testator’s intent that the lifetime gift should count towards the testamentary gift. This intent can be demonstrated through a written declaration by the testator, either in the will itself or in a separate writing. Alternatively, if the beneficiary acknowledges in writing that the gift is in satisfaction of the legacy, it can also establish intent. If neither of these conditions is met, a presumption arises that the gift was not intended to adeem the legacy, and this presumption can be rebutted by evidence of the testator’s intent. In the given scenario, the will explicitly states that any advances made to beneficiaries during the testator’s lifetime are to be deducted from their respective inheritances. This written declaration within the will itself clearly manifests the testator’s intent that lifetime gifts are to be in satisfaction of the bequests. Therefore, when Elias receives the \( \$50,000 \) from his father’s estate, it will be considered an ademption by satisfaction, reducing his specific bequest by that amount.

The scenario involves a testamentary substitute for a will, specifically a Totten trust, which is a bank account held in trust for another person. In New York, a Totten trust is a tentative trust, revocable during the depositor’s lifetime by any manifest intention to revoke. The depositor, Ms. Albright, established a Totten trust for her nephew, Mr. Finch, by depositing funds into a savings account titled “Ms. Albright, in trust for Mr. Finch.” During her lifetime, Ms. Albright could have revoked this trust by withdrawing the funds, changing the account title, or executing a written notice of revocation delivered to the bank. However, Ms. Albright passed away without taking any of these actions. Therefore, the funds in the Totten trust pass directly to Mr. Finch upon Ms. Albright’s death, outside of her probate estate. The Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified in New York, generally governs the creation, termination, and modification of trusts. While a Totten trust is a statutory creature in New York, its revocability during the depositor’s lifetime is a key characteristic. The absence of any lifetime revocation action by Ms. Albright means the trust remains intact and payable to the named beneficiary. The will’s provisions regarding the residue of the estate are irrelevant to the disposition of the Totten trust funds because the trust is a separate, non-probate asset. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is not the governing law in New York; New York has its own distinct estate and trust laws. The concept of an express trust created by deed is distinct from a tentative trust established in a bank account.

In New York, the concept of “ademption” applies when a specifically devised asset is no longer in the testator’s estate at the time of death. Ademption by extinction occurs when the specific asset is wholly gone. Ademption by satisfaction occurs when the testator transfers the asset to the beneficiary during their lifetime with the intent that it be in satisfaction of the legacy. For real property specifically devised, New York follows a rule of “equitable conversion” in certain contexts, but for ademption purposes, it generally adheres to the principle that if the specific real property is not owned by the testator at death, the devise fails. However, New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) §3-4.10 provides exceptions to the harshness of ademption by extinction. Specifically, if the testator’s property has been sold by a conservator or guardian, or if the testator is declared incompetent and the asset is sold, the beneficiary may be entitled to the sale proceeds if the will manifests an intent that the beneficiary receive the value of the specific devise. In this scenario, the testator’s guardian sold the described parcel of land. The will specifically devises “my farm located at 123 Maple Lane, Westchester County, New York.” Since the farm was sold by the guardian during the testator’s lifetime due to incapacitation, the general rule of ademption by extinction would ordinarily apply, causing the devise to fail. However, EPTL §3-4.10(2)(b) permits the beneficiary to receive the condemnation award or insurance proceeds, or the sale proceeds, if the will contains a general statement of the testator’s intention that the beneficiary should receive the value of the specific devise, or if the testator’s guardian or conservator has been authorized by court order to sell the property and the testator has not been declared competent. The will here states, “I wish for my niece, Elara, to inherit the value of my farm, regardless of its form.” This language clearly indicates an intent to provide Elara with the value of the farm, not necessarily the farm itself in its original state. Therefore, Elara is entitled to the net proceeds from the sale of the farm by the guardian. The sale price was $500,000, and the guardian incurred $20,000 in selling expenses, resulting in net proceeds of $480,000.

In New York, the concept of a “pretermitted heir” refers to a child born or adopted after the execution of a will, who is neither provided for nor mentioned in the will. Under New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 5-3.2, such a child is generally entitled to a share of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions include situations where the testator had other children living when the will was executed and devised substantially all of their estate to the other parent of the pretermitted child, or where the testator intentionally omitted to provide for the child by name or by class. The question involves a scenario where the testator’s will was executed before the birth of his son, and the will does not mention or provide for this after-born child. The will leaves the entire estate to the testator’s spouse. Since the testator had no other children living at the time the will was executed, the exception that allows for substantial provision to other children of the testator to disinherit an after-born child does not apply. The will also does not indicate any intentional omission of the after-born son. Therefore, the son is entitled to a share of the estate as if the testator died intestate. An intestate share in New York for a surviving spouse when there are issue is one-third of the net estate if there is one child, and one-half if there are two or more children. In this case, there is only one child. The net estate is calculated as the gross estate less debts, funeral expenses, and administration expenses. Assuming the gross estate is \$1,000,000 and the debts, funeral, and administration expenses total \$200,000, the net estate is \$800,000. The surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the net estate, which is \(\frac{1}{3} \times \$800,000 = \$266,666.67\). The pretermitted child is entitled to the remaining two-thirds of the net estate, which is \(\frac{2}{3} \times \$800,000 = \$533,333.33\). However, EPTL § 5-3.2 states the pretermitted child receives the share they would have received if the testator died intestate. If the testator dies intestate with one child and a surviving spouse, the spouse receives the first \$50,000 and half the residue, and the child receives the other half of the residue. In this scenario, the net estate is \$800,000. The spouse receives \$50,000 plus half the residue of \$750,000, which is \$375,000. So the spouse receives \$50,000 + \$375,000 = \$425,000. The child receives the remaining half of the residue, which is \$375,000. Therefore, the pretermitted child is entitled to \$375,000.

In New York, a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is generally not valid unless it is made by a member of the armed forces during wartime or by a mariner at sea. The Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) §3-2.1 governs the execution of wills. For a will to be validly executed, it must be signed by the testator, and the testator’s signature must be affixed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, who then sign the will in the testator’s presence. The scenario describes a will entirely in the testator’s handwriting but lacks any indication of being made by a member of the armed forces during wartime or a mariner at sea, nor does it mention the required attestation by witnesses. Therefore, under New York law, such a document, despite being wholly in the testator’s handwriting, fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid will. The concept of a “nuncupative will” refers to an oral will, which also has very limited validity in New York, typically only for members of the armed forces during wartime. The key failure here is the absence of the statutory formalities of execution, specifically the witnessing requirement, which is a cornerstone of will validity in New York for all non-privileged individuals.

In New York, the concept of “after-acquired property” refers to assets that a testator obtains after executing their will. Section 3-4.1 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) generally provides that a will disposes of all property the testator owns at the time of their death, including property acquired after the will’s execution. This means that a will is typically effective to pass after-acquired property unless the will explicitly or implicitly indicates a contrary intent. The question presents a scenario where a testator, Beatrice, bequeaths her “current collection of antique porcelain dolls” to her nephew, Arthur, in a will executed in 2018. Subsequently, in 2020, Beatrice purchases several rare Fabergé egg replicas, which she considers part of her “decorative arts collection,” a term not explicitly used in her will. The critical issue is whether these newly acquired Fabergé egg replicas pass under the 2018 will. Since Beatrice did not acquire these replicas until after the will’s execution, they are considered after-acquired property. The will specifically devises her “current collection of antique porcelain dolls.” This specific bequest is limited to the dolls Beatrice owned at the time of the will’s execution. The Fabergé egg replicas do not fit the description of “antique porcelain dolls.” Therefore, the will does not effectively pass these replicas to Arthur through that specific bequest. However, if Beatrice had no other testamentary disposition for these replicas and died without a codicil or a new will, they would pass as part of her residuary estate. If there is no residuary clause, or if the residuary estate is also ineffective, the property would pass according to the laws of intestacy. The question asks what happens to the Fabergé egg replicas. The specific bequest of porcelain dolls does not encompass the Fabergé egg replicas. Thus, the replicas are not disposed of by that specific provision. They would pass as part of the residuary estate, if one exists and is effective, or by intestacy if not. The options provided test the understanding of whether a specific bequest can encompass after-acquired property that does not fit the description of the bequest, and the general rule regarding after-acquired property in New York. The Fabergé egg replicas, being distinct from porcelain dolls and acquired after the will’s execution, are not covered by the specific bequest. Therefore, they would not pass to Arthur as part of the porcelain doll collection. They would pass as part of the residuary estate or by intestacy if no residuary estate exists. The correct answer focuses on the fact that the specific bequest is limited to the items described and owned at the time of execution, and after-acquired property not fitting the description does not pass under that specific bequest.

The scenario involves a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. In New York, holographic wills are generally not recognized as valid unless they also meet the requirements of a witnessed will, meaning they must be signed by the testator and attested to by at least two witnesses. The document in question is entirely in the testator’s handwriting but lacks any witness signatures or any indication that it was intended to be a witnessed will. Therefore, it fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid will in New York, which typically requires a written instrument signed by the testator in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, who also sign the will in the testator’s presence. While New York law does permit nuncupative wills (oral wills) for soldiers in active military service or mariners at sea, and has specific provisions for self-proving affidavits, neither of these exceptions applies here. The crucial defect is the absence of attesting witnesses, which is a fundamental requirement for most wills in New York, including those that are entirely in the testator’s handwriting. The law prioritizes certainty and the prevention of fraud, which is why the witness requirement is strictly enforced.

The scenario involves a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. In New York, holographic wills are generally not recognized as valid unless they also meet the requirements of a witnessed will, meaning they must be signed by the testator and attested to by at least two witnesses. While New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 outlines the requirements for a valid will, including subscription, presence of witnesses, and acknowledgment, it does not provide a specific exception for holographic wills. Therefore, a will that is solely holographic and lacks the requisite witness attestation will fail to be admitted to probate in New York. The critical element here is the absence of witnesses, which is a mandatory requirement for a formal will in New York, even if the will is entirely in the testator’s handwriting. The fact that the will is holographic does not bypass the witness requirement.

In New York, the doctrine of exoneration dictates that a beneficiary who receives specifically devised real property encumbered by a mortgage or other lien is entitled to have the lien satisfied out of the testator’s residuary estate, unless the will expressly or by implication directs otherwise. This right to exoneration is not automatic and can be waived, either explicitly or implicitly. For a waiver to be effective, it must be clear and unequivocal. A general direction to pay debts and funeral expenses from the residuary estate is typically insufficient to overcome the presumption of exoneration. The will must contain a specific provision indicating an intent to charge the encumbrance against the specific devise itself. In the absence of such a clear directive, the beneficiary of the specifically devised property in New York can generally expect the lien to be paid from the general assets of the estate. This principle aims to ensure that specific gifts are passed to beneficiaries free from encumbrances, preserving the testator’s intended bounty.

In New York, a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is generally not recognized as valid unless it is executed with the same formalities as any other will, meaning it must be signed by the testator and witnessed by at least two attesting witnesses who also sign the will in the testator’s presence. The Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 outlines the requirements for the execution of a will in New York. The scenario describes a will written entirely in Mr. Abernathy’s handwriting and signed by him, but it lacks any attestation by witnesses. Therefore, it fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid will in New York. The concept of a “nuncupative will,” which is an oral will, is also generally not recognized in New York, except for very limited circumstances involving soldiers in active military service or mariners at sea, which are not applicable here. The will’s validity hinges on proper execution under EPTL § 3-2.1. Since there are no witnesses, the will is invalid.

In New York, the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA) governs the administration of estates. When a fiduciary, such as an executor or administrator, resigns or is removed, the court must appoint a successor fiduciary. SCPA § 706 outlines the process for filling vacancies. If a sole fiduciary resigns or is removed, the court will appoint a successor. If there are multiple fiduciaries and one resigns or is removed, the remaining fiduciaries can continue to act unless the will or court order directs otherwise. However, if the will requires a specific number of fiduciaries or if the remaining fiduciaries are unable to administer the estate effectively, the court will appoint a successor. The statute prioritizes certain individuals for appointment, generally following the same order as initial appointment, but with considerations for the circumstances of the vacancy. In this scenario, with the removal of the sole executor, the Surrogate’s Court must appoint a successor. The will nominated Amelia as executrix. In the absence of a renunciation by Amelia, and assuming she is qualified to serve, she has the primary right to be appointed as the successor executor. The statute aims to respect the testator’s intent as expressed in the will, and therefore, a nominated individual, if willing and able, is typically favored.

In New York, a testamentary substitute is an asset or interest that passes to a beneficiary outside of the will, but is treated as if it passed under the will for the purpose of calculating the surviving spouse’s elective share. The Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 5-1.1-A outlines the types of assets that constitute testamentary substitutes. These include, but are not limited to, assets held in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, assets held by the decedent and another in trust for another, and life insurance proceeds payable to a beneficiary other than the estate. The purpose of including these assets is to prevent a testator from diminishing the surviving spouse’s elective share by transferring assets outside the will. The statute provides specific look-back periods and exceptions, such as gifts made with the consent of the spouse or gifts made more than a certain number of years prior to death, depending on the nature of the gift. For example, gifts made within one year of death are generally considered testamentary substitutes unless specific exceptions apply. The calculation of the elective share itself is based on the length of the marriage, with percentages increasing over time, up to a maximum of one-third of the net estate. The net estate for elective share purposes includes assets passing under the will, assets passing outside the will that are considered testamentary substitutes, and certain lifetime gifts.

In New York, a will must be signed by the testator in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses. Each witness must sign the will in the testator’s presence. The concept of “presence” in New York is generally interpreted to mean that the testator must be able to see the witnesses sign or be aware that they are signing. This can be a physical presence or a conscious presence. For a holographic or nuncupative will, New York law does not recognize them as valid for the disposition of property, except for specific exceptions like wills made by soldiers in active service or mariners at sea, which are not relevant to the general rule for a civilian testator. Therefore, a will signed by the testator alone, even if intended to be their will and in their handwriting, would be invalid. The subsequent signing by witnesses, even if they were aware of the testator’s intent, would not cure the defect of the testator not signing in their presence or their signing not being in the testator’s presence. The core requirement for due execution under New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 is the simultaneous presence of the testator and witnesses during the signing process, or at least the testator acknowledging their signature to the witnesses who then sign in the testator’s presence.

The core issue in this scenario revolves around the concept of a “predeceased beneficiary” and the application of New York’s anti-lapse statute, EPTL § 3-3.3. When a beneficiary named in a will dies before the testator, the gift to that beneficiary typically fails, resulting in an “ademption” of the legacy or devise. However, EPTL § 3-3.3 provides an exception. It states that if a beneficiary, who is a descendant of the testator’s grandparent, dies before the testator, the gift to that beneficiary will pass to the beneficiary’s surviving descendants, per stirpes, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. In this case, Bartholomew is the testator’s grandson, making him a descendant of the testator’s grandparent. Since Bartholomew predeceased the testator and left surviving descendants (his children), the gift of the beachfront property in the Hamptons, which was a specific devise, will pass to Bartholomew’s surviving descendants, not lapse. The devise does not fall into the residuary estate because the anti-lapse statute is specifically designed to prevent this outcome for certain classes of beneficiaries. Therefore, the property will be distributed among Bartholomew’s children.

The scenario involves a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. In New York, holographic wills are generally not recognized as valid unless they also meet the requirements of a formal written will, meaning they must be signed by the testator and witnessed by two attesting witnesses who sign in the testator’s presence. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) recognizes holographic wills without witnesses if they are entirely in the testator’s handwriting, but New York has not adopted this provision of the UPC. Therefore, even though Elara’s will is entirely in her handwriting, its validity in New York hinges on whether it was properly witnessed. Since the provided information states it was not signed by any witnesses, it fails to meet the statutory requirements for a valid will in New York. The self-proving affidavit, while a convenience for probate, does not cure a defect in the execution of the will itself. The will’s contents regarding the disposition of property are irrelevant to its validity if the execution requirements are not met. Consequently, the property will pass as if Elara had died intestate, meaning according to New York’s laws of intestacy.

In New York, a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator, is generally not valid unless it meets specific statutory requirements. New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 governs the execution of wills. While EPTL § 3-2.1 does not explicitly recognize holographic wills as a distinct category of valid wills, it requires a will to be signed by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and at the testator’s direction, and to be attested by at least two witnesses. A will that is entirely in the testator’s handwriting but not properly witnessed, as is typical of a holographic will, would fail to meet these formal execution requirements. Therefore, such a document would not be admitted to probate in New York. The rationale behind these strict execution requirements is to prevent fraud and ensure that the document genuinely reflects the testator’s testamentary intent. While some other states recognize holographic wills, New York adheres to a more traditional attestation system. The scenario presented describes a document that, while handwritten by the testator, lacks the required attestation by two witnesses, rendering it invalid under New York law.

The scenario involves a testamentary substitute for a spouse in New York. Under New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) §5-1.1-A, a surviving spouse has a right of election against a decedent’s estate. This right allows the surviving spouse to take a statutory share of the “augmented estate,” which includes certain assets passing outside the will, known as “testamentary substitutes.” These substitutes are designed to prevent a testator from disinheriting a spouse by transferring assets to non-probate arrangements. In this case, the inter vivos trust created by Arthur for the benefit of Beatrice, which Arthur retained the right to revoke and amend, is a testamentary substitute. Arthur’s retained power to revoke and amend the trust means he retained control over the beneficial interest, making it similar to a testamentary disposition. Therefore, this trust asset is included in the augmented estate for the purpose of calculating Beatrice’s elective share. New York EPTL §5-1.1-A(b)(1)(E) specifically lists assets over which the decedent retained the power to revoke or amend, or retained the beneficial interest, as testamentary substitutes. Since Arthur retained the power to revoke and amend the trust, the entire value of the trust corpus at the time of Arthur’s death is considered part of the augmented estate. The question asks about the assets that constitute a testamentary substitute. The inter vivos trust where Arthur retained the power to revoke and amend is precisely such a substitute.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by Elias, a resident of New York, for the benefit of his nephew, Julian. The trust instrument specifies that income is to be paid to Julian during his lifetime, and upon Julian’s death, the principal is to be distributed to Julian’s issue. Elias’s will was executed on January 1, 2000. Julian was born on January 1, 1980. Julian’s first child, Clara, was born on January 1, 2005. Julian’s second child, David, was born on January 1, 2010. Julian’s third child, Emily, was born on January 1, 2015. Julian dies on January 1, 2020. The question concerns the validity of the trust under New York’s Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP). New York’s RAP statute, EPTL § 9-1.1, limits the period for which property can be tied up in trust to two lives in being at the creation of the interest, plus a period of minority. In this case, the trust was created on January 1, 2000. The measuring lives are Elias (the settlor, whose life is not directly relevant to the trust’s duration but whose intent is paramount) and Julian (the income beneficiary). The trust terminates upon Julian’s death, and the principal is distributed to his issue. Since Julian was alive at the creation of the trust, he is a life in being. Clara, David, and Emily are all born after the creation of the trust. The critical period for determining the validity of the gift to Julian’s issue is from the creation of the trust until the vesting of the interest in the issue. Under New York law, a trust is valid if the vesting of all present and future interests is certain to occur within two lives in being at the creation of the trust. Here, the trust terminates upon Julian’s death, and the principal is to be distributed to his issue. Julian’s issue are ascertainable upon his death. Since Julian was alive at the creation of the trust, his life is one measuring life. The trust vests in Julian’s issue upon Julian’s death. Julian’s death is a future event that must occur within the RAP period. As Julian was alive when the trust was created, his life is a measuring life. The trust terminates and vests upon his death. Therefore, the interest vests within one life in being at the creation of the trust. The fact that Julian has children born after the trust’s creation does not invalidate the trust, as the RAP is concerned with the potential for remoteness of vesting, not the actual timing of events. The trust is valid because the vesting of the remainder interest in Julian’s issue is certain to occur within Julian’s lifetime, and Julian was a life in being at the creation of the trust. The period of minority for any potential beneficiary is also encompassed within this framework, as the distribution is to Julian’s issue generally, not to a specific minor whose minority might extend beyond the two-life period. Therefore, the trust is valid.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established in New York. The testator, Ms. Anya Sharma, devised her residuary estate to her trustee, Mr. David Chen, to hold for the benefit of her niece, Ms. Priya Sharma, with the condition that Priya attains the age of 25. The trust instrument specifies that income generated during the trust’s term is to be accumulated and added to the principal until Priya reaches 21, after which all income is to be paid to her until she turns 25. New York law, specifically EPTL § 9-2.2, addresses the accumulation of income. This statute generally prohibits the accumulation of income except in limited circumstances, such as for minors. In this case, the accumulation of income until Priya reaches 21 is permissible under EPTL § 9-2.2(a), which allows for the accumulation of income for the benefit of a minor. However, the trust attempts to further accumulate income from age 21 until 25, which is not permitted for a beneficiary who is no longer a minor. EPTL § 9-2.2(b) states that where income is directed to be accumulated for a period longer than the minority of the beneficiary, the direction is void as to the period beyond the minority. Therefore, the direction to accumulate income between the ages of 21 and 25 is invalid. The income earned during this period must be paid to Priya as it accrues, as she is the income beneficiary. The trust itself remains valid, but the specific provision for accumulation beyond minority is struck down. The trustee, Mr. Chen, must therefore distribute the income to Priya as it is earned from the date she turns 21.

In New York, a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is generally not recognized as valid unless it meets specific statutory requirements for witnessed wills. The Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 outlines the formal requirements for a valid will in New York. These include that the will must be signed by the testator, or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. Furthermore, the testator must declare to at least two attesting witnesses, within the period of their attending at the same time, that the instrument constitutes the testator’s will. Each of the attesting witnesses must sign the will in the presence of the testator. A holographic will, by its very nature, typically lacks these attestation requirements. Therefore, unless the document was executed in conformity with the witnessed will requirements of EPTL § 3-2.1, it would be considered invalid in New York. The fact that the will is entirely in the testator’s handwriting is irrelevant to its validity if the statutory formalities of execution are not met. The scenario describes a will that is entirely in the testator’s handwriting but provides no information about whether it was signed by witnesses or if the testator declared it to be their will in the presence of two witnesses. Without evidence of compliance with EPTL § 3-2.1, the will cannot be admitted to probate in New York.

In New York, a testamentary substitute for a surviving spouse’s elective share is an asset that passes to a beneficiary other than the surviving spouse, and that the decedent transferred outside of their will but in a manner that effectively retains control or benefit for the decedent during their lifetime. The purpose of the elective share statute, EPTL § 5-1.1-A, is to provide a surviving spouse with a minimum inheritance regardless of the will’s provisions. Assets that are considered testamentary substitutes are brought back into the “augmented estate” for the purpose of calculating the elective share. The decedent’s retained interest in a trust, such as a retained income interest or a power to revoke, makes the trust principal a testamentary substitute. In this scenario, Elara retained the income from the trust for her life, and also retained the power to revoke the trust. Both of these retained interests are significant indicators that the trust was intended to function as a substitute for a testamentary disposition, thereby making the trust principal part of the augmented estate for the calculation of the surviving spouse’s elective share. The New York statute is designed to prevent a testator from disinheriting a spouse by transferring assets outside of the will while retaining substantial control or benefit.

The core issue here revolves around the interpretation of a holographic will under New York law, specifically regarding the testator’s intent and the validity of a codicil. A holographic will, which is entirely in the testator’s handwriting, is generally not recognized in New York unless it is made by a soldier in actual military service or by a mariner at sea. However, the initial document created by Ms. Anya Petrova, while entirely in her handwriting, was not made under such exigent circumstances. The subsequent “addendum” dated six months later, also in her handwriting, purports to modify the original disposition. In New York, a will can be modified by a codicil, which must be executed with the same formalities as a will (i.e., signed by the testator and attested by at least two witnesses, each of whom signs within thirty days of each other). Since neither the original document nor the addendum meets these witnessing requirements, they are not valid as a will or a codicil under New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1. Therefore, Ms. Petrova died intestate, and her estate would pass according to the laws of intestacy in New York, typically to her surviving spouse and descendants. The scenario presents a common pitfall where handwritten documents are mistakenly assumed to be valid wills. The key is the lack of proper execution formalities required by EPTL § 3-2.1 for both the initial document and the subsequent modification. The intent of the testator is paramount, but that intent must be expressed through a document executed in accordance with statutory requirements. Without witnesses, neither the original disposition nor the purported codicil can alter the intestate distribution of Ms. Petrova’s estate.

In New York, a testamentary substitute for a will is an asset that passes outside of the will, but is treated as if it were part of the testamentary estate for the purpose of calculating the surviving spouse’s elective share. The Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 5-1.1-A outlines which assets qualify as testamentary substitutes. These include, but are not limited to, joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, Totten trusts, and revocable inter vivos trusts where the decedent retained control or beneficial interest. For an asset to be considered a testamentary substitute, the decedent must have retained certain rights or powers over the asset during their lifetime, such as the right to revoke, amend, or receive the income from the asset, or the right to withdraw the asset. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a testator from disinheriting a surviving spouse by transferring assets into non-probate forms over which the testator retained significant control or benefit. The specific asset in question, a payable-on-death (POD) bank account in New York, where the decedent designated their niece as the beneficiary, is a testamentary substitute under EPTL § 5-1.1-A(b)(1)(C) because the decedent retained the right to revoke the designation or withdraw the funds during their lifetime. Therefore, this asset is included in the calculation of the augmented estate for the purpose of determining the surviving spouse’s elective share.

In New York, the doctrine of exoneration dictates whether a beneficiary who receives specifically devised real property encumbered by a mortgage is entitled to have that mortgage paid off from the residuary estate. Generally, a will must contain a clear and unambiguous direction to exonerate the mortgage. This direction can be explicit, such as a statement that all mortgages on specifically devised property should be paid from the estate. Alternatively, it can be implicit, arising from the overall context of the will, though this is a more difficult standard to meet. In the absence of such a direction, the mortgage is considered to pass with the land, meaning the beneficiary takes the property subject to the mortgage. New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-1.1(b) addresses the abatement of legacies, but the specific issue of exoneration is primarily governed by common law principles as interpreted by New York courts. The question of whether a testator intended exoneration is a matter of construction, looking to the language of the will. If the will is silent, the presumption is against exoneration. The residuary estate is the source for exoneration if such an intent is found.

In New York, the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA) governs the administration of estates. Specifically, SCPA § 1407 addresses the probate of a will of a person who died domiciled outside of New York but left property within the state. For a will executed outside New York to be admitted to probate in New York, it must be executed in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was executed, or in accordance with New York law, or in accordance with the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of execution. The question presents a scenario where a testator, domiciled in California, executed a will in Florida. California law requires a will to be signed by the testator and by two witnesses, each of whom signs the will in the testator’s presence. Florida law, at the time of execution, also required the testator’s signature and two witnesses, with specific requirements for the witnesses’ presence. The will in question was signed by the testator in Florida and by one witness in Florida. A second witness, a resident of New York, signed the will in New York. Since the will was not executed in accordance with Florida law (requiring two witnesses in Florida) nor in accordance with California law (requiring two witnesses in the testator’s presence), the sole basis for admitting it to probate in New York would be if it was executed in accordance with New York law. However, New York law at the time of execution required the testator’s signature and attestation by two witnesses, who must sign in the testator’s presence. The scenario states the second witness signed in New York, but it does not specify if this occurred in the testator’s presence. Assuming the second witness did not sign in the testator’s presence, the will fails to meet the requirements of SCPA § 1407, as it was not validly executed under any of the permissible jurisdictions. Therefore, the will would not be eligible for probate in New York.

In New York, the doctrine of equitable conversion treats real property as personal property for the purposes of a will or trust when a contract for the sale of that property is in effect. This doctrine is rooted in the principle that equity considers that done which ought to be done. When a binding contract for the sale of real property is executed, the seller, despite retaining legal title, is deemed to hold it in trust for the buyer, and the buyer is deemed to have an equitable interest in the property. Consequently, upon the seller’s death, the proceeds from the sale are considered personal property, passing to the beneficiaries of the seller’s personal property under their will or intestacy laws. Conversely, the buyer’s interest in the property is treated as real property. In this scenario, the decedent, Ms. Anya Sharma, entered into a binding contract to sell her residential property in Brooklyn, New York, before her death. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, her interest in the property at the time of her death was no longer real property but rather the right to receive the purchase price. Therefore, the proceeds from the sale of the property are to be distributed as personal property according to her will, specifically to the beneficiary designated to receive her personalty. The fact that the closing occurred after her death does not alter the equitable conversion that took place upon the execution of the contract.

In New York, the doctrine of equitable conversion dictates that for the purposes of the contract of sale, real property is deemed to be personal property, and personal property is deemed to be real property. This doctrine is applied to determine the rights of the parties in the event of the death of either the vendor or the purchaser between the execution of a binding contract for the sale of real property and the closing of title. When a contract for the sale of real property is binding, the vendor, having agreed to sell, is considered to hold the legal title as a trustee for the purchaser, who has the equitable title. The vendor’s interest in the property is converted into a right to receive the purchase price, which is considered personal property. Conversely, the purchaser’s interest in the property is converted into an equitable interest in the real estate itself, which is considered real property. Consider a scenario where a vendor in New York enters into a binding contract to sell their residential property to a purchaser. The contract is fully executed and binding. Before the scheduled closing date, the vendor dies. Under the principle of equitable conversion, the vendor’s interest in the property at the time of death is no longer considered real property but has been converted into personal property, specifically a chose in action representing the right to receive the purchase money. Therefore, the vendor’s executor or administrator would administer this contractual right as part of the vendor’s personal estate, subject to the terms of the vendor’s will or the laws of intestacy. The vendor’s heirs who would have inherited the real property had the contract not been executed would not inherit the property itself, as it has been equitably converted.

The scenario involves a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator. In New York, holographic wills are generally not recognized as valid unless they meet specific statutory requirements, which are quite stringent. Specifically, New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) § 3-2.1 governs the execution of wills. While EPTL § 3-2.1(a)(1) allows for a will to be signed by the testator, it also requires that the testator publish the will, meaning they must declare to the witnesses that the instrument is their will. Furthermore, EPTL § 3-2.1(a)(2) requires that the testator sign the will in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, or acknowledge their signature to each witness separately. The key deficiency in a purely holographic will, if not properly executed with witnesses, is the lack of the required attestation. Even if the entire will is in the testator’s handwriting, the absence of two witnesses who saw the testator sign or acknowledge their signature, and to whom the testator declared the instrument to be their will, renders it invalid in New York. The testator’s subsequent statement to their neighbor, even if corroborated, does not cure the defect in the original execution. The will must be executed in compliance with EPTL § 3-2.1 at the time of signing. Therefore, the holographic will, lacking the required testamentary formalities, is invalid in New York.