In Utah, a holographic will is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. Utah Code Section 75-2-502(2) specifically addresses holographic wills, stating that they are valid if the signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator. Unlike attested wills, holographic wills do not require witnesses. The key is that the entire document, including the dispositive provisions and the testator’s intent to make a will, must be in their own handwriting. The question presents a scenario where a testator writes a letter expressing their wishes for their property distribution after death. The letter is entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed. This meets the statutory requirements for a holographic will in Utah. Therefore, the letter would be considered a valid will. The other options are incorrect because they either introduce requirements not applicable to holographic wills (witnesses, notarization) or misinterpret the scope of what constitutes a holographic will. A will that is not entirely in the testator’s handwriting, even if signed, would not qualify as holographic.

In Utah, the Uniform Probate Code, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-503, governs the requirements for a valid will. A will must be in writing, signed by the testator, or in the testator’s name by some other individual in the testator’s conscious presence and by the testator’s direction. Furthermore, the will must be signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after the testator published the will as their will. These witnesses must have observed the testator sign the will or acknowledge their signature, and they must have signed the will in the testator’s presence. A will that does not meet these formal requirements may still be admitted to probate if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended the document to be their will. This is known as a holographic will or a statutory exception for un-witnessed wills. However, the question specifies a document that is signed by the testator and one witness, and it was not signed by a second witness. This scenario does not satisfy the statutory requirements for a formal witnessed will under Utah law. It also does not meet the criteria for a holographic will, which must be entirely in the testator’s handwriting. Therefore, without a second witness or meeting the holographic will requirements, the document is not a valid will in Utah.

The Utah Uniform Trust Code, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406, addresses the effect of a change in a trustee. When a trustee resigns, is removed, or dies, and the trust instrument does not provide for the appointment of a successor trustee, a successor trustee shall be appointed. Utah law permits the qualified beneficiaries to nominate a successor trustee, and if they are unable to agree, the court will appoint one. The question presents a scenario where the trust instrument is silent on successor trustees, and the primary beneficiary, Elara, is a minor. In such cases, a minor cannot nominate a trustee. Therefore, the power to nominate a successor trustee would fall to the court. The court’s primary consideration in appointing a trustee is the best interests of the beneficiaries and the proper administration of the trust. While the court may consider the wishes of the deceased settlor or the beneficiaries, when a beneficiary is a minor, the court exercises its discretion to appoint a suitable trustee, often considering a qualified adult who has demonstrated responsibility and understanding of fiduciary duties. The question asks about the *nomination* of a successor trustee, not the court’s ultimate appointment. Since Elara is a minor, she lacks the legal capacity to nominate. Consequently, the court will make the nomination in this instance.

In Utah, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the interpretation and administration of trusts. Specifically, Utah Code § 75-7-406 addresses the duty of a trustee to respond to beneficiaries. This statute requires a trustee to keep beneficiaries reasonably informed about the trust’s administration and to respond promptly to reasonable requests for information. The definition of “reasonable” in this context is fact-dependent, considering factors such as the complexity of the trust, the nature of the information requested, and the trustee’s administrative burden. A trustee’s failure to respond to a reasonable request within a reasonable time can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The statute does not mandate immediate responses for all requests, but rather a timely and appropriate one. The specific timeframe for a response is not rigidly defined but is subject to judicial interpretation based on the circumstances. The statute also outlines the types of information a trustee must provide, including a copy of the trust instrument, a statement of accounts, and any other information necessary for the beneficiary to protect their interest. The duty to inform and respond is a core fiduciary obligation, essential for transparency and accountability in trust administration.

The scenario involves a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. Utah law, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-502, addresses the validity of wills. For a will to be valid in Utah, it must be signed by the testator or by another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction, and it must be attested to by at least two individuals, each of whom signed the will in the testator’s presence. Holographic wills are an exception to the attestation requirement; they are valid if proved to be entirely in the testator’s handwriting. In this case, the will is holographic, meaning it is entirely in the testator’s handwriting. The critical issue is whether the testator’s signature is present. The explanation provided in the prompt states that the will was signed by the testator. Therefore, if the will is entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator, it meets the requirements for a valid holographic will in Utah, even without witnesses. The prompt does not require a calculation. The concept tested is the specific requirements for holographic wills in Utah and how they differ from attested wills. The Utah Code defines a holographic will as one that is entirely in the testator’s handwriting. While the prompt mentions the testator signed the will, the core of the question revolves around the holographic nature and the absence of witnesses, which is permissible for holographic wills in Utah. The validity hinges on the entirety of the document being in the testator’s handwriting and the testator’s signature.

In Utah, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration of trusts. When a trustee resigns or is removed, the Uniform Trust Code provides a framework for appointing a successor trustee. Utah Code Section 75-7-411 addresses the resignation of a trustee. If a trustee resigns, the resignation is effective when a successor trustee is appointed. Utah Code Section 75-7-412 outlines the procedure for appointing a successor trustee. If the trust instrument does not provide for the appointment of a successor trustee, or if the named successor is unable or unwilling to serve, the power to appoint a successor trustee can be exercised by the person holding the power to appoint, or if no such person exists, by the current beneficiaries of the trust. If the beneficiaries cannot agree, or if the trust is for the benefit of a minor or incapacitated person, the court may appoint a successor trustee. In this scenario, the trust instrument is silent on successor trustee appointment, and the initial trustee has resigned. The beneficiaries, a group of adults who are all competent and in agreement, have the power to appoint a successor trustee. They are not restricted by the trust instrument’s silence, nor is there a need for court intervention as long as they can agree. Therefore, the beneficiaries can directly appoint a successor trustee.

In Utah, the concept of an “after-acquired property” clause in a will is crucial for understanding how a testator’s estate is distributed. When a testator executes a will, it typically disposes of property owned by the testator at the time of their death. However, a will can include provisions that specifically address property acquired by the testator *after* the will was signed. This is known as an after-acquired property clause. Such a clause demonstrates the testator’s intent to include any property they might acquire in the future within the scope of their testamentary plan. Without such a clause, property acquired after the will’s execution might pass according to the laws of intestacy or through a codicil, unless the will is interpreted to encompass it by its general language. Utah law, like many other jurisdictions, generally permits the inclusion of such clauses, allowing for a more comprehensive and efficient distribution of the testator’s entire estate, regardless of when the property was acquired. The key is the testator’s clear intent, as expressed in the will, to cover all property owned at death, including that acquired post-execution. This foresight prevents potential disputes and ensures the testator’s wishes are fully realized. The scenario describes a will with an after-acquired property clause, indicating the testator’s intent to include all future acquisitions. Therefore, the property purchased by the testator after the will’s execution would pass according to the terms of that will.

The scenario involves the concept of ademption by extinction in Utah. Ademption by extinction occurs when a specifically devised asset is no longer owned by the testator at the time of their death. In Utah, like many other states, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) approach is generally followed, which emphasizes the testator’s intent. Under Utah Code § 75-2-606, if specifically devised property is sold or otherwise disposed of by the testator, the devisee has no right to the property or to the proceeds of the sale unless the will indicates a contrary intent or the testator reacquires the property. In this case, Beatrice specifically devised her “antique grandfather clock” to her nephew, Arthur. However, she sold the clock to a collector in Nevada prior to her death. Since Beatrice sold the clock and did not reacquire it, and her will did not contain any provisions indicating a contrary intent (such as a general direction to purchase a similar item or to receive the proceeds of sale), the devise to Arthur fails. Arthur is not entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the clock, nor is he entitled to a similar clock. The disposition of the clock is governed by the residuary clause of Beatrice’s will, which leaves the remainder of her estate to her daughter, Clara. Therefore, Clara would receive the proceeds from the sale of the clock as part of the residue.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established in Utah. The question concerns the enforceability of a spendthrift provision within this trust. Utah law, like many states, recognizes spendthrift provisions as a valid means to protect a beneficiary’s interest from their creditors. Under Utah Code \(75-7-502\), a trust may provide that the beneficiary’s interest is not transferable and is not subject to the claims of the beneficiary’s creditors or to other persons. This protection is generally robust, shielding the trust principal and income from most third-party claims. However, there are statutory exceptions to spendthrift protection. Utah Code \(75-7-503\) outlines these exceptions, which typically include claims for child support, alimony, and, in some circumstances, claims by the state for public assistance. In this case, the beneficiary, Ms. Anya Sharma, has incurred debts with a medical provider for services rendered. The medical provider is a private creditor seeking to attach the trust funds to satisfy a contractual debt. Since the debt is not for child support, alimony, or public assistance, it falls outside the enumerated exceptions to the spendthrift provision. Therefore, the spendthrift clause in the trust, as validly drafted under Utah law, will prevent the medical provider from reaching the trust assets to satisfy Ms. Sharma’s debt. The trust’s spendthrift provision is effective in shielding the assets from this particular creditor’s claim.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established by a Utah resident, wherein a life estate is granted to the surviving spouse, Elara, with the remainder interest passing to their children upon Elara’s death. The core issue is the tax treatment of the distribution of income generated by the trust assets during Elara’s lifetime. Under Utah law and general trust principles, income earned by a trust is typically taxable to the beneficiary who is entitled to receive it. In this case, Elara, as the life estate beneficiary, is entitled to the trust’s income. Therefore, the income generated by the trust assets, such as dividends from stocks or interest from bonds, is considered taxable income to Elara for the tax year in which it is earned by the trust, regardless of whether it is actually distributed to her during that year. The trust itself, as a separate legal entity, may also have filing requirements, but the ultimate tax liability for the income it generates, which is designated for the life tenant, falls upon Elara. This aligns with the concept of a life estate where the holder benefits from the use and income of the property for their lifetime. The remainder beneficiaries do not have an interest in the income until the life estate terminates.

In Utah, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified, governs the administration of trusts. A trustee’s duty of loyalty is a fundamental fiduciary obligation, requiring the trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. This duty is often tested in situations involving potential conflicts of interest. When a trustee engages in self-dealing, such as purchasing trust property for their own benefit, it is a breach of this duty. Utah law, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802, addresses the trustee’s duty of loyalty and the prohibition against self-dealing. While a trust instrument can sometimes modify certain fiduciary duties, the duty of loyalty, particularly concerning transactions that are not fair to the beneficiaries, is generally considered non-waivable in its core essence, meaning a trustee cannot be authorized to act disloyally. A trustee can, however, be authorized to enter into certain transactions that might otherwise appear to be self-dealing if the trust instrument expressly permits it and the transaction is conducted on terms fair to the beneficiaries. In the scenario presented, the trust instrument explicitly allows the trustee to purchase trust property, but this authorization is contingent upon the transaction being conducted at a fair market value. The trustee’s offer to purchase the property for \( \$150,000 \) when its appraised fair market value is \( \$200,000 \) clearly violates this condition. Therefore, the trustee has breached the duty of loyalty and the specific terms of the trust by failing to conduct the transaction at fair market value. The beneficiaries have grounds to challenge this action and seek remedies for the breach.

The scenario presented involves the administration of a decedent’s estate in Utah. The decedent, Elara Vance, died with a valid will. The will names her nephew, Silas, as the sole beneficiary of her entire estate. The estate consists of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, valued at $750,000, and personal property, including a savings account with a balance of $150,000, and various tangible items valued at $50,000. The total gross estate value is $950,000. There are outstanding debts and administrative expenses. Specifically, Elara had a mortgage on the real property for $200,000, and medical bills totaling $25,000. The estimated administrative expenses, including probate court fees, attorney fees, and executor fees, are projected to be $30,000. Under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703, the personal representative has a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent with reasonable diligence and in the best interests of the estate and its beneficiaries. The order of priority for the payment of claims and expenses against an estate is generally established by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805. This statute outlines that expenses of administration, including funeral expenses and expenses of last illness, have priority over claims of creditors. However, secured claims, such as a mortgage on real property, are typically satisfied from the collateral securing the debt, or if the personal representative elects to pay the debt, it is treated as an expense of administration. In this case, the mortgage is a secured debt against the real property. The personal representative can choose to pay off the mortgage to preserve the property for the beneficiary or allow the lender to foreclose. If the personal representative pays the mortgage, it is treated as an expense of administration. The total liabilities and expenses are: Mortgage: $200,000 Medical Bills: $25,000 Administrative Expenses: $30,000 Total Liabilities and Expenses = $200,000 + $25,000 + $30,000 = $255,000 The net distributable estate is the total gross estate minus the total liabilities and expenses: Net Distributable Estate = $950,000 – $255,000 = $695,000 Silas, as the sole beneficiary, is entitled to the net distributable estate. The question asks about the value of the estate that Silas is entitled to receive. This is the net value after all valid debts and expenses have been paid or provided for. The Utah Probate Code prioritizes expenses of administration and last illness over general unsecured debts, and secured debts are handled in relation to their collateral. Assuming the personal representative decides to pay off the mortgage to deliver clear title of the real property to Silas, the total deductions are as calculated. Therefore, Silas is entitled to the net distributable estate.

Under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-507, a will that is not entirely in the testator’s handwriting and is signed by the testator is generally valid if it is signed by at least two individuals each of whom signs the will in the testator’s presence. This is known as a attested will. The presence requirement is crucial; the witnesses must be aware that the testator is signing or acknowledging the signature on the will. While the testator’s intent to make the document their will is paramount, the statutory requirements for witnessing are designed to prevent fraud and undue influence. In this scenario, the will was signed by Elias in the presence of both Anya and Ben. Anya then signed the will in Elias’s presence. Ben, however, signed the will later that evening in his own home, not in Elias’s presence. This means Ben’s signature does not meet the statutory requirement for an attested will under Utah law. Therefore, the will is not properly attested according to Utah’s statutory requirements for a formal, witnessed will. The fact that Elias intended the document to be his will and that Anya signed in his presence is insufficient without the second witness also signing in the testator’s presence. The law requires strict adherence to these formalities to ensure the validity of the will.

The scenario involves a potential challenge to a will based on undue influence. In Utah, for a will to be invalidated on the grounds of undue influence, the contestant must generally prove that the influence was exerted and that it caused the testator to act against their own free will. Utah law, like many jurisdictions, requires a showing of: (1) susceptibility of the testator to undue influence, (2) opportunity to exert undue influence, (3) a disposition to exert undue influence, and (4) a result indicating undue influence. The key here is the nature of the relationship between Elias Thorne and Ms. Albright. Elias Thorne, as Ms. Albright’s financial advisor and a significant beneficiary, occupied a position of trust and confidence. This fiduciary relationship, coupled with his substantial involvement in Ms. Albright’s financial affairs and his position as a beneficiary, creates a presumption of undue influence if the will disproportionately benefits him. The fact that Ms. Albright was elderly and recently widowed further supports her potential susceptibility. The will’s terms, leaving the bulk of the estate to Elias Thorne, while Ms. Albright’s estranged son receives a minimal bequest, strongly suggests a result that may be indicative of undue influence. Therefore, the contestant, Ms. Albright’s son, would likely focus on demonstrating these elements to successfully challenge the will. The Utah Uniform Probate Code, specifically provisions related to contest of wills, would govern the procedure and evidentiary standards.

In Utah, a holographic will is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting. Utah Code § 75-2-502 specifies that a will which does not satisfy the requirements of due execution (attested by witnesses) may still be established as a valid will, whether intended as a will or a codicil, if it is entirely in the testator’s handwriting. The key element for validity is that the entire document, including the dispositive provisions and the testator’s signature (though not strictly required for holographic wills if intent is clear), must be in the testator’s handwriting. If any material part of the will is written by someone else, or typed, it fails to meet the definition of a holographic will under Utah law. Therefore, if the primary dispositive clause and the intent to make a will are in handwriting, but a crucial amendment or addition is typed, the entire instrument may be invalidated as a holographic will. The question describes a scenario where the initial will is holographic, but a later handwritten addition is made to it. This addition, if it modifies the dispositive provisions or adds new ones, must also be entirely in the testator’s handwriting to be considered a valid codicil to the holographic will. The question implies the addition might not be entirely in the testator’s handwriting, or that its nature as a codicil to a holographic will needs to be assessed under Utah’s specific rules. Since the core of the issue is whether the *entire* document, including the addition, meets the holographic standard, and assuming the addition is a material change, the validity hinges on its entirety being handwritten. If the addition is not entirely in the testator’s handwriting, it would not be a valid holographic codicil, and thus the original holographic will would remain as is, unless the addition was intended to revoke it entirely and failed due to not being a valid holographic codicil. The most precise legal outcome is that the original holographic will, being entirely in the testator’s handwriting, remains valid, and the invalid addition does not affect it.

The scenario involves the concept of a revocable trust and its interaction with a pour-over will in Utah. When a person creates a revocable trust and then executes a pour-over will, the will directs that any assets not already in the trust at the time of the testator’s death should be transferred into the trust. The key principle here is that the pour-over will acts as a mechanism to consolidate all estate assets into the trust for administration according to the trust’s terms. In Utah, as in most jurisdictions, a pour-over will is generally valid and effective in directing assets to a pre-existing revocable trust, even if the trust is amended after the will’s execution, provided the trust is identifiable and the testator has the power to revoke or amend it. This is often supported by statutes that specifically address the validity of pour-over provisions. The question tests the understanding of how a pour-over will functions to fund a revocable trust upon the testator’s death, ensuring that the trust document, as it exists at the time of death, governs the disposition of those assets. The validity of the trust’s subsequent amendments is implicitly recognized by the effectiveness of the pour-over mechanism.

The scenario involves the distribution of assets from a deceased individual’s estate in Utah. The key issue is the validity of a holographic will, which is a will written entirely in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator. Utah Code Section 75-2-502(2) explicitly states that a will that does not meet the requirements of subsection (1) (attested will) can still be established as a valid will, whether intended as such or not, if it is proved to have been executed in a manner that is testamentary. Crucially, Utah law permits holographic wills, meaning they do not require witnesses if they are wholly in the testator’s handwriting and signed. The document in question, a handwritten note found in the deceased’s desk drawer, clearly meets these criteria. It expresses the deceased’s intent to distribute specific assets to named beneficiaries and is entirely in their handwriting and signed. Therefore, the note would be considered a valid holographic will under Utah law, and its provisions for distribution would be legally binding. The existence of a prior attested will does not automatically invalidate a later holographic will if the holographic will is properly executed and demonstrates a clear intent to revoke or modify the prior will, or if it is simply a later expression of testamentary intent. In this case, the note functions as a valid testamentary instrument.

In Utah, a will is generally considered revoked if the testator intentionally burns, tears, cancels, obliterates, or destroys it with the intent to revoke. This is codified in Utah Code \(75-2-507\). The intent to revoke must be present at the time of the physical act. If a testator makes a physical act of destruction on a will, but without the present intent to revoke, the will is not revoked. For example, if the testator intended to destroy a draft of the will, but accidentally destroyed the executed original, the revocation would likely fail because the intent was to destroy the draft, not the executed will. Similarly, if the testator intended to destroy the will to prevent a third party from finding it, but did not intend to revoke it themselves, this act would not constitute a revocation under Utah law. The key is the testator’s intent to revoke the will through the physical act. In this scenario, the act of tearing the will in half, coupled with the statement “I want this will to be void,” clearly demonstrates the testator’s intent to revoke the document. The physical act of tearing, combined with the explicit declaration of intent to make the will void, satisfies the requirements for revocation by physical act under Utah law.

The scenario involves a beneficiary who has predeceased the testator, creating a lapse. In Utah, if a will devises property to a beneficiary who predeceases the testator, and the beneficiary is a descendant of the testator’s parent, the property passes to the beneficiary’s descendants per stirpes, unless the will provides otherwise. This is governed by Utah Code § 75-2-605, the anti-lapse statute. In this case, Elias is the testator’s grandson, and his mother, Clara, who was the testator’s daughter, predeceased Elias. Therefore, Elias’s share of the residue would pass to his children, Anya and Ben, as they are his lineal descendants. The question asks about the distribution of Elias’s share. Since Elias predeceased the testator, his gift lapses unless an anti-lapse statute applies. Utah’s anti-lapse statute applies because Elias is a descendant of the testator’s parent (Clara, the testator’s daughter). Thus, Elias’s share passes to his descendants. Elias has two children, Anya and Ben. The statute directs that the property passes to the descendants of the predeceased beneficiary. Therefore, Elias’s share will be divided equally between Anya and Ben.

In Utah, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified by Utah statutes, governs the administration of trusts. Specifically, Utah Code Section 75-7-401 outlines the trustee’s duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and in accordance with its terms. This duty is often referred to as the duty of loyalty. When a trustee faces a potential conflict of interest, such as a transaction where the trustee has a personal stake, the trustee must adhere to strict standards to ensure the beneficiaries’ interests are paramount. Utah law permits certain transactions involving a trustee with a beneficial interest, but these are subject to stringent conditions. According to Utah Code Section 75-7-404, a transaction involving the trust and a trustee who has an interest that may affect the trustee’s exercise of the trustee’s powers is voidable by a beneficiary unless: (1) the terms of the trust provided for the transaction; (2) the trustee obtained the consent of all beneficiaries who have the current interest in the trust; (3) the trustee disclosed the conflict to all beneficiaries and obtained their consent; or (4) the transaction was fair to the beneficiaries at the time it was entered into. In this scenario, the trustee, Mr. Abernathy, who is also a beneficiary of the trust, proposes to sell trust property to himself at a price he determines to be fair market value. While the trust instrument does not explicitly permit this self-dealing, Mr. Abernathy’s proposed action triggers the conflict of interest provisions. For the transaction to be valid without being voidable by the other beneficiaries, Mr. Abernathy must either obtain the consent of all beneficiaries who have a current interest in the trust after full disclosure of the conflict, or demonstrate that the transaction was fair to the beneficiaries at the time it was entered into. The question asks about the *most* appropriate action to ensure the transaction’s validity. While obtaining consent is a direct method, seeking court approval provides an independent judicial determination of fairness and protects the trustee from future challenges, especially when dealing with potentially complex valuations or when consent from all beneficiaries might be difficult to obtain. Therefore, seeking court approval is the most robust method to ensure the transaction’s validity and protect the trustee.

The scenario describes a situation involving a testamentary trust established in Utah. The question hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “surviving issue” within the context of Utah’s intestacy laws and the Uniform Probate Code as adopted in Utah. Utah Code Section 75-2-706 addresses the meaning of “issue” in a governing instrument, clarifying that it includes descendants of all generations. When a will specifies a gift to “surviving issue,” it typically means those descendants who are alive at the time of the event triggering distribution, in this case, the death of the life beneficiary, Elara. However, the specific wording “living issue” in Elara’s will creates a potential ambiguity. Utah law, particularly Utah Code Section 75-2-706, generally presumes that “issue” includes descendants of all degrees, and absent specific language to the contrary, it refers to those alive at the relevant time. The phrase “living issue” is not a defined term in Utah statutes that deviates from the general meaning of issue. Therefore, the most accurate interpretation, consistent with Utah probate law and the principle of favoring the testator’s intent as expressed in the document, is that it refers to Elara’s direct lineal descendants who are alive at the time of her death. The fact that Beatrice is Elara’s daughter and is alive at Elara’s death makes her Elara’s living issue. The question asks who would take under the will if Beatrice predeceases Elara’s husband, but the will states the gift is to Elara’s “living issue.” This means the gift vests at Elara’s death in her living issue. If Beatrice is alive at Elara’s death, she takes. If Beatrice then dies before Elara’s husband, her share is governed by her own estate plan, not Elara’s will, as the gift has already vested in her. Therefore, Beatrice would have taken a vested interest upon Elara’s death.

In Utah, the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted and modified by state law, governs the administration of trusts. A key aspect of trust administration involves the duty of a trustee to keep beneficiaries reasonably informed about the trust and its administration. Utah Code Section 75-7-813 outlines the specific information a trustee must provide to current beneficiaries. This includes a copy of the trust instrument, notification of the trust’s existence, the trustee’s name and contact information, and the right to request a trust accounting. A trust accounting, as defined in Utah Code Section 75-7-813(2), is a report detailing the trust’s financial activities over a specified period, typically annually. It includes a statement of all receipts and disbursements, a statement of the assets and liabilities of the trust, and the trustee’s compensation. The duty to provide information is ongoing and essential for transparency and accountability in trust management. Failure to comply with these informational duties can lead to legal action by beneficiaries seeking remedies such as compelling the trustee to provide information or even removal of the trustee. The statute emphasizes that these duties cannot be waived in the trust instrument itself, underscoring their fundamental importance in protecting beneficiary rights.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established in Utah. The core issue is the interpretation of a “no-contest” clause, also known as an in terrorem clause, and its enforceability when a beneficiary challenges the will based on allegations of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. Utah law, like many jurisdictions, generally upholds no-contest clauses, but there are statutory exceptions. Specifically, Utah Code § 75-3-905 provides that a provision in a will that purports to penalize any beneficiary for bringing any proceeding, including a contest, or for defending against a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting the proceeding. In this case, Elara has presented allegations of undue influence by Silas and a lack of testamentary capacity by the testator. These are precisely the types of claims that, if brought with probable cause, would render the no-contest clause unenforceable. The determination of probable cause is a factual question that would be decided by the court. If the court finds that Elara had probable cause to bring her will contest, she would not forfeit her inheritance despite the presence of the no-contest clause. The question asks about the enforceability of the clause against Elara. Given that she has alleged grounds for contest that fall under the statutory exception in Utah Code § 75-3-905, the clause is not automatically enforceable against her challenge. The enforceability hinges on whether she can demonstrate probable cause for her contest. Therefore, the clause is not absolutely enforceable against her in this context.

The scenario describes a testamentary trust established by Elias, a resident of Utah, for the benefit of his niece, Clara. The trust instrument specifies that Clara is to receive income from the trust assets for her lifetime, with the remainder to be distributed to her children upon her death. Elias’s will further states that if Clara dies without leaving any surviving children, the trust corpus should be distributed to Elias’s brother, Silas. Utah law, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-101, governs the validity and interpretation of wills and trusts. The question hinges on the concept of a contingent remainder interest. A remainder interest is a future interest that takes effect in possession after the termination of a preceding estate. A contingent remainder is one that is subject to a condition precedent or is limited to an uncertain person. In this case, Clara’s children have a remainder interest, but this interest is contingent upon Clara having children who survive her. The gift to Silas is also contingent; it depends on Clara dying without surviving children. The trust is valid because it clearly identifies the beneficiaries (Clara, her children, and Silas), the trust property (implied by the corpus), and the terms of distribution. The rule against perpetuities, while a consideration in trust law, is generally satisfied by life estates and remainders to ascertainable classes within the permissible period. The trust is not void for indefiniteness as the beneficiaries and the intent are clear. The distribution to Clara’s children is a vested remainder subject to open (meaning other children born to Clara would also share), and the gift to Silas is a contingent remainder. The core legal principle tested here is the nature of future interests in a testamentary trust under Utah law, specifically distinguishing between vested and contingent remainders and the conditions attached to them. The trust is structured to distribute assets upon the death of Clara, with the ultimate beneficiaries determined by whether she has surviving issue.

Under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-506, a will is generally revoked by the testator’s subsequent marriage, annulment, or divorce. However, this revocation is not absolute. If a will was made before a marriage, and the spouse is not provided for in the will, nor is there any provision made for the spouse in any other writing intended to be effective upon the testator’s death, and the spouse is not provided for by a transfer outside the will intended to be effective upon the testator’s death, then the surviving spouse will be entitled to receive the spouse’s intestate share of the testator’s estate. This is often referred to as a “pretermitted spouse” provision. The intestate share in Utah for a surviving spouse, when there are no surviving issue, is the entire estate. Therefore, if Bartholomew made his will before marrying Cassandra, and Cassandra was not mentioned or provided for in any way that would satisfy the statutory requirements, her entitlement to the intestate share would effectively revoke the provisions of the will as it pertains to her inheritance, leaving her with the entire estate as if no will existed concerning her share. The will is not entirely voided, but its effect is nullified regarding the surviving spouse’s inheritance rights. The remaining assets, after Cassandra receives her intestate share (the entire estate in this scenario), would pass according to the terms of the will, if any provisions remain applicable after the spouse’s share is satisfied. In this specific case, since Cassandra is entitled to the entire estate as her intestate share, there are no remaining assets to pass according to the will’s original terms.

In Utah, when a testator’s will is lost or destroyed, the court will presume that the testator intended to revoke the will, unless evidence to the contrary is presented. This presumption is rebuttable. To overcome this presumption and admit a lost or destroyed will to probate, the proponent must prove the existence and due execution of the will, and that it was not revoked by the testator. Utah Code Section 75-3-402 governs the requirements for proving a lost or destroyed will. The statute requires that the contents of the will be established by the testimony of at least two disinterested witnesses, or by a will proponent who is a beneficiary if the proponent can establish the contents by clear and convincing evidence. In this scenario, the existence of a duplicate original, properly executed, and the testimony of the attorney who drafted it, confirming its contents and due execution, along with the testimony of a subscribing witness who can also confirm the contents, would satisfy the statutory requirements. The key is demonstrating that the will was not revoked and proving its exact contents. The fact that the original was lost or destroyed does not automatically invalidate it if its existence and terms can be proven to the required standard. The presumption of revocation is overcome by proving the will’s due execution and its contents by clear and convincing evidence, often through the testimony of those familiar with it.

Under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-506, a will is generally revoked by a subsequent instrument that is executed with the same formalities as the original will, or by an act of destruction done with the intent to revoke. This destruction can include burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will. The key elements are the physical act of destruction and the concurrent intent to revoke. If a testator tears their will in half with the intention of revoking it, this constitutes a valid revocation by physical act. However, if the testator tears the will for a different purpose, such as to fit it into an envelope, and without the intent to revoke, the revocation is ineffective. The question describes Elara tearing her will into pieces with the express declaration that she wants to revoke it. This combination of physical act (tearing into pieces) and specific intent to revoke satisfies the requirements for revocation by physical act under Utah law. Therefore, the will is considered revoked.

The scenario involves the interpretation of a testamentary disposition within the context of Utah law, specifically concerning the concept of a contingent remainder interest and the potential for its acceleration. When a life estate is devised to a beneficiary, and the remainder interest is contingent upon that beneficiary’s survival to a certain event or date, the common law rule against perpetuities or statutory limitations on the duration of future interests are not directly at issue here. Instead, the core issue is whether the condition precedent to the vesting of the remainder has been met. In Utah, as in many jurisdictions, a remainder is contingent if it is subject to an unmet condition precedent other than the natural termination of the preceding estate. Here, the remainder to the children of Elias is contingent upon Elias having children. If Elias has no children, the condition precedent to the vesting of the remainder in Elias’s children has not occurred. The devise then fails as to that class of beneficiaries. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 addresses lapse of a devise, but this is not a lapse; it’s a failure of a condition precedent. The property would then pass according to the residuary clause of the will, if one exists, or via intestacy. Assuming no residuary clause and no other provisions in the will address this specific contingency, the property would descend to the decedent’s heirs at law. The decedent is Elara. If Elara has no other living heirs, and Elias is her sole heir, then Elias would inherit the property as a result of intestacy. However, the question focuses on the remainder interest itself. Since Elias has no children, the condition for the remainder to vest in Elias’s children is not met. Therefore, the remainder fails.

Under Utah law, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-507, a will can be revoked by a subsequent writing that clearly revokes the prior will, or by an act of destruction that is done with the intent to revoke. The act of destruction must be performed by the testator, or by someone else in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction. The intent to revoke must be present at the time of the physical act. In this scenario, Bartholomew’s act of tearing the will into several pieces, coupled with his explicit statement, “This will is no longer valid,” demonstrates a clear intent to revoke. The physical act of tearing is sufficient destruction under Utah law to effectuate revocation, provided the intent is present. The fact that a single piece remained does not negate the revocation, as the statute does not require complete obliteration, but rather an act of destruction done with the intent to revoke. The subsequent discovery of the torn will by the executor confirms the physical act occurred. Therefore, the will is considered revoked.

The scenario involves a testamentary trust established in Utah that is now facing a challenge regarding the interpretation of a “per stirpes” distribution. The testator, Elara Vance, devised her residuary estate to her children, “to be divided per stirpes among them.” Elara had three children: Beatrice, Charles, and Diana. Beatrice predeceased Elara, leaving two children, Ethan and Fiona. Charles survived Elara. Diana predeceased Elara, leaving one child, George, and a grandchild, Hannah (George’s child). The principle of “per stirpes” means “by the root” or “by the branch.” In estate distribution, it signifies that a beneficiary’s share is divided among their descendants. When a beneficiary predeceases the testator, their share passes to their issue. If a beneficiary survives, they receive their direct share. Applying this to Elara’s estate: 1. The residuary estate is to be divided among her children: Beatrice, Charles, and Diana. 2. Beatrice’s share: Beatrice predeceased Elara. Her share goes to her issue, Ethan and Fiona. Since there are two children, Beatrice’s share is divided equally between them. 3. Charles’s share: Charles survived Elara. He receives his direct share. 4. Diana’s share: Diana predeceased Elara. Her share goes to her issue. Diana’s only issue is her child, George. George would inherit Diana’s share. Hannah, being George’s child, is a more remote descendant and does not take a share directly under a per stirpes distribution unless George also predeceased Elara, which is not stated. The “per stirpes” mandate means the distribution goes down the direct line of descent from the named beneficiary. Therefore, the estate is divided into three initial shares, one for each child. Beatrice’s share is split between her two children. Charles receives his full share. Diana’s share goes to her sole surviving child, George. The distribution would be: Charles: 1/3 of the estate. Ethan (Beatrice’s child): 1/2 of Beatrice’s 1/3 share, which is \( \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{3} = \frac{1}{6} \) of the estate. Fiona (Beatrice’s child): 1/2 of Beatrice’s 1/3 share, which is \( \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{3} = \frac{1}{6} \) of the estate. George (Diana’s child): Diana’s 1/3 share, which is \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the estate. The total distributed is \( \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{3} = \frac{2}{6} + \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{6} + \frac{2}{6} = \frac{6}{6} = 1 \). This correctly accounts for the entire estate. The concept of “per stirpes” in Utah law, as in most jurisdictions, follows the direct line of descent from the named beneficiary.